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This thesis constitutes a theoretical study of the phenomenon of 
organized crime from a perspective different from the conventional view 
of the subject. It examines the problems of conceptions, classificat- 
ions, and definitions inherent in this view and the reasons why they 
are both confusing and misleading. Our approach, which employs comp- 
arative and historical methods, involves an analysis of the matrix 
and development of organized crime and the axis on which it has 
revolved in each of the six societies we have investigated. This study 
views organized crime as assentially a phenomenon of capitalist 
societies. Rather than analysing it in a social void, the thesis 
attempts to examine the political and economic forces behind the 
existence and operations of organized crime in the societies: its 
connections with the established power structure to which it acts as 
servant and with whom it shares its profits in return for protection, 
and the operation of the political economy which brings organized crime 
operatives and their 'respectable' masters into a symbiotic relationship 
that enables both sides to pursue their common objective, of profits and 
the wealth and power they bring. 
As a protected phenomenon, this thesis argues that organized crime 
can thrive only in those societies in which it finds conditions conducive 
to its existence, and that the operations of capitalist economy and 
adversary politics in capitalist societies provide these conditions and 
serve to sustain its existence on a permanent and quid pro quo basis. 
This argument is buttressed by our findings in the examination of the 
state of organized crime in China and Cuba before and after their 
socialist revolution. In support of the assertion that the systematic 
organization of illegal activities organized for continuing profits, 
rather than individual illegal acts, is as characteristic of capitalism 
as bureaucracy is characteristic of the modern state, the argument 
(which can be extrapolated for other socialist societies) points to 
the absence of organized crime in these two societies after their 
socialist revolution, and which contrasts drastically with the 
situation during their pre-revolutionary, capitalist period, as well 
as with the current situations in Sicily, the United States, Canada, 
and Hong Kong. It argues that organized crime in capitalist societies 
cannot be eliminated as long as the alliance, collusion and symbiotic 
relationships between organized crime operatives and officials of the 
power structure continue to exist, and that its elimination in these 
societies will necessarily require a socialist transformation, as 
has been done in China and Cuba, of their political economy. 
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Organized crime is a subject on which there has been 
more disagreement in its conception, classification and 
definition than with any other forms of crime. This is 
due partly to the nature of the phenomenon which is rarely 
subject to empirical observation, and partly to the inter- 
pretations writers give to the term 'organized' and what 
crimes they choose to include and exclude within it. As 
Block and Chambliss point out, 'organized crime always 
reflects the structure and tension in civil society, the 
opportunities for profit and power, and the contradictions in 
political economy'. 
' Most contemporary writers, as this 
study will indicate, have analyzed organized crime in terms 
of typology and criteria which can be used to distinguish it 
from other forms of criminality, and in terms of the activ- 
ities of the criminals themselves without any reference to 
the powerful elements in society whose interests are served 
by organized crime, and have rarely made any reference to the 
type of society in which organized crime usually thrives. 
This chapter examines the problems inherent in the 
classification of organized crime, the difficulty of arriving 
at a universally acceptable definition of the phenomenon, the 
unique problems associated with the study of organized crime, 
1. A. Block and W. J. Chambliss,, Organizing Crime, New York, 
1981: 131. 
2. 
and some contemporary perspectives on the structure of 
organized crime. In reconsidering the subject, the chapter 
points out why contemporary conceptions and definitions of 
organized crime are confusing and misleading. It views the 
structure of organized crime as a coalition of criminals and 
'respectable' members of the ruling class whose interests are 
served by the former; it offers a working definition of 
organized crime and considers it as a phenomenon that is 
usually found in capitalist societies where its members are 
able to operate in the illicit sector of the capitalist 
system, and where they and legitimate capitalists pursue the 
same ends: profit, wealth, power and influence. The chapter 
also explores briefly varieties of capitalist societies, and 
draws attention to the difficulty of making distinctions on 
economic grounds between licit and illicit business enter- 
prises. It sets out the plan for this comparative study. 
3. 
PROBLEMS IN THE CONCEPTION AND CLASSIFICATION OF 
ORGANIZED CRIME 
One of the persistent problems in the study of 
organized crime which has never been satisfactorily resolved, 
despite all that have been written in this area, is that 
connected with the conflicting myriads of its conceptions, 
classification and definition. Admittedly, these problems 
only serve to underline the nature of the phenomenon which, 
unlike conventional crimes such as robbery, theft, or 
burglary, l is a disparate form of criminality. 2 Whereas 
the latter is usually treated as a legal category, organized 
crime has no generally acceptable definition and is usually 
treated as a social problem by most contemporary social 
scientists. This situation has often opened the door to a 
variety of strange and varying definitions and concepts as to 
what organized crime is and is not. Because sociologists as 
well as law-makers have never been able to agree on what is 
meant by the term 'organized crime', efforts to define it so 
as to have it outlawed have never been able to surmount legal 
and constitutional hurdles. 
3. As one official highlighted 
1. M. McIntosh, The Organization of Crime, London, 1975: 
10. 
2. D. C. Gibbons, Society, Crime, and Criminal Careers, 
Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1968: 407. 
3. For instance, on June 24,1965, Senators John L. 
McClennan and Frank J. Lausche introduced in the U. S. Senate 
'A Bill to Outlaw the Mafia and Other Organized Crime 
Syndicates'. The bill, however, fell of its own weight, for 
constitutional reasons. The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, 374 November 19b7): 108. 
4. 
this problem before the McClellan committee in the United 
States, 'The hard-to-realize fact is that we have not legis- 
lated it to be a crime to engage in that activity which we 
have come to refer to as 'organized crime', and it follows 
that there are no meaningful sanctions to be imposed'. 1 
Organized crime should be distinguished from the 
efforts of the large number of individual operators: petty 
thieves, pickpockets, purse-snatchers, burglars, or stick-up 
men, and others of this type who try their hands at crime but 
without much effective accomplishment. There is apparently a 
recognition by organized criminals that while one may operate 
as one of the above, the big money is in none of these rack- 
ets. 
2 They realize that one is not likely to achieve grand 
success from these criminal activities in the absence of 
'organization'. 3 Certainly, the big money - and success to 
organized criminals is measured in terms of monetary reward - 
is to be made usually in enterprises which have a legitimate 
place in a competitive system but which can be perverted to 
criminal ends. 4 Crime organization may be loose and 
1. O. W. Wilson quote, Hearings Before the McClellan 
Comittee, 88th Congress, First Session, Washington, D. C., 
1963: 3; O. W. Wilson, Police Administration, New York, 
1950: 67-68. 
2. Morris Ploscowe, 'Crime in a Competitive Society', The 
Annals of the American Academy, 217,1941: 105-111. 
3. M. McIntosh, op. cit. 13-17. 
4. M. Plowscowe, op. cit.: 110. See also Ernest D. 
MacDougall (ed. ), Crime for Profit, Boston, 1933: Simon 
Rottenberg (ed. ), The Economics o )-f and Punishment, 
Washington, D. C., 17777- 
5. 
general, or informal: or it may be definite involving a 
system of specifically defined relationships with mutual 
obligation and privileges. 
' Organization usually 
introduces into the field of crime those factors of group 
discipline and obedience, cooperation and planning which make 
for efficiency here just as it does in the normal economic, 
political and social life. 
2 It brings with it cooperation, 
specialization, and a form of social structure that gives 
personal status and a place where the individual belongs in 
the world of his associates. As well, organization helps to 
integrate and coordinate existing crime opportunities, pract- 
ices, and personnel into a smoothly functioning, large- scale 
enterprise devoted to the assurance of a high level of 
profits for its members. 
3 The criminal syndicate, in con- 
trast to the criminal gang, is a relatively stable type of 
organization and usually represents an important, large-scale 
combination of capital and skilled personnel devoted to crim- 
inal activity. 
4 
As we shall demonstrate in this study, political graft 
and police corruption are always necessary and intimately 
related to any effective organization of crime in any society. 
1. Alfred R. Lindesmith, 'Organized Crime', The Annals of the 
American Academy, 217,1941: 119-127. 
2. D. R. Taft and R. W. England Jr., Criminology, 4th ed., Ne w 
York, 1966: 183. 
3. G. B. Vold, Theoretical Criminology, New York, 1967: 222; 
James G. March (ed. ), Handbook of Organizations, Chicago, 
1965. 
4. ibid: 226. 
6. 
Perhaps in no other area of lawless activity is the intimate 
association between crime and the general culture and offic- 
ialdom better illustrated than in the phenomenon of organized 
crime. ' Apart from political and police corruption and 
graft, businessmen and union leaders in some capitalist 
countries have often played a leading role in the phenomenon 
of organized crime, 
2 
as we shall demonstrate in the course 
of this study. It has been noted that organized criminals 
embody major cultural values in their activities and hardly 
differ at all from their fellow citizens with regards to the 
ends they pursue. 
3 The gangster and the businessman, it 
has been pointed out, are both engaged in the single-minded 
pursuit of material success and they differ from each other 
mainly in terms of the services they provide and the techni- 
ques by which they ply their trade. 
4 
The image of organized criminals conveyed by some 
writers and the news media, as Gibbons notes, is often one of 
evil malefactors in ever perpetual war with society and 
1. D. R. Taft and R. W. England, op cit. 182. 
2. W. J. Chambliss, On the Take: From Petty Crooks to 
Presidents, Bloomington, Indiana, 1982: 84-6; A. Block and 
W. J. Chambliss, Organizing Crime, New York, 1981: 63-88; 
F. Pearce, Crimes of the Powerful: Marxism Crime and 
Deviance, London 1976: 131-14&; D. Bell, The End of Ideology, 
New York, 1967: 175-209; G. Servadio, Mafioso: A History of 
the Mafia from its Origins to the Present Day, New York, 
197 . 
3. D. C. Gibbons, op. cit.; Herbert A. Bloch and Gilbert 
Geis, Man, Crime and Society, New York, 1962: 220-21. 
4. A. W. Linesmith, op. cit. 
7. 
against whom the police are hopelessly powerless. 1 The 
symbiotic relationship between organized criminals and the 
established power structure, including the police, which 
makes the existence of organized crime possible is rarely 
given the necessary and extensive coverage it deserves before 
the public. Rather organized criminals are invariably port- 
rayed, all by their own power, as being 'involved in extor- 
tion, violence, and other assorted crimes directed against an 
innocent public'. 2 This perspective hardly tells the whole 
story. Because of shared interests which exist between 
organized criminals and 'respectables' in capitalist 
countries, organized crime has traditionally involved 
collusion and collaboration between its operatives and the 
established power structure. 
3 In fact, an examination of 
this close but hidden relationship would indicate that coop- 
eration rather than conflict between the two has been common- 
place, so that the notion of society at war with its internal 
enemies in the shape of gangster is more of a caricature than 
anything else. 
4 Furthermore, the implication in popular 
1. D. C. Gibbons, op. cit.: 408. 
2. ibid. For exponents of this perspective see, among 
others, A. Bequai, Organized Crime: The Fifth Estate, 
Lexington, Mass., 1979; D. R. Cressey, Tie t of the Nation: 
The Structure and Operations of Organized rime in erica, 
New York, 1969. 
3. W. J. Chambliss, op. cit. 88-96; J. L. Albini, The American 
Mafia: Genesis of a Legend, New York, 1979: 177- . 
4. D. C. Gibbons, op. cit.; ' R. K. Merton, Social Theory and 
Social Structure, New York, 1968: 127-136. 
8. 
views that organized crime 'exists in spite of the wishes of 
the public rather than as a consequence of official collusion 
and citizen demands for illegal goods or services" is 
admittedly misleading (emphasis supplied). 
Rather organized crime exists to provide for the 
satisfaction of widely demanded, but legally prohibited, 
services or products. In the provision of these goods or 
services the cooperation of members of the established power 
structure is seen not merely an incidental characteristic of, 
but rather one of the critical elements for the survival and 
success of organized crime in any society. In order to 
adequately understand organized crime, it is imperative to 
view it as a dynamic interplay of structural-functional 
relationships between criminal associations and the general 
public, and should be analysed in terms of its structural- 
developmental, as well as historical differences. 
2 Usually 
three basic groups of citizens are bound together in the 
complex that makes up organized crime: the criminal 
operatives who engage,. in organized crime, members of the 
legal power structure with whom they are in collusive 
cooperation and symbiotic accommodation, and the citizens who 
patronize the services or products of organized criminals. 
Thus, organized crime does not exist in isolation from other 
segments of society. As McCaghy argues, gangsters do not 
1. D. C. Gibbons, op. cit. 
2. J. Z. Albini, op. cit.: 22-23" 
9. 
impose their wills upon society despite vigorous protest- 
ations and resistance. ' If 'families' in organized crime 
have corrupters, as Cressey contends, 
2 it is because there 
are individuals in society who are corruptible. 3 Indeed, 
as Chambliss has emphasized, to understand organized crime it 
is important to recognize that it is more than a collection 
of unsavoury elements. It is an alliance between government 
and criminals. 
4 (emphasis supplied). We should also add 
that this alliance includes not only government but also 
businessmen some of whom very often utilize organized crime 
as servant to achieve their own ends. 
Because organized crime is variously viewed by writers, 
this has resulted in conflicting arrays of conception of the 
phenomenon. As one police officer once put the problem 
during an inquiry, 'the presence or absence of organized 
crime here or anywhere else depends upon how you define 
it. '5 Most writers and observers have viewed a variety of 
criminal groups as one and the same thing with variations 
1. Charles H. McCaghy, Deviant Behaviour: Crime, Conflict 
and Interest Groups, New York, 234. 
2. D. R. Cressey, op. cit.: 248-89. 
3. H. S. Ruth, Jr., Why Organized Crime Thrives, The Annals) 
374, November 1967: 113-122. 
4. W. J. Chambliss, 'Vice, Corruption, Bureaucracy, and 
Power', Wisconsin Law Review, volume 4,1971: 1150-1173; 
Denis T. Lynch, Criminals and Politicians, New York, 1932. 
5. J. L. Albini, op. cit. 21" 
10. 
in name only, l and they often fail to stress the symbiotic 
relationships between organized crime and the established 
legal authorities which allow it to thrive in capitalist 
societies. In the final analysis, organized crime is not 
some kind of an alien 'sickness' which afflicts an otherwise 
healthy social system. The way people view any phenomenon 
has always influenced their definition of it or classific- 
ation of its components. This is equally true of the defin- 
ition and classification of organized crime put forth by some 
writers. 
Classifying Organized Crime 
A review of the literature would indicate that 
organized crime has been classified and continues to be 
classified in a variety of ways which both include and 
exclude a variety of crimes according to the writer's con- 
ception of the phenomenon. We review here some of those 
works that have explicitly debated what organized crime is, 
and some of the criteria they have used in an effort to 
distinguish it from other forms of criminality. For 
Caldwell, organized crime involves, among other things, an 
associational nature, centralized authority, a fund of money, 
and a division of labour; and consists of three types: 
organized gang activity, racketeering, and syndicated crime. 
1. Milton R. Wessel, 'how we bagged the Mafia', Saturday 
Evening Post, July 16,1960: 58-60. It should be noted that 
Wessel was discussing the American crime syndicates here, but 
he chose to use the popular term 'Mafia' which has ethnic 
connotation. 
11. 
In his view, organized crime differs from professional crime 
which includes robbery, burglary, auto theft, fencing, purse 
snatching, l etc. On the other hand, Ruth Cavan views 
organized crime in terms of varying and increasing complexity 
of structure in which specialization, planning, protection 
from interference by the law, and a continuity of purpose and 
organization are the major characteristics. In her view, 
organized crime is of four types: theft by firearms, crim- 
inal syndicate operations, racketeering, and corruption. 2 
1 
While Cavan maintains that the organization of criminal gangs 
is quite different from the criminal syndicate, 
3 Caldwell 
considers criminal syndicate as falling within the realm of 
organized criminal gang activity. 
4 For Elliot, organized 
crime consists basically of professional criminals who form 
collusions or relationships in order to aid one another and 
increase efficiency of operation and protection thereof. 
5 
She divides organized crime into five types: thieving, 
fencing, gambling, swindling, and racketeering; and she 
considers as professional criminal: ýgamblers, prostitutes, 
kidnappers, swindlers, counterfieters, and narcotics 
1. Robert Caldwell, Criminology, New York, 1965: 133-58. 
2. R. S. Cavan, Criminology, New York, 1962: 123-129. 
3. ibid: 123. 
4 R. G. Caldwell, op. cit.: 158. 
5'. Mabel A. Elliot, Crime in Modern Society, New York, 
1952: 136. 
12. 
traffickers. In this way, according to her classification, 
organized crime and professional crime appear to be one and 
the same thing. Barnes and Teeters consider syndicated crime 
to be one that is national in scope and uses strong arm 
methods to control vice or business. 
2 They explain a 
criminal gang in terms of its activities which include 
kidnapping, bank robbery, and highjacking, 
3 and then cite 
the Mafia or 'Black Hand' as an example of criminal gangs. 
4 
Interestingly, they bring in the Mafia and 'Black Hand' in 
their discussion of crime syndicate, thus making criminal 
gang and crime syndicate almost synonymous. 
On the other hand, Johnson sees syndicated crime as 
"the perversion of the organizational scheme of legitimate 
business to provide illicit 'services, such as liquor, 
prostitution, gambling, or protection". 
5 Although he 
maintains that no criminal group can be properly classified 
as professional, nevertheless he concedes that some groups 
are often regarded as such because of their skills and other 
capabilities. 
6 His syndicated crime both includes and 
1. ibid: 133. 
2. IL. E. Barnes, and N. K. Teeters, New Horizon in Criminology, 
Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1959: 24. 
3. ibid. 51. 
4. ibid. 
5. E. H. Johnson, Crime, Correction and Society, Homewood, 
Illinois, 1968: 246. 
6. ibid. 243. 
13. 
excludes some of the enterprises that Elliot places under the 
category of organized and professional crime. For Sutherland 
who based his work on the information he received f== a 
professional thief, rackets are seen as comprising such 
activities as pickpocketing, blackmail, shoplifting, and 
various forms of confidence games; 
' 
whereas for Caldwell, 
Cavan, and Barnes and Teeters racketeering belongsto the 
realm of force and intimidation, and Caldwell and Cavan view 
these three activities as falling within the realm of 
professional or mob criminality. 
In viewing organized crime as synonymous with the 
underworld, Lindesmith believes that the latter's activity 
varies in degree of skill and organizational complexity, 
ranging from simpler forms of thieving to more complex 
swindling and finally to a more intricate format which in- 
cludes illegal enterprises and various types of racketeer- 
ing. Elsewhere he argues that 'organized crime' refers to 
crime that involves the cooperation of several different 
persons or groups for its successful execution, and it is 
usually a professional crime. 3 For Taft and England, 
organized crime is basically of two kinds: predatory and 
1. The Professional Thief, by a Professional Thief, 
Annotated and interpreted by E. H. Sutherland, Chicago, 1965; 
see a similar study by Carl Clockars, The Professional Fence, 
New York, 1974. 
2. Alfred R. Lindesmith, 'The Nature of Organized Crime' in 
C. B. Vedder, S. Koenig, and R. E. Clark (eds. ) Criminology, 
New York, 1953: 376-77. 
3. A. R. Lindesmith, 'Organized Crime', Annals, op. cit.: 
119. 
14. 
service-oriented, with the former consisting of extortion, 
pickpocketing, auto theftl which other writers classify as 
professional, criminal gang, or mob enterprises. The two 
writers include gambling in the service-oriented crime2 and 
then view the latter as a form of racketeering which Caldwell 
and others view as falling primarily within the realm of 
extortion enterprises. While Thrasher saw the adolescent 
gang as central to the formation of criminal rackets, he 
emphasized that the gang is a phenomenon that is usually 
found in the immigrant or lower class area. 3 This latter 
position has been criticized by Bloch and Niederhoffer who 
point out that gang characteristics can be found among middle 
class adolescent groups as well as in middle class 
residential areas. 
4 In the view of Sutherland and Cressey, 
organized crime consists of criminal groups whose size and 
structure is determined by the type of activity engaged in. 
For them, there are four kinds of criminal organization and 
all the members subscribe to the acceptance of an underworld 
code of mutual protection and hatred for the law. 
5 In 
1. D. R. Taft and R. W. England, op. cit.: 184-95. 
2. ibid .: 94. 
3. F. M. Thrasher, The Gang: A Study 1,313 Gangs in Chicago, 
Chicago, 1963: ibidem, Gangs -Enclyclopedia o the SociaSciences, 
VI: 
4. H. A. Bloch and A. Niederhoffer, The Gang, New York, 1958: 
7-8. 
5. E. H. Sutherland and D. R. Cressey, Principles of 
Criminology, New York, 1974; see also D. R. . ressey, Theft of 
the Nation, op. cit. 
15. 
their typology of organized crime, they include some and 
exclude other types which other writers consider to be 
within the context of criminal gangs, mobs, juvenile gangs, 
racketeers, organized predatory crime, and sydicated 
crime. 1 In his recent work Cressey depicts organized crime 
as a type of conspiratorial crime involving hierarchical 
coordination of a number of persons in the planning and 
execution of illegal acts aimed at subverting legitimate 
business. 2 
Similar to the view expressed by Sutherland and Cressey 
is that of Albini who reports that organized crime can best 
be described in terms of criminal groups which vary in size, 
composition of the functionaries and in the enterprises in 
which they engage3 .... Mclntosh, on the other hand, views 
organized crime in terms of professional crime which utilizes 
organization and professional methods, and she considers a 
variety of conventional crimes: theft, robbery, burglary, 
confidence trickery, as well as the operation of other types 
of crime, such as racketeering, as falling within the context 
1. Sutherland and Cressey, op. cit. 
2. The Theft of the Nation, op. cit.; see also D. R. Cressey, 
'The Functions and Structure of Criminal Syndicates', 
Appendix 'A'. Task Force Report: Organized Crime, 
Washington, D. C., 1967; Criminal Organization: its Elementary 
Forms, London, 1972. 
3. J. L. Albini, 'Mafia as a Method: A comparision between 
Great Britain and America regarding the existence and 
structure of types of organized crime', Paper to the 5th. 
National Conference on Teaching and research in Criminology, 
Cambridge, 1973. 
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of professional crime. ' In their work, Mack and Kerner 
identifies organized crime with syndicated crime which are 
practised by two distinct sets of criminals, 2 and those 
engaged in syndicated crime tend to form a distinct group3 
and their activity is said to be primarily commercial in 
nature. 
4 For Landesco who wrote during the turbulent years 
in Chicago, organized crime was seen as the manner in which 
the cooperative arrangements of 'good citizens', which are 
characterized as 'business enterprises' are mirrored in the 
environment of the gangster. 
5 Pointing out the similarity 
between legitimate and illegitimate business, Sellin 
considers organized crime as being synonymous with economic 
enterprise organized for the purpose of conducting illegal 
activities and which, when in pursuit of legitimate ventures, 
uses illegal methods. 
6 
Considering the range of crime most of the writers have 
classified as falling within the context of syndicated or 
organized crime: burglary, robbery, theft, pickpocketing, 
purse snatching, blackmail, shoplifting, swindling and 
similar types of crime, it is quite apparent that these 
varieties of crime are a universal phenomenon and are 
1. M. McIntosh, op. cit. 
2. J. A. Mack with H. Kerner, The Crime Industry, Westmead, 
1975: 6. 
3. ibid: 38. 
4. ibid: 33,173. 
5. J. Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago, Chicago, 1968. 
6. T. Sellin, 'Organized crime a business enterprise', The 
Annals, 347,1963: 12-19. 
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hardly the type of crime organized criminals usually involve 
themselves in. Neither the Sicilian mafia, nor the American 
or Triad syndicates are known to engage in these kinds of 
crime ostensibly because they are not where the big money is 
normally made. These kinds of crime can be carried out in 
any country by individuals without police or political 
protection. When one examines the criteria employed: use of 
force, intimidation, violence or threat of it, the nature of 
collusions or relationships among crime operatives, how long 
the organization has been in operation, the skills and 
efficiency of the organization, the degree of complexity of 
structure of the groups involved, the degree of specializ- 
zation and planning, and the inclusion of some crimes by some 
writers and their exclusion by others, it becomes quite 
evident that these can hardly make for a consistent framework 
for the classification of organized crime because other forms 
of crime can be analysed in terms of these criteria as well. 
As Albini points to the futility and difficulty of this kind 
of exercise, 'these criteria in themselves are not mutually 
exclusive. Any effort to isolate organized crime on the 
basis of any one of these standards necessitates by its very 
nature the inclusion of a continuum of attributes both within 
the realm of behaviour as well as that of structure'. 
1. 
More importantly, conspicuously missing in the discussion of 
organized crime by these authors is, Cavan being the 
exception, 2 the role of the established authorities and, 
1. J. L. Albini, op. cit.: 23. 
2. Ruth Cavan, op. cit.: 127. 
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with the exception of Lindesmith, l the type of the social 
system in which organized crime usually thrives. The problem 
in the study of organized crime is not limited to its 
classification only but is also bound to confront anyone 
attempting to formulate a generally acceptable definition, or 
even a government seeking its legal definition. 
Defining Organized Crime 
Instead of looking for universal criteria with which 
organized crime can be identified for purposes of definition, 
a more fruitful exercise would endeavour to examine the 
phenomenon in terms of economic arrangement and political 
ethos of the societies in which it thrives. Efforts in the 
past to define and classify organized crime have not appar- 
ently yielded good results largely because they invariably 
tended to treat the subject in a vacuum without reference to 
the above variables. This approach was evident in the United 
States in the 1960s when the State of New York sponsored the 
Oyster Bay Conference to identify and define organized 
criminal activities in the State. 2 Listing what they 
considered to be its characterisitcs, the conference group 
viewed organized crime mainly in terms of its violence 
1. A. R. Lindesmith, 'Organized Crime', The Annals, op. cit: 
120. 
2. Combatting Organized Crime: A Report of the Oyster Bay 
New Yor Con erence on Organized Crime, Office of the 
Governor's Counsel, Albany, New York, 1965: 19-24. 
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and described it as a totalitarian system' that 'seeks to 
subvert the established governmental apparatus by use of fear 
to maintain order within and outside its ranks', and its 
discipline is said to be almost paramilitary. 
2 Apparently 
unable to come up with an acceptable definition, the confer- 
ence group went on to describe the type of activities that 
they consider organized criminals usually engage in and 
viewed the phenomenon as 'a way of life in which members 
receive services which outsiders either do not receive or 
receive from legitimate sources'. 
3 
After examining several terms and their political 
implications, the conference group settled for the term 
'confederation' as the best one, in their view, for the 
characterization of organized crime in America. It should be 
noted that the conference did not extend its efforts to 
examine the role of political 'respectables' and other 
established authorities in organized crime in the country. 
It would appear that the majority of the conferees voted 
1. A totalitarian system, according to some writers, is said 
to have both political ideology and revolutionary objectives 
which apparently organized crime does not appear to have. 
For an overview on the system see, C. J. Friedrich and Z. K. 
Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, New 
York, 1966: 19. 
2. Combatting Organized Crime, op. cit. 
3. A Theory of Organized Crime Control: A Preliminary 
Statement, mimeographed paper prepared by the Technical Staff 
and Consultants of the New York Identification and 
Intelligence System (SIIS) May, 1966. 
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'confederation' out of political consideration but actually 
thought 'Mafia' or 'Cosa Nostra', as their final conclusion 
would indicate: 
All of these terms are generally applied 
to a single loosely-knit conspiracy, which 
is Italian-dominated, which operates on a 
nationwide basis, and represents the most 
sophisticated and powerful group in organ- 
ized crime .... 
1 
The definitional problem was further complicated two 
years later when the President Crime Commission framed its 
public discourse on organized crime in terms of a highly 
selective characterization and viewed organized crime as 'a 
society that seeks to operate outside the control of the 
American people and their government, involving thousands of 
criminals.... whose structure is as complex as those of large 
corporations, and whose actions are the result of intricate 
conspiracies aimed at gaining control over whole fields of 
activity. 2 The echoes of conspiracy in these efforts can be 
traced back to the early 1950s when the Kefauver committed 
first viewed organized crime in terms of alien conspiracies, 
1. ibid. To fully understand the theme of conspiracy in 
America, see R. O. Curry and T. M. Brown (eds. ), Cons ira : 
The Fear of Subversion in American History, New York, 
c2. 
2. Task Force Report: Organized Crime, Washington, D. C., 
1967-: -1. 
3. The Kefauver Committee: Special Committee to investigate 
organized crime in interstate commerce, 81st Congress, 
Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, First Interim 
Report, 1950; Estes Kefauver, Crime in America, Garden City, 
New York, 1951: 12-16. 
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and the McClellan committee in the late 1950s echoed the same 
conclusion. ' Thus it was these two committees which set 
the stage in the 1950s, and during the 1960s the search for 
organized crime and its definition in the U. S. was particul- 
arly focused on one ethnic group - Italian Americans - whose 
crime networks were most dominant during this period, after 
the pioneers in the field - the Poles, Germans, Irish and 
Jews etc. - had faded into respectable obscurity. 
2 These 
efforts, however, were largely misdirected since they dealt 
mostly with the symptoms rather than the real 'disease' and 
its connection with the established power structure. 
The alien conspiracy perspective which usually domin- 
ates the official thinking in the U. S. has traditionally 
viewed organized crime as something which was imported into 
the country by foreigners. 3 However, when the relation- 
ship of organized criminals and their masters in the dominant 
society, which we shall treat at the appropriate places in 
the study, is fully understood, it can be argued that organ- 
ized crime is not some evil and monolithic presence standing 
1. McClellan Committee. U. S. Government, Select Committee on 
Improper Activities in the Labour or Management Field, 85th. 
Congress, second session, Washington, D. C., 1957-59, 
Hearings, Parts 1-58. 
2. A. Bequai, Organized Crime, op. cit.: 2. 
3. And it was at times suggested during Congressional 
hearings on organized crime that one easy way to eradicate 
organized crime in the country would be the deportation of 
the 'aliens'; see Stanley Frank, 'The Rap Gangsters Fear 
Most', The Saturday Evening Post, August 9,1958. 
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apart from a capitalist society and planning its destruction. 
Nor is it some alien conspiracy whose aims are counter to the 
logic and tenets of competitive capitalism. In fact, it is 
part of the social and political fabric of the nation in 
which it thrives. The General Accounting Office (GAO) in the 
U. S. in a review of that nation's efforts against organized 
crime, notes several times that there is no generally 
acceptable definition of organized crime and points out that 
the root of contemporary struggle against organized crime is 
hopelessly twisted because of the problem of meaning. 1 
It is clear that without a proper definition any 
government seeking to control or eradicate organized crime 
would have to face very difficult choices. It may resort to 
compiling an extensive list of small fry of enemies2 while 
the big ones, their masters in 'respectable' positions remain 
largely untouched; it may frame its charges in terms of the 
activities carried on by organized criminals which are 
against the law - selling narcotics, smuggling, bookmaking, 
usury, murder, extortion, 
3 and the like; or it may resort 
1. General Accounting Office, War on Organized Crime 
Falterin , Washington, D. C., U. S. 
Government Printing Office, 
1977: 2. 
2. Robert F. Kennedy, The Enem Within, New York, 1960. 
V. S. Navasky, Kennedy Justice, New Yor , 1971: 
46. Such a 
list was compiled during the Kennedy Administration by Edward 
Silbering, Block and Chambliss, op. cit.: 196. 
3. D. R. Cressey, 'Methodological Problems in the Study of 
Organized Crime as a Social Problem', The Annals of the 
American Academy, volume 374,1967: 1. 
23. 
to the all-embracing conspiracy statutes, 
' since 'the 
criminal law cannot effectively be used to attack organiz- 
ations'. 2 The issue of meaning, in our view, is a critical 
one, and points to a problem of more than mere antecedent 
interest, for how one views any phenomenon naturally leads to 
ideological differences in defining how it may be controlled. 
This would be particularly so in the case of organized crime 
where Lippman warned many years ago that 'the underworld, 
because of the scale and character of its operation, is not 
comprehensible in the ordinary category of crime... and is 
impossible to abolish'. 
3 Not only would the issues of 
meaning and definition go to the core of strategies for 
control4 of organized crime, they also pose special 
methodological problems in the study of the phenomenon. 
1. This has been a particularly popular weapon in the U. S. 
where it has frequently been invoked against organized 
criminals, and often it was used to attack left-wing 
tendencies, draft dodgers and war resisters, as was the case 
in the trial of the Chicago Seven' in 1968. President Nixon 
found the conspiracy statute a good weapon against crime 
networks closely connected with his political foes; F. 
Pearce, op. cit.: 156; Gerald Csiscery, 'Nixon and the 
Mafia', Sundance, San Francisco, November-December 1972: 
36-42,68; W. J. Chambliss, On the Take, op. cit.: 157-163. 
2. D. R. Cressey, Criminal Organization, London, 1972: 83. 
3. Walter Lippman, 'The Underworld: Our Secret Servant', 
Forum volume 85, No. 1 (Jan. 1931): 1-9. 
4. The Oyster Bay Conference noted the importance of this 
issue when it observed, 'A first necessity is that of 
developing a systematic and accurate definition of organized 
crime from which more effective enforcement activities might 
proceed. In the absence of a definition ... public 
understanding of organized crime would continue to be 
influenced by folklore and rumour: Combating Organized 
Crime, op. cit.: iv-v. 
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Unique Problems 
In studying organized crime, one is inevitably con- 
fronted with certain unique methodological problems which one 
does not normally encounter in the study of other social 
problems. These problems stem mainly from the secrecy of the 
phenomen- on, the monopoly of data by one group of observers 
- the police -, and the absence of a generally acceptable 
defin- ition of the subject. These three factors taken 
together have often been largely responsible for some doubts 
that have at times been expressed about the existence of 
organized crime. ' The main drawback in the study appears 
to stem from the fact that there are no 'hard data' on the 
subject. 
2 Informants are usually not available for 
interviews, and there is usually no known way to observe the 
everyday interactions empirically of organized criminals with 
each other, 3 with other criminals, or with their masters in 
the superstructure which could help the observer learn 
1. For two contrasting views as to the existence of 
organized crime, see The New York Times, October 29,1967: 
31; J. L. Albini, The American Ma ia, op. cit.: 1. 
2. Even in the two cases, where researchers had carried out 
studies with criminals and acted as interpreters of what the 
criminals said and did, they had no independent sources from 
which they could verify the accuracy of the statements and 
claims made by the criminals; see E. H. Sutherland, The 
Professional Thief, op. cit.; C. Klockars, The Professional 
Fence, op. cit. 
3. The only exception here appears to be the study by the 
Iannis of the Lupollo crime Family: F. A. Lanni with E. 
Reuss-Lanni, A Family Business, New York, 1972. 
25. 
something about their norms, values, rules and modus operandi 
because such phenomena are socio-psychological in nature and, 
therefore, are readily observable only in the context of 
interaction. ' Thus the stage from which organized 
criminals operate is always veiled in the cloak of secrecy. 
Participants in the drama are not accessible for observation 
by outsiders; they grant no interviews nor write memoirs or 
admit involvement, if indeed they can be identified. 
2 
The public opinion or its attitude toward organized 
crime is often moulded in many respects by law enforcement 
personnel who invariably possess a monopoly on criminal data, 
a situation that tends to give them a pre-eminent positon in 
the development of polities and strategies to combat organ- 
ized crime, usually based on how they think the underworld is 
structured and how it operates. The information that is 
collected by law enforcers on the subject is usually 
surrounded by secrecy and confidentiality3 which preclude 
the material from being subjected to any critical and object- 
ive examination. Where access is permitted, it is normally 
to individuals, such as consultants to governments, who are 
known to share the perspective of law enforcers on the 
subject. Furthermore, informers are not easy to come by4 
1. D. R. Cressey, The Annals, op. cit.: 109. 
2. Annelise G. Anderson, The Business of Organized Crime, 
Stanford, Ca., 1979: 147. 
3. D. R. Cressey, op. cit.: 105. 
4. Malachi L. Harney and J. C. Cross, The Informer in Law 
Enforcement, Springfield, Illinois, l9. 
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and where a former member happens to turn a government 
witness, there is always the problem of reliability and 
validity of the information provided by the informer, for 
informers are usually known for their tendency to 
exaggerate. ' To a student of organized crime these facts 
constitute a serious challenge to opening up the window to 
the world of organized criminals. 
The extent of organized crime in any country in which 
it exists has always remained a matter of opinion, as it 
cannot be measured statistically. As the sole respository of 
data and information on criminal matters, law enforcement 
agencies have at times magnified incidents of organized crime 
in order to excite popular opinion and gain public acceptance 
of the extreme techniques which they employ in their invest- 
igations and arrests. 2 This gap in knowledge has often 
1. For instance, Valachi's story and testimony before the 
U. S. Senate Committee which most law enforcement officers 
hailed as a great breakthrough was found, upon thorough 
scrutiny, to be riddled with inconsistencies by Morris and 
others: see N. Morris and G. Hawkins, The Honest Politician's 
Guide to Crime Control, Chicago, 1970: 203-235; Peter Maas, 
The Valachi Pa ers, New York, 1969; J. L. Albini, 
ýop . 
cit.: 
T227= mit , The Mafia Mystique, New York, 1975: 230-240; D. Bell, 'Myth of the Cosa Nostra', The New Leader: 
46, Dec. 23,1963. 
2. In 1959, for example, in California, the Subcommittee 
Report on rackets declared that rackets definitely existed in 
the state in the form of 'Mafia'. But a special invest- 
igator, Alvin Goldstein, appointed by Governor Edmund G. 
Brown, found no such evidence and stated that the existence 
of the Mafia was merely assumed, not proven. The Los Angeles 
Chief of Police retorted saying that Goldstein did not find 
evidence of the Mafia because his men had succeeded in 
keeping the organization under cover; Organized Crime in 
California. Report of the Subcommittee on Rackets o the 
Assembly of the State of California, Sacramento, 1959: 24. 
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been profitably exploited by law enforcers who have found in 
organized crime a strong and powerful card with which to 
lobby for increased annual resource allocations. ' Since 
they alone possess all the 'facts and figures' on criminal 
activities, opposition to their demand is usually minimal, 
while any doubt as to the intensity of such activities is 
viewed by the police as 'heresy'. It should be noted that 
even Vincent Teresa, a well known former member of organized 
crime in America, indicated in his book that Valachi's story 
may have been tailored by law enforcement agents. 
2 
Along with law enforcement agencies, journalists and 
the news media have always shown special delight in sensat- 
ionalizing organized crime incidents and in bringing about 
the type of perspective the general public maintains on the 
subject. 3 Admittedly, crime stories are by their nature 
circulation builders: they create alarm, arouse apprehension 
and often stimulate calls for action. Although journalists 
and the media can be a powerful force in the fight against 
organized crime and those that collude with it, 
4 
yet it 
would be a mistake to view them as disinterested crusaders. 
1'. D. C. Smith, The Mafia Mystique, New York, 1975. 
2. V. Teresa with T. C. Renner, Vinnie Teresa's Mafia, Garden 
City, New York, 1975: 322; P. Maas, op. c it: - 1. 
3. Eugene Ruffini, Call it Mafia; 'The Police, the Press and 
the Legend', The Nation, November 22,1971: 520-524. 
4. Robert Allen (ed. ), Our Fair City, New York, 1947: 12; 
Morton Mockridge and R. H. Pra , The Big Fix, New York, 1954: 130. 
28. 
Steffens recalls how competition among newspapers in New York 
City generated a 'crime wave' whereby some newspapers resort- 
ed to taking run-of-the-mill burglary stories off the police 
blotter and printing them in bold black headlines. The 
'crime wave', however, suddenly disappeared when the police 
commissioner, Theodore Roosevelt, called off the competi- 
tion. 1 Similarly, Feder and Joesten relate how a Rome 
journalist was convinced that the U. S. Bureau of Narcotics, 
'fumbling in the dark', used to 'pop-off' about Luciano for 
want of a suitable headline-making name 'on which to hang its 
hat'. 2 Apparently the Rome journalist was not aware of the 
Bureau's obsession about the 'Mafia' -a sure-fire source of 
publicity. 
3 Indeed, there is need to be critical about 
reports from the police, journalists and newsmedia on 
organized crime; a stringent caveat is certainly called for 
in the use of such reports in research. In our view, they 
should merely serve as a reference point to assist 
1. Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities, New York, 
1948; see also Silas Bent, 'Newspapermen - Partners in 
Crime? ', Scribner's. November 1930. 
2. Sid Feder and Joachim Joesten, The Luciano Story, New 
York, 1954. 
3. Traditionally, the U. S. Narcotics Bureau has used the 
purported existence of the 'Mafia' in the U. S. and its 
narcotics involvement to justify requests for increased 
funding when it and the FBI go before the Senate 
Appropriation Committee. Smith has dropped a caveat in this 
regard when he said, 'when the source of evidence for such an 
explanation is confined to one agency that has a stake in 
spreading its own point of view, the reliability of its 
evidence should be a matter of real concern'; D. C. Smith, 
op. cit.: 187. 
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one in critically analysing and reaching an independant 
opinion, and not as a reliable guide on which to base one's 
opinion. Perhaps even more troublesome and problematic, 
resulting from its secrecy and lack of personal observation 
of its operation, is the structure of organized crime which 
some writers, journalists and newsmedia have postulated, 
especially in North America. 
Structure of Organized Crime 
During the late 1960s a new picture of the structure of 
organized crime was espoused in North America by journalists, 
the newsmedia, and interpretative sociologists anxious to 
create 'new knowledge' by assuming similarities between the 
operation and management of legitimate and illicit businesses 
or enterprises. l The structure of organized crime that was 
postulated at this time was based on the events in America in 
the 1950s and 1960s: the Kefauver and McClellan committee 
hearings on organized crime, 2, the Valachi testimony before 
the U. S. Senate subcommittee, 3 and the President's Task 
Force on organized crime4 which drew a bureaucratic 
1. See, for example, D. R. Cressey, 'Methodological 
Problems' The Annals, op. cit.: 110; Robert T. Anderson, 
'From Mafia to Cosa Nostra', The American Journal of 
Sociolo , 
61,1965; 71,1966; R. Salerno and J. S. Tompkins, 
Te Crime Confederation, New York, 1969. 
2. The Kefauver Committee, op. cit.; The McClellan 
Committee, op. cit. 
3. The Valachi testimony before The McClellan Committee, 
Hearings, 88th Congress, First Session, 1963. 
4. The President's Task Force: Organized Crime, op. cit. 
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analogy between the workings of large legitimate corporations 
and that of organized crime. Essentially, organized crime 
structure was viewed as a formal organization deliberately 
designed like a business or government bureaucracy, operating 
on a nation-wide basis with integrated hierarchical positions 
for commissioners, councilors, bosses, underbosses, advisers, 
section chiefs, buffers, operatorsl and so on, just as one 
would find in a model corporate organization like the Bell 
Telephone System. This perspective which has gained wide 
credibility in North America has been sufficiently analysed 
and refuted by F. A. Ianni2 and others that we do not intend 
to rehash the topic here. 
However, while Lanni and others have pointed out that 
'organization' of criminal syndicates cannot be described in 
the way Cressey and others have done without major distort- 
ions, their analysis is limited in that it deals with the 
structure of organized crime in terms of the relationship 
among the criminals themselves only. As our analysis in each 
of the countries we shall investigate in this comparative 
study would indicate, organized crime networks are not com- 
posed of criminals only but include the 'respectables' in the 
superstructure - politicians, businessmen, and law enforce- 
ment officers all of whom have shared interests in keeping 
1. D. R. Cressey, Theft of the Nation, op. cit.: 109-140; 
A. Bequai, Organized Crime, op. cit.: 19-20. 
2. F. A. Lanni, A Family Business op. cit.: 5-14,107-110; 
151-153; D. Bell, op. cit.; 139-141; J. L. Albini, op. cit. 
221-257; D. C. Smit cit.: 289-314. 
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organized crime thriving. 
organized criminals have a 
govern their behaviour and 
rituals featuring blood oal 
American syndicate nor the 
uncovered the existence of 
ceremony. 
It has also been claimed that 
code or rules of conduct which 
that recruits submit to initiation 
: hs; 
l however, in neither the 
Sicilian mafia has anyone 
the code or observed the ritual 
Organized Crime Reconsidered 
The conflicting perception and definitional problem 
inherent in the study of organized crime, as shown by the 
theories we have reviewed, appear to stem from the fact that 
these theories of the subject are essentially non-structural 
and ahistorical in their modes of analyses. 
2 By restrict- 
ing investigations and study of organized crime to the crim- 
inals only: gamblers, drug distributors, loansharks, etc., 
these theories divert attention from the important segments 
of crime network -a coalition of representatives of the 
leading centres of power in a capitalist society: bankers, 
business- men, politicians, and law enforcement officers. As 
we shall demonstrate in each society we shall investigate, 
these 'respectables' have as much interest in the rackets as 
1. D. R. Cressey, op-cit.: 186-215; G. Servadio, op. cit.: 
27-28,146; A. Bequai, o e. cit.; 15-16; A. Blok, Th a of 
a Sicilian Village 1860-1960, New York, 1975: 51, - 
2. S. Thernstrom, 'Yankee City' Revisted: The Perils of 
Historical Naivete', American Sociological Review, 30 April, 
1965: 
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the organized criminals themselves, and they usually 
strive to maintain control of corruption and widespread 
criminality through a system of payoffs. 1 As well, these 
authors appear to analyse organized crime as an autonomous 
entity flourishing on its own, with no reference to its 
symbiotic relationship with these powerful masters in 
the superstructure whose cooperation and protection is 
essential for the continuing existence and growth of the 
phenomenon. 
2 Nor do these analyses make any reference to 
the type of society. As our treatment of the subject 
would indicate, organized crime can best be understood within 
the context of its history and the political and economic 
forces that created it and which continue to sustain its 
existence in the society. 3 
As Smith notes, the characteristics that have been 
cited as keys to 'understanding' organized crime are 
1. W. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 61-80; 92; A Block and W. J. 
Chambliss, op. cit.: 917-14; W. J. Chambliss and M. Mankoff 
(eds. ) Whose Law, What Order?: A Conflict Approach to 
Crimino ogy, New York, 1976: 162-182. 
2. In several investigations carried out in American cities 
on organized crime, it was revealed that the real power 
behind organized criminals were 'respectable' members of the 
society: Estes Kefauver, Crime in America, op. cit.; J. A. 
Gardner, The Politics of Corru tion: Organized Crime in an 
American City, New York, 1970; Robert S. Allen e, Our 
Fair City, New York, 1947. 
3. A. Toynbee, A Study of History, volume iv, London, 1935; 
Durant, Willrand Ariel, The Lesson of History, New York, 
1968. 
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not the right keys. They often open doors that lead down 
dimly lit paths to cul-de-sacs, while the reality of organ- 
ized crime continues down the main line, unimpeded. 
' As 
can be seen from the perspectives examined, the criminal 
conspiracy approach to defining organized crime2 essent- 
ially would view organized crime as a popular concept to be 
communicated to the public and would naturally lead to a 
military analogue for systematic development of means to 
control conspiratorial movements. 
3 But there are certainly 
other better and more meaningful approaches within which a 
definition of the subject might be cast, such as a social 
phenomenon to be analysed and understood4 as part of the 
society in which it thrives; or as a specific set of acts or 
states of being which have been defined as illegal. These 
approaches, however, are basically interrelated and cannot 
1. D. C. Smith, 'The Problem of Definition' in F. A. Lanni and 
E. Reuss Lanni (eds. ) The Crime City, New York, 1976: 
60-68. 
2. Combating Organized Crime, op. cit.: 19; President's 
Commission on Law En orcement, Task Force Report: Organized 
Crime, op. cit.: 1. 
3. R. O. Curry and T. M. Brown, op. cit.; A. Block and W. J. 
Chambliss, op. cit.; D. C. Smith, op. cit. 
4. D. R. Cressey, Theft of the Nation, op. cit.: 54-71. 
Although Cressey proposes that organized crime be studied as 
a social problem, his approach to the subject essentially 
violates the principle known as the Ocam's razor: entia non 
sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem - entities ought not 
to be multiplied except out of necessity. 
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be considered apart from each other. Nevertheless, an 
adequate social definition, as Smith points out, ought to 
precede a legal definition if the latter is to have any 
enforcement value; and similarily, both the social and legal 
definitions ought to support the popular concept. 
' As the 
Oyster Bay Conference would demonstrate, this is not what has 
happened. Rather the popular notions2 which are so burdened 
with stereotypes that it has been virtually impossible to 
undertake the necessary objective analysis that would produce 
an adequate social definition3 have been adopted in the U. S. 
as the basis for efforts at legal definitions. 
This is precisely the reason why some contemporary 
definitions of organized crime based on this premise are both 
confusing and misleading. The purpose of a definition is to 
provide limits within which to focus an enquiry. A good 
definition should be neither so narrow as to be trivialinor 
so broad as to encompass more than is theoretically and 
empirically manageable. It is in this light that we suggest 
as a working definition that organized crime be difined as 
1. D. C. Smith, op. cit. 
2. A number of social definitions of organized crime, all of 
which are hopelessly inadequate, have been proposed by 
Cressey. As would be expected, they are mostly based on the 
popular notion of equating organized crime with the Mafia: 
D, R. Cressey, op. cit.: 301-323. 
3. In a seminar on organized crime in the U. S. students in a 
class were asked to list the first ten reponses evoked by the 
term 'organized crime' and the first ten common responses 
made by all the students in the order in which they occurred 
were: Mafia, money, Italian, Cosa Nostra, gambling, 
narcotics, prostitution, organization, corruption, murder: 
D. C. Smith, op` cit.: 13. 
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that unique brand of crime that is usually associated with 
capitalist societies which involves the management and 
coordination of racketeering and vice in cooperation with the 
established power structure, following the pattern of 
management and practice of the political economy in these 
societies. Unlike the definitions that focus on the 
stereotypes and their characteristics, this one does not 
suggest who is involved, thereby leaving that question open 
for research. And it does not include such a wide range of 
criminal activities such as professional theft and corporate 
crimes that have much in common with the phenomenon. As a 
contrived concept, at least in contemporary usage, 
' 
organized crime does not possess its own logic, but would 
require, as our analyses will indicate, interpretations and 
insights from a variety of disciplines such as history, 
economics, sociology, political science, and even philosophy 
and theology that would facilitate efforts to understand why 
the phenomenon known as organized crime occurs, and what 
2 forces are behind its occurrence in capitalist societies. 
1. There is a considerable difference between contemporary 
references to organized crime, especially in North America 
where it is burdened with the Mafia mystique and with which 
it is viewed as synonymous, and the conceptual approach 
intended by John Landesco in his original use of the phrase. 
See J. Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago, Chicago, 1968. 
2. These forces which occupy positons of power and influence 
in the government-business structure maintain links with and 
control over important segments of crime enterprises through 
symbiotic accommodation with the racketeers; see W. J. 
Chambliss, ON the Take, op. cit.: 81-113,238-247; W. P. 
Morgan, Triad Societies in Hong Kong Hong Kong, 1982; F. 
Rome, The Tatoed Men, New York, 1975; J. Landesco, op. 
cit.; F. Bresler, The Chinese Mafia, New York, 1981. 
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By capitalist societies we mean of course those 
societies that practise the mode of production which was 
first advocated by Adam Smith around 1776.1 Several auth- 
orities have offered definitions of capitalism. Charles A. 
Beard says that 'Capitalism is a system of production in 
which the primary object is the gain of profit through 
exchange'. 2 A. Shadwell defines capitalism as 'a partic- 
ular mode of using material and financial capital character- 
ized by private ownership, production for profit by means of 
hired labour so as to procure for the owner an income without 
work. 
3 Professor Edwin R. Seligman views capitalism as 
'that form of economic life which, resting on the desire to 
earn profits, places in the hands of a specific class the 
control of every stage in the process of production from 
1. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the 
Wealth of Nations, Chicago, 1978. It should be noted that 
the ideology of classical capitalism which Smith advocated, 
recommended leaving economic decisions to the free play of 
self-regulating market forces. After the French Revolution 
and the Napoleonic Wars had swept the remnants of feudalism 
into oblivion, Smith's policies were increasingly put into 
practice, and they apparently worked until the Great 
Depression of the 1930s brought Smith's policy of laissez- 
faire (noninterference by the state in economic matters) to 
an end and led to the Keynesian reappraisal. J. M. Keyes 
argued, among other things, that vigorous government 
intervention was required to maintain the economy at a high 
level of employment; see D. D. Dillard, The Economics of John 
Maynard Keynes, New York, 1948; R. F. Harrod , The Life o Jo n Maynard Keyes, London, 1951; J. M. Keynes, The General Theory 
of Employment, Interest and Money, London, -196T. 
2. Yale Review, volume 18: 456-468. 
3. Edinburgh Review, January, 1921: 80. 
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the supply of the raw material to the sale of the finished 
product on the market. 
1 And many more of these 
definitions, all of which, while differing in details, are 
agreed on two things: that capitalism is directed for the 
profit-making purposes of capital, and that the means of 
production is largely privately owned. 2 The instruments of 
production of a society, in terms of the mode of ownership, 
can be privately owned and operated by individuals, families, 
and corporations; or publicly owned by the State and operated 
and controlled by its governing bureaucracy. 
3 For our 
purpose, we view capitalism as an economic system under which 
production, distribution and finance are privately ownedo 
operated and controlled by individuals or a minority who run 
them for private profit. Producers sell their products in 
open markets at competitive prices and not to government 
warehouses at prices set by the government. The presence of 
a relatively free market enables entrepreneurs to enter any 
kind of business they wish, and private businessmen make most 
of their own decisions based on the drive for profits and the 
consumer needs. 
1. E. R. Seligman, in Jerome Davis, Capitlism and Its 
Culture, New York, 1936: 19. 
2. Oliver C. Cox, Capitalism as a System, New York, 1964; 
David M. Wright, Capitalism, New York, 1951; Paul M. Sweezy, 
The Theor of Capitalist Development, New York, 1949; Jerome 
Davis, Capitalism anits Culture, New York, 1936; Karl Marx, 
Capital volume Three, London, 1974. 
Louise. O. Kelso and M. J. Adler, The Capitalist Manifesto, 
New York, 1958: 94. 
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Capitalist societies, however, differ strikingly 
ranging from advanced industrialized countries of the West 
and Japan to most of the Third World countries still 
struggling to get industrialized. We may distinguish the 
following models of capitalism. The America-German model 
which is the most purely capitalist system based on laissez 
faire philosophy where businessmen operate as they please so 
long as they obey the many regulatory laws. The Anglo- 
French-Italian model: while most production is in private 
hands, the government owns and operates some key companies or 
industries; the Scandinavian system which could be called 
either welfare capitalism or free enterprise socialism; the 
Japanese system which is a mixture of capitalism and feudal- 
ism. Although the industry here is almost entirely in private 
hands, it is heavily cartelized and subject to government 
administrative guidance. On the other hand, the zaibatsu 
(big capitalists) so strongly influence these decisions and 
get so many favours - such as light taxes and easy credits 
from state-connected banks - that it is hard to tell where 
industry ends and government begins. And finally, the model 
that is found in most Third World countries where the 
production is mostly labour-intensive and governments own and 
operate some key industries as in the Anglo-French-Italian 
model. 
' The capitalist system may be contrasted with the 
collectivist or socialist system which is centrally planned 
and managed and in which the government owns the means of 
production and exercises control over economic decision- 
1. Time Magazine, July 14,1975: 32-41. 
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making. Since individual producers must sell to the 
government warehouses at prices set by the government there 
is virtually no free and competitive market. 
1 
Although there are differences among the capitalist 
economies in the growth of the public 
alter their basic similarity since bo 
demands are met chiefly by the output 
prises. 
2 Whereas capitalism has been 
rich supply of goods and services, it 
sector, this does not 
th private and public 
of private enter- 
able to produce a 
can build only a rich, 
not a just society. 
3 Apologists of capitalism believe that 
one of its great benefits is free competition. 
4 Adam Smith 
himself, who never used the term 'capitalism' but preferred 
the term 'natural order' for his system, assumed that this 
was the 'obvious and simple system of natural liberty'. 
5 
1. This system is in operation in the Soviet Union and most 
of other Communists countries; see P. M. Sweezy, Socialism, 
New York, 1949; H. Wellisz, The Economies of the Soviet Bloc: 
A Study of Decision Making and Resource Allocation, New York, 
1964; F. D. Holzman (ed. ), Readings on the Soviet Economy, 
Chicago, 1962. 
2. The New Enclyclopaedia Britannica, 6, Chicago, 1979: 
276. 
3. Time, op. cit. 
4. See, for example, M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 
Chicago, 1974; J. A. Schumpeter, The Theory o Economic 
Development, Cambridge (Mass), 1. 
5. Adam Smith, op. cit. Book IV, Chapter 9. 
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The official organ of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce once 
declared that 'the best way to promote the improvement of a 
nation is to leave capital to find its lucrative course, 
commodities their fair price, industry and intelligence their 
natural reward, idleness and folly their natural 
punishment'. 
' These views which extoll the virtues of 
competition and the self-regulating market apparently over- 
looked the formation of combinations which, as Sweezy points 
out, have the conscious goal of controlling competition. 
2 
There is an inherent tendency in capitalism to lead 
away from free competition among producers and toward the 
formation of monopolies resulting from the concentration of 
capital and centralization of control in a few hands. 
3 
Thus monopoly capital may be secured on the basis of a 
relatively high degree of centralization which, by reducing 
the number of competitors and enterprises in a given line of 
production, makes competition increasingly severe and 
perilous for the survivors. 
4 This has often come about 
1. Nation's Business, August 1932. 
2. P. M. Sweezy, The Theory of Capitalist Development, op. 
cit.: 262; Modern Capitalism: Its Nature and National 
Features, Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, 1962. 
3. P. M. Sweezy, op. cit.: 254; E. Wfauver, In A Few Hands: 
Monopoly Power in America, New York, 1965. 
4. P. M. Sweezy, op. cit. 
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via a large-scale merger' activity which, in Europe at 
least, has been mainly horizontal in character - that is, it 
involves the joining together of corporations to form new 
giants which dominated specific industries or sectors of the 
economy. 2 In effect, corporate capitalism, which is one of 
the stages in the development of monopoly capitalism, 
operates in most cases in such a way that the great majority 
of owners are completely divorced from management or control 
of their capital in favour of a small minority of owners who 
act as managers and administrators of others' money. 
3 For 
example, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company is said 
to control more wealth than is contained within the borders 
of twenty-one states of the Union. 4 Since the Great 
Depression, however, governments of capitalist societies have 
realized that the self-regulating market, as advocated by 
classical economists, would not always tend to a state of 
1. Whereas the accumulation of capital by some big 
entrepreneurs has often helped them to take over other small 
businesses or corporations, the same accumulation of capital 
by organized criminals has often enabled them to enter the 
legitimate economy; D. C. Smith, op. cit.: 332. 
2. Keith Cowling, Monopoly Capitalism, Warwick, 1982: 71; see 
also S. Aaronovitch and M. Sawyer, Big Business: Theoretical 
and Empirical Aspects of Concentration an Mergers in the 
U. K., London, 1975. 
3. J. Davis, op. cit.: 63-64; Modern Captialism: op. cit. 
4. ibid. 
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full-employment equilibrium, ' and they have come to accept, 
at least in principle, the responsibility for maintaining a 
reasonable level of employment through a variety of fiscal 
and monetary policies. All of these policies have this in 
common, however, that they differ radically from Soviet-type 
central planning which tends to guarantee full employment. 
2 
For our purposes, what is important is not the debate over 
corporate and monopoly capitalism but rather the application 
of control and monopoly in the legitimate sector to stifle 
competition by a few entrepreneurs and corporations in order 
to control the market. The same technique has been adopted 
by organized criminals to control the illicit sector of the 
market. 
3 As Vold points out, the situation is strikingly 
similar in the case of the underworld 'combination' or 
'syndicate'. This same element of control is precisely what 
these forms of organization bring to the system of underworld 
business enterprises. Since the profits from these 
activities are enormous, there will inevitably be competitors 
trying to 'muscle in' on the lush take. 
4 
1. J. M. Keynes, op. cit. 
2. A. R. Oxenfeldt and V. Holubnychy, Economic Systems in 
Action, New York, 1965; Gennadi Khromushin, Lenin on Modern 
Capitalism, Moscow, N. D. 
3. Gus tyler, 'The Roots of Organized Crime', Crime and 
Delinquency, volume 8, (October 1962): 833-834; Herbert 
Bloch, The Juvenile Gang: A Cultural Reflex, The Annals, 
volume 347 (May 1963): 25; F. Rome op. cit.: -. 
4. G. B. Vold, op. cit.: 235. See also K. Allsop, The 
Bootleggers, London, 1961, for the account of the Brody St. 
Valentine's Day massacre for the control of liquor business 
in Chicago during the Prohibition period; D. Arlacchi, 'The 
Mafia and Capitalism', New Left Review, 118,1979: 65; Modern 
Capitalism, its Nature, op. cit. 
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Problem of Distinction: Licit and Illicit Businesses 
As social structures, the underworld of crime and the 
upperworld of business and politics are in many ways 
essentially two sides of the same coin. The nature and 
character of the underworld in any given society is a 
reflection of the kind of business integrity and political 
morality that is characteristic of the dominant elements of 
the community. ' There is a paradoxical relationship 
between legal and illegal business enterprises in capitalist 
countries. The paradox is that the seeds of the illegal 
business that is so pervasive in these societies are usually 
sown in the nature of business enterprises that are legal. 
2 
As this study will indicate, the so-called 'tolerance' that 
dominant society is said to extend to organized crime often 
stems from this relationship. As Vold has emphasized, 
'organized crime should be thought of as a natural growth, or 
as a developmental adjunct to our general system of private 
profit economy. Business, industry, and finance all are 
competitive enterprises within the area of legal operations. 
But there is also an area of genuine economic demand for 
things and services not permitted under our legal and social 
codes. Organized crime is the system of business operating 
in this area. It, too, is competitive, and hence must 
organize for its self-protection and for control of the 
market'. 3 Thus there is an interrelation between the 
1. G. B. Vold, op. cit.: 237. 2. A. Block and W. J. Chambliss, op. cit: 135. 3. G. B. Vold, op. cit.: 240. 
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underworld and the upperworld. 
All this raises the question of distinction that is 
often drawn in capitalist societies between legitimate and 
illegitimate, or licit and illicit enterprises. It has been 
pointed out that, except on moral grounds, in strictly 
economic terms there is no relevant difference between the 
provision of licit and of illicit goods and services. 
' 
Illicit enterprise, as Smith makes clear, is the extension of 
legitimate market activities into areas normally proscribed - 
that is, beyond existing limits of the law - for the pursuit 
of profit and in response to latent illicit demand. 
2 As 
the liquor traffick in the U. S. before, during, and after 
Prohibition would illustrate, the provision of liquor in that 
country during the Prohibition period constituted no less an 
economic service dispensed in a market than either before 
Prohibition was introduced or after. it was abolished., Nor 
can it be held that in European countries, with registered 
and legalized prostitution, the prostitute contributes an 
economic service, wheras in countries like the U. S. and 
Canada, lacking legal sanction, the prostitute provides no 
such service. The same argument can be made of gambling. As 
Merton notes, 'the failure to recognize that these 
1. E. R. Hawkins and W. Waller, 'Critical Notes on the Cost of 
Crime'. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 1936, volume 
26: 679-694; see also R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social 
Structure, New York, 1968: 133. 
2. D. C. Smith, op. cit.: 335. 
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businesses are only morally and not economically 
distinguishable from 'legitimate' business has led to badly 
scrambled analysisý, l (Emphasis in original). Thus 
business activities can be depicted as falling on a continuum 
of behaviour ranging from the very saintly to the most 
sinful. 
2 However, conventional descriptions of organized 
crime appear to operate from a different assumption by 
holding that activities such as gambling, loansharking, and 
union racketeering are distictive in character from 
'legitimate' business and operate according to different 
cultural values. 3 It should be emphasized that the line 
separating the upperworld and the underworld is indeed a thin 
4 
one, and that there is only one world, in fact, in which 
illicit enterprises, which have clear and often accepted 
roles in society, are linked to the licit enterprises by 
functional similarities and by practices that evidence only 
the subtlest of distinctions. Indeed, the only meaningful 
distinction that can be made between what is called 
1. R. K. Merton, op. cit.: 134. 
2. L. T. Wilkins, Social Deviance: Social Policy, Action and 
Research, Englewood, New York, 46"7. 
3. D. C. Smith, op. cit. 
4. This thin line between what is proper behaviour and what 
is frowned upon in the interrelations of private and public 
morality, and which appears to be one of the vulnerable 
chinks in the armour of public morality in capitalist 
societies today, has been subjected to book-length discussion 
and analysis; see E. S. Atiyah, The Thin Line, New York, 1952. 
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'legitimate' business and what is called 'illegitimate' 
business is that the former supposedly operates within the 
law while the latter operates outside the law. Both, 
however, are in some degree concerned with the provision of 
goods and services for which there is an economic demand. 
Organized crime thrives in capitalist societies because 
its goal and that of capitalism is the same - the pursuit of 
profit which brings wealth, power and influence to its 
possessor. Certain characteristics that form the hallmark of 
capitalist economy and its success: individualism, private 
property, materialism, profit motive, consumer sovereignty, 
freedom of competition and contract, occupational freedom, 
and limited role of government, are also conducive to the 
growth and success of organized crime. 
' It has been said 
that the model of capitalism that stresses more individualism 
and non-interference by government, that is, the laissez 
faire model, is most conducive to the growth of-organized 
crime. 
2 During this phase of capitalism which lasted up to 
the Great Depression, the capitalist barons of the period 
employed ruthless methods and engaged in most reprehensible 
1. J. Davis, Capitalism and its Culture, op. cit.: 30-39; G. 
Tyler, 'The Roots of Organized Crime', Crime and Delinquency, 
volume 8, October 1962: 325-338; D. R. Taft and R. W. England, 
op. cit.: 23-31; C. B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of 
Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Lock, London, 1962. 
V 
2. A. R. Lindesmith, 'Organized Crime', Annals, op. cit. 
47. 
trade and practices in their pursuit of capital. ' They 
blazed the trail that organized criminals would follow later 
on in their own pursuit of the same capital. 2 As Bell 
appropriately points out,... 'the foundation of many a 
distinguished older American fortune was laid by sharp 
practices and morally reprehensible methods... They ignored, 
circumvented, or stretched the law when it stood in their' 
wa, y. This has not prevented them and their descendants foam 
feeling proper moral outrage when latercomers pursued equally 
ruthless tactics'. 3 
Crime organizations are not political parties that could 
publish manifestoes or position papers advocating a 
particular brand of capitalism. Nevertheless, their 
activities appear to indicate a preference for a market- 
regulating economy which is riven with intense horizontal 
1. For the literature of the period and the nature of 
activities carried on, see, among others, J. T. Adams, Our 
Business Civilization, London, 1929; A. M. Schlesinger, Paths 
to the Present, New York, 1949; J. T. Adams, 'Our Lawless 
Heritage Atlantic Monthly, December 1928; Max Lerner, 
America as a Civilization, London, 1958; H. D. Lloyd, Wealth 
against Commonwealth, New York, 1894; Eric Williams, 
Capitalism and Slavery, Chapel Hill, N. Carolina, 1944; D. E. 
Owen, British Opium Policy in China and India, New Haven, 
Con., 1934. 
2. H. D. Lloyd, op. cit.: 512-513; A. M. Schlesinger, op. cit.: 
15; F. Rome, op. cit.: 152. 
3. D. Bell, The End of Ideology, New York, 1967: 148; Matthew 
Josephson, The Robber Barons: The Great American Capitalists: 
1861-1901, New York, 1962; Milton Manko in Introduction to 
Perspectivess on the Problem of Crime, in W. J. Chambliss and U. Mankoff, op. cit.: 187; D. S. Strong, 'New England: the 
Refined Yankee in Organized Crime', The Annals: 347, May 
1963. 
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conflicts between individuals and groups and in which the 
resulting competition would place them in the role of a 
mediator and powerbroker. l Such a role enables them to 
apply some form of control that would act as a firm deterrent 
to the unfettered spread of the conflicts, hostilities and 
feuds that would otherwise ensue from the anarchic 
competition of the self-regulating market. 2 As a tool of 
the bourgeoisie and the established power structure, members 
of organized crime have traditionally been used to fight any 
encroachment of socialism, real or imagined, upon the 
capitalist system, to keep workers in their place, and to 
cheat them of their fair wages. 
3 Because organized crime 
needs capitalism with least government interference to 
operate, it has traditionally remained an enemy of left-wing 
politicians, socialists, and trade unions whose philosophy 
favours socialism and massive government intervention in the 
economy. 
4 Its members have tended to support individual 
1. P. Arlacchi, op. cit.: 65; H. Hess, Mafia and Mafioso: The 
Stucture of Power, Westmead, 1973: 33-39,120-150; D. Be , 
op. cit.: 186-18T. 
2. M. Pantaleone, The Mafia and Politics, London, 1966: 
34-40; D. Bell, op. cit. 181-189; P. Arlacchi, op. cit.; H. 
Hess, op. cit.: 139. 
3. N. Lewis, The Honoured Societ : The Mafia Conspiracy 
Observed, London, :-5,161-1630, F. Rome, op. cit.: 
70,132,144; F. Pearce, op. cit.: 131-145, A. Block and W. J. 
Chambliss, op. cit.: 87; H. Hess, op. cit.: 6,141-142; G. 
Servandio, op. cit : 36. 
4. F. Rome, op. cit.: 60-64,190; G. Servadio, op. cit.: 36. 
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politicians or political party, that would protect them in 
the course of their business enterprises, through political 
'contribution' and fraudulent voting practices. 1 It is a 
mutual or symbiotic arrangement that works to the advantage 
of both parties, and helps to ensure the survival of 
organized crime in the capitalist economy. 
For the plan of this comparative study. In order to 
demonstrate that organized crime is a phenomenon that usually 
flourishes in capitalist societies because its philosophy and 
that of capitalism is underpinned by the same motive - the 
pursuit of profit and the wealth, power and influence it 
brings - and because organized crime is system operating in 
the illegitimate sector of capitalism, we shall attempt to 
explore the dimension of organized criminal activities in 
four capitalist societies. In order to test our argument, we 
intend to investigate two other societies that are currently 
socialist but were formerly capitalist, with respect to the 
existence of organized crime in those countries both in their 
capitalist and socialist phases of history. 
1. Mark H. Haller, 'Organized Crime in Urban Society: Chicago 
in the Twentieth Century', Journal of Social History, volume 
5, (1971-1972): 210-234; F. Tannen aum, Crime an, te 
Community, New York, 1957: 128; D. Bell, op. cit.: 142-148; 
W. J. C ambliss, On the Take, op. cit.: 178-180; J. Kobler, 
Capone: The Life and World of Al Capone, London, 1971: 199; 
F. Pearce, op. c it.: -. 
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Conclusion 
The study of organized crime has always been fraught 
with unique problems stemming from the nature of the 
phenomenon which is usually not subject to empirical 
observation. The concepts of organized crime itself have 
been and will probably remain a matter of controversy on 
which opinions and perspectives are likely to be sharply 
divided. While some conventional theories tend to focus more 
on the characteristics that could distinguish organized crime 
from other forms of crime and less on the society that breeds 
it, we take the view that organized crime is largely a 
reflection of the kind of business integrity and political 
morality that is characteristic of the dominant elements of 
the community in which it exists; that it cannot be 
adequately understood outside the context of its history and 
the politico-economic forces that keep it thriving in 
society; that it is a phenomenon that is usually found in 
capitalist societies because its philosophy and that of 
capitalism is underpinned basically by the same profit 
motive; and that it is a system of business operating in the 
illegitimate sector of the capitalist system. The nature of 
political and economic symbiotic accommodation which exists 
between organized criminals and officials of the established 
power structure strongly suggests that the former cannot 
exist without the collusion and cooperation of the latter, 
and that organized criminals usually act as servants of the 
ruling class. Like their counterparts in legitimate 
business, organized criminal entrepreneurs usually provide 
goods and services desired by a large minority of the members 
of the society and their businesses are only morally and not 
economically distingished from 'legitimate business. 
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THE MAFIA PHENOMENON IN SICILY 
Introduction 
In the annals of organized crime, the Sicilian Mafia has 
admittedly become the most popular word for the 
characterization of underworld activities. It has survived 
nearly two centuries of wars, and political and economic 
changes to emerge in recent years as a household word in many 
countries of the world. Despite constant exposure to the 
term, not everyone who readily employs it in reference to an 
underworld activity or a threatening situation can give a 
lucid interpretation of what the word stands for in the 
Sicilian context. 
This chapter examines the various concepts of the Mafia, 
its evolution as one of the secret societies that flourished 
in Europe, how it originated and the purpose of its, initial 
mission; the political and economic conditions in Sicily that 
preceded its emergence; its evolution as a broker capitalist 
and the role it played in maintaining the status quo in the 
latifondo, its political activity and tie-up with the power 
structure in which it plays the role of a power broker as 
well as a servant. The chapter also examines the rise of the 
Left-wing organizations in Sicily in the early part of this 
century which provided the people with an alternative to the 
Mafia, thus weakening its power and leading to its decline. 
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Its power was further undermined by the progressive economic 
transformation that took place in the island which robbed 
the mafia the ability to exercise complete control over its 
mainstay, the latifondo. Mafia's adaptation to all these 
changes is also examined. As the chapter makes clear, it is 
only in a capitalist system that a phenomenon such as the mafia 
can thrive for such a long period. 
Different Concepts of the Mafia. 
Few would argue that no single term has been so frequently 
invoked in discussing the underworld activities and yet so 
little understood by the majority of those who use it as the 
term "Mafia'. From its primitive beginnings in the nineteenth 
century, mafia has now become such an ubiquitous label that 
analogies can be built on it to match almost any circumstance, 
often with little or no direct reference to criminality. 
' 
Perhaps the worst extravagant use of the word can be 
observed in the case of North America where the term has consi- 
stently been substituted for the activities of the indigenous 
criminal syndicates because of its ethnic connotation, and 
because the usage helps create the impression, if not the 
notion, that organized crime in that part of the world is an 
import 'made somewhere'. Since the term gained currency in the 
mid nineteenth century, mafia has been defined and still is 
1. D. C. Smith, The Mafia Mystique, New York, 1975: 4. In the 
U. S. in the 1960s and MOs, one often heard of the 'Irish 
Mafia' of the Kennedys, the 'Jewish Mafia' of Senantor Javits,. 
the 'German Mafia' of the White House during the Nixon 
administration, etc, none of which had anything to do with 
criminality. Similar inferences are often heard today in 
North America where the term has virtually replaced the term 'the underworld'. 
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being defined in various ways, and researchers are still 
trying to come to grips with the phenomenon conceptually, 
empirically, and as a social problem, and widely different 
views on the subject have had their staunch supporters. 
1 
For some people the mafia is a criminal association 
operating at the margin of Sicilian society; 
2 
a state of 
mind, a philosophy of life... a particular sensibility prevai- 
ling among all Sicilians3; the resistance which the whole 
Sicilian people opposes to all kinds of government and autho- 
rity; a loose association of crime families; 
5 
a spirit of 
hostility to the law and its ministers prevailing among a 
large portion of the Sicilian population and manifesting itself 
frequently in vindictive crimes, a sentiment, and not one vast 
society of criminals as is generally believed, akin to arrogance 
which imposes a special line of conduct upon persons affected 
by it. 6 Still for others it is a small group of malefactors 
who obey local leaders; 
7 the complex of many small groupings 
which have set themselves a variety of objectives that often 
1. A. Blok, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village 1860-1960, New 
York, 1975: 5. From 1963 to 1-77-T a Parliamentary Commission in 
Italy investigated its genesis and present spheres of action. 
2. ibid. 
3. L. "Barzini, The Italians, London, 1964: 253-4. 
4. F. M. Crawford, Corleone: A Tale of Sicil New York, 1898: yl, 
127-8. This was the first Mafia novel, and entitled appropri- 
ately in retrospect - Corleone. Though burdened with an impos- 
sible plot based on mistaken identity and the inviolability 
of the confessional, it was well received by American readers, 
and the Atlantic Monthly reviewer found it difficult to 
overpraise; D. C. Smith, op. cit. 
5. A. Bequai, Organized Crime: The Fifth Estate, Lexington, 
Mass., 1979: 1. 
6. G. Mosca, Quoted in The Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford, 
1933, volume vi. 
7. R. Ciasca, 'Mafia' in Encyclopedia Italiana, Rome, 1934-42 
volume 21: 863. ' 
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bring them against the criminal law; 
1 
small local associations 
that lend each other mutual aid and assistance; 
2 
an appendage 
of the social order: a corporate structure opposed and detri- 
mental to the State and Italian society; 
3 
an antagonistic 
phenomenon and a special method for the consolidation of ruling 
positions; 
4 
an attitude or pattern in Sicilian culture; 
5 the 
result of class struggle, etc. 
6 
As well, the mafia is viewed not as an organization or a 
movement with precise ends and specific programmes but the 
point of confluence of several conflicting tendencies: the 
defence of the whole society against the threat to its tradi- 
tional way of life; 
7 the aspirations of the various component 
groups to 'freeze' the undulating movement of social mobility; 
personal ambitions and the aspirations of active and ruthless 
individuals. 8 The mafia is also viewed in terms of the cont- 
rol of the community's life by a secret - or rather an offici- 
ally unrecognized - system of gangs that exercise power on the 
local level and virtually constitute a parallel government. 
9 
Like the American syndicates, the mafia is believed by some 
writers to be a hierarchically centralized organization with 
1. Gaetano Mosca, 'Mafia' in Encyclopedia Italiana, Rome, 1934- 
42, volume 21: 863. 
2. G. Montalbano, 'La Mafia e il Banditismo', in Renascita, No. 
10, October 1953. 
3. A. Blok, op. cit. 
4. H. Hess, Mafia and Mafiosi: The Structure of Power, 
Lexington, Mass., 3: 5. 
5. F. A. Ianni, with E. Reuss-Ianni, A Family Business: Kinship 
and Social Control in Organized Crime, New York, 1972: 2. 
6. G. Servadio, Mafioso: A History of the Mafia from its 
Origins to the Present Day, New York 1976: xiv. 
7. E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms 
of social movement in the 19th and 20th centuries, Manchester, 1959: 30-51. 
8. Pino Arlacchi, Mafia peasants and great estates: Society in traditional Cälabria, London, 1983: 
. 
9. E. J. Hobsbawm, 2P. cit.: 33. 
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a supreme head who lives in Palermo, and a system of initiation 
rites, a code of conduct and recognized passwords. 
' Whatever 
the degree of validity each of these perspectives may have, it 
is clear that any brand of organized crime is ultimately a 
reflection and product of the society in which it thrives. 
2 
This would be true of the existence of the Sicilian mafia as 
well as the American syndicates, the Hong Kong Triads and the 
Japanese Yakuza. 3 
Traditionally, the term 'mafia' has been employed by 
Italian writers mainly in two different although related 
senses: as a social attitude or a state of mind, and as a 
criminal organization, with the former being reputed as the 
mother of the latter. 
4 When used in the first sense, mafia is 
said to be an attitude more or less common in Latin countries 
in which recourse to legal authorities was seen as a sign of 
-ý weakness. 
5 A man of honour, as a mafioso is believed to be, 
is supposed to take matters into his own hands. More recently, 
however, some writers have also suggested that the term denotes 
a method of criminal exploitation for profit as illustrated 
by the activities of the mafia. 
6 From the point of view 
of Italian writers the confusion about the mafia stems 
1. Ed Reid, Mafia, New York, 1964. 
2. R. Quinney, Criminology: Analysis and Critique of Crime in 
America, Boston, 1975. 
3. For how these brands of organized crime are both a reflect- ion and product of their respective societies, see, M. 
Pantaleone, The Mafia and politics, London, 1966; G. Servadio, 
op. cit. J. L. Al ini, The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend, 
New York, 1979; J. Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago, 
Chicago, 1968; F. Bresler, The Chinese Mafia, New York, 1981; 
F. Rome, The Tattooed Men: An American woman reports on the Japanese criminal underworld, New York, 197 . 
4. L. Barzini, op. cit.; G. Mosca, op. cit. 
5. G. Mosca, o . cit.: 36; E. J. Howsbawm, 2p. cit.: 32. 
6. H. Hess, Mafia and Mafiosi, 2p. cit.: 127-151; J. L. Albini, - The American Mafia, op. cit.: 125 26. 
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mainly from foreign writers and sensation-hungry journalists' 
failure to draw the distinction between the twousages:. of the 
word .1 In their view, foreign writers have tended to view the 
subject in terms of a national criminal organization only, 
which practises secrecy, silence, violence and murder. 
2 But 
these acts, however, are not limited to the mafia albne. No 
secret organization has been able to survive beyond its first 
birthday without the practice of secrecy, for secrecy is the 
weapon of those who are too proud or too puny to fight above" 
ground. 
3 
Although today the Mafia is the best-publicized in 
Europe, it is not the only phenomenon of its kind. At the 
time of its foundation almost every continent and every 
country had its own share of secret soceities. They can be 
viewed as underground springs that have transformed political 
geology; have fostered progress and crime, illumination and 
disaster. 4 Their origins can be traced to a variety of causes: 
chance, grievances, real or imagined, foreign rule, or criminal 
instinct. 5 Before the birth of the Mafia in Sicily there were 
apparently many secret societies in Europe and elsewhere whose 
origins date back even to the Middle Ages or earlier on. In 
the annals of secret societies, the Sicilian Mafia should be 
seen in the context of other prominent ones such as the 
Phansegars or Thugs of India, the Neapolitan Camorra, the 
1. L. Barzini, op. cit. 
2. See, for instance, the treatment of the subject by Ed Reid Mafia: Cosa Nostra Syndicate. New York, 1964. 
3. Herbert Vivian, Secret Societies: Old and New, London, 
1927: 18. 
4. ibid.: 11. 
5. H. Vivian, op. cit. 
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Spanish Garduna, the Persian Assassins, the French Carbonari, 
the Bavarian Illuminati, the United Slavonians and Polish 
Templars, the English Brotherhood of the Beggars, the Irish 
Whiteboys and Defenders, the Orange Society, the Chinese 
Boxers, the White Lotus, the Triads, the Freemasons, and the 
Rosicrucians, etc. 
1 Some of these societies were mystic in 
character, some were democratic movements, having proved to 
be the instruments of hidden hands, still difficult if not 
impossible to discern; some arose as a result of nationalist 
sentiments. Still othersturned to subversion or criminality. 
2 
Most of these secret societies exist today in name only. 
A few still exist as respectable societies. The Mafia is 
one of the few that have survived to the twentieth century. 
In recent years, the activities of this secret society, 
like those of the Hong Kong Triads currently in many parts of 
the world and of the American syndicates in the first half of 
this century, have attracted the attention of the world press, 
especially since the mass trial of its members by the Italian 
court which began early this year. Like the American syndi- 
cates and Hong Kong Triads, the mafia has survived many decades 
of government changes, inquires, and police mobilization. In 
so far as the word, in its indigenous sense, stands not for an 
organization but a certain form of behaviour or conduct which 
has its genesis in certain political, economic, and historical 
facts peculiar to Sicily, it would be a mistake to discuss the 
mafia phenomenon without taking into account the structure of 
the society in which it thrives. 
1. John H. Lepper, Famous Secret Societies London, 1933; D. W. 
Pike, Secret Societies: Their Origins, History and Ultimate Fate, London, 1939; H. Vivian, OP. cit.; A. Bequai, r anized Crime: The Fifth Estate, Lexington, Mass., 1979: 10-11. 
2. H. Vivian, op. cit. 
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Mafia's Origin 
The Sicilian mafia is believed to have originated as a result 
of an intricate history of injustice, of unlawful practice of 
the law, of many years of misgovernment and mismanagement, and 
of overbearing despotism of colonial rule during which time 
Sicilians developed widespread mistrust of and hostility toward 
all State organs and opted for an informal system of self-help 
institutions to solve their problems. 
' Essentially, the 
origin of the mafia is bound up with the history of Sicily and 
its political and economic conditions that helped to bring 
about the phenomenon. 
2 Sicily is an island of some ten 
thousand square miles3 so situated in the Mediterranean, off 
the coast of Italy, as to be a natural stepping-stone for 
expanding empires reaching out from Africa to Europe, and from 
the Orient to the Straits of Gibraltar. 
4 Thus the history of 
Sicily is a history of successive foreign conquerors: Greeks, 
Phoenecians, Romans, Byzantines, Saracens, Normans, Angevins, 
Catalans, Lombards, Spaniards, Frenchmen, Englishmen, 
Italians, Germans, and Americans. 
5 Although important differ- 
ences distinguish various periods of colonial domination, 
6 
Sicily was basically very much an economic and political 
appendage of outside powers that shaped its history and 
1. G. Schiavo, The Truth about the Mafia and Organized Crime 
in America, El Paso, Texas, 1962: 23-47: G. Tyler e, 
Organized Crime in America: A Book of Readings, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, . 
2. ibid; M. Pantaleone, The Mafia and Politics, op. cit. 
3. The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago, 1979: 727-8. 
4. G. Tyler, op. cit.: 329. 
5. J. and P. Schneider, Culture and Political Economy in 
Western Sicily, New York, 1976: 19; A. Bequai, op. cit.: 11. 
6. Dennis Mack Smith, A History of Sicily: Medieval Sicily 
800-1713, London, 1968. 
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controlled its trade and commerce. The island exported grain 
and animal products and imported manufactured goods. 
1 
Popular legends claim that the Mafia was originally a 
political organization, one of the many secret societies 
2 
formed in Sicily to free the island of foreign domination, and 
that the methods used for securing secrecy of operations, 
unity of command, intimidation and murder, and the silencing 
3 
of informers were later adopted by this organization. It has 
been argued that it was out of these repeated conquests, 
enslavement, conflict and disorder which marked the Sicilian 
history that individuals and bands of men arose who had little 
or no respect for the established law and order, and that it 
was out of such a cauldron that the mafia attitude developed, 
with persons and groups arising to dispute power, to check 
oppression and injustice, to raid and pillage, to extort and 
exploit, to harass the stronger and harness the weak: in short, 
to be a law unto itself. 
4 The frequency with which the govern- 
went changed from one colonial master to another and the remot- 
eness of these governments from the people are said to be among 
the factors believed to have made it difficult for the popula- 
tion to identify with the exponents of government, quite apart 
from their usual impotence. Some of these forms of alien 
5 
rule gave rise to social phenomena which admittedly had an 
important effect in the moulding of the character of the region. 
One of the major results of this situation is believed to have 
been a strong anarchist dislike of any state system of law or 
1. J. and P. Schneider, op. cit.. 
2. G. Schiavo, op. cit.: 39. 
3. G. Tyler, op. cit.:, 231. 
4. A. Bequai, op. cit.; J. and P. Schneider, op. cit.: 84; G. Tyler, op. cit.; G. Servadio, op. cit.: 77. 
5. H. Hess, op. ccit.: 14-15;. G. Schiavo, op. cit. 
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coercion and of any hierarchically or centrally organized 
governmental structure, and a corresponding withdrawal into 
an informal system of self-help institutions, notably the 
family and clientage, which further weakened the ability of 
the government to assert its authority against the vested 
interests of the ruling class. 
' 
To a large extent what was later called the mafia, 
coincided with associations of armed strong men and their 
follwers who exercised jurisdiction on the local level in 
conjunction with formal authority. 
2 The presence of these 
armed men and the general situation in Sicily by the early 
nineteenth century were well documented by Pietro Ulloa, ' 
General Prosecutor at Trapani. He notes that in 'Sicily there 
is not a single official who does not prostrate himself before 
the local men of influence and power, and who does not intend 
to profit from his office. '... This general corruption has 
induced the population to have recourse to remedies which are 
strange and dangerous beyond measure. i3 He observed that in' 
many towns and villages there were fraternities called partiti 
(parties), without meetings and without other links than those 
of dependency upon a chief, who might be a landowner or an 
archpriest. The prosecutor noted that 'a common fund takes 
care of their needs, whether it is to have an official 
dismissed, bribed, or to accuse'an innocent person. The 
population colludes with criminals, and many high-placed 
magistrates protect these brotherhoods with an impenetrable 
shield. '4 
1. ibid. 
2. A. Blok, op. cit.: 94. 
3. Letter from Pietro Calo 
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Ulloa, Prosecutor General at Trapani, 
in Naples, August 3,1838, cited in 
A. Blok, OP- cit.: 95; Dennis Mack 
: Mordern Sicil After-1713'I London, 
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This was the beginning of the notorious componenda, an 
arrangement by which the Captains at Arms recovered part or 
all of the stolen goods from the criminal, then took a rake- 
off on the deal and the legitimate owner agreed not to deno- 
unce the theft. 
1 The prosecutor's letter noted that it was 
not possible to find witnesses even when crimes were committed 
in full broad daylight. 'In this heart of Sicily', the letter 
continued, 'public offices are for sale, justice is corrupt, 
and ignorance is fostered. '2 Even as early as 1611 the latest 
Viceroy, the Duke of Ossuna, was reported to have informed the 
King that assassination was rife throughout the island, and 
that murderers were cheap to hire and were protected from the 
law by their aristocratic employers. 'No one is safe', the 
Viceroy's letter noted, 'even in his own house. This Kingdom 
recognizes neither God nor His Majesty the King; everything 
is for sale, including the lives and possessions of the poor.. '3 
The indifference of the population which regarded the 
central government as a special form of brigand whose soldiers, 
tax gatherers, policemen and courts fell upon them from time 
4 to time, only helped to exacerbate the government's weakness 
in dealing with the situation. As Franchetti noted with 
regards to'. this almost total lack of cooperation by the 
population, 'whereas in other countries the difficulty consists 
in finding somebody who knows anything useful to the investi- 
gation, in Sicily, by contrast, the difficulty consists in 
finding someone who will speak up'. 
5 
1. G. Servadio, op. cit.: 13; D. Mack Smith, op. it. 
2. G. Schiavo, op. cit.; A. Blok, op. cit. 
3. G. Servadio, op. cit.: B. 
4. E. J. Hobsbawn, op. cit. 
5. L. Franchette, quoted in H. Hess, OP. cit.: 24. 
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These and other developments which are today known as the the 
mafia and its activities were present in Sicily prior to the 
middle of the last century. All that was lacking for this 
intricate, illegal sub-world was a name, and that would be 
forthcoming in the 1860s. 1 
Certain institutional changes, however, helped to speed 
up the crystallization of the mafia in western Sicily during 
the period in question. Among these may be mentioned the 
abolition of feudalism in 1812 under the British occupation 
of the island (1806-1815), the unification of the island with 
mainland Italy in 1860 along with the introduction of the 
universal suffrage in 1882, the expropriation and sale of 
Church lands in Sicily in 1867; the transformation of the 
island from an exporter of wheat to an exporter of labour, 
resulting from loss of wheat markets to foreign competitors 
which enjoyed the advantage of the industrial revolution. 
2 
Perhaps the most significant changes that occurred in the 
island following the abolition of feudalism were the intro- 
duction of the latifundia system (large landed estates) and 
the evolution of broker capitalists. 
3 
It should be noted that broker capitalism differs from 
merchant, industrial, and finance capitalism in several 
important ways. First, from broker to finance capitalism, the 
number of capitalists tends to decrease while their power to 
accumulate surplus and make critical decisions tends to 
1. D. Mack Smith, op. cit.; A. Blok, Op. cit.: 95; E. J. 
Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, op. cit.: 36. 
2. A. Blok, op. cit.: 90; E. J. Hobsbawm, OR. cit.: 37; J. and P. S 
Schneider, 3o . 
cit.: 114; G. Tyler, Organized Crime in America, 
3. J. and P. Schneider, op. cit. Broker capitalists have also been characterized by other writers as rural capitalists, rent capitalists; E. J. Hobsbawn, OP- cit.: 38; A. Blok, op. cit.: 56. 
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increase vastly. 
' Second, compared with the merchants, 
industrialists, and financiers of, metropolis, broker 
capitalists usually control only marginal assets, their most 
significant resource being their networks of personal contact's 
Thirdly, broker capitalism tends to promote short-term specul- 
ative investment, reflecting the uncertainties in which ulti- 
mate control over markets lies in the hands of unpredicatable 
foreigners. It selects for those who are able - by structural 
position or personality - to seize opportunities, mobilizing 
friends and friends of friends to live, as it were, by their 
wits. Finally, broker-capitalism which was a contributing 
factor in the rise of the mafia tends to advance by means of 
short-term fluid, egocentric coalitions, reinforced by friend- 
ship ties rather than by long-term corporate associations which 
organize commerce, industry, and finance in the metropolis. 
2 
Broker capitalism which is said to flourish in the 
periphery of society and appears to be more pronounced in some 
underdeveloped areas of the world and not in others, is usually 
associated with the Spanish Empire. Thus Sicily and southern 
Italy, Latin America, and to some extent the Philippines are 
said to reveal historical careers strongly influenced by the 
presence of broker capitalism. 3 
1. It should be noted that the concept 'broker capitalist' 
subsumes the concepts 'broker', 'middleman', 'mediator'. Often 
these terms have been used to characterize men who link local 
to supralocal political structures, as in the same sense emp- 
loyed by Blok. However, this usage does not preclude earning 
profits; it in fact emphasizes profitmaking and is considered 
a more appropriate term than the term 'rural bourgeoisie'. 
Broker capitalists, like all entrepreneurs, organize themselves 
politically when it suits them. Under these conditions the 
concept embraces a political as well as an economic meaning; 
see J. and P. Schneider, o cit.: 10-14; A. Blok, 'Variations 
in Patronage'. Sociolo ische Gi s, volume 16,1969: 365-378; 
see also P. Goubert, 'The French Peasantry of the 17th Century: A Regional Example', in Crisis in Euro e 1560-1660, edited by T. Aston, New York, 1967: 174-75. 
2. J. and P. Schneider, op. cit.: 11. 
3. ibid.: 11-12. 
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It is known to be symptomatic of colonial situations in which 
the government is too weak to penetrate the regional domains 
of power and is consequently forced to operate through the 
local power holders, the barons and landlords, who are rivals 
to the government. The Spanish colonial rule was known for 
its weakness and the baronage of the period often was strong 
enough to compete with the viceroyal crown. 
1 For Sicily, it 
is said that the island was ruled not by a monarchy but a 
'diarchy' in which the relationship between the Crown and 
barons was such that the latter more or less kept the upper 
hand; that the bureaucracy was so feeble that it was easily 
circumvented by powerful individuals for personal profit; and 
that there was a proliferation of banditry in the countryside 
and little capacity on the part of the government to provide 
security. 
2 All these created the political structure so 
congenial to broker capitalism3 whose elements consisted of 
herdsmen, civili or signori (gentlemen), and Gabellotti 
(big leaseholders). 
The mafiosi are said to have evolved out of this stru- 
cture as rival entrepreneurs and were favoured because the 
state, needing their support, supplied them with protection 
and patronage, which in turn sustained their power on the 
1. S. F. Romano, Breve Storia della Sicilia: Momenti e 
Problemi della Civita Siciliana, Verona, 1966: 230"235. 
2 ibid; J. and P. Schneider, op. cit.: 41,55; H. G. Nenigsberger, 
The Practice of Empire. Emended ed. of The 
Government of Sicily under Philip 11 of Spain, Ithaca, 
New Yor , 1969: 83,197. 
3. A. Blok, op. cit.; J. and P. Schneider, 42-43. 
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local level. ' By neutralizing the police and the judiciary 
they protected a wide range of business interests that 
depended for profit on illegal acts including the use, 
threat, or implied threat of violence. Thus mafia is said to 
be a creature of fluorescent broker capitalism, a violent and 
parasitic 'businessman's fraternity', and as such it shares 
much with other social forms found in other broker capitalist 
societies. 
2 The existence of the Mafia in Sicily is necessa- 
rily intertwined with the political economy of the country 
and its activities would testify to our argument that organ- 
ized crime is largely a vagary of competitive capitalism. 
It was their ability to move from being defenders of others' 
interests to harnessing the economy of, the country through, 
the use of unlicensed force that enabled the mafia operators 
to amass the wealth, as in the case of the-U. S. syndicates, 
which in turn enabled them to become a critical factor in 
Sicilian politics. Opinions are divided, however, as to 
whether mafia's politics was secondary to its entrepreneurial 
activity, 
3 
or the latter was secondary to the former. 
4 
Mafia's Evolution and Capitalist Economy 
Even though all the elements that constitute what is now 
called the mafia were present in Sicily prior to the middle of 
the last century, it is conceivable that the mafia would not 
1. J. and P. Schneider, op. cit.: 9. Sicily, it has been argued 
that Spain had no theory m ire, and that its strategy 
called for viceroys to distribute patronage among feudal lords 
and reconfirm their special priveleges in return for financial 
support to the empire, H. G. Koenigsberger, op. cit. 
2. J. and P. Schneider, op. cit.: 9,173. 
3. ibid; A. Blok, o . cit.: 17-102. 
4. M. Pantaleone, The Mafia and Politics, a. cit.; G. Schiavo, 
pp. cit.: 82. 
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have assumed its current form in the absence of certain 
institutional changes, especially as they pertain to the 
ownership of land which was tranformed by law into private 
property as specialization in wheat led to great latifundia, 
large estates. 
1 This export-oriented monocrop economy, 
with its associated patterns of land tenure, was accompanied 
by the rise of certain social groups all which had interests 
in the land. These included a market-oriented dependence 
elite composed of great latifundist lords; a feeble noncomm- 
ercial, nonindustrial urban bougeoisie who were followers of 
the latifundist lords; peasants who farmed the land under 
contracts of day labour, tenancy and sharecropping; pastora- 
lists under pressure from the spread of wheat over the land, 
but able to respond with violence and banditry; and finally 
the most significant group, rival entrepreneurs who would 
ultimately supplant the feudal landlords. 
2 The historical 
origin of the Sicilian mafioso can be trace to the land 
liberation from feudalism in which a rising rural biurgeoisie 
joined the old aristocrats and gradually replaced the tradit- 
ional feudal elites by acquiring most of the lands that came 
on the market3 and consolidating them into large estates 
1. A. Blok, op. cit.: 90; J. and P. Schneider, op. cit.: 7. 
2. J. and P. Schneider, op. cit. 
3. A. Blok, 'Mafia and Peasant Rebellion as contrasting 
factors in Sicilian Latifundism', European Journal of 
Sociology, X, 1969: 95-116 at 95; J. L. Albini, op-. cit.: 127; 
E. J. Hobsbawm, The Primitive Rebels, op. cit.: 40-41; 
M. Pantaleone, op. cit.: 28-2 . 
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(latifundia). 
It should be noted that the various social groups that 
arose with specialization in wheat in Sicily were very differ- 
ent from the urban bourgeois entrepreneurs of industrializing 
northern Europe, for they were estate superintendedts, chief 
herders, carters, and others who played key roles in the 
organization of the latifundia. This group was knowrtto have 
had their major base of operations in the massaria - the 
social and administrative headquarters of the latifundia - 
where the pastoral and agrarian economics of the large estates 
were articulated. 
' Because of their close relationship to the 
massaria and its associated complex of activities, these rural 
entrepreneurs had contacts which the rest of the population 
did not have, and which provided protection, hospitality, and 
sustenance without which travel and commerce in the countryside 
would have been difficulty, if not impossible. 
2 This situation 
in turn gave them a great advantage in dealing with the 
peasants and herdsmen who worked the land. Their strategie 
relationship to the massaria complex and their geographic 
mobility enabled Sicily's rural entrepreneurs not only to 
organize and control the movement of commodities into export 
markets but also the movement of the peasants. 
The establishment of the latifundia should be seen as a 
social and economic setback for the peasants, for the common 
use rights of gleaning and pasturage which they exercised on 
the former fiefs and which guaranteed them the fundamental 
means of living were lost in the new establishment. 3 
1. J. and P. Schneider, op. Cit.: 7. 
2. ibid. 
3. A. Blok, 'The Mafia and Peasant Rebellion', op. cit.: 1-2. 
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As the avid, rural bourgeoisie excluded them from a share in 
the land, the creation of the latifundia resulted in a growing 
number of rural proletariat, thus setting up an explosive 
situation in which the Sicilian peasants found themselves 
pitied against two powerful enemies - the rural bourgeoisie or 
landlords who own the latifondo, and their mafia protectors. 
' 
Although the Sicilian rural entrepreneurs in the nineteenth 
century were economically successful by virtue of their 
acquisition of the large estate holdings, this class of new 
gentry, unlike the feudal aristocracy of an earlier age, had 
some difficulty in consolidating its position; 
2 it never became 
a stable and internally coherent ruling group, and often faced 
pressures from the peasants and herdsmen who have suffered 
serious dislocations as a result of Sicily's encounter with 
North Atlantic industrial capitalism in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. 
3 
However, it would appear that the response of the 
herdsmen (pastoralists) to the displacement caused by the 
introduction of the latifondo was different from that of the 
peasants. Where the latter joined mass demonstrations and 
collectively occupied estates, herdsmen pursued strategies 
based on acts of prepotency which were planned and executed 
by individuals and adhoc coalitions. Although the displaced 
peasants formed bands which robbed and kidnapped notably 
during the early 1870s and again after the two World Wars, 
the classic act of the displaced shehperds was said to be 
1. ibid. 
2. D. Mack Smith, op. cit.; A. Blok, op. cit.; J. and P. Schneider, op. cit. 
3. J. and P. Schneider, op. ccit.: 149. 
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that of banditry and rustling. 
' While rustling was the constant 
manifestation, peasant uprisings were the occasional symptoms 
of an ongoing struggle against diminishing resources. It is 
in this context that the widespread rustling in the first half 
of this century can be understood, when Paolo Grisafi and his 
men roamed and pillaged the western interior of Sicily; it is 
said that his men were victims of the spread of latifundism 
and were, on the whole, more pastoral than peasant, Grisafi 
himself being as ex-shepherd. 
2 
The growing voraciousness for land on the part of the. 
new gentry only turned the peasantry, especially its expanding 
landless segments, into a latent revolutionary force. It 
should be noted that although the Bourbon rule was weak, it 
was not wholly oppressive and it succeeded in challenging 
vested interests and whetting peasant aspirations for land. 
Thus pressed, Sicilian latifondisi and the new gentry often 
acted to neutralize Bourbon reforms by 'playing on local 
patriotism, xenophobia and the prevalent dislike of all laws 
and regulations, by convincing the people that it was the 
Bourbons who prevented improvement and kept the people poor'. 
3 
This powerful myth helped unleash the peasant forces that cul- 
minated in the Sicilian Risorgimento that swept away Bourbon 
rule and from which the new Sicilian ruling class reaped the 
main benefits at the expense of the peasantry. To defend their 
land and property the new gentry felt the urgent need for men 
who could respond with violence to the growing banditry and 
peasant unrest, and who could ward off the 'unwelcome interv- 
ention of the State in land reforms - hence the role of mafiosi. 
1. A. Blok, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, op. cit.: 30,93-4, 108-109,128--1-47; H. Hess, op. cit.: 140-143; J. and P. Schneider, 
op. cit.: 146. 
2. A. Blok, pp. cit.: 132-134; J. and P. Schneider, op. cie.: 146. 
3. D. Mack Smith, op. cit.: 409; A. Blok, op. cit.: 98. 
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The mafiosi were recruited from the ranks of the peasantry 
to provide the large estate owners with armed staff to confront 
both the impact of the State and the restive peasants, 
especially in the inland areas of the island where the Bourbon 
State failed to monopolize the use of physical force. Thus 
while on the one hand mafiosi heightened class tensions through 
their control over land, they checked open rebellions by 
peasants and sustained revolts in several ways: by force, by 
keeping a hold on outside influence; and by turning outlaws and 
bandits into allies. 
1 From the earliest times the barons had 
exerted their authority with the help of private armed guards 
and overseers who were always selected from men with an unusual 
criminal record which made them particularly suitable for the 
job. 2 From 1812 onwards, however, when the latifondo was 
being threatened more and fore by the popular peasants' 
uprisings the gangs of gabellotti and stewards (now known as 
the mafia), protected by the barons, usurped the authority of 
the State in the inland areas and ministered their own rough 
form of justice, dependent not so much on respect for the law 
as on the fear which they inspired and on their desire to avoid 
interference from the public authorities. 3 
1. A. Blok, op. cit.; 96- 
2. These were later formed into armed companies or gangs (compagnie d'armi) recognized by the government and they sought 
to preserve and defend the lord's privileges and territories 
under his jurisdiction, M. Pantaleone, op. cit.: 26-27- 
3. ibid. 
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Although the peasants had become legally free, they 
obtained their freedom at the cost of title to the land they 
held under feudal conditions. 
' As had happened to peasants 
elsewhere, the abolition of 'feudalism' left Sicilian 
peasants more vulnerable than ever to the market forces. 
2 
It was an event in which they emerged from one social 
servitude only to fall into another ecomomic and political 
dependency. 3 Most serious of all, they lost access to 
arable land through indebtedness and usurpation, and several 
times under the Bourbons, they rose up to occupy approriated 
communal land, set fire to tax records, and attacked agents 
of the state. 
4 This situation which served to emphasize 
the fundamental social stratification in Sicilian society 
between those who control and those who are controlled5 was 
one of the root causes of a series of peasant revolts that 
would eventually lead to the modification of the latifondi. 
Thus for the last century, as Boissevan notes, Sicily has 
1. A. Blok, 'Mafia and Peasant Rebellion', op. cit. 
2. J. and P. Schneider; op. cit.; 118. 
3. A. Blok, op. cit.: 90- 
4. J. and P. Schneider, op. cit.; see also E. Wolf, Peasant 
Wars of the Twentieth Century, New York, 1969- 
5. Essentially, the economic and political life of capitalist 
societies is primarily determined by the relationship, born 
out of the capitalist mode of production, between these two 
classes - the class which on the one hand owns and controls, 
and the working class on the other; see Ralph Miliband, The 
State in Capitalist Societ : An Analysis of the Western 
System of Power, London, . 
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been a land where revolution and violence have been endemic, 
where economic exploitation of the proletarian masses by a 
small upper class composed of the bourgeoisie and nobility, 
often aided by delinquents, went hand in hand with their 
control of the local and regional adimistation, and their 
manipulation of it for personal gain. In short, it was, and 
to an extent still is, said to be a land where the strong 
survive at the expense of the weak. 
' The contrast between 
the bourgeoisie and the rural proletariat has thus been not 
only between employer and employee, but between wealth and 
poverty, between education and illiteracy. 
2 It was within 
this social environment, it has been noted, that the mafioso 
emerged as a broker capitalist -, to mediate between the 
land-owning class and the tenant peasants and became the 
effective instrument for the exploitation of the 
peasants. 
3 The mafia, then. was able to find a foothold in 
Sicily at first through its control of the partitioned land 
because the society provided the necessary elements for its 
1. Jeremy Boissevain, 'Patronage in Sicily', Man, volumel, 
1966: 18-33 at 19. 
2. ibid: 20. 
3. ibid; J. Albini, The American Mafia, op. cit.: 130-131; 
M. Pantaleone. Op. cit., 23-30; J. and P. Schneider, 
op. cit.: 8-10,139-140; A. Blok, 'Peasants, Patrons, and 
Brokers in Western Sicily' Anthropological Quarterly, 
Volume 41-42,1968-1969: 155-169. 
74. 
its existence and and growth. 
' Thus its birth can be 
traced to the tensions between the central government and 
local bourgeoisie on the one hand, and between the latter and 
the tenant peasants on the other, giving rise to a situation 
in which the three actors arranged and rearranged themselves 
in conflict and accommodation. 
2 
Although the mafia could not possibly have emerged 
without a measure of state-formation, 
3 it survives because 
the political development of the country was 'hijacked' by 
forces within the social system. The mafiosi, as we have 
indicated, were the creatures of the landlords and they began 
as armed retainers and ended up as exploiters with 
J. and P. Schneider, op. cit.: 8-9,150; A. Blok, op. cit.: 
89. 
2. A. Blok, op. cit. 10-11. 
3. Capitalist enterprise obviously depends to an ever greater 
extent on the direct support of the state, and can only 
preserve its 'private' character on the basis of such public 
help. State intervention actually presided at its birth or 
at least guided and helped its early steps, not only in such 
obvious cases as Germany and Japan but in every other 
capitalist country as well; and it has never ceased to be of 
crucial importance in the workings of the system, even in the 
country most dedicated to laissez-faire and rugged 
individualism; see, for instance, Barrington Moore Jr., The 
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democrac : Lord and 
Peasant in the Making o the Modern World, Boston, 1967, P. K. 
Crosser, State Ca to sm in t Fe Economy of the United 
States, New York, ; R. M an , op. cit. 10,72; Gabriel Ko to, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of 
American H story, New York, 1963* 
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considerable autonomy. 
' The evolution of the mafia in 
Sicily may be divided into two stages: (1) before the 
universal franchise in Italy when the mafioso stood between 
the landlords and tenant peasants and used violence to keep 
the latter in their place, with the connivance of the State; 
and (2) after the universal franchise, following the end of 
feudalism, when they became the intermediary between 
politicians and peasants and used their position to procure 
votes for politicians. 
2 Essentially, the mafioso began as 
a rural capitalist entrepreneur through his monopoly of land 
and its products in the last century and by the middle of the 
present century he was already on his way to becoming a 
corporate, rich entrepreneur. 
The evolution of mafioso as an entrepreneur was made 
possible because the society possessed the essential 
socio-economic preconditions for this purpose. In societies 
characterized by the mafia-type organization, the market 
often plays a decisive role; they are usually riven by 
intense horizontal conflicts between individuals and groups; 
and they suffer from the weakness or absence altogether of 
any principle of centralized regulation of social and 
economic relations or state control over the use of 
violence. 
3 As a result of the abolition of serfdom, a new 
relationship developed between master and labourer, based on 
the principle of 'rent capitalism' which arose through 
1. A. Blok, op. cit.; E. J. Hobsbawm, op. cit. 
2. J. L. Albini, op. cit.: 131; Blok, op. cit. 
3. P. Arlacchi, 'The Mafioso: From Man of Honour to 
Entrepreneur', New Left Review, 118,1979: 60. 
76. 
commercialization and transformation undertaken in a plain 
profit-seeking spirit. 
' At the same time the private armed 
companies disappeared and were replaced by stewards and 
campieri who were more suited to the changed conditions by 
virtue of their ability to wield violence. 
The absentee landlords who now lived in Palermo to be near 
the court entrusted their lands to the middleman, the 
gabellotto, in return for a specified annual rent. 
2 The 
gabellotto then cultivated the land himself or sublet it so 
that his profits not only allowed him to pay the gabella 
(rent) to the owner, and the stewards' and campieri's wages, 
but also to put aside a tidy profit for himself. By using 
violence, the gabellotto, backed by his retinue of armed 
guards, managed to impose the most iniquitous leases and to 
pay ridiculously low wages to the peasants who worked the 
land, 3 thus exploiting the peasants even more than their 
1. Among the measures adopted (by the rent capitalist) 
included: appropriation of the means of production, the 
creation of indebtedness and opportunities to place the 
peasants in perpetual obligation. Rent capitalism was true 
capitalism in so far as it was marked by a striving for 
unlimited profit; it differed from the more recent 'capitalism' in that it was not linked with production but 
rather was satisfied with skimming off its proceeds, see Hans 
Bobek, 'The Main Stages in Socio-Economic Evolution from a 
Geographical oint of view' inPhilip L. Wagner and Marvin W. 
Mikesll (eds. 
), 
Readings in Cultural Geography, Chicago, 
1962: 234-237; A. Blok, The Mafia oa Sicilian Village, op. 
cit.: 56-7" 
2. E. J. Hobsbawm, op. cit.; 39-40" 
3. M. Pantaleone, o. cit__.: 26; Cesara Bruno, La Sicilia e La Mafia, Roma, 1900. ý1, 
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former feudal barons had done. ' Because there were more 
peasants looking for tenancy than there was tenancy available 
on the latifondo2, the gabellotto was able to extract from 
the peasants the right of 'protection' while they conceded to 
his armed guards payments in kind of varying magnitude. 
3 
Thus the presence of a market in a determining role is seen 
as a fundamental prerequisite of mafioso power and behaviour 
since the internal competition that he encourages plays an 
important role in securing the mobility, instability and 
stratification of all social positions essential to mafioso 
type activities. 
4 It can be argued that the existence of 
the mafioso would be inconceivable in a centralized, 
regulated economy, or in an economy that is organized 
1. Among the inequitable measures pursued by the gabellotto 
was the fact that he used two different measures: a small one 
when giving out seed, loans, and other soccorsi (aids) in 
grain; and a larger one when claiming these advances and dues 
from the crops at the threshing floor; A. Blok, op. cit.: 55; 
J. L. Albini, op. cit.: 133. 
2. The availability of peasants' surplus labour enabled the 
gabellotto to set the terms of payment. It is this form of 
economic exploitation that Marx spoke about when he observed: 
"The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is 
pumped out of the direct producers determines the relation of 
domination and servitude, as it grows directly out of 
production itself and in return reacts upon it as a 
determinant... ", 
K. Marx, Capital, volume 3, London, 1962: 841-842. 
3. H. Hess, op. cit.: 36; M. Pantaleone, op. cit.. Mafioso 
not only use s power to force terms on tenants and 
sharecroppers, he also used it to force them on the absentee 
landlords, E. J. Hobsbawm, op. cit.: 38. 
4. P. Arlacchi, 'The Mafioso', op. cit. 
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on cooperative lines. The penetration of the market by the 
mafioso is seen to be due partly to the widespread struggle 
between individuals and groups, 
' but more importantly to 
the class struggle between the rich and the poor, between the 
landed bourgeoisie and the agricultural proletariat. 
2 As 
the gabellotto, now a mafioso in his own right, sought to 
increase his profits, he applied a variety of pressures on 
the landowners aimed at forcing them to sell the land: 
withholding of payments due, threats of violence, of 
kidnapping, and intimidation of the landowners. All of these 
measures would eventually force the landowners to put up 
their land for sale, only to find that the gabellotto was the 
sole bidder, for no one would dare to challenge his power. 
The land would normally be offered to him at an absurdly low 
price. 
3 
Indeed, it is said that by the second half of the last 
century the mafia had completed this stage in its evolution 
and mafioso had become a rural capitalist entrepreneur whose 
aim was to rob the legitimate authorities of their power and 
to preserve the feudal structure in the countryside. 
4 As 
the mafiosi began to assume the powerful roles of landowners 
1. ibid . 
2. S. F. Romano, Momenti del resorgimento in Sicilia, 
Florence, 1952: 291-92; J. L. Al n, The American Mafia: 
Genesis of a Legend, New York, 1979: ; M. Pantaleone, op. 
c it.: 28. 
3. J. L. Albini, op. cit.: 129; M. Pantaleone, o. cit.: 29; 
A. Blok, 'Mafia ant Rebellion', op. c t.: . 
4. M. Pantaleone, op. cit.: 27. 
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and patrons, they gradually gained a foothold into the 
legitimate and illegitimate sectors of Sicilian societyl by 
imposing themselves on people as arbitrators and 
peace-makers, and ultimately as silent and speedy executors 
of a form of rough justice based on the law of an eye for an 
eye. 
2 The role of the mafioso in mediating conflicts, and 
the very existence of such a role stemming from a state of 
permanent competition, only become explicable on the 
assumption of a competitive society constantly favouring the 
stronger party; for in the absence of that, there would be no 
call for mediation. 
3 However, in the series of peasant 
insurrections, many local governments found the mafia a 
useful tool for subjugating the peasants by re-establishing 
the campagnie d'armi (armed guards) which had been abolished 
by royal decree in 1837.4 
Mafia power usually arises in a situation of anarchic 
competition and represents an excellent instrument of social 
mobility and promotion in a capitalist commercial system 
where risky, fraudulent, and unscrupulous practices are 
indispensable to success. 5 Although mafia power is 
underpinned by a situation of universal competition and the 
existence of mafioso requires a state of competition, 
tensions and conflicts which he actively encourages to allow 
1. J. L. Albini, op. cit.: 130- 
2. M. Pantaleone. op. cit. 
3. P. Arlacchi, 'The Mafiose', op. cit. 
4. M. Pantaleone, op. cit. 
5. P. Arlacchi, 'The Mafioso', op. cit: 
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for his mediatory and protective role, his behaviour in the 
market place is essentially one of anti-competition, and he 
usually reacts back on its cause in the form of monopoly 
and control. 
' His control of the market activities, 
2 
and 
more importantly of votes, is rationalized as a firm deterrent 
to the unfettered spread of the conflicts, hostilities and 
feuds that would otherwise ensue from the logic of the 
3 
anarchic competition of the market. 
Thus in his shrewd business activities, the mafioso 
usually tends to mediate between market forces and society 
by 'protecting' the latter from the potential destruction- 
in the ambition of the unregulated market to impose itself 
as the supreme regulator of all economic relations. The 
4 
1. ibid. 
2. In their expansion into other economic zones, the mafiosi 
found in irrigation a potent weapon. For instance, 
irrigation works near the coast of Palermo depended upon 
water originating in the mountains. Control over water 
sources gave mafiosi a new and particularly severe sanction: 
they could deny water to an uncooperative fruit grower; 
see J. and P. Schneider, op. cit.: 182. 
3. The mafia of the markets controls the sale of fertilizers, 
the supply of labour, the provision of guards for the 
citrus fruit plantations, the transport of the fruit, the 
control of prices to be paid to commission agents and 
shopkeepers, the management of places of entertainment, 
cafes and other extra-market transactions; see 
M. Pantaleone, op. cit.: 170; N. Lewis, 
The Honoured Societ : the Mafia Conspiracy Observed, 
London, 4: 'IU. 
4. ibid. 
It should be noted that the mafiosi are accepted by some 
officials as order-maintaining factors. We may recall 
Giussep Russo's and Don Calogero Vizzini's assessment of 
themselves and, more particularly, Vizzini's words, 'The 
fact is that in any society there must be a category of 
persons who put things right when they have become 
complicated'; H. Hess, op. cit.: 139. 
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position of the mafisosi as local men of influence enabled 
them to cash in on the vast body of landsales to peasants 
under the various reform laws. As Renda analysed the 
situation, 'It may be affirmed that practically all purchases 
of small peasant property have been negotiated through the 
mediation of mafioso elementsi' to whose hands much of the 
land and other assets have therefore tended to cling. 
2 All 
these activities naturally brought the mafioso a number of 
economic advantages so that in the rural centres 
particularly, the mafioso was the only person, except the 
landowner himself, whose activities enabled him to amass an 
enormous fortune. In this way, the more outstanding mafiosi 
became well-to-do members of the bourgeoisie and, drawn by 
the need for closer contact with the urban bureaucracy and 
even more by the attractions of livelier commercial and 
industrial activities, gradually moved into the larger 
towns. 3 Even then the migration did not bring any decline 
in the mafia's connections with the feudo and far more 
important was the method which the mafia adopted to resist 
the destruction of its mainstay, the latifundist economy. 
4 
In this regard, the mafia was reminiscent of the many 
historical instances in which the local capitalists were 
powerful enough to resist being dislodged by technologically 
and organizationally more advanced outsiders. Hausa 
1. F. Renda, 'Funzione e basi sociali della Mafia', in I1 
movimento Contadino nella Societa Siciliana, Palermo, 16: 
2. E. J. Hobsbawm, op. cit.: 49- 
3. M. Pantaleone, op. cit.: 33- 
4. E. J. Hobsbawm, op. cit.: 48- 
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cattle traders in Nigeria. 
1 German towns in the 
Renaissance, 2 and small shopkeepers in the French 
Revolution3 are a few among many notable examples. 
Mafia's control still persists in certain traditional 
activities which link the country districts with the towns. 
Thus usury with money and water, overcharging for all kinds 
of merchandise handled by mafiosi, monopolization of the 
vegetable and citrus trade and the consequential obstruction 
of the building of dams, the unlawful occupation of the most 
favourable spots in the market, the market stalls protected 
by a mafioso in return for payment (the well-know 
institution of the 'piazza assicurata'), monopolization of 
orders for a building firm or of licences for the retail of 
motor fuel, the socially and historically significant 
intervention in land transactions and the individual cases of 
mediation in debtor-creditor relationships, are all features 
of mafioso control and monopoly which contribute to the, 
regulations of economic relations in the Sicilian social 
system, and they are ways and means by which the mafioso can 
improve his economic positions. The mediatory role by the 
4 
1. A. Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of 
Hausa Migrants in Yoruba town, Berkeley, California, 1969. 
2. E. F. Heckscher, Mercantilism, rev. ed., edited by 
E. F. Soderlund, London, 62-73. 
3. E. J. Hobsbawn, The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848, New York, 
1962: 69-70. 
4. H. Hess, o.: 133-145; G. Servadio, pp. cit.; 
N. Lewis, op. cit.; M. Pantaleone, op. cit.; J. and P. 
Schneider, op. cit.: 182. 
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mafioso in the numerous cattle thefts and stolen goods has 
often been more successful than the government efforts to 
recover the property. Mori estimates that in seventy-five 
percent of all cases the State's agencies achieved absolutely 
nothing, while mediation by mafioso, on the other hand, 
remains unsuccessful in only five percent of all cases - the 
owner losing only about a quarter or a third of the value of 
the stolen property to the mafioso as a 'present', part of 
which is passed on to the robber. 
' Because of the weakness 
of the state in recovering such stolen goods, the victim does 
not normally turn to it but to a man who is respected and 
whom he knows to have connections in all circles of the 
population, especially among the delinquents. 
2 
It has been said that mafia employees invariably receive 
lower wages-than the trade union minimum and that they suffer 
greater insecurity and irregularity in the conditions of 
their work. 
3 A reduction in the cost of wages is usually 
. secured 
by a variety of ways: reducing the number of days of 
work, 
4 
an evasion of health and other insurance 
contributions, and non-payment of overtime, all of which give 
1. The Last Struggle with the Mafia, London, 1933: 96-8. 
2. D. Mack Smith, op. cit.: 368-69; H. Hess, op. cit. 
3. P. Arlacchi, 'The Mafioso', op. cit.; Danilo Dolci, Waste, 
London, 1963; see also R. Milibn , op. cit., chapter 2: 'Economic Elites and Dominant Class ; K. Marx, Capital: 1, London, 1974: 594. 
4. Danilo Dolci, Waste, op. cit. 
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mafioso distinct comparative advantages and place his 
enterprises in a position to do better than those of his 
'normal' competitors. 
' 
The territorial monopoly over the use of violence by 
mafioso has been replaced by a series of monopolies over 
industrial branches and natural resources as a result of 
discouragement of competition, thus creating a protectionist 
umbrella in the area of the market that is of particular 
concern to his enterprises. 
2 This situation usually helps 
to shield the mafioso from the pressures of market 
competition and enables him to secure orders, contracts, and 
raw materials at comparatively advantageous prices. The 
legality with which the mafioso carries on his enterprises is 
usually not subject to government inspection. In effect, an 
entrepreneurial mafioso is not like the 'normal' capitalist 
who must rely exclusively on the accumulation of profits for 
investment purposes; on the contrary, he can always draw on 
the considerable sums of capital acquired from illegal 
activities from sources extraneous to the market to finance 
his ambitious investment programs. 
3 
Whether the entrepreneurial mafiosi can continue to maintain 
the comparative advantages which they have long enjoyed in 
1. P. Arlacchi, 'The Mafioso', op. cit. 
2. P. Arlacchi, Mafia, peasants and great estates, op. cit.: 114. 
3. P. Arlacchi, 'The Mafioso', op. cit. 
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the Sicilian economy is rather debatable. Given the 
progressive metamorphosis in the Italian politics and, economy 
in recent years and the concomitant social disintegration of 
vast areas of southern Italy, including the abolition of the 
latifondi, it would appear that the mafia has to adapt if it 
is to survive. However, given its entrenched position in the 
Sicilian society, any decline in its connection with the 
feudo would have to await the governments's action on land 
reform. Thus by the end of the last century the foundation 
of the mafia as an economic institution in Sicily had been 
firmly laid. This process was apparently made possible by 




J. L. Albini, op. cit.; J. and P. Schneider, op. cit.: 174" 
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Mafia and Political Activity 
The mafia is not only an economic institution but. also a 
political one whose activities benefit not only its members 
but also serve the interests of the ruling class. The 
immense power which the mafioso wields in Italian politics 
derives not only from his ability to use threat and violence 
but also from his ability to penetrate every facet of Italian. 
society, especially the politicians and other office 
holders. 1 In any capitalist society it has become a common 
phenomenon that the possession of economic power or wealth 
often leads, directly or indirectly, to the possession of 
political power. 
2 The mafiosi as local men of economic 
power have been able to dominate Italian politics partly 
through their ability to use unlicensed force, and partly and 
more importantly through the symbiotic accommodation3 that 
has long existed between them and the ruling class which 
provided them with a political shield that neutralized the 
work of the police and the judiciary. 
4 A political shield 
and a neutral or impotent police-judiciary combined to 
guarantee to mafiosi immunity from prosecution or 
imprisonment. 
1. M. Pantaleone, op. cit.; J. L. Albini, ope cit.: 130; E. J. 
Hobsbawm, op. cit.: 43. 
2. Miliband, op. cit.; A. BlockEast Side-West Side: 
Organized Crime w York 1936-1950, University College, 
Cardiff, 190: 239-Z41. 
3. E. J. Hobsbawm, op. cit.: 44. 
4. J. and P Schneider, op. cit.: 173-4. 
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James Scott's analysis of corruption argues that this 
phenomenon occurs when private interests exert extraordinary 
pressure on the administration of law, rather than on the 
legislative process. 
' In this sense of the term, 
corruption would be most pronounced among those who are not 
rich or powerful enough to make law, but are sufficiently 
wealthy and powerful to determine its application. The 
Sicilian mafiosi appear to fit perfectly into this category 
from the mid-1870s on, and especially during the early 
decades of the present century. 
2 Although where there is 
an established structure of power, 'honour' tends to belong 
to the mighty; in lawless communities, however, power is 
rarely scattered among an anarchy of competing units but 
usually clusters round local strong-points whose typical 
holder, as in the case of the mafioso, is the private magnate 
or boss with his body of retainers and dependants and the 
network of 'influence' which surrounds him and causes men to 
put themselves under his protection. 
3 
It may be useful to realize that probably in any society 
. 
there are sections which the state is unable or unwilling to 
control and in which it has, at least at a pragmatic level, 
to yield power to 'parapolitical' associations. 
4 These 
1. J. C. Scott, 'The Analysis of Corruption in Developing 
Nations", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Volume 
11,1969: 315. 
2. J. and P. Schneider, op. cit: 155. 
3. E. J. Hobsbawm, op. cit.: 32-33. 
4. A. Blok, 'Mafia and Peasant Rebellion', op. cit.: 103. 
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forms of distributing power may have feudal antecedents as 
was doubtless the case in Sicily where, up to the early 
nineteenth century, the barons, later to be displaced by the 
mafiosi, were formally invested with public power. It is 
important to note, however, that once such informal groupings 
have obtained a foothold, they are increasingly less inclined 
to surrender power. 
' Instead, these structures may prevent 
the larger, formal framework from functioning according to 
its own rules by invading some of its institutions, while 
corroding others. Thus the phenomenon of mafia may be 
understood politically in terms of a modus vivendi resulting 
from the interaction between the larger, encapsulating 
structure of the modern state on the one hand, and the 
smaller encapsulated feudal structure of the village. 
2 
" Pervading both the state and the village the mafia has, so to 
" speak, its feet in each structure thus overarching both. In 
fact, the mafia is not an appendix of Sicilian society, but 
rather its very backbone. 3 
Right from its emergence, the Sicilian mafia has sought 
to monopolize and exercise the power that belongs to the 
1. ibid: 104. 
2. For the concepts of parapolitical association, structure 
and encapsulation, see F. G. Bailey, Stratagems and S oils: A 
Social Anthropology of Politics, Oxford, 144-185, a so 
see 
Eric R. Wolf, 'Kinship, Friendship, and Patron-Client 
Relations in Complex Societies', in Michael Banton (ed. ), The 
Social Anthropology of Complex Societies, Edinburgh, 1966. 
3. A. Blok, op. cit. 
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state. Its mediatory role was not confined to the economic 
field but often it tended to usurp the state's authority. As 
one official observed in 1838: 
As soon as thefts take place 
mediators appear on the scene 
and offer to arrange the 
recovery of the stolen 
objects. The number of týese 
arrangements is infinite. 
Reticence and secrecy, at times amounting to conspiracies of 
silence, especially vis-a-vis legal authorities, and embodied 
in a code of behaviour that is neatly summed up by the term 
omerta, 
2 
expresses the'sway and range of established local 
power domains. Silence is usually enforced by violence or 
threat of it upon the population and talking (cantare, 
literally singing) involves in effect attempts to draw on 
external forces that would upset the established balance of 
power. 
3 Through their manipulation of this complex cultural 
code and social control it entails, mafiosi have been able 
1. Part of Pietro Cala Ulloa's letter, Prosecutor General at 
Trapani, of 1838, cited in H. Hess, op. cit.: 143. 
2. G. Servadio 'Wall of Silence in the war against the mafia', 
The Times, 26 February)1970. 
3. Essentially, Omerta is both a Sicilian social value and 
behaviour pattern manifesting itself in the Sicilian's ego as 
well as his actions, and is believed to have its origin in the 
constant changes in the Sicilian political history. It 
represents suspicion and resentment of governments and law 
which are viewed as mechanisms of exploitation. Even after 
unification with Italy, Maxwell notes that Sicily continued to 
contribute far more in taxes than it received in benefits from 
the Italian government; see J. L. Albini, op. cit.: 108; Gavin 
Maxwell, Bandits, New York, 1956: 28-29; F. G. Friendman. 
'The World of La Miseria', Partisan Review, volume 20, 
(March-April, 1953): 224-225; T. Se n, Culture Conflict and 
Crime, New York, 1938: 64-65. 
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to isolate the local population from external rival powers 
and thus make the people depend on them. In this way, omerta 
became structurally pervasive throughout the whole community, 
albeit in varying degrees. 
' It is important to see the 
code not in isolation, but as an aspect of the real 
interdependencies between people who formed the community in 
which omerta constitutes a very concrete and real part of the 
behaviour of the people who depend on each other in specific 
and fundamental ways. 
2 
Like power brokers elsewhere, the Sicilian mafia 
basically wields power in two spheres: its actual control in 
either sphere depends upon its success in dealing with the 
other. 
3 Far from replacing the State or constituting a 
State within a State, as has been so often noted by some 
4 
writers, the mafiosi depend on the State since their local 
and regional power domains exist only by virtue of their 
access to the larger domains of the State. The concept of 
political and power broker is particularly helpful in 
understanding this symbiosis, for the very articulation of 
mafiosi with public authorities and national politicians 
1. A. Blok, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, op. cit.: 
211-212. 
2. ibid. 
3. Richard N. Adams, 'Brokers and Career Mobility Systems in 
the Structure of Complex Societies', Southwestern Journal of 
Anthropology, volume 26,1970: 315-3 . 
4. For the view of the mafia as a parallel system to the 
government, see E. J. Hosbawn, op. cit.: 36-37. 
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often renders any State-based action or reform against them 
abortive. 
' 
As political middlemen and power brokers, the mafiosi 
simultaneously carry on active roles in the community and in 
the national structures and they gain power through their 
extrordinary access to information and to powerful 
individuals in the society. 
2. 
The relationships between mafiosi and formal authorities- 
are strongly ambivalent. On the one hand, mafiosi tend to 
disregard formal law and are able to withstand the impact of 
the legal and governmental apparatus. On the other, they act 
in connivance and collusion with formal authorities, and 
validate their control through covert and pragmatic 
relationshipp with them. This symbiosis distinguishes 
mafiosi from outlaws and bandits whose power domains are also 
buttressed by physical force but contrast openly with those 
of the State. 
3 Although all power is ultimately based on 
1. J. and P. Schneider, op. cit. 
2. Organized crime, generally speaking, cannot exist in any 
. 
society without the collusion and cooperation of these 
powerful individuals who are invariably government office 
holders. It is precisely for this reason that organized 
crime has logically and analytically been viewed as one of 
the crimes of the powerful; see for instance, W. J. Chambliss, 
On the Take" From Petty Crooks to Presidents, Bloomington, 
Indiana, earce, rimes ot e oweiful: Marxism, 
Crime and Deviance, London, 1976. 
3. Charles Tilly , The Vendee, New York, 1967: 80; A. Blok, oz. cit.: 6. Events have demonstrated how Mafia and organs 
ot Enestate, theoretically competitors for the monopoly of the control of. violence, in fact collaborated, often with 
very similar methods, in the repression of the most serious 
malfunctions and threats to the established order. In the 
many episodes of banditry or common criminality, as in other cases of organized political dissent or trade union activity, the intervention of the armed power of the mafiosi on the side of the official forces of order was decisive in the killing, capture or neutralization of the deviants see P. Arlacchi, Mafia, Peasants and Great Estates op. cit.: 117; N. Lewis, The onoure Society, o. c.: HO--I-53, ii-163; Danilo Dolc ,u aws, ew or , l9bJ.. 
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the ability to use force, in the case of organized criminals, 
however, this statement must be qualified. Their power and 
existence derives more from the symbiotic relationship that 
exists between them and their powerful friends in the power 
structure1 than from their ability to use unlicensed force. 
It should be noted that in almost all the instances where bandits 
have used unlicensed force without the authorization and sanction 
of the established legal authorities, it has invariably led to 
their immediate expulsion from the community or complete destr- 
uction. 
2 
More specifically, the Sicilian mafia owes its longevity 
to the collusion and connivance of the state authorities and 
this in turn accounts to a large measure for its ability to 
permeate almost every facet of Sicilian establishment. As 
one Communist senator appropriately observed, 'The mafia goes 
where the power is, that is why the Christian Democrat party 
is riddled with it, not only on a regional level. The high 
protectors, the ones elected through the power of the mafia, 
are in Rome. '3 The collusion between the mafia and the 
(long ruling) Christian Democrat party has long been common 
knowledge among well-informed Italians and outside keen 
observers. In 1968, the then president of the Antimafia 
Commission. and a Christian Democrat deputy, Cattanei, was able 
to admit as much: 
1. G. Servadio, 'The Political untounchables who protect the 
mafia', The Times, 29 September, 1972. 
2. See, C. Mori, The Last Struggle with the Mafia, op. cit.: 165-185, with regards to the destruction of the bandits of the Madonie; H. Hess, op.. cit.: 48. On the other hand, see, E. J. Hobsbawm's article, Social Bandit: A Comment', Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 14,1972: 504-5077- 
3. A testimony before an Antimafia Commission by Senator Li 
Causi, Cited in G. Servadio, op. cit.: 211. 
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The mafia goes with power. That is why they 
say that there is the phenomenon of collusion 
between the mafia and the Chrisrian Democrats, 
but I think this happens mainly in Sicily and 
it is difficult to distinguish between ý 
organized delinquency and the mafia.... 
If anything, organized delinquency such as banditry, does not 
usually enjoy the protection of the State. The contrast 
between a bandit and the mafioso vis-a-vis the state protection 
cna. be seen when the two clash with the state. The former 
usually ends up taking to the hills, while the latter usually 
gets acquitted for lack of proof - 'per insufficienza di prove. '2 
The series of Antimafia Commissions since the 1960s, like the 
crime Committees in the United States, have been more often a 
public relations exercise designed to appease the moral senti- 
ments of the society than mafia's enemies have traditionally 
been the left-wing politicians, the communists and socialists. 
3 
In the nature of Italian politics, there commissions have not 
always come about without considerable opposition by the right 
wing members of Christian Democrat party which had traditiona- 
lly been sympathetic to the mafia. 
4 
It is noted that when the Socialists introduced one such 
bill in the early 1950s for the constitution of a special body 
1. ibid.: 213. 
2. H. Hess, op. cit.: 48; N. Lewis, op. cit. 
3. In 1947 Salvatore Giuliano who had followed Don Calo and 
the mafia into Christian Democrat party, attacked the members 
of left-wing parties and peasant trade unions who had gathered 
at Portella della Ginestre with bombs and machine guns. At 
the trial that followed after Giuliano had been killed, his 
lieutenant testified that it was Maechesano, Prince Alliata, 
and Bernardo Mattarella, all members of the ruling Christian 
Democrat party, who ordered the massacre, and that before the 
massacre they had had a meeting with Giuliano; see N. Lewis, 
The Honoured Society, op. cit.: 197; G. Servadio, 'The Real 
Victims of the Mafia', Evening Standard, 5 July, 1974. 
4. G. Servadio, Mafioso, op. cit.: 197. 
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to inquire into the phenomenon, it was opposed by its 
sympathizers; and that Minister Scelba had turned down one such 
proposal which had come from the Communists in 1948.1 It is 
further reported that it was not only the Regional authorities 
who had repeatedly refused to investigate mafia matters but 
that Rome had also claimed that the mafia did not exist, or 
that it was an unimportant phenomenon peculiar to Sicily. 
2 
But times, however, have changed for the mafia. 
In the late sixties collusion between mafia and politic- 
ians became so evident to the public that some well-informed 
observers felt that something more than an inquiry was needed 
to deal with the situation. As the editor of L'Ora put it 
in 1969, 
The Mafia today is not what it was ten years ago. 
Its new aim is to be able to control from an 
invisible chair. Since the establishment of the 
Antimafia Commission, many have been punished, 
but the political names, materially linked with . 
the Mafia, remain untouched... There are forces 
within the Commission that are there to prevent 
the inquiry from moving toward the political 
field, which is now the centre of the mafia. 
The Christian Democrat party would need 
courage to allow the truth to come out, because 
the power of the party here in Sicily is based 
on the strength ý, f votes that the mafia has 
and can produce. y 
In 1976 the new Antimafia Commission, after examining the 
symbiotic relationships between the mafia and its powerful 
masters, came to the conclusion that the mafia was strong 
because 'it has penetrated the structure of the State, and 
not only in Sicily'. The Commission stated that the mafia 
with its extraordinary flexibility has always known how to 
survive and prosper in every surrounding, that it has succeeded 
in doning so by asserting itself as an autonomous extralegal 
1. ibid. 
2. ibid; M. Pantaleone, op. cit.: 195-225. 
3. G. Servadio, op. cit.: 214. 
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power, by forging links with public power in order to operate 
within them, and manipulate them for its own ends. 
1 The 
Commission observed that 'although the Mafia has lost its 
former prestige with the Sicilian population, it still thrives 
and has transformed itself, as its custom, keeping pace with 
developments in society at large'. 
2 The Commission believes 
that the mafia has implanted its roots in the Northern regions 
of Italy and penetrated the banking and credit business, the 
tax collecting firms, the wholesale markets, and is active in 
the 'web of unrevealable relations that the Mafia continues 
to keep with public institutions'. 
3 
The great hopes of exposing the mafia and wiping it out 
through the new weapon of the Commission have so far remained 
an illusion. The Commission; s recommendations, such as 
measures against reticent witnesses and confiscation of 
property acquired through mafia activities aimed at hitting 
neo-capitalist mafia at its economic roots, were reported to 
have been received with less enthusiasm by the government. 
When the volumes of the Commission's report were published, 
it is said that every effort was made to confuse their 
message and diminish their value, and that the work of 'the 
Commission was drowned in a sea of slande. 
4 In its later 
publication, the Antimafia Commission noted that magistrates, 
trade unionists, prefects, journalists and police authorities 
1. ibid.: 217-218. 
2. ibid.: 219. 
3. ibid; M. Pantaleone, op. cit. 
4. The Antimafia Commission not only developed the history of 
the links between mafia and public power in Sicily, what it is, what it has been, and why it has not been eliminated, it 
also handed to both Chambers and to the nation a document 
which frankly shows the weaknesses and the lack of courage in denouncing the links which all parties, excluding the 
Socialists and Communists, have kept with the mafia, the traditional procurer of votes; G. Servadio, op. cit.; 220. 
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expressed an affirmative judgment on the existence of more or 
less intimate links between the mafia and the public author- 
ities and that some trade unionists were of the view that 
the mafioso is a man of politics. 
1 
In fact, it can be said that no institution in Sicily 
is immune from, and beyond the reach of, the mafia. King and 
Okey have noted that where the mafia is strong, it is imposs- 
'ible, for a candidate to win a parliamentary or local election 
unless he promises it his protection. 
2 The same situation 
prevailed in the U. S. with regards to the strength of the 
syndicates in deciding the outcome of municipal and local 
elections as late as the 1950s. 
3 'Thus it has its patrons 
in the Senate Chambers, who use it for political and worse 
ends; and the government has its well-understood relations 
with the mafiosi grand electors.... '4 
The Mafia's penetration of the structure of the State 
does not appear to stop with the legislative branch of the 
government but can be observed in the operation of the 
judiciary, especially when the person on trial is a mafioso. 
Such trials are usually marked by their extreme slowness; 
and a slow judiciary machine often favours the mafioso's 
methods of operation; documents often disappear, and real 
minutes in the file are replaced by the fake ones. 
Witnesses against the mafioso, even if they could read and 
write, could be declared illiterate. 
5 
1. ibid.: 216-217. 
2. Bolton King and T Okey, Italy toda , London, 1909: 121-122; G. Servadio, 'The Political Untouchables who Protect the 
Mafia', op. cit. 
3. See, for instance, K. Allsop, The Bootleggers and their Era, 
New York, 1961; J. Landesco, Organize rime in icago, Chicago, 
1968, among others. 
4. B. King and T. Okey, op. cit. 
5. G. Servadio, op. cit.: 46. 
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The Antimafia Commissions of the seventies revealed that 
judges tend to dimiss the evidence offered by the police too 
quickly, while giving too much weight to the retraction of 
witnesses in court, and that the judge evidently often 
follow higher instructions. 1 The acquittal of mafiosi 
usually results from 'insufficiency of proof' which has 
become the standard formula under which cases brought against 
mafiosi are eventually committed to oblivion, and nine times 
out of ten it covers up the fact that essential witnesses 
have suddenly decided to retract their damaging evidence. 
2 
This widespread corruption of the social structure of the 
Sicilian society is apparently not of recent origin but was 
in evidence before the middle of the last century, as we have 
already noted. 
Structure of-the Network 
The degree of immunity which members of organized crime 
enjoy in any society and the extent of their penetration of 
the different levels of that society is directly related to ; 
the nature and composition of their crime network. 
Like their counterparts*in the U. S, Hong Kong, 
1. G. servadio, op. cit.: 113-114. 
2. N. Lewis, op. Cit.: 48; H. Hess, op. cit.: 48; J. and P. 
Schneider, op. cit.: 192-193. During the trial of Raffaele 
Palizzolo for e murder of Enanuele Notarbartolo in 1899, 
for instance, Colajanni later wrote, "Although all the 
magistrates were convinced that the basic material out of 
which to build a trial pointed towards Polizzolo, they all 
cooperated to put him in the clear, and were more than 
satisfied if they could wind everything up with the formula 
'impossible to proceed for lack of evidence, "' see, G. Servadio, op. cit.: 46; H. Hess, op. cit.: 84. 
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and Japan' which have networks of powerful individuals whose 
interests are usually served by the criminals, the mafia too has 
its own network of powerful collaborators: political office 
holders at all levels of government, judges, law enforcers, 
doctors and lawyers. These enable the mafioso to withstand and 
evade the impact of legal and governmental apparatus in return for 
a variety of services which the mafioso can provide. 
2 The 
network of powerful patrons for whom he has performed services 
provides the mafioso with a zone of influence, a circle of 
'friends' to whom he can turn should he need to obtain an 
unimpeachable alibi for a client, a job for a poor relative, or a 
lucrative business deal for himself. 3 The services which the 
mafioso renders to his powerful friends are indeed countless, 
depending on the situation. They may range from collecting a long 
outstanding debt to regulating a family feud, and from seeing that 
1. See, for instance, W. J. Chambliss, On the Take: op. cit.: 
61-80; F. Pearce, op. cit.: 131-152; F. Robertson. Triangle of 
Death: The inside Story of the Triads-Chinese Mafia, London, 
F. Bresler, The Chinese Mafia, New York, 1981; F. Rome, The 
Tattooed Men, New York, 1975. 
2. Consider, for example, the case of Tommaso Buscetta who 
recently made international headlines when he turned government 
informer and named other mafiosi in Italy and overseas. In 1961, 
after killing Angelo La Barbera, he needed a passport and so he 
asked the Questore of the police, Jacovacci. On the same day a 
letter had come from Francesco Barbaccia, deputy for the Christian 
Democrat party: 'Gentilissimo Signor dottore Jacovacci, I beg you 
to allow the renewal of a passport to Signor Tommaso Buscetta, a 
person in whom I am very interested. - Being sure that you will 
comply, I thank you and greet you cordially", see Servadio, op_ 
cit.: 216. 
3. J. Boissevain, 'Poverty and Politics in a Sicilian Agro-town', 
International Archives of Ethnography, volume 56,1966: 198-236. 
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the son of a respected lawyer or doctor receives top marks at 
school (by threatening the boy's teacher) to protecting a 
large landed estate against the inroads of an agricultural 
cooperative seeking to take it over. 
' 
The vulnerability of politicians and administrators 
often helps feed the popular belief that all constituted 
authorities, whether priest or sacristan, are corrupt -a 
belief that appears to be held by people at all social 
levels in Sicily. It helps perpetuate the idea that favou- 
rable decisions can be obtained if only the right pressure 
applied. This attitude, in combination with the social 
distance which separates the masses from the constituted 
authorities, has operated to create a social role for the 
intermediary or protector who can intercede with the 
authorities on behalf of his client, 
2 
and who is known to 
be in alliance with the ruling class. 
It can be argued that in the absence of this alliance 
and network, of patrons which the mafia has built over the 
years, it would have been difficult to see how it could have 
existed in its present form in Sicily today. While some 
writers have argued that the mafia was almost eliminated 
during the Fascist regime of Mussolini but for the 
intervention of the Allied Military Government headed by the 
1. ibid. 
2. ibid.: 220. 
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U. S.., ' there are others who think that the phenomenon 
merely went underground or was driven out of the cities to 
the mountain areas of western Sicily. 
2 Whatever the true 
picture was, there was abundant evidence to suggest that the 
activities of the mafia were drastically curtailed by Mori 
during the period; 
3 however, it would appear that the 
powerful, political elements, with mafia connections remained 
largely untouched. 
4 Although the American Army's 
involvement with the mafia during the occupation of Sicily 
remains a controversial matter, it would appear that their 
appointment of well-known mafiosi as mayors and councillors 
and the subsequent restoration of democracy helped reinstate 
the mafia back to its full powers and returned to the 
'Onorata Sorieta' the weapons which Fascism had snatched away 
from it. 5 
Although Mori's repressive measures were aimed not only 
at the mafiosi but also at left-wing elements, yet his action 
demonstrated that there could be no role for an intermediary 
in any society in which the State assumes its 
economy-regulating and security functions and moves against 
1. G. Schiavo, The Truth About the Mafia and Organized Crime 
in America, El Paso, Texas, 1967: 15- 
2. A. W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, New 
York, 1972: 200 M. Pantaleone, op. c it..: 52. 
3. Cesare Mori, The Last Struggle with the Mafia, London, 
1933.. 
4. G. Servadio, 'The political untouchables who protect the 
Mafia', op. cit. 
5. A. W. McCoy, op. cit.; N. Lewis, op. cit.: 49; M. 
Pantaleone, op. c it.: 54-55. 
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all formsof private use of force. 
' The mafia has been able 
to thrive in Sicily because it found the social structure 
conducive to its growth and existence. In reality, the mafia 
does not exist for the mafioso only, but also for the 
powerful, 'respectable' elements in the society who compose 
its network. While most of the daily papers in the country 
vie with each other in describing its criminal methods and 
activities, they usually keep silent about the connections 
between the mafia and the country's political 
representatives. It has been observed that there are still 
many people in Sicily who continue, in all good faith, to 
look on the mafia as an instrument for keeping order where 
the state does not exercise its authority sufficiently, or is 
too weak to control certain situations, and who do not 
recognize it as a criminal force which prevents the legal 
government from discharging its function. 
2 
As the sociologist Sabino Acquaviva has noted, the 
mafia, in order to thrive, needs a very precise social and 
cultural environment, mainly characterized by parasitism. 
'Until a few years ago, due to its history, this was a 
characteristic of the South. Now, little by little, all the 
country has become infected; Rome started with its patronage, 
which quickly spread. It is for this reason that the mafia 
1. In describing how the people came into line, Mori noted 
that as soon as the traditional and compulsory Omerta had 
been overcome, the people of Sicily, seized with an impulse 
for freedom, were everyday joining more closely with the 
government in common action, C. Mori, The Last Struggle with 
the Mafia, op. cit.: 186. 
2. M. Pantaleone, op. cit.: 260. 
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can extend itself and find a grip in the North... '1 
Certainly, the practice of banishing convicted. mafiosi, the 
so-called saggiorno obligato, has only served to infect areas 
which were still uncontaminated by the phenomenon. It has 
been observed that Britain would be a difficult field for 
real mafia penetration because the basis of mafia power, 
political protection, would be difficult to secure. Not only 
because of the interchanging of ruling parties, but because 
legalized corruption assures clean money for future company 
directors. 2 Like-all political and economic institutions 
that have to change with the changing times in order to 
survive, the mafia too has learned to adapt to the changing 
situations in Sicily in recent times: the willingness and 
ability of the government to take on the Mafia, the abolition 
of the latifondo system, the economic boom in the country in 
the, 1950s and 1960s, the 'great transformation' exemplified 
in northwards migration, and so on. All these have thus laid 
the premises for a radical change in the 'meaning' and forms 
of mafioso power and behaviour. 
3 
Adaptation and Change 
The Sicilian mafia has adapted remarkably to the 
economic, industrial as well as political changes that have 
1. Quoted in G. Servadio, op. cit.: 260. 
2. G. Servadio, op. cit. 273. 
3. P. Arlacchi, op. cit.; E. J. Hobsbawm, op. cit. 
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taken place in Italy since the 1940s. 
1 Hitherto the 
mafia's success in the Sicilian society has been largely due 
to the failure of the Socialist-Communist movement and the 
weakness of the State in dealing with the phenomenon. Anton 
Blok has argued that the failure of peasants to change their 
society through socialism was intimately related to the 
success of mafia. 
2 Its 'alliance' with the power structure 
made it all but impossible for the leaders of the Sicilian 
fasci (peasant movement) to weld it into an effective-trade 
union movement. For instance, in 1893, a regional Socialist 
congress met in Sicily, but not long afterward Crispi, the 
then Prime Minister, on the advice of Sicilian deputies to 
Parliament, imposed martial law and dissolved the fasci by 
force. 3 A second uprising in 1897-1898 was similarly 
repressed. That a socialist mdvement should have failed to 
coalesce among Sicilian peasants appears to be consistent 
with Eric Wolf's observation that peasants must have leverage 
if they are to sustain a revolt, 
4 
and they must have enough 
freedom from their oppressors to grow their own food and 
1. The need to follow the wind of change is probably a common 
characteristic among all organized criminals everywhere, and 
is probably dictated by the desire for survival. Similar 
adaptation has been noted in respect of organized criminals 
in other countries; see for instance, W. P. Morgan, The Triad 
Societies in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 1982; F. Rome, op. cit.; 
J. L. An, op. cit. 
2. A. Blok, Mafia and Peasant Rebellion, op. cit. 
3. J. and P. Schneider, op. cit.: 123. 
4. E. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, New York, 
Harper & Row, . 
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food for their guerrillas and leaders. 
' Such leverage, 
however, was not possible for Sicilian peasants by the close 
of the last century as mafiosi in particular, and other 
broker capitalists in general, not only assisted the 
repression of the fasci but also held out the alternative of 
jobs, favours and protection to at least some client peasants 
willing to join their ranks.? 
A number of events, however, took place in the early 
part of the present century which weakened the mafia's hold 
on its traditional mainstay, the latifundist economy, and 
which led to its decline. Among these was the rise of 
Fascism under Mussolini which loosened the mafia's hold on 
the latifondo and its overwhelming influence in the 
nomination and election of political leaders. It has been 
3 
argued, however, that the Fascist campaign against the mafia 
revealed its growing weakness more than they contributed to 
it, and that it ended with very much the same tacit working 
agreement between the local men of wealth and power and the 
central government as before. 
4 Nevertheless, by abolishing 
.. elections 
Fascism effectively deprived the mafia of its main 
currency for purchasing concessions from Rome. 
1. H. Alavi, 'Peasants and Revolutions' in The Socialist 
Register, R. Miliband and J. Saville (eds. ), London, 5. 
2. J. and P. Schneider, ope cit: 124. 
3. M. 'Pantaleone o. cit.: 44; A. Blok, The Mafia of a 
Sicilian Villa e, , op. c t.: 181-182; G. Sch avo, op. 
cit. :. 
4. E. J. Hobsbawm, op. cit.: 47. 
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Secondly, the rise of the peasant leagues and the Socialists 
(later Communists) which provided Sicilians with an 
alternative to mafia, while at the same time alienating them 
from a body which was now considered a terrorist force 
directed againsts the Left, tended to diminish the base of 
mafia's power. 
' The series of clashes between the mafia 
and the Socialist-Communists and the massacres at Villalba 
(1944) and at Portella della Ginestra (1947), the attempted 
assassination of the leading Sicilian Communist Girolamo Li 
Causi and the killing of various union organizers, all helped 
to widen the gap during the post-fascist period. 
2 The rise 
of the Socialist-Communist votes since 1946 has been marked 
in the most mafia-riddled provinces and this trend has 
continued tp the present time. This would appear to suggest 
that the mafia is no longer able to contol local elections 
and that consequently it has lost much of the power that 
comes from patronage. This situation has tended to reduce 
its political role to that of a powerful pressure group. 
3 
Thirdly, the rivalries and differences between the 'old' 
and the 'young' mafia have generated during the first post 
World War period profound internal divisions and dissensions 
that broke up the cohesion of the mafia on which much of its 
1. ibid: 44-5; G. Servadio, op. cit.: 44, G. Schiavo, op. cit.: 
84-5. 
2. M.. Pantaleone, op. cit.; 12-13,88-89,155,203; 
N. Lewis, The Honoured Societ : 150-153,157-163; A. Blok, 
op. c it.: 204-205. 
3. E. J. Hobsbawm, op. cit.: 45; G. Schiavo, op. cit.: 83. 
106. 
strength depended. 
' Added to all these was the ability of 
the government to exercise its authority, albeit in a limited 
way, against the mafia, especially in recent years... In the 
circumstances the mafia probably realized that if it was to 
survive, it would have to expand its business and economic 
horizon beyond the control of the latifondo. 
2 Perhaps the 
first warning to the mafia of the government's determination 
to take control of the situation and which apparently was 
instrumental in compelling the mafia to look beyond the feudo 
came in 1951 when the Sicilian Regional Asssembly passed the 
Land Reclamation Act which prohibited any one person in 
Sicily from owning more than 500 acres of land. At the same 
time the government set up Boards to oversee land reclamation 
and reform.. This Act was further strengthed by the 
Gullo-Segni Act which prohibited sub-letting of feudo and 
which thus hampered the mafia's traditional hold on the rural 
areas of Sicily; and it did away with the old system of 
gabellotto, supervisors and campieri. 
3 Nevertheless, the 
mafia continued to influence the rural economy in Sicily 
through its control of the Boards just mentioned. With the 
intention of fostering lucrative activities outside the 
traditional scope of the feudo, the mafia has managed to work 
1. ibid: 46-47; M. Pantaleone, op. cit.: 170-172; 
G. Schiavo, op. cit.: 81" 
2. M. "Pantaleone, op. cit. 
3. M. Pantaleone, op. cit.: 167; E. J. Hobsbawn, op. cit., 48-49. 
107. 
itself into nearly all the public offices of the Regional 
government: offices dealing with the provision of licences 
and concessions, with contracts for public works, roads, 
bridges and land reclamation. 
' Government contracts always 
seemed to go to the mafioso, even though his tenders are 
usually the highest. While the mafia doctor gets all the 
patients and can always find a hospitl bed in a hurry, the 
mafia advocate usually has all the briefq he can handle, and 
his clients usually win their cases. 
2 
Although the processes of 'mediation', 'protection' and 
control of the market have long been the traditional sources 
of income, it may now appear that these activities may no 
longer be able to afford the mafiosi sufficient income as in 
the past in-the changing political, economic and industrial 
situation of the society. The evolution of the mafiosi into 
big corporate entrepreneurs can be explained in terms of the 
economic and social disintegration that has taken place in 
Italy during the 1970s, and which has acted as a catalyst for 
the accumulation of wealth for the mafiosi. - Their entry 
into industrial competition on a massive scale since the 
1970s can be viewed as a form of diversification of economic 
operations similar to the techniques employed by the American 
syndicates which the authorities there consider as a form of 
1. M. Pantaleone, op. cit.: 169. 
2. N. Lewis, The Honoured Society, op. cit.: 70. 
3. P. Arlacchi, op. cit. 
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'infiltration' of legitimate business .1 More important in 
the declining fortunes of the mafia has been the reassertion 
by the State of its legitimate authority in recent years. 
The trial of 475 accused mafiosi currently underway in 
Palermo and which is said to be the largest mafia trial in 
Italian history is expected by the government to mark a 
turning point in its long fight against the mafia. 
2 Such a 
mass trial would probably not have been possible in the past 
decades when no informer from the mafia rank dared point his 
finger at the members of the organization, and when the 
Italian Parliament was dominated by its sympathizers. 
3 How 
far the government will succeed in this latest war against 
the mafia remains to be seen, for in the past the mafiosi had 
usually been acquitted for 'lack of sufficient evidence'. 
4 
As astute businessmen with their eyes always on the 
business that is most lucrative at any given period of time, 
the mafiosi in recent years appear to have shifted their 
operations more to drug trafficking and kidnappings which 
usually yield enormous profits for capital expansion - 
1. See, for instance, W. A. Moore, The Kefauver Committee and 
the Politics of Crime 1950-1952, Columbia, Missouri, : 
IX, for a criticism of this view which has been articulated 
by Cressey and others; D. R. Cressey, Theft of the Nation, 
op. cit. 
2. Associated Press: 'Security tight as Largest Mafia Trial 
Opens'. The Toronto Star, February 11,1986: A3 
3. M. Pantaleone, op. cit.; G. Servadio, op. cit. 
4. N. Lewis, op. cit. 
F 
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capital for the acquisition of commodities, machinery, 
buildings and labour. It is generally believed that the 
mafiosi from the Piana di Gioia who kidnapped Paul Getty Jr. 
used the multi-million lire ransom to buy the lorries needed 
to obtain the monopoly over the transportation of materials 
used in the construction of an industrial port. 
' Although 
this was one of such cases that received worldwide news 
coverage, there are thousands of others that ususally go 
unreported by the media every year. 
2 Further accumulation 
of capital is often sought through trafficking in narcotics, 
arms, precious metals, and a whole range of illegal 
activities that tend to give mafiosi competitive advantage 
over their 'normal' competitors. Experts on drug trafficking 
believe that mafia's deep involvement in international 
narcotics began shortly after the last world war when Lucky 
Luciano was released from an American prison and deported to 
Sicily; that shortly afterwards he established a network of 
clandestine laboratories in Sicily, and that Sicily continues 
to be a major distributing centre of drugs originating from 
the Middle East and, more recently, from the Golden Triangle 
in Asia, whence they are piped to various European cities and 
1. P. Arlacchi, op. cit.,; G. Servadio, 'The Kidnapping 
Industry', Evening Standard' 5 July, 1974" 
2. Traditionally, the feudal landowners and the middle class 
of Sicily had been left in peace - unless they had committed 
a sgarro, an offence. When their sons were kidnapped they 
were usually released unharmed by tacit agreement, without 
police interference. However, in recent years all cases of 
kidnappings appear to have been the sons of the really rich; 
see G. Servadio, op. cit.: 255. 
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North America. ' For the mafioso, the accumulation of 
capital is not only necessary to carry out a wide range of 
economic activities, but it provides 'an avenue to power and 
social mobility'* 
2 
Indeed, the sociological perspectives advanced by 
Sombart and Vablen in respect of the marginal groups' 
attachment to the pursuit of wealth may be equally germane in 
the case of the mafiosi and their counterparts in other 
societies. They advanced the view that a close link exists 
between the excluded members of society and their tendency to 
engage in entrepreneurism. 
3 Just as the Jews, 
non-comformists and foreigners were able to profit from their 
marginal status in society during the early stages of 
capitalism, so it would appear that the same status and 
tendency has driven the mafiosi today to throw everything 
into the all-out pursuit of maximum profit. In so far as 
they view themselves as 'excluded' members of society, the 
1. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics in the U. S. has 
consistently argued that much of the narcotics entering the 
U. S. could be traced to Sicilians who sit astride the trade 
--routes from Eastern Mediterranean sources, and that it is the 
work of a secret organization, the Mafia, which possesses 
considerable influence in local affairs in Sicily; see D. C. 
Smith, op. cit.: 187; Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of 
Heroin, op. cit.: 24-25; see also Harry J. Ans linger, The 
Murderers, New York, 1961; Ed Reid, Mafia: Cosa Nostra 
Synd cate, New York, 1964: chapter 7. 
2. For an analysis of organized crime as a queer ladder of 
social mobility, see D. Bell, The End of Ideolo , New York, 1967:. 129. It has been said that cre t concess ons from 
banks to notorious mafiosi have been used to finance, 
directly or indirectly, illicit trade and traffic with frightening social cost for society as a whole; G. Servadio, 
op. cit.: 216. 
3. Warner Sombart, The Jews and Modern Capitalism, Illinois, 
1951: 169-190, T. Ve en, TeT eory o Leisure-Class, 
London, 1925: 188-211. 
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pursuit of wealth appears to assume a much greater 
significance than for other social groupings, capital and its 
accumulation representing the sole avenue to the acquisition 
of power and honour. 
' 
Today, however, the mafia is no longer just an 
instrument for defending other people's interests, but a 
political and economic institution like the banks, trade 
unionism and religion, and its goal is the quick accumulation 
of wealth and power in a land of widespread poverty. 
2 No 
one would argue that the mafia was imposed upon the Sicilian 
society, but rather it'was brought about by the process which 
the economic and political development took in Sicily, and in 
which Sicilians found themselves victims of their own making. 
Whereas it used to be concerned with the organized 
exploitation of agriculture and cattle breeding, it has 
expanded its activities into such areas as graft and bribery 
in the business of regional offices and financial 
institutions, in the drawing up of building contracts, the 
organization of international drug traffick and smuggling, 
the control of urban rackets, and the conquest of political 
power. 
3 It has apparently none of the characteristics 
1. Arlacchi, op. cit.: 68; D. Bell, o. cit.: 141-146; A. 
Block, East SU -e-West Side: Organizing Crime in New York 
1930-19 50,. 2p. c it.: . 
2. M. Pantaleone, op. cit.: 231. 
3. J. -and P. Schneider, op. cit.: 184, M. Pantaleone, op. 
cit.: 170-171,231-232. 
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generally attributed to it in popular and clandestine 
literature: a national or supreme head in Palermo, a rigidly 
defined hierarchy of positions, specific rules and rituals, 
and so on. 
' Nor is it a centralized organization, as has 
often been claimed. 2 
Despite its use of unlicensed violence, it can be argued 
that the mafia could not have assumed its present form in 
Sicily in the absence of free market for labour and goods, 
the institution of a universal suffrage and electoral 
politics, all of which, with the exception of universal 
suffrage, are features"of democratic capitalist societies. 
It is clear that it is only in such societies, in the absence 
of countervailing factors, that the mafia and similar brands 
of organized crime can find a foothold on a permanent basis. 
In the next chapter we shall examine the development and 
.. evolution of a parallel and almost 
identical but distinct 
brand of organized crime across the Atlantic which has been 
popularly but wrongly identified as 'the Mafia. 
1. C. Mori, op. cit.: 39-40. 
2. Rather than being a centralized organization with one 
supreme head, the Mafia structure is known to consist of a 
cosca (plural cosche), which is an individual group of 
mafiosi or a group of 'friend-of- friends'. All the cosche 
engaged in identical enterprises often join in an alliance 
called consorteria. All the consorterie in Sicily are said 
to constitute the Mafia phenomenon known to its members as 
the Onorata Societa; G. Schiavo, op. cit.: 52; A. Blok, 





The Sicilian mafia has been defined in various ways and 
researchers are still trying to come to grips with the 
phenomenon conceptually, empirically, and as a social 
problem. No one even can say with absolute certainty how and 
from where the word 'mafia' originated, 
' 
which has now been 
employed in a variety of senses. It is said to have resulted 
from an intricate history of injustice, from unlawful 
practice of the law, from many years of misgovernment and 
mismanagement, and overbearing despotism of colonial rule in 
which Sicilians developed widespread mistrust and hostility 
toward all State organs and opted for an informal system of 
self-help institutions to solve their problems. The mafia 
can be traced to a situation in which the weak, modern state 
superimposed itself on a marginal peasant society which was 
still largely feudal in its basic features, and where the 
State failed to monopolize the use of physical force in large 
areas of western Sicily. Essentially, the mafia is believed 
to have evolved in Sicily out of the tensions between the 
" central government and local landowners on the one hand, and 
between the latter and the tenant peasants on the other, thus 
creating the role of a middle man and power broker who 
1. For the various theories regarding the origin of the word 'mafia', see, among others, J. L. Albini, op. cit.: 91-106; 
N. Lewis, o. cit.: 23; Ed Reid, The Grim Reapers: -  ers: the 
Anatomy of -Organized Crime in America, C cago, 1969: - 3-4; H. 
Hess, 2. c it. ' 3; F. A. Tann with E. Reuss-Lanni, A 
Family Business, New York, 1972: 25; and A. Bequai, op. 
c t. -. 
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provided a specific code through which members of the various 
social class and groups arranged and rearranged themselves in 
a new 'modus vivendi'. Mafia's operations in Sicily and its 
existence hitherto have apparently been made possible through 
its symbiotic accommodation with its powerful masters in 
strategic postions in the society and who compose its 
network. Whereas initially the mafia used to be concerned 
with the organized exploitation of agriculture and cattle 
breeding, it has switched into such activities as graft and 
bribery in the drawing up of building contracts, in the 
business of regional offices and financial institutions, the 
organization of international smuggling, the control of urban 
markets and the conquest of political power. The mafia has 
attained such economic and political power in Sicily that it 
can today be justifiably described as a political and 
economic institution. The mafia in the Sicilian context can 
best be viewed as a result of class struggle, and it is hard 
to reject a Marxist vision of history in dealing with this 
phenomenon, as the social development is the result of 
economic causes. The history of the mafia in Sicily can best 
be described sociologically as one of continuing conflict, 
cooperation, and accomodation in which the mafiosi have 
invariably allied themselves with the power structure to 
maintain the status quo. On the basis of mafia's entrenched 
position in Sicily, one can argue that only a successful 
socialist revolution, coupled with radical economic 
rearrangements, can eliminate its existence. 
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ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA 
INTRODUCTION 
In our study of the evolution of the mafia phenomenon in 
Sicily, we saw that certain political and economic conditions 
not only facilitated its final emergence but also have served 
to maintain and sustain its long existence in that country. 
We suggested that organized crime can be viewed as a 
particular kind of seed which can thrive only if it finds the 
right soil and climate-conducive to its growth. 
In this chapter, we shall attempt to explore the hows 
and whys organized crime in the United States has persisted 
for many generations through all the vicissitudes of internal 
and inter-syndicate conflicts, has survived many committees 
of enquiry, and has continued to flourish in the face of 
massive law-enforcement mobilizations. Most contemporary 
theories of organized crime in America are usually framed in 
terms of the 'mafia' phenomenon and often view the first as 
being synonomous with the second. This analysis, which is 
based on the assumption that organized crime in America is 
probably imported from abroad and is the work of one 
particular ethnic group, has for many years served to mask the 
role which the 'respectable' members of the society, as in 
the case of Sicily, have played in sustaining the existence 
of organized crime in the country. Just as the existence of 
the mafia is intertwined with the Sicilian society, the 
existence of the crime syndicates in America should be sought 
in the characteristics of that society. 
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More specifically, the chapter examines the matrix of 
organized crime in America, the application of the 'mafia' 
label in the country, 'mafia' and 'organized crime' as two 
distinct, separate entities, characteristics of the 
activities of American syndicates, the role of the 
'respectable' members of the society, the composition of the 
crime networks in America, organized crime as servant to the 
power structure: its symbiosis with politicians, law 
enforcers and union leaders; how it has served as an 
alternative route to wealth and power, possible future 
successors to the 'throne' of organized crime in the country. 
It argues that organized crime is as characteristic of 




In examining the phenomenon of organized crime in the 
United States and elsewhere, we should like to preface our 
remarks by observing that virtually any country is capable of 
developing the phenomenon at any point in time, if the 
necessary conditions prevail at the time; however, when it 
persists over decades of years, one must look for the 
explanation in the historical and cultural context of the 
society, as well as the nature of its political economy. 
Just as the mafist spirit nurtured over many decades 
eventually contributed to the development of organized crime 
in Sicily in the form of the mafia, so too there were and 
still are certain specific forces which have made possible 
the development of organized crime in the United States. 
It is noted that right from its foundation the United 
States has manifested symptoms of a lawless society in which 
a class of professional criminals and organized gangs' took 
the law into their hands in the name of inalienable 
- rights. 
2 Despite the complexity of the society, American 
1. For the activities of various criminal gangs in the United 
States before the turn of the century and shortly after, see 
Herbert Asbury, The Gangs of New York: An Informal History of 
the Underworld, New York, 1927; em, The Barbary Coast: An 
Informal H stor of the San Francisco Underworld, London, 
em, The French Quarter: An informal story of New 
Orleans Underworl , New York, 1938, i dem The Underworld o Chicago: An Informal History of the Chicago Underworld-, 
London, 1941. 
2. Even during its colonial period, the colonists were known 
to obey such laws as they approved individually and usually 
evaded unwelcome regulations that interfered with their 
convenience or profit and always insisted that acts of Parliament which went contrary to their 'inalienable rights' 
were void; see, Gus Tyler, 'The Roots of Organized Crime', 
Crime and Delinquency, volume 8 (October 1962): 235-338. 
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law-makers, unlike their counterparts in other countries, 
have more often resorted to criminal law as an effective 
means of regulating behaviour and forbidding satisfactions 
which are in wide demand - acts which in simpler societies 
are more effectively controlled through mores and public 
opinion. 
' This attitude, however has not usually resulted 
in better observance of the law; on the contrary, it has 
predictably led to more violations of it. As Adams notes, 
'any law that goes counter to the strong feelings of a large 
part of the population is bound to be disobeyed in 
America'2. It may be easy to explain the origins of the 
development of organized crime in America in terms of the 
effects of the Prohibition, criminal immigrants to the new 
world, the two World Wars, or the economic depression of the 
thirties, all of which may have caused enormous widespread 
social disorders resulting in group criminality. These 
events, however, constitute an insufficient account because 
organized crime in America is not a child of institutions or 
events which Americans would normally view as 'evil' but, on 
the contrary, it is believed to have developed from such 
forces and events which they would proudly proclaim as 
essentially 'noble'. 
3 
Even though Prohibition served to streamline syndicated 
activities, it apparently did not start the cartelization of 
crime, contrary to popular belief; nor did organized crime in 
1. D. R. Taft and R. W. England Jr., Criminology, 4th ed. New 
York, 1964: 23. 
2. James T. Adams, Our Business Civilization, London, 1929: 
101. 
3. G. Tyler, op. cit. 
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America originate from the wave of immigration, or the 
often-publicized 'mafia' which was supposed to have been 
imported from abroad. 
' Adams rightly dismissed these 
arguments which tended to place the blame on the foreigners. 
He notes that the Eighteenth Amendment (which ushered in 
Prohibition) was operating upon a population which was 
already the most lawless in spirit of any in the great modern 
civilized countries. 
2 In his view, "lawlessness has been 
and remains one of the most distinctive American traits.... It 
is impossible to blame the situation on the foreigners. The 
overwhelming mass of them were law-abiding in their native 
lands. If they become lawless here it must be largely due to 
the American atmosphere and conditions. 
0 
One of the critical factors which has sustained the 
existence of organized crime in the United States and which 
is not readily evident in other capitalist democracies is the 
insipid 'alliance' or symbiotic accommodation between 
organized criminals and holders of official power, Sicily 
being an exception. This 'entente cordiale' which has been 
the subject of enquiry by several special-committees and 
commissions of the Senate, as in the case of Italy, has long 
1. For the anthropological controversy and argument about 
'diffusion versus independent invention' see, among others, 
Melville J. Herskovitz, Man and His Works, New York, 1956. 
2. J. T. Adams, op. cit. 
3. ibid. 
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presented an insoluble dilemma to the American society. 
' 
In a society in which there is faith in law without expecting 
or approving obedience to all laws, it would not be suprising 
that the more intelligent criminals hardly distinguish 
themselves from non-criminals as law-breakers in a society of 
law-keepers. 2 This kind of individualistic bias toward the 
law often presents a contradictory stance in a society that 
for treating social problems. As Schlesinger observes in 
this regard, 'for from taking the law into one's hands when 
it could not function, it was but a step to taking the law 
into one's hands when it did not function as one wanted it 
to. i3 It is generally acknowledged that the institution of 
Prohibition in 1920 in America was as a result of the 
influence of its puritanical ethics which originated with the 
early settlers and which continues to colour its moral codes 
long after the minorities ceased to practise such ethics. 
The exponents of Prohibition apparently sought to justify its 
institution by linking drink with alien influence, racial 
4 degeneracy and bolshevism. 
1. See, for instance, The Wickersham Commission Report of 
1931 on the enforcement of Prohibition in New Yor ; The 
Kefauver Committee: Senate Special Committee to invests ate 
Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, 81st Congress, First, 
Second and Third Interim Reports, 1950-1951; The McClellan 
Committee: Senate Select Committee on 
'Improper 
Activities in 
the Labour or Management Field, 85th Congress, second 
session, Hear ngs, Parts 1-58: First and Second Interim 
Reports, Washington, D. C. 1958-1963. 
2. D. R. Taft and R. W. England, op. cit.: 31- 
3. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Paths to the Present, New York, 
1949: 15. 
4. Andrew Sinclair, Prohibition: Era of Excess, London, 
1965: 107. 
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For a nation that believes in the accumulation of wealth 
as an end itself, a puritan heritage, superimposed on a 
materialistic culture, would only create a widespread 
hypocrisy in which Americans collectively outlawed the goods 
in which they privately relish. In the ensuing inner clash 
of values, organized criminals saw the opportunity to provide 
the 'outlawed' goods and services that were in great demand 
by the 'respectable' members of the society. 
' 
It would appear that a lawless heritage by its very 
nature is incompatible with an ethical principle bent on 
forbidding and restraining individual expressions of basic 
instincts and appetites; the resulting contradiction was even 
obvious in the activities of the early Puritans to the new 
world. As Adams notes, 'the foundation of the strongest of 
the puritan colonies was tainted with illegality from the 
start. i2 Despite the practice of this 'noble' ethic, it is 
common knowledge that the foundation of many a distinguished 
older American fortune was laid by sharp practices and 
morally reprehensible methods involving shady speculations 
and a not inconsiderable amount of violence. 
3 They often 
ignored, circumvented, or stretched the law when it stood in 
their way, or were themselves the law when it served their 
purposes. This has not prevented them and their descendants 
from feeling proper moral outrage when, under the changed 
1. G. Tyler, op. cit.: 333 
2. James T. Adams, 'Our Lawless Heritage' Atlantic Monthly, 
December 1928. 
3. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideolo : On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, New York, 1968: 148, 
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circumstances of the crowded urban environments, latecomers 
pursued equally ruthless tactics. 
' It has been a tactic 
well suited to the operation of criminal syndicates. There 
may be some truth in Max Lerner's observation that moral 
indignation is a peculiar fact of middle-class psychology and 
represents a disguised form of repressed envy. 
2 
Bell appropriately points out that Catholic cultures 
have rarely imposed such restrictions and have rarely suffer- 
ed such excesses. 'Even in Anglican England, prostitution is 
a commonplace of Piccadilly night life, and gambling one of 
the largest and most popular industries. i3 The paradox of 
restricting and relishing in common vices like gambling4 
and prostitution perhaps lies in the fact that Americans have 
traditionally had an extra-ordinary talent for compromise in 
politics and extremism in morality. In fact, crime as a grow- 
ing business was fed by the revenues from prostitution, 
liquor and gambling that a wide-open urban society encouraged 
and which a middle-class Protestant ethos tried to suppress 
with a ferocity unmatched in any other civilized country. 
5 
Efforts to legislate human appetites in any society have 
often produced unintended consequences; the American efforts 
to suppress 'immorality' by legislation only provided the 
seed bed out of which organized crime has grown. As Tyler 
observes, 'Our puritanism creates a whole range of illegal 
1. ibid. 
2. Max Lerner, America as a Civilization, London, 1958: 664" 
3. D. Bell, 'Crime as an American Way of Life', The Antioch 
Review, volume 13 (June 1953): 131-154 at 132. 
4. For an overview of gambling in general and reasons why 
people gamble, see Edmund Bergler, The Psychology of Gambling, New ? ork, 1957; Herbert B loch, 'The Sociology of Gam bli ng', The American Journal of Sociology, 57, November, 
1951. 
5. D. Bell, op. cit. 
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commodities and services, for which there is a widespread 
demand. ' Into the gap between what people want and what 
they can legally get leaps the underworld as purveyor and 
pimp with gaming tables, narcotics, and women. In this way 
puritanism appears to give the underworld a monopoly on a 
market with an almost insatiable demand. 
2 
The main goal of organized criminals is no different 
from that of 'respectable' society: the pursuit and achieve- 
ment of wealth and power; a society that is oriented toward 
this goal would naturally be an ideal haven for their activi- 
ties. The pursuit of material wealth as an end itself was 
apparently institutionalized in America by generations of 
'robber barons' whose unethical methods were rationalized as 
expedient and which successive generations have sought to 
emulate. 
3 For an average American, rights and riches are 
the Eldorado; together they constitute the American Dream. 
It is a dream, however, attainable by those who have what it 
takes to compete successfully, while the disadvantaged are 
always lost in the struggle. As Lerner notes, 'since such 
people feel at a strategic disadvantage in the competition of 
life, they feel justified in ignoring the usual inhibitions 
and in tearing down the accepted cement of social 
relations. '4 Such disadvantaged individuals have seen how 
1. For instance, this was the case when the consumption of 
alcohol was prohibited by law in January 1920; Andrew 
Sinclair; Prohibition: Era of Excess, London, 1965: 238. 
2. Gus Tyler, (ed. ) Organized Crime in America: A Book of 
Readings, Ann Arbor, 1962 48. 
3. See M. Josephson, The Robber Barons: The Great American 
Capitalists, New York, 1934; T. Brewer, Te Robber Barons: 
Saints and Sinners?, New York, 1976. 
4. M. Lerner, op. cit. 
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easy money could be made and predacity practised; how the 
rules of the. game are constantly broken and the odds stacked 
against the little 'guy'; they apparently realize there is an 
internal violence in the act of exploiting the market, and 
that in America organized illegality can serve as a tool of 
social ascent. 
' 
When one digs through the social and economic history of 
America, one would find that the ruthless and illegal methods- 
adopted by the early captains of industries in their pursuit of 
wealth are very similar to those which have been utilized by 
modern syndicates in alliance with official power holders in 
pursuit of the same goal. It is a history that drips with the 
sordid account of men and their shady land grants acquired by 
bribing colonial legislatures; of capital amassed in tripartite 
deals among governors, pirates and brokers; of fortunes piled 
up along side the drunk and dead bodies of native Indians; of 
small settlers who were driven from their land or turned into 
tenants by big ranchers employ- ing bandits, rustlers, guns - 
and the law; of railroad builders who used extortion, 
blackmail, bribery, violence, cannons and private armies to 
wreck their competitors and to become the sole boss of the 
trade. 2 Incidentally, these men were considered as 
'enterprising capitalists'. by the moral temper of their time. 
In time, however, they became the very models of a modern major 
gentleman, writing laws and appointing law-enforcers to 
establish legal dominion over their illegally won gains. Very 
few of the robber barons actually had any other. 
1. D. Bell, op. cit.: 133- 
2. G. Tyler, op. cit.: 330. 
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origin, 
l thereby establishing it as a precedent that 
compliance with the law is subordinate to the pursuit of 
property. 
2 
As financial success was accepted in America as the 
highest achievement, it was not until the twentieth century 
did any religious leader venture to advance the un-American 
doctrine that ill-gotten wealth was 'tainted money', even 
when devoted to benevolent uses. 
3 Not only were these 
early buccaneers viewed as heroes rather than villains, their 
social acceptance has tended to dilute the social stigma that 
would normally be attached to ill-gotten wealth in other 
societies. As Lloyd deplores this attitude in America, 'it 
is an adjudicated fact of the business and social life of 
America that to receive the profits of crime and cherish the 
agents who commit it does not disqualify (one) for fellowship 
in the 'most solid' circles - financial, commercial, 
religious, or social. It illustrates what Ruskin calls the 
morbid character of modern business that the history of its 
most brilliant episodes must be studied in the vestibules of 
the penitentiary... Property to the extent of uncounted 
millions has been changed from the possession of the many who 
owned it to the few who hold it... i4 
1. See P. Jones, The Robber Baron Revisted, Boston, 1968. 
2. G. Tyler, op. cit. 
3. D. Bell, op. cit. 
3. Henry D. Lloyd, Wealth Against Commonwealth, New York, 
1894: 512. 
127. 
It was clear to perceptive observers like Lloyd that if their 
civilization would be destroyed, it would not be by 
barbarians from below but by the plutocrats from above. 
' 
The foundation of business ethics thus laid by these 
plutocrats has become a blueprint for successive generations 
with its attendant results. Viewed against this background, 
the urban rackets in America - the illicit activity organized 
for continuing profits is probably a prototype of the 
activities of the early captains of American industries. 
2 
Until the turn of the century, America has always had 
frontiers; though the open frontiers have all disappeared the 
spirit and influence they fostered has continued to linger on 
and make Americans look on the criminal as a modern Robin 
Hood. The spirit of open frontier, as it is portrayed by 
movies and television depicting the eternal struggle between 
the forces of good and evil, has often given rise to 
subcultures where law and order came to represent a foreign 
enemy; it enjoins one to 'grab what you can, hold what you 
3 
can, and live the outlaw'. It is believed that it was out 
of this inner frontier that the great, violent, antisocial 
gangs arose who were to become the direct ancestors of modern 
'Crime Incorporated'; 4 that the juvenile troops emerged to 
1. ibid. 
2. G. Tyler, Organized Crime in America, op. cit.: 93. 
3. G. -Tyler, Crime and Delinquency, op. cit.: 333. 
4. B. Turkus and Sid Feder, Murder, Inc.: The Story of the Syndicate, London, 1953. 
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replace the aging gangs, the cadets of organized 
criminality. 
' 
Violence or the threat of it has been one of the weapons 
in the arsenal of organized criminals of which American 
society generates a great deal. The violence so generated 
tends to condition the national mentality, often expressing 
itself in repetitive acts of rebellion which find their 
legitimacy in the struggle for 'rights'. Violence and 
disrespect for the law usually go together, with the latter 
often generating the former. Finally, it cannot be said that 
the scientific perspective which views the criminal as a 
product of society is yet dominant in the United States. 
Particularly lacking is the recognition that crime is chiefly 
a group rather than an individual phenomenon and that crime 
is basically implicit in the nature of American society and 
in many of its cultural values. 
3 The main stream 
perspectives of American sociology are overwhelmingly 
reformist in orientation, normally support the status quo, 
and usually view the social structure as basically sound; 
4' 
They have rarely called for wholesale political and economic 
changes that could redistribute wealth. 
5' 
The main stream 
1. G. Tyler, Organized Crime in America, op. cit.: 47. 
2. A. M. Schlesinger, Paths To the Present, opo cit.: 15- 
3. D. R. Taft and R. W. England, op. cit.: 30. 
4. See, for instance, Talcott Parsons, The Social System, 
Glencoe, Illinois, 1951; idem Essays in Soc oo ca Theory, 
Pure and Applied, Glencoe, Illinois, 1949, among others. 
5. D. C. Gibbons, The Criminological Enter rise: Theories and Perspectives, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 132-1 . 
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of American sociology is replete with such terms as 'balance', 
'harmony', 'equilibrium', 'adjustment', 'maladjustment', 
'accommodation', 'function', 'disorganization', 'social progress', 
and 'cultural lag'. 
' As Myrdal has pointed out, while these terms 
have been used to describe empirically observable situations, they 
carry within them static and fatalistic valuation. hidden in the 
ethos of social science and they tend to emphasize the 'do-nothing' 
(laissez-faire) approach to these situations. 
2 In its liberal 
orientation, structural functionalism of academic sociology ," 
usually views criminogenic influences which produce criminality 
as eclectic, extremely pervasive, and intimately bound up with 
the core institutions of modern society so that no one single 
factor can be held as the chief villain. Apparently Sutherland 
thought along these lines in his efforts to abstract an explan- 
ation of criminal etiology, 'I reached the general conclusion 
that a concrete condition cannot be a cause of crime.... '3 
It emphasizes the systemic character of society whose needs must 
be met if the needs of the members are to be met. 
4 At the same 
time the overwhelming emphasis which the society has placed 
upon the acquisition of wealth as an end in itself and a 
1. See, for instance, T. Parson, The Social System, New York, 
1977; R. E. Park and Ernest N. Burgess, Introduction to the 
Science of Sociology, Chicago, 1969; W. F. Ogburn, Man and his 
Institutions', Publications of the American Sociological Society, 
(August 1935): 39-40; E. B. Reuter, 'Competition and Racia 
Division of Labour', in E. T. Thompson (ed. ), Race Relations and 
the Race Problem: A Definition and Analysis, Durham: Duke 
University, 1939: 46-47; C. Shaw, H. D. Mckay, F. Zorbaugh, and 
L. S. Cottrell, Delinquency Areas, Chicago, 1929. 
2. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and 
Modern Democracy, volume 11, New York, 1962: 1055; Stan or M. 
Lyman, The Black American in Sociological Thought, New York, 
1972: 1 5. 
3. E. H. Sutherland, 'Development of the Theory' in A. Cohen et 
al, Sutherland Papers, Bloomington, Indiana, 1959: 19. 
4. W. J.. Chambliss (ed. ), Sociological readings in the Conflict 
Perspective, Reading, Mass., 1973: 4. 
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measure of success would only induce some people to adopt any 
method possible to achieve this esteemed goal. Although it 
can be argued that these characteristics of American society 
did not themselves cause organized crime in the country, 
there is abundant evidence that they have served as catalysts 
and axis on which the phenomenon has revolved over the 
years. 
' 
In recent years, however, organized crime in North 
America has become synonymous with the word 'mafia' partly 
because of the appearance of ethnic Italians in the 
historical succession in the American underworld, and 
2 
partly because of the fact that organized crime is a kind of 
an orphan that no nation would be proud to claim. The term 
also appears to fit in well with the belief widely shared in 
America, though erroneously, that organized crime in the 
:- country was probably imported from abroad. As Bell 
insightfully notes, it is a belief that suits the American 
temper and feeling that 'somewhere', 'somebody' is pulling 
all the complicated strings to which this jumbled world 
dances. 3 Today, it is difficult to find an author or a 
news commentator-on organized crime who does not leave the 
impression that the members of the 'mafia' have a virtual 
1. D. Bell, The End of Ideology_,, op. cit.: 127-150; 175-209; 
G. Tyler, Organized Crime in America, op. cit. 
2. A process by which one ethnic group used organized crime to achieve wealth. and power and then faded into 
respectability, as its place is taken over by another ethnic 
group; D. Bell, op. cit.: 129. 
3. D. Bell, The End of Ideology, opo cit.: 140-141. 
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monopoly on organized crime in the country. Tyler has 
cautioned against the impression this attitude creates when 
he observed that 'while lurid journalism has made "organized 
crime" and "mafia" synonymous, this is a dangerous 
distortion of both the origin and nature of the underworld. ' 
Organized crime in America, he maintains, is not an import, 
"Made in Sicily", it is American, risen out of a native 
matrix of lawlessness, different but not dissimilar from that. 
of Sicily. 'The Underworld, ' he concludes, ' is not an 
Italian organization, but a vast syndicate of many ethnic and 
native groups. il 
A brief examination of the literature would indicate 
that the 'mafia' was never the author of organized crime in 
America, that its use in recent years as the 'dominant' and 
controlling factor in organized crime in the country is due 
to a variety of reasons: the convenience and popularity of 
the term itself as a criminal label; 2 a casuality in the 
political struggle to find outside scapegoats responsible for 
America's organized crime problems, and the historic rise of 
ethnic Italians during the Prohibition period and its effects 
thereafter. 3 There is, however, a dichotomy of perspective 
on this issue; there is the conventional view that views 
organized crime and 'mafia' as synonymous; 
4 then the view 
1. G. -Tyler, Organized Crime in America, op. cit.: 336. 
2. D. C. Smith, op. cit.: 6-7. 
3. D. Bell, op. cit. 
4. See, for instance, J. Allen, Merchants of Menace - The Mafia: A Study of Organized Crime, Springfield, illi no s, 1962; R. Salerno and J. S. Tompkins, The Crime Confederation, 
New York, 1969, among others. 
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that maintains that organized crime and the mafia are two 
distinct entities, or, at least, the latter is a sub-species 
of the former. 
' In our view, the use of the 'mafia' label 
in the U. S. is a misapplied one, especially when it is 
intended to replace the term 'organized crime', for the 
latter has existed in the U. S. long before the former was 
invented. Such an application of the label can only create 
obstacles and distortions in understanding the nature of 
organized crime in America. 
Examination of Literat»rP 
It is difficult today to find any book on organized 
crime published in North America which does not include in 
its title the word 'Mafia' or similar terms suggestive of 
'family', 'godfather', 'brotherhood', 'violence' and the 
like. 2 To the uninformed majority in the continent, the 
1. D. C. Smith, o E. cit.; D. Bell, o. cit. G. Tyler, op. 
cit.; J. L. Albini, The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend, 
New York, 1979. 
' 2. In the forties there was an effort to substitute 'Unione 
Siciliana'; in the early sixties the Oyster Bay Conference of 
New York State suggested the term 'Confederation'; during the 
same period Joseph Valachi testified before the McClellan 
Committee and insisted that their organization is called 'La 
Cosa Nostra' rather than the 'Mafia'. Although some writers 
toyed with 'Cosa Nostra' for a while as an alternate label, 
none of these terms took hold; see Edward J. Allen, Merchants 
of Menace - The Mafia: A Study of Organized Crime, 
Springfield, Illinois ,; Frederic Son eon, Jr., Brotherhood of Evil: The Mafia, New York, 1959; Ralph Salerno 




word 'mafia' is basically synonymous with the term 'organized 
crime'. Other terms which have been suggested in the past - 
Unione Siciliana, Cosa Nostra, Confederation, Black Hand, 
etc. - for the characterization of organized crime in 
America' have never taken hold with the public because they 
lack the sense of history that gives strength to 'mafia', 
particularly to those searching for deep-rooted conspiracies, 
but more importantly because they are too long. The 
popularity of the term among headline writers appears to lie 
mainly in its power of identification and its commercial 
appeal. 
2 As Kempton notes, 'the good scores are made not 
by belonging to but by exposing the 'Mafia'. 3 
The persistence of the 'mafia' label over the other 
terms clearly underlines the reality of the threat which the 
'organization' in question is supposed to pose and which the 
other terms do not convey. As Smith humourously states the 
situation, "We call them 'Mafias' because the name already 
has threatening connotations. In doing so, we are like 
superstitious natives who adopt an attitude of bravado by 
using the devil's name with impunity and simultaneously 
create a sense of familiarity that reduces his threat. "4 
1. H. S. Nelli, The Business of Crime: Italians and Syndicate 
Crime in the U. S., New York, --1976: 199,208; Combatting 
Organized Crime: A Report of the 0 ster Ba New York 
Conference on Organized Cr me, Office of the Governor's 
Counsel, Albany, New York-, --1765; The McClellan Senate Select 
Committee on Improper Activities in the Labour or Management 
Field, 85th Congress, second session, Hearing-s--, -Parts 1-58. 
2. D. C. Smith, The Mafia Mystique, New York, 1975: 7-8. 
3. Murray Kempton, 'Cosa Nostra: That's Italian for Our 
Headache', Playboy, volume 17 (December 1970): 193-194. 
4. D. C. Smith, op. cit.: 5. 
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More importantly, the popularity of the 'mafia' label in 
America should be seen in terms of what it stands for: 
ethnicity and violence - and thus can be considered a foreign 
behaviour pattern that is supposed to be 'un-American' in 
origin. This view does allow the public to speak of the 
'black Mafia' or the 'Hispanic Mafia' as potential successor 
groups to today's leaders in organized crime in America. 
' 
But today's keen observers believe that new groups are in the 
process of taking over the major areas of criminal endeavour 
from Italian Americans to which the mafia label applies 
naturally. 
2 But even with the new ethnic succession, one 
wonders why the name 'mafia' continues to dominate the 
characterization of organized criminal activities in North 
America. 
Perhaps a partial answer would lie with the post-war 
conspiracy theories which argue that a nationwide 
confederation superseded old rivalries and thus the new name 
(Mafia) has come to signify a superorganization of crime. 
3 
But. the apparent absence of a similar umbrella organization 
among the new ethnics would certainly make the term 
inapplicable for the future; however, the name persists. 
1. In view of Ianni's concern over the perpetuation of the 
'Mafia' label, it is rather astonishing that his recently 
published study of ethnic succession in emerging criminal 
networks has been given the title of 'Black Mafia'. We think 
the reason is most probably commercial; F. A. Lanni, Black 
Mafia, New York, 1974. 
2. ibid; D. Bell, 'Crime as an American Way of Life', The 
Antioch Review, op. cit. 
3. Ralph Salerno, The Crime Confederation, op. cit. 
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A simple explanation would probably be that the arenas of 
commercialized vice and racketeering in which the process of 
succession can be observed still have an Italian cast in 
them, and thus it is only a matter of logic to continue using 
the label. When applied to new criminal groups, however, 
'mafia' appears to perform two basic functions: it supplies 
an easily identified criminal label for one group, while 
perpetuating the criminal identification of another. ' As 
Lanni notes, "What remains to be seen is whether the spectre 
of the 'Mafia' - the image of a nationwide conspiracy to 
control all organized crime and to subvert legitimate 
business and professional life - will die out..., for the 
notion is a haunting one. i2 If the present trend is any 
indication of the future, one can conveniently predict that 
the label will remain in use as long as organized crime 
continues to exist in North America. 
The use of the term 'mafia' by a majority of the people 
in North America when speaking of organized crime often 
ignores the historical fact that the two terms began as 
separate conceptual entities, and that the latter does not 
need the former for its survival. As sociological-evidence 
would indicate, when Frederick Thrasher wrote on the subject 
of organized crime in 1927, he had a non-mafia concept in 
mind and he viewed organized crime as 'an area of life and 
1. D. C. Smith, op. cit. 
2. F. A. Lanni, A Family Business, New York, 1972. 
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activity characterized by the absence of ordinary 
conventions'. 
' Similarly, Landesco approached the subject 
in non-mafia terms and viewed it as the manner in which 
cooperative arrangements of 
_'good 
citizens', which are 
characterized as business enterprises, are mirrored in the 
environment of the gangster. 
2 These concepts are 
fundamentally different from the majority view in America 
which today conceives organized crime in terms of ethnicity, 
alien conspiracy, and the 'mafia'. 
3 It should be recalled 
that as early as 1830s organized underworld activities were 
taking place in such large cities as Chicago and New York by 
criminal syndicates who were mainly Anglo-Irish immigrants 
and native whites and who dominated gambling and prostitution 
in those cities. 
4 
It is believed that the first mention of the 'mafia' in 
the American media was in connection with the assassination 
1. F. M. Thrasher, The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in 
Chicago, Chicago, 1963. 
2,. J. Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago: Part Three of the 
-Illinois Crime Survey 192 , Chicago, 19 68., In te introduction to the book, Mark Haller praised Landesco's work 
as 'standing alone as a scholarly attempt to understand the 
social roots of organized crime in an American city and the 
gangster's ties with many segments of conventional society. ' 
ib id : IX. 
3. See, for instance, Ed Reid, Mafia: Cosa Nostra-Syndicate, 
New York, 1964; Frederic Sondern, o. c it.; Edward Allen, op. 
cit.; D. R. Cressey, Theft of the Nat New York, 1969; A. 
Bequai, Organized Crime: The Fifth Estate, Lexington, mass., 1979, among others. 
4. H. Asbury, The Gangs of New York, op. cit.; idem, The 
Underworld of Chicago: An Informal History o 'the Chicago 
Underworld, London, 1941; J. L. Albin- n, The American Mafia: 
Genesis of a Legend, New York, 1979: 177-200. 
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of the New Orleans Police Chief, David Hennessey. 
' Because 
the existence of the mafia in Sicily was known at the time in 
America it seemed logical to some people that, if there was a 
mafia, some of its members might have been included in the 
mass of immigrants entering the U. S. from southern Italy in 
the 1880s. 2 It was therefore generally assumed that it was 
these Italian 'mafias' who perpetrated Hennessey's murder, 
but the jury thought otherwise. 
3 The lynching of the men 
in prison accused of Hennessey's murder and the rapid 
disappearance of concern for the 'Mafia' after the lynching 
would suggest, in retrospect, that the real issue was not a 
threatening secret society but widespread concern over 
Italian immigration, fueled by a history of Native 
Americanism, and economic and political rivalries. Under the 
circumstances, then, once an Italian connection was 
introduced into the case, a 'Mafia' explantion was 
inevitable, regardless of the real course of events. Even 
though the activities of the underworld reached a new peak in 
America in the Roaring twenties and early thirties, 
4 
1. D. C. Smith, op. cit.: 32; H. S. Nelli, The Business of 
Crime, New York, 1976. 
2. D. C. Smith, op. cit. 
3. For a full treatment of this incident, see H. Asbury, The 
French Quarters, op. cit.; G. Schiavo, The Truth About the 
Mafia and Organized Crime in America, El Paso, Texas, 1962: 
H. S. Nelli, op. c it.: 47-66. 
4. For the activities of the early captains of the gambling 
industry and labour 'managers', see D. Bell, op. cit. 
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the industrial racketeers, gamblers and bootleggers of the 
period were known simply as gangsters, mobsters, and at times 
syndicates. 
1 One may assume that the 'mafia' perhaps went 
underground during this period, but such assumption would fly 
in the face of the bloody, open gang warfares that marked the 
Prohibition period. 
2 It would appear, however, that the 
application of the mafia label is largely dependent upon the 
willingness of the media and the public not to apply it at 
times or to apply it selectively to particular phenomena. 
Thus between 1915 and 1945 the label virtually disappeared 
and some writers have attempted to explain this disappearance 
in terms of the extent to which the gangster was truly 
American which could not support a pejorative label. 
3 
1. Books describing the activities of the underworld during 
the Prohibition era hardly used the term 'mafia', see, for 
instance, Edward D. Sullivan, Chicago Surrenders, New York, 
1930; idem, Rattling the Cup on Chicago Crime, New York, 
1929; J. Lan esco, op. c it.; F. Thrasher, op. cit.; 
E. D. Sullivan, Look at Chicago, London; 1930; H. Asbury, Gem 
of the Prairie, Garden City, New York, 1942, etc. 
2. For an account of the St. Valentine's Day Massacre in 
Chicago in which Capone's gang mowed down members of a rival 
. 
gang, see Kenneth AllsopThe Bootleggers and Their Era, 
Garden City, New York, 166T777-48. 
3. Katherine Gerould has perceptively dealt with this theme 
of 'Americanism' in her article, 'Jessica and Al Capone'. In 
her effort to understand why the villain should appear as 
hero to an eleven-year old Jessica, Gerould pointed to two 
characteristics: honesty and efficiency which Capone 
personified. Capone made no bones about what he did. It was 
his efficienc that mattered more. 'A successful monopolist 
commands (our) attention, whether it is in manufacturing or 
racketeering', she writes; K. F. Gerould, 'Jessica and Al 
Capone'. Harper's Magazine, volume 163,1931: 93-97. 
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Furthermore, it should be noted that the founders of 'Murder 
Incorporated' in Brooklyn, New York, in the 1940s were simply 
known as syndicates; the pejorative 'mafia' label apparently 
could not be applied here because Lepke Buchalter and several 
of his associates were Jewish. 
' Added to this was the fact 
that Prohibition did serve to blur or virtually remove the 
distinction between law respecter and law breaker, and the 
symbiotic relationship that emerged between gangster and 
patron obviously blocked the normal application of criminal 
labels. In the circumstance, the Prohibitionists apparently 
became the scapegoats, not the bootleggers, and this 
circumstance alone might explain some instinctive reluctance 
to apply the 'mafia' label. 
2 It was not until the 
beginning of the 1950s that the 'mafia' label which surfaced 
briefly following the assassination of Hennessey reappeared 
once more. 
Reappearance of the 'Mafia' in America 
The first reemergence of the 'Mafia' on the national 
scene was a product of the Kefauver Committee hearings of 
1950-1951. The process of reviving the 'mafia' label 
1. For the activities of this group of death-bound assassins, 
the execution of Lepke Buchalter, and the prosecution and 
conviction of other members, see B. Turkus and Sid Feder, 
Murder Inc.: The Story of the Syndicate, London, 1952. 
2. D. C. Smith, op. cit.: 88. 
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required basically two roles: the persons willing to make 
certain charges and those who would listen to them. The 
latter role was filled by legislative committees that really 
had other concerns, while the former role continues to be 
filled by the agents of the Federal Narcotics Bureau which 
needs a 'mafia' as its drawing card in the competition with 
other law enforcement agencies for federal budget 
support. 
' The existence of the 'Mafia' as a "supercriminal" 
organization in the U. S. has always served as an excuse for 
the Bureau's failure to halt the importation of narcotics 
into the country. The Kefauver Committee which was created 
to investigate organized crime in interstate commerce 
apparently began its investigations not entirely divested of 
preconceived notions as to what it expected to find. After 
visiting fourteen cities and holding hearings, it declared 
that "there is a nationwide, sinister criminal organization 
known as the 'Mafia' operating throughout the country, with 
ties in other nations. i2 The use of the name 'mafia' in 
this way unwittingly conveys the impression that organized 
crime in America is dominated by Italian-Americans and a 
so-called monolithic organization. The committee pointed to 
1. Alfred R. Lindesmith, The Addict and the Law, Bloomington, 
Indiana, 1965, This was one of the early attempts to provide 
such an analysis. See also David Musto, The American 
Disease: origins of Narcotic Control, New Haven, Conn., 1973. 
2. The Kefauver Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, op. 
cit.; see also Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in 
Southeast Asia, New York, 1972: T3--. 
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bookmaking and slot machines as evidence of its charge. ' 
The McClellan Committee on Improper Activities in the Labour 
or Management Field (1957-1959)2 repeated the charge that 
the 'Mafia' is at the heart of organized crime in America and 
it pointed to the Apalachin gangland meeting in upstate New 
York which took place while the committee was in session, as 
proof of its evidence. The refusal of the men at Apalachin 
to state the purpose of their meeting was construed as proof 
of its 'silent wall of omerta'. 
3 The Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics' twenty years' campaign against the 'Mafia' seemed 
to have paid off this time as 'Mafia' was introduced to the 
Committee by the agents of the Bureau as the sole purveyor of 
illegal narcotics in the country. 
4 
Earl Johnson has reconciled pro and anti 'mafia' claims 
of the fifties on the basis of different perspectives and 
argued that the Bureau's responsibilities for narcotics 
1. The Committee viewed the 'Mafia' as an elusive, shadowy, 
and sinister organization that enabled rackets to be fused 
into a single nationwide organization; it acknowledged, 
. 
however, that reliable data about the Mafia was hard to find 
and it offered only three indirect bits of information to 
support its entire thesis concerning the existence of a 
contemporary American Mafia; see The Kefauver Committee 
Report op. cit. 
2. The McClellan Committee, op. cit. 
3. The government's response to the refusal of the men to 
talk about why they gathered at the Apalachin meeting was a 
conspiracy trial which the government lost eventually. It 
may have appeared to some as the end of the road, but for 
those who believe in conspiracy theory it was only the 
beginning. In 1969 through 1972, the protesters against the 
Vietnam War chose to stand on conscience and to defy the 
government as a matter of principle, and the government 
responses in each case were more conspiracy trials; 
D. C. Smith, op. cit. 
4. ibid. 
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control forced it, and not others, to look at. the one area of 
crime that required a high degree of cooperation and interna- 
tional connections. 
1 For those who believe in-a-centralized 
criminal organization controlled by Italian-Americans, 
Valachi's testimony before the Second McClellan Committee was 
seen as a 'smoking pistol'. 
2 It should be noted, however, 
that a former member of the American syndicates, Vincent- 
Teresa, was convinced that Valachi's testimony might have been 
tailored by the law enforcement officials. 
3 Four years later, 
the President's Task Force on Organized Crime compounded the 
picture when it took a cue from Valachi's testimony, and 
Kefauver's findings and declared that the core of organized 
crime in America consisted of 24 groups operating as criminal 
cartels in large cities, and that its membership was exclus- 
ively men of Italian descent. 
4 
Although all these pronouncements and declarations 
rested on tenuous evidence and thus lacked intellectual 
subatance, yet they saw the vocabulary of the crime fighter 
and the images of the novelist combined to turn 'Mafia' in 
America into a household word over which its earlier 
1. Earl Johnson, Jr., 'Organized Crime: Challenge to the 
American Legal System', Journal of Criminal'Law Criminology 
and Police Science, volume 53, Dec. 1962 ; volume 54, March 
and June 1963. 
2. U. S. Government: Senate, Committee on Government 
Operations, Organized Crime and Illicit Traffick in 
Narcotics, 88th Congress, Hearings, Part 1-5, Washington. 
D. C. 196-3-1964. 
3. V. Teresa with T. C. Renner, Vinnie Teresa's Mafia, 
Garden City, New York, 1975. 
4. Task Force Report: Organized Crime, Washington D. C., 
Government Printing office, 1967: 6. 
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advocates now have little control. 
' However, the principal 
effort to add intellectual substance to the prevailing 
sentiment was Donald Cressey's work for the President's Crime 
Commission in which the search for reality appeared to have 
been largely dominated by established conventions. 2 With 
the publication of The Godfather3 in 1969, the success of 
the 'Mafia' label becomes in itself an insurmountable barrier 
to its understanding as the American public is treated to an 
explosion of books and films based on The Godfather which in 
1. In the wake of the Apalachin trial in the late fifties, 
the head of an Italian organization, Joseph Gorassi, raised 
the issue of prejudice and demanded that the Attorney General 
end the rumours and innuendoes about the 'Mafia'. The 
Attorney General, W. P. Rogers, responded that he knew of no 
crime 'consisting solely of criminals of one particular 
national origin. In 1970, following the publication of The 
Godfather and its impact on society, Attorney General John- 
Mitchell placed a ban on official use of 'Mafia' and 'Cosa 
Nostra' labels by Justice Department officials. It was his 
view that the use of these Italian terms reflects badly on 
Italian-Americans generally. His example was followed by 
governors of several states; see D. C. Smith, op. cit.: 206, 
294. 
2. The President's Crime Commission's report, with its 
accompanying papers, was the first systematic national effort 
to define and explain organized crime to a contemporary 
society and in which Professor Cressey served as a 
Consultant, producing a paper titled 'The Functions and 
Structure of Criminal Syndicates'. In 1969 he reconstituted 
his article into a book - Theft of the Nation - in which 
appeared conclusions that weren't in his or ginal article. 
It resulted in a twenty-year effort to recast Landesco's 
original broad concept of organized crime into a narrow focus 
on specific, identifiable groups of people to the exclusion 
of other persons and what they might be doing as well; see 
Theft of the Nation, op. cit.: 20-21. 
3. Mario Puzo, The Godfather, New York, 1969. 
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itself is based on the testimony of Valachi. The success of 
The Godfather and its offspring in planting the 'mafia' in 
the mind of the American public as the 'dominant' label for 
organized crime can hardly be overestimated. 
The Offspring of the Godfather 
The results of these official assertions and the 
publication of The Godfather have been the identification of 
organized crime activity in North America almost exclusively 
in terms of the Mafia. The success of The Godfather was 
apparently a matter of timing as the public was ripe for a 
book that would demonstrate the 'reality' of the twenty-year 
campaign of, the law-enforcement community to portray 
organized crime as an evil 'alien', conspiratorial entity 
comprised solely of Italians bearing the label of the 
'mafia'l. 
-Tuzö! 
ss impact could be seen not only in 
fictional but also in non-fictional books2 that poured into 
the market in hundreds following his publication, and they 
1. It is clear that the sustained use of a single label which 
began in the fifties was the work of the Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics which was bent upon portraying a supercriminal 
opponent as a partial excuse for its inability to halt heroin 
smuggling into the country. Other law enforcement officials 
appropriated the 'Mafia' label by the sixties as a 
justification for tipping the legal balance away from 
individual privacy and towards internal security: 
see D. C. Smith op. cit. 289-90. 
2. See, for instance, R. Salerno and J. S. Tompkin's The Crime 
Confederation o . cit. When its paperback was released in is cover art featured shattered glass and men in 
trench coats blazing at each other, and a new description of the old content read: "For the first time! The Real and Shocking Facts behind the Fiction of The Godfather. " 
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covered a wide range of crime literature, including dime- 
novel adventure stories, police stories, urban adventure, and 
the gothic novel. In the spirit of the time, David Hanna's 
1974 biographies of Carlo Gambino and Vito Genovese were 
promoted by the publishers as 'The Godfather Series'. 
' The 
'Mafia' imagery was not only confined to conventional 
gangster fiction, it was also extended to science fiction and 
old adventure stories were reissued as 'Mafia' stories, 
regardless of original contents. 
It was a period that saw Peter McCurtin's Cosa Nostra 
(1970) come around once more as The Hit in 1973, and even 
Brain Guy which contained only vague references to Italian 
gangters but no mention of 'Mafia' when it was written in 
1934, reappeared thirty nine years later as The Enforcer, and 
was billed as a successor to The Godfather. As well, Noel 
Clad's The Savage (1958) was retitled The Mafia in 1970; Ovid 
Demaris's Candyleg (1961) was reissued with the same name in 
1970, and The Organization (1964) was renamed The Contract in 
the same year. Similarly, Leslie Waller's The Family (1968) 
was reissued, as was Philip Loraine's A Mafia Kiss -a novel 
about Sicily with overtones of the Giuliano legend. 
2 
1. D. Hanna, Carlo Gambino: King of the Mafia, New York, 
1974. 
2. Peter McCurtin, Cosa Nostra, New York: Belmont Books, 1970 
(Published as The Hit by Leisure Books, 1973); Noel Clad, The 
Savage, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1958, (Republished as 
The Mafia, by Belmont books, 1970); Ovid Demaris, Candle , Greenwich, Conn. Fawcett, 1970 (originally published 19 61,, 
Philip Loraine, A Mafia Kiss, New York, 1970; ovid Demaris, 
The Contract, New York; Be mont Books, 1970, published as The 
Organization, 1964, as Fatal Mistake, 1966; Leslie Waller, 
The Fam , New York, 1968; Ben am n Appel, Brain Guy, New York, 1934* 
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Perhaps, most importantly, many of the new paperbacks at this 
time proudly announced their lineage fom Puzo and this can be 
seen in what their covers proclaim. We may consider just a 
few of these: "Explosive stories that make The Godfather look 
pale', in relation to Phil Hirsch's The Mafia (1974); 
1 
"Deadlier than The Godfather: the most accurate, the most 
incredible account of the syndicate that has ever been 
published", in relation to Joseph Rosenberger's The Death 
Merchant (1971); 2 "violence, sex, and a strange code of 
honour in a novel that dares dig deeper than The Godfather", 
in respect of Phil Loraines's A Mafia Kiss; 
3 "Now that the 
Godfather was dead, she was cocksure she could run the 
family... The Mafia will never be the same again", a reference 
to R. T. Larkin's The Godmother (1971), and so on. 
In the midst of these official declarations, 
hair-raising headlines and reviews, organized crime in 
America unwittingly acquired an indelible badge of ethnicity 
and 'mafia' became its 'dominant' label. It was not only the 
fiction writers and hard-boiled novelist who have cashed in 
on organized criminals as mafia and its ethnic connotation; 
the moviemakers also have benefited from the new portrayal of 
the gangster which has now an identifiable ethnic label 
displaying the contrast between good and evil in a kind of 
1. Philip Hirsch (ed. ), The Mafia, New York, 1971. 
2. Joseph Rosenberger, The Death Merchant, New York, 1971. 
3. Philip Loraine, A Mafia Kiss, New York, 1970, 
4. R. T. Larkin, The Godmother, New York, 1971" 
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medieval morality play. 
1 In addition to a tendency to mora- 
lize, there was apparently a tendency to analyse as well, and 
the movies of the period responded to this by cashing in on.. 
the new ethnic image of the gangster in a more pronounced-way. 
Hollywood was quick to seize the opportunity and the gangster 
novels based on the events that were taking place in Chicago 
in the twenties and thirties were transferred into-movies and 
given distinct ethnic focus during the sixties and seventies. 
2 
While Little Caesar was made to be largely descriptive, 
The Seat of Power was meant to explain the awesome power of the 
gangsters, and Kiss Me Deadly, the killingsthat take place in 
the lives of mafia gangsters, and so on. 
3, Their impact on the 
society in depicting organized crime as an exclusive monopoly 
of one ethnic group which happens to feature prominently in 
recent years as a result of historical succession., can hardly 
be overestimated. But there were some keen observers. who did 
not share the view of 'mafia' mystique and felt that the 
public was being misled into accepting the view that one 
particular ethnic group in society controlled all organized 
criminal activities in the country. They viewed organized 
crime and 'mafia' as two distinct, separate entities, or 
at least the latter is a subspecies of the former. Theirs 
apparently remains a minority, though more accurate, view. 
1. John Baxter, The Gangster Film, New York, 1970; 
Dorothy Gardner and K. Walker (eds. ), Raymond Chandler Speaking, 
Boston, 1962. 
2. See, for instance, David Madden, (ed. ), Tough Guy Writers 
of the Thirties, Carbondale, Illinois, 1968; Benjamin Appel, 
Brain Guy, op. cit., republished in 1973 as The Enforcer. 
3. W. R. Burnett, Little Caesar, New York, 1929; James Horan, 
The Seat of Power, New York, 1965; M. Spillance, Kiss Me Deadly, 
New York, 1952. 
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The Dissenters 
Although the book trade and movie enterprises have shown 
revived interest in 'Mafia', not everybody in the country has 
bought the idea that 'Mafia' is the controlling factor in 
organized crime, or, for that matter, organized crime is 
synonymous with 'mafia'. In retrospect, it is clear that 
between 1929 when Landesco wrote in Chicagoland 1967 (the 
President's Crime Commission), 2 there was very little 
serious enquiry into organized crime in America. Daniel 
Bell's skeptical review of the Kefauver Commission's find- 
ings, 'Crime as an American Way of Life', 
3 
appears to have 
been the only comment to receive wide attention during this 
period. From the late fifties to sixties, scholarly public- 
ations took note of a revived interest in organized crime and 
'mafia'. Earl Johnson's lengthy analysis of the legal 
challenge of organized crime apparently contributed little to 
public understanding; not only was its circulation limited, 
the contributions from men in law enforcement (like Johnson) 
were seen as little more than rehashes of recent agency 
accomplishments; and observations from social scientists held 
generally to the approach that Thrasher and Landesco 
1. John Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago, op. cit. 
2. The President's Task Force Report: Organized Crime, op. 
cit. 
3. D. Bell, 'Crime as as American Way of Life': The Antioch 
Review, 1953, op. cit. 
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had traced rather than embrace a re-emerging conspiracy 
theory. ' 
Perhaps one of the most useful single articles 
appearing this time, in contrast to the prevailing 
perspective of conspiracy and mafia theory, was Sellin's 
article on organized crime as an economic enterprise, 
'organized for the purposes of conducting illegal 
activities and which, when in pursuit of legitimate 
venture, uses illegal methods. '2 There were other 
dissenting voices that have made some contributions to 
the academic community but their impact on the general 
public remains to be seen. Tyler disputed the 
Mafia-Prohibition origins of organized crime in America; 
instead he approached organized crime from the American 
tradition of gangs and buttressed his thesis with 
examples from New York, Chicago, Denver, and other cities 
in the mid nineteenth century. His was an effort to 
confront the key question in the continuing debate over 
the nature of organized crime, and he raised some 
important questions that have yet to be dealt with: is 
its origin, as the prevailing 'Mafia' theory presupposed, 
a. -combinaton of forces basically external to the American 
experience, or is it 'a product and reflection of our 
1. D. C. Smith, op. cit.: 182. 
2. T. Sellin, 'Organized Crime: A Business Enterprise', 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Sciences, 347, May, . 
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national culture'?. 
' Tyler produced considerable evidence 
to justify the substitution of the latter theory, but 
supporting material for his notions about gangs, as an 
indigenous alternative to the alien Mafia, was not apparently 
as strong. Although Tyler's approach appears now to be 
dated, yet it remains the only concentrated and systematic 
effort to assemble and evaluate (to a degree) what had 
previously been said about organized crime. 
Another dissenting voice of the period was that of 
Schiavo and his analysis of the situation was in effect a 
sweeping indictment of 'mafia' conspiracy - alien adherents. 
In his view, the myth of the 'mafia' in America originated 
with the Hennessey murder case and was later revived by the 
Kefauver and McClellan committees which misapplied an 
emotional label to persons and events that have significantly 
different meanings. 
2 He viewed the roots of the mafia in 
Sicily (rather than in America) as stemming from a state of 
mind rather than a specific organization, and he believed it 
was sustained by characteristic Sicilian regard for freedom, 
justice, and honour, and by the corrupt nature of an 
externally imposed government. 
3 By his insistence on this 
1. Gus Tyler (ed. ), Organized Crime in America, op. cit. 
2. Giovanni Schiavo reserved particular reproach, for 
fostering the myth of an American Mafia, for Frederic Sondern 
and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics; he did not, however, 
ignore other authors of the previous decade. In a sense, his 
review of the entire field was unique; see G. Schiavo, The 
Truth about the Mafia, op. cit. 1962. 
3. ibid. 
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point, Schiavo wanted obviously to restore the concept of the 
mafia as a state of mind, or a state of society, and not just 
a tightly knit organization. Unfortunately, his efforts have 
gone almost totally unnoticed. There is no later reference 
to Schiavo in the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, 
and no references to his work in any of the organized crime 
literature prior to 1971. 
In supporting the approach taken by Schiavo, Barzini 
considered the family to be the supreme social organization 
in Italy and he thought it commanded ultimate loyalty. In 
his view, there was a mafia in Sicily, but it had two 
meanings: 'the lower-case mafia is a state of mind. Mafia, 
in the second and more specialized meaning of the word, is 
the world-famous illegal organization'. ' The distiction 
obviously reflected the earlier observation of Mosca, 
2 but 
Barzins added his evaluation of the relative inportance of 
the two meanings that reinforced Schiavo's view: 'The second 
mafia could not flourish if the first were not 
widespread. i3 Other articles holding contrary views from 
the conventional mafia perspective by Robert Woetzel and 
Gilbert Geis gave little comfort to believers in a 'Mafia' 
conspiracy, and were generally ignored. 4 For Turkus and 
1. Luigi Barzini, The Italians, London, 1964: 252-275. 
2. G. Mosca, Encyclopeadia of the Social Sciences, volume 10, New York, 1933-1934. 
3. G. Schiavo, op. cit. 
4. Robert Woetzel, 'An Overview of Organized Crime: Mores 
versus Morality', The Annals of American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, volume 247, May : 1-11; Gilbert Geis, 'Violence'-and Organized Crime', idem, volume 364, (March 1966): 86-122. 
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Feder, there had been an organized underworld that controlled 
lawlessness across the U. S. which, they believed, was Unione 
Siciliano rather than the Mafia. As to the existence of the 
Mafia which the Kefauver Committee claimed to have 
discovered, their view was rather unequivocal: 
Perhaps the most pertinent evidence against the 
existence of mafia in modern-day crime is found 
in the committee's own confession that after an 
investigation which lasted one year, travelled to 
14 cities...... was ynable to uncover one single 
member of Mafia.... 
From somewhat different approaches, J. L. Albini and F. A. 
Lanni have made the most significant contribution to date in 
the debate over the existence of the 'Mafia' in America and 
the associated alien-conspiracy theory. 
2 Albini's approach 
to syndicated (rather than conspiratorial) crime goes 
directly to the 'Mafia' evidence in its own terms, not those 
of law'enforcement. 
3 He avoided most of 
1. Burton B. Turkus and Sid Feder, Murder, Inc; op. cit. 
2. J. L. Albini, The American Mafia" op. cit. F. A. Lanni, A 
Family business: Kinship and Social Contro in Organized 
Crime, New York, 1972. 
3. A distictive feature of Albini's work is that he is 
interested in syndicated crime, which is the form organized 
crime in America has, for the most part, assumed. This may 
explain the reason why he was able to find his way into a 
network of people who did not necessarily know each other. 
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Professor Cressey's pitfalls' but, by maintaining a limited 
allegiance to the distinctions of criminality, was unable to 
disassociate himself completely from the conventional mould. 
His contribution which comes through new insights into the 
meaning of 'Mafia' and a rediscovery of the patron-client 
relationships takes a fresh look at the meaning of 'Mafia' 
apart from its conventional organized criminal attributes. 
Given the social conditions in Sicily and the importance of 
the family as a social structure, Albini argues that historic 
conditions created omerta not simply as a mafia character- 
istic or even a state of silence alone, but as a behaviour 
pattern that is common among groups that have been victims of 
oppression and maladministration. 
2 In a world in which a 
man has little control over his own destiny, he notes, there 
is little incentive to cooperate with his neighbours, 
'because in doing so, he jeopardizes his position in a 
competitive world where goods-are scarce. ' Instead he must 
use whatever means, fair or foul, to get his share, and 
omerta is the only form of social cooperation he engages in 
which does not require the individual to surrender or 
- sacrifice anything. 
3 
Albini points out that the structure and function of 
mafia in Sicily lie within the realm of patron-client 
relationships which interweave throughout all social levels 
1. Professor Cressey views organized crime in America mostly in terms of the 'mafia' which he believes is composed of 24 'families' and is structured like a modern bureaucracy; D. R. 
Cressey, Theft of The Nation, op. cit. 
2. J. L. Albini, op. cit.: 107-109. 
3. ibid: 111-112. 
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of Sicilian society and constitute a form of complex system 
of obligation, power postition and mutually binding 
responsibilities, in which the patron often functions as a 
'mediator' between the community and the outside world. In 
this way, the mafioso is able to penetrate both the 
legitimate and illegitimate segments of Sicilian society. 
' 
The mafioso, then, he states, is not a rank or position in a 
secret organization. 'In any one locale, differing levels of 
power are manifested by mafioso based upon'the number and 
types of relationships they have managed to develop'. Thus 
he believed this mafia was neither a secret, sinister 
'brotherhood of evil' that Sondern saw, nor a band of 'death- 
bound assassins' as the 
them. 2 Rather, Albini 
Sicilian as he was seen 
Merlino, 3 Jessie Mario4 
1. ibid. 
New Orleans City Council viewed 
in contemporary terms described the 
at the turn of the century by S. 
and F. M. Crawford. 
5 
2. H. S. Nelli, op. cit. 
3. S. Merlino, 'Camorra, Mafia and Brigandage', Political 
Science Quarterly, volume 9 (September 1894): 46-6--W-. 
4. Jessie W. Mario, 'Italy and the United States', Nineteenth 
Century and After, volume 29 (May 1891): 701-718. 
5. Francis M. Crawford, Corleone: A tale of Sicily, New York, 
1898. This was the first Mafia novel which was based on 
mistaken identity and the inviolability of the confessional 
and was well received by American readers. When, however, 
seventy years later Mario Puzo described the Corleone family 
of new York in a way that fits established expectation, he 
was credited by Fred Cook with having 'brought home reality 
more vividly and realistically than the drier stuff of fact 
ever can', F. J. Cook, 'Power of the Mafia' Nation, volume 
208, (June 16,1969): 771-772. 
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The central theme of Albini's work was to show the 
incongruity of grafting a foreign term and applying it in 
another foreign situation without any due regard to its 
history, meaning and origin. The Mafia may be a native of 
Sicily, but not of America. 
' 
Lanni, writing a year later, elaborated on this concept 
by distinguishing between cooperative relationships that 
could be called 'organized' and the utilization of mafia 
values in personal relationships: 
2 
a distinction that had 
eluded Cressey. He examined the manner in which 
entrepreneurial activities were developed within a kinship 
that avoided the conventional criminal stereotypes. His 
argument, briefly, was that there are Italian-American 
criminals who operate in an organized way but the structure 
of authority and the division of labour reflect family 
relationships and loyalties, not a bureaucratic organization. 
In other words, kinship is as important in criminal affairs 
as it is in any other business. There were links, too, 
between individuals, but to view these links as a formal 
structure (as Cressey had done)3 would be analagous to 
interpreting the sociogram of a grade-school class as 
evidence of organization and authority structure, he argues. 
1. J. L. Albini, op. cit. 
2. F. A. Lanni, op. cit., especially chapter 6. 
3. In his structuralist perspective, Professor Cressey views 
these links as a form of 'organization' as defined by 
positions, a hierarchy of jobs filled by individuals 
operating at various levels of authority; D. R: Cressey, op. 
cit.: 109-161. 
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In his view, Italian Mafia families 
are traditional social systems, organized by action 
and by cultural values which have nothing to do with 
modern bureaucratic virtues. Like all social systems, 
they have no structure apart from their functioning... 
And when the cultural values which underliekiýi the 1 
social system weaken, the families also weaken and die. 
He points out that secret criminal organizations like the 
Sicilian mafia or American syndicates are not formal organiz- 
ations like government or business corporations which can be 
defined by positions, a hierarchy of jobs to be filled and 
carried out, or as a blueprint which can be used to construct 
and reconstruct organizations everywhere. Indeed, he contends 
that they are not rationally structured into statuses and 
functions in order to 'maximize profits'. 
2 Ianni's work appears 
to have the virtue of pointing out the distortions introduced by 
the attempt to-compare the structure of the Cosa Nostra to the 
American bureacratic organization and to describe organizational 
positions in terms of equivalents in Sicilian Mafia. 
3 
Furthermore, Ianni examined the importance of family, and its 
'code of rustic chivalry' which is an integrative behaviour 
system and which provides a sense of protection and relief in 
dealing with a stratified society. In his view, the sense of 
kinship came to the United States with the immigrant and, as 
Little Italies replicated the village back home, the ritualistic 
wed of loyalty survived, and often presents the appearance of 
1. F. A. Ianni, op. cit.: 108. A distictive feature of Ianni's 
work is that he appears to be interested in syndicates as 
distinct from syndicated crime. Like Albini, he apparently 
had no connection with any law enforcement agency. He notes 
that practically all recent research into syndicated crime 
has been based on agency files, and that the focus of these 
agency studies 'has been on criminal activity rather than on 
the nature of the organization through which the activity 




'organized conspiracy' to the outsiders. He argues that it 
was reinforced by weak governmental control and by the lack 
of individual opportunity in the restricted world of 
immigrant labour. ' We can combine Ianni's insights with 
those of Albini and perceive a contemporary perspective that 
supports a credible alternative approach to two separate 
concepts: 'organized crime' and 'Mafia'. In effect, their 
perspectives call attention to the historical fact, often 
overlooked by the newsmedia and the public, that the two 
terms began as separate conceptual entities and that 
organized crime had existed in America for many decades 
before the 'mafia' label came into use. 
Finally, in analysing the fact and myth of the 
contemporary 'mafia' in America, in relation to the present- 
day images of organized crime, Smith has identified three 
threads in the broader conceptual fabric of 'crime'. The 
first thread he calls the official and reportorial approach 
to real persons identified with organized crimes then the 
novelist's approach to the fictional criminal who used to be 
called a gangster but since 1969 has been known as a mafioso; 
and finally, the scholarly approach to a sociological concept 
of organized crime. He notes that these were essentially 
independent views at the outset, but after 1950 (with the 
Kefauver Committee's declaration) they became increasingly 
intertwined; and with the President's Crime Commission report 
in 1967 and the publication of The Godfather in 1969, the 
three threads have each become infected with the 'mafia' 
label. 2 
1. ibid: 43-61" 
2. D. C. Smith, op. cit.: 289-290" 
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Although the contributions of these scholars have been 
immense within the academic community in distinguishing 
between the entities called 'organized crime, and 'the 
Mafia', and in refuting the absurd notion that the latter 
exists in America and is entirely responsible for that 
country's organized crime activities; yet it can be argued 
that their voice is still in the minority, and that the 
'Mafia' continues to be the 'dominant' and common label in 
use among the general public in North America. One has yet 
to find a book on organized crime published in this continent 
which does not include in its title that magic word 
'Mafia'. ' The word has even now been extended to 
characterize organized criminals in other countries apart 
from the U. S. and Sicily. 
2 
There are, however, certain characteristics of the 
American syndicates which are found in the Sicilian Mafia and 
which may serve as a justification for the exponents of 
'mafia'--theories in the U. S. in calling their organized 
criminals 'mafias'. 
1. Fenton Bresler realized this fact in a hard way. In 1980 
he published his book on the Triads under the title of 'The 
Trail of the Triads', a title that did not mean much to most 
people in North America. A year later, because the title did 
not command enough sales, he changed the title to 'The 
Chinese Mafia' and sales caught fire; F. Bresler, The Chinese 
Mafia, New York, 1981. 
2. Similarly, Robertson's book on the Triads bearing the name 
of 'Triangle of Death' as its main title, has to add the 
words-'The Chinese Mafia' as part of the book's title. 
Frank Roberton, Triangle of Death: The Inside Story of the 
Triads - The Chinese Mafia, London, l97 4 
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Earmarks of American Syndicates 
The American syndicates, like their Sicilian 
counterparts, are essentially men of politics and 
business) In the early decades of the century they were 
able to influence the outcome of electoral contests through 
the power of their capital and manpower, 
2 
as in the case of 
Sicily. Prior to Prohibition, however, their activities were 
known to be parasitical, 
3 
consisting of extortion and 
'protection' carried on individuals and business 
establishments, 
4 
as the mafiosi do in Sicily. Although 
these rackets still constitute a steady source of income 
today, the main distinguishing feature of the syndicates 
since the Prohibition appears to be that of the middleman 
suppling the needed prohibited goods and services in which 
they, like their counterparts in Sicily, usually tend toward 
near monopoly, using violence and intimidation to maintain 
control. 
5 
1. A. Block and W. J. Chambliss, Organizing Crime, New York, 
- 1981: 65-70. 
2. See, for example, the account of the battle by Capone and 
his gang to re-elect mayor 'Big' Bill Thompson of Chicago in 
1927; K. Allsop, The Bootleggers, op. cit.; 128-129. 
J. Landesco, o. c It.: 25-83; F. Pearce, Crimes of the 
Powerful: Marxism, Crime and Deviance, London, 1M--- . 
T23. 
3. J. A. Mack with H. Kenner, The Crime Industry, Farnborough, 
Westmead, 1977: 173. 
4. Task Force Report: Organized Crime, op. cit. 
5. W. J. Chambliss, On the Take: From Petty Crooks to 
Presidents, Bloomington, Indiana, 1982: 32- 
160. 
Like their mafia counterparts in Sicily, the American 
syndicates owe their extraordinary longevity largely to their 
powerful friends in strategic positions in the society whose 
interests are served by the syndicates. 
1 In this respect 
they contrast with the European counterparts (Italy being the 
exception); such arrangements as exist with the European 
counterparts and officials are said to be ad hoc, flexible 
and changing. 
2 The insipid` alliance betwen the American 
syndicates and their lawyers which enables the former to 
avoid arrest, conviction and sometimes long-term imprisonment 
through the process of 'fix' does not appear to operate with 
respect to European mobs and lawyers. 
3 Futhermore, the 
European mobs may engage in some incidental illicit 
trafficking but apparently they fill no major role of 
middleman supplying powerful economic demands for forbidden 
goods and services. 
4 
Organized crime in America has persisted for many 
generations despite all the vicissitudes of internal and 
inter-syndicate feuds and in the face of massive law 
enforcement mobilizations mainly because of two factors which 
1. W. J. Chambliss, op. cit. 
2. The Guerini empire in Marseilles is said to have lasted 
about twenty years and then came to an end, apparently when 
it lost its political support. Similarly, the activities of 
the Krays brothers in Britain are said to have lasted only a 
few years before the officials caught up with them; 
A. W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, New 
York, -1972: 38; J- A. Mack, op. HE-. 
3. See, for example, G. Tyler, Organized Crime in America, 
op. cit.: 15-9; E. H. Sutherland, The Profess ona T hie , Chicago, -1965. M. Mockridge and R. H. Prall, TeBg Fix, New 
York, 1954; A. Mack, op. cit. 
4. J. A. Mack, op. cit 
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have always worked in its favour: the protective shield it 
enjoys at the hand of the power structure, and the failure of 
American socialism. In the double alliance with the police 
and politicians, police payoffs and 'campaign contributions' 
have been the traditional means by which American syndicates 
have been able to acquire immunity from the law in the course 
of their operations. 
1 This striking feature of the 
syndicates to influence official power holders can be 
understood in terms of the fact that American government at 
all levels is largely a matter of pressure-group politics, 
2 
and it is a feature which appears to be lacking with regard* 
to their European counterpart. Policing in America is often 
an avenue to wealth for the incumbent, for the money flowing 
through the rackets is usually large, and the profits one of 
the highest'of any industry in the world. 
3 
'Campaign contributions' by syndicates usually provide 
the cash nexus that serves the interests of both the 
contributor and the politician. These elements of the 
American syndicates constitute the base support on which the 
axis of syndicated crime has revolved for several decades in 
- the country. Just as the failure of socialism in Sicily up 
to the first three decades of the twentieth century was 
1. W. J. Chambliss, On the Take, o. cit.: 50-80; J. A. 
Gardiner, The Politics of Corruption: Organized Crime in an 
American C New York, 1970. 
2. Philip L. Graham, 'High cost of Politics', National 
Municipal Review, July 1955: 347-351. 
3. W. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 52. 
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intimately related to the success of the mafia during the 
period, 
l 
while its success from the 1940s onwards led to 
the decline of the mafia's hold on the society, 
2 the degree 
to which syndicated crime has successfully prevailed in 
America more than in any other western country is partly due 
to the failure of socialism in that country, in our view. 
3 
It is argued that the syndicate activity has been 
functional, but admittedly this is so for the powerful, 
4 
'respectable' members of the crime network and not for the 
workers. 
5 The U. S. and Canada are the only western 
countries where a socialist party has never held power. 
Despite the preoccupation with the 'Mafia', however_5it can be 
argued that the real power behind organized crime in America 
is not the 'Mafia', but the 'respectable' members of the 
society who have symbiotic relationships with organized 
criminals and who operate in networks in which organized 
criminals play the role of servants. 
1. A. Blo'. k, 'mafia and Peasant rebellion as contrasting 
factors in Sicilian Latifundism', European Journal of 
Sociology, 10,1969: 95-116. 
2. E. J. Hobsbawn, Primitive Rebels: Studies in archiac forms 
of social movements in the 19th. and 20th. centuries. 
Manchester, 
3. For some of the reasons of this failure, see D. Bell, op. 
cit.: 275-298. 
4. D. Bell, op. cit.: 183-192. 
5. F. Pearce, op. cit.: 133. 
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Organized Crime Symbiotic Network 
Organized crime by its very nature is a protected crime 
whose very existence often derives from the connivance and 
cooperation it receives from the powerful elites of society, 
hence it has often been viewed as one of the crimes of the 
powerful. 
1 As one political campaigner once told his 
audience in New York City, 'I have said before and I say 
again, that this (organized crime) could not happen were 
there not a definite link between the big-time gambling 
racketeers and those in high office... '2 In the past, 
reliance on police and other law enforcement agencies for 
information on organized crime has inevitably led to an 
overemphasis on the role of those who fit the stereotype of 
the 'criminal' - often the infamous 'mafia' - and a 
corresponding de-emphasis on the importance of businessmen, 
poiticians, and law enforcers as institutionalized components 
of the system which creates and perpetuates the American 
syndicates that supply the vices, payoffs, and 'campaign 
contributions'. 
3 Recent empirical studies conducted in 
different U. S. cities in the last one and a half decades have 
clearly shown that the main axis of organized crime today is 
not the 'mafia' or 'Cosa Nostra' but official corruption, and 
that organized crime is not run by a group of private 
1. F. Pearce, Crimes of the Powerful, op. cit. 
2. Daniel P. Moynihan, 'The Private Government of Crime' in 
Bruce J. Cohen (ed. ), Crime in America: Pers ectives on 
Criminal and Delinquent Behaviour, Itasca, Ill., 1972: 321" 
3. W. J. Chambliss, On the Take, op. cit. 
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citizens. 1 
These studies have found that organized crime is not run 
and controlled by a national syndicate with a 'commission' or 
'board of directors' who have a feudal-like control over 
underlings spread across the nation; that organized crime 
really consists of a coalition of politicians, law- 
enforcement officials, businessmen, union leaders, and (in 
some ways least important of all) racketeers. 
2 The 
coalition can be viewed as a network of powerful individuals 
who have shared interests and cooperate with one another in 
the management and profit of organized crime. It is not 
always easy to say who dominates this coalition, for roles 
vary and fluctuate as people come and go, and, as Chambliss 
and others say, it is always a mistake to look for a 
'godfather' in the crime network. 
3 Since the end of 
Prohibition, the activities of the networks have centred in 
the areas of gambling, pimping, prostitution, drug 
trafficking, usury, and bookmaking. 
4 The rang. of these 
1. Although these studies were confined to certain particular 
cities, their findings are basically applicable to most U. S. 
big cities in general; John A. Gardiner, The Politics of 
Corruption: Oganized Crime in an American City, New York, 
1970; J. A. Gardiner and D. J. Olson, Wincanton: 'The Politics 
of Corruption', Appendix 'B', Task Force Report: Orgsnized 
Crime, op. cit., which studiedr_ the city of Reading,, 
Pennsylvania; W. J. Chambliss, On the Take, op. cit., a study 
on the City of Seattle, Washington. 
2. W. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 9; A. Block and W. J. Chambliss, 
op. cit.; A. Block, East Side - West Side; Organized Crime in 
New York 1930-1950, Cardiff, 1980; F. Pearce, op. cit. 
3. W. J. Chambliss, 011, cit.: 9,73,101; E. Kefauver, Crime 
in America, Garden City, New York, 1951: 13. 
4. W. J. Chambliss, op. cit. 
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enterprises often makes it possible for organized crime to 
move freely but not without sharing the profits and paying 
homage to those members of 'straight' society who provide 
'entry permit' into the enterprises. 
Thus the people who run the organizations that supply 
the vices are not simply members of a criminal society. The 
study of organized crime, to be more meaningful, should 
consider official corruption, bureaucracy, and power, and 
should not rely on governmental and police agencies for the 
information on vices and rackets; these agencies often 
inadvertently contribute to the miscasting of the issues in 
terms that are descriptively biased and theoretically 
sterile, and often divert attention from sociologically 
interesting and important issues raised by the persistence of 
crime networks. 
2 As a result, the real significance of the 
existence of syndicates is often overlooked; for instead of 
viewing these social entities as being intimately tied to, 
, 
and in, symbiosis with, the legal and political bureaucracies 
of the state, these agencies often emphasize the criminality 
of only a portion of those involved. Such a view contributes 
very little to our knowledge of organized crime and even less 
to attempts at its control. 3 Of critical importance are 
the roles of politicians, law-enforcers, union leaders and 
1. W. J. Chambliss, op. cit. 




businessmen for the network of organized crime in America, as 
elsewhere, includes not only petty crooks but also powerful 
officials. 
1 
The official view in America that organized crime, like 
the radical movements, is controlled by a fraternity whose 
traditions are 'un-American' and whose loyalties lie with an 
international organization based in a foreign country often 
attempts to explain it culturally rather than structurally. 
Consequently, the focus for law enforcement and public 
concern has become the Italian-American community rather than 
the political and economic system. 
2 Pointing out that the 
National Crime Commissions have for years been chasing phantoms 
in the entity called the 'mafia', Hank Messick has observed 
that 'if every member of the Mafia (or Cosa Nostra) were 
jailed tomorrow, organized crime would be just as powerful as 
ever... '3 The emphasis on the common racketeers by the 
officials only serves to mask the role of the powerful friends 
for whom the underworld acts as servant. As the history of 
any past crime networks such as those of Al Capone and the 
Guerini's in Marseille would indicate, organized criminals 
usually owe their existence as servant to the powerful elites 
in the society, and their demise usually follows when the 
4 
elites'. support is withdrawn. 
1. It was disclosed during the Watergate episode that 
President Nixon's source of the infamous one 'million-dollar 
hush money' that he told John Dean he could get was the 
Teamster Union pension fund. His Vice-President, Spiro Agnew, 
in 1973 pleaded 'no contest' to the charge of taking kickbacks 
for government contracts for many years. At the same time, he 
was making speeches across the country decrying 'crime in the 
street'and demanding reinstatement of law and order; W. J. 
Chambliss, On the Take, pp. cit.: ix. 
2. P. Pearce, The Crimes of the Powerful: Marxism, Crime and Deviance, London, 1976: 121. 
3. H. Messick, Lansky, New York, 1971: 8. 
4. J. Kobler, Capone: The Life and World of Al Capone, New York, 1971; A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 35: 449. 
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ORGANIZED CRIMINALS AS SERVANTS OF THE POWER STRUCTURE 
1. Organized Crime and Politicians 
In 1931, the National Commission on Law Observance, 
after completing an inquiry into the police, concluded: 
Nearly all of the large cities suffer from an 
alliance between politicians and criminals... 
' 
The commission went on to enumerate all the large cities in 
America that have been under the control of a few syndicates 
for a number of years and bemoaned the fact that 'the people 
have frequently been betrayed by their elected officials. '2 
What has been uncovered in recent years in Seattle and 
Reading ('Wincanton') appears to be true in virtually every 
big city in the United States and has been true since at 
least the early 1900s. At the turn of the century, Lincoln 
Steffens observed that 'the spirit of graft and lawlessness 
is the American spirit. i3 He went on to describe the 
results of his inquiries: 
- In the very first study - St. Louis - the startling 
truth lay bare that corruption was not merely 
political; it was financial, commercial, social; 
1. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement; 
Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, Washington, D. C. 3Government. ' Printing Office, 1931. - 
2. ib id " 
3. L. Steffens, The Shame of the Cities, New York, 1904: 
151. 
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the ramifications of boodle were so complex, various 
and far-reaching, that our mind could hardly grasp 
them.... St. Louis exemplified boodle; Minneapolis 
police graft; Pittsburgh a political and industrial 
machine; Philadelphia general civil corruption.... 
1 
Twenty years later, the Kefauver Crime probe found identical 
situations in the fourteen cities it examined. 
2 
It has been noted that the gambling, p.: ostitution, and 
other vices that flourish in the lower centres of the cities 
do so with the compliance, and cooperation of the major 
political and law enforcement officials of those cities. 
3 
In Seattle, for instance, those involved in providing 
gambling and other vices point out that their services are 
profitable because of the demand for them by 'respectable' 
members of the community. 
4 As Tannenbaum hEs observed, 'it 
is clear from the evidence at hand that a ccnsiderable 
measure of the crime in the community is made possible and 
perhaps inevitable by the peculiar connection that exists 
between the political organization of our large cities and 
the criminal activities of various gangs that are permitted 
and even encouraged to operate'. 
5. 
Like all activities of the criminal network, political 
influence is usually obtained in a variety of ways, of which 
campaign contribution from the syndicates to the political 
1. ibid. 
2. Estes Kefauver, Crime in America, Garden City, New York, 
1951. 
3. A. A. Block and W. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 101. 
4. ibid. 
5. Frank Tannenbaum, Crime and the Community, Boston, 1978: 
128. 
169. 
elites is the most common. This cash nexus which buys the 
permission to operate and immunity from prosecution often 
constitutes an important source of money for the political 
elites. It is a connection that ties the syndicates to most 
American politicians, even up to candidates running for 
President. As Gosnell notes, '... the gangsters and other 
criminals in America enjoy extraordinary immunities from 
interference on the part of the law enforcing agencies. They 
realize that this freedom from restraint depends upon how 
useful they can make themselves to the politicians. i1 In 
1968, a well known gambler, Mickey Cohen, detailed the amount 
of money he and his group raised for Richard Nixon as a 
result of Nixon's public criticism of organized crime. He 
stated, in part, 'in view of the fact that hr. Nixon is now 
making. speeches in his campaign.... I have decided that the 
people of California should know the true facts with Nixon's 
entry into politics being based upon money raised by me and 
my associates in the gambling fraternity who started him off 
with $26,000. i2 As noted in the preceding chapter, a 
similar situation obtains with regards to Mafia members and 
politicians in Sicily, and is probably true in other 
capitalist democracies where organized crime exists. In 1927 
Al Capone was reported to have contributed :; 280,000 to 'Big' 
Bill Thompson of Chicago for his re-election as mayor that 
year, and more recently Alexander Heard estimates that 
organized crime currently pays for fifteen percent of 
1. H. F. Gosnell, 'The Political Party versus the Political 
Machine', The Annals: 169, September 1933: 21-28. 
2. Drew Pearson, 'Racketeer Details His Aid to Nixon', The 
Free Press (Detroit), October 31,1968. 
170. 
campaign expenditures at state and local levels. 
' 
In the 1930s through to the 1960s an unspoken detente 
prevailed between the Republicans and Democratic leaders with 
regards to some of the major sources of campaign 
contributions; the Republican and Democratic parties came to 
control different sources of the available political fund. 
It was obvious that if either party could undermine a major 
source of the other party's political 'contribution', the 
balance of power so crucial to any workable detente would be 
severely threatened as the money shifted into the coffers of 
one party. 
2 Richard Nixon's campaign shortly after his 
election to the Presidency in 1968 was believed to be, first 
and foremost, a strategy designed to undermine this balance; 
had it been successful it would have probably shifted much of 
the labour-tinion-crime-network political contribution from 
the Democratic to the Republican party. 
3 It has been 
suggested that the Nixon administration's campaign against 
'organized crime' was in fact a campaign agE. inst those crime 
networks that were most closely connected with his political 
foes, Republicans and Democrats. To accomplish this, his 
administration systematically exposed crime networks in 
Democratic Party strongholds, while ignoring networks which 
supported Nixon's wing of the Republican party. 
4 
In state after state, the weight of the government - 
the FBI, Internal Revenue Service, and Crown Attorneys - was 
1. F. Pearce, op. cit.: 123; J. Kobler, op. cit.: 199. 
2. W. J. Chambliss, On the Take, op. cit.: 157. 
3. ibid. 
4. Anthony Sampson, The Sovereign State of ITT, New York, 1973: 217-288. 
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brought to bear on the crime networks that were identified 
with the Democratic Party by the Nixon Administration. Newly 
appointed Republican U. S. attorneys called grand juries to 
investigate corruption and racketeering and to hand out 
indictment in the states that were under the Democratic crime 
networks. In the process, Meyer Lanskyl was forced to sell 
his hotels and casinos in Miami and The Bahamas to Bebe 
Rebozo, a Nixon associate and friend. Lansky had contributed 
at least $240,000 to Hubert Humphrey's campaign against 
Nixon. As well, once in office, Nixon continued the Johnson 
tradition of selling favours and protecting investments for 
those who supported him politically. A variety of industries 
that contributed to his campaign were rewarded with generous 
treatment. 2 Abe Fortas, one of President Johnson's 
appointees to the U. S. Supreme court was less fortunate, 
however, than Johnson, and when his links with a notorious 
financial wheeler-dealer in Florida were revealed, Fortas had 
to resign from the Supreme Court. 3 As in the case of the 
Sicilian mafia, the ability of the American syndicates to 
purchase immunity from the law is not only limited to corrupt 
politicians looking for 'campaign contribution', but extends 
to law enforcers as well. 
1. Meyer Lansky, in his nation-wide operations, exhibited a 
political shrewdness by choosing his candidates and even financed candidates who competed with each other. Thus he 
paid. handsomely into the campaigns of both Democratic and 
Republican candidates running against each other; see Martin 
A. Gosch and Richard Hammer, The Last Testanent of Lucky 
Luciano, New York, 1974; Hank Messick, Lans y, New York, 1971* 
2. W. J. Chambjiss, op. cit.: 175-176. 
3. ibid. 
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2. Organized Crime and Law Enforcers 
Shared interests which connect politicians with the 
syndicates also connect the latter with law enforcement 
officials and should be seen as one of the concomitant 
contradictions inherent in the operation of competitive 
capitalism. 
1 In the U. S., the laws of some states, 
counties and cities are written in such a way as to make it 
impossible for anyone to operate profitably a tavern, 
2 
caberet, hotel or nightclub without violating the laws.. 
Moreover, laws prohibiting vices have traditionally lacked 
consensus. Faced with such legal ambiguities and conflicting 
demands, police officials often follow the least line of 
resistance. Using the discretion inherent in their position, 
law enforcers usually follow procedures that minimize 
organizational strain and adopt a tolerance policy toward the 
vices, selectively enforcing the laws when it suits their 
advantage to do so. 
3 
1. Law enforcers normally follow orders from their political 
masters, and in the process it is only natural that they 
would demand a piece of the action; W. J. Chambliss, On the 
Take, op. cit.: 91-96; see also Daniel Bell, The Cultural 
Contra cdi tions of Capitalism, New York, 1976. 
2. W. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 100. 
3. McMullan has noted that the first precondition for 
corruption is a substantial conflict over the goals of the 
legal system. He observes that 'a high level of corruption 
is the result of a wide divergence between the attitudes, 
aims, and methods of the government of a country and those of 
the society in which they operate.... Therefore the different 
levels of corruption in different countries depend on the 
extent to which government and society are homogeneous', see 
M. McMullen, 'A Theory of Corruption', Sociological Review, 
IX, July, 1961: 184-185. 
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Because gambling, prostitution and drug trafficking are 
profitable, competition among operators is usually fierce and 
violent because legal remedies are non-existent. Thus the 
police view the policy of cooperation in order to control 
these vices as advantageous in that it renders the legal 
system capable of exercising considerable control over 
potential source of trouble. ' The mechanism by which 
corrupt police officials come to share an interest in 
maintaining corruption and widespread criminality is normally' 
the cash payoffs. As in the cases of Seattle, Washington, 
and Wincanton, Pennsylvania, the syndicates worked with the 
City Hall to put cooperative men in office, to buy off those 
who occupied strategic enforcement positions, and to ensure 
their loyalty by regular payoffs. 
2 To control access to 
very lucrative operations and maintain profit-sharing 
arrangements, prominent syndicates often use the police to 
deprive uncooperative gamblers or bookies of their source of 
income, or to arrest those not paying their tribute. 
3 
On the state and local levels corruption of police and 
politicians is revealed with a regularity that is as certain 
-- as physical laws. In 1974, the Knapp Commission which 
investigated the corruption in the New York City Police 
Department reported that corruption of the police was 
widespread; that it took various forms depending upon the 
activity involved, appearing at its most sophisticated among 
1. W. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 88-96. 
2. J. A. Gardiner, op. cit.: 122. 
3. ibid. 
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plainclothesmen assigned to enforce gambling laws; that these 
men engage in what is known in police parlance as a 'pad', 
collecting regular biweekly or monthly payments amounting to 
thousands of dollars from each of the gambling establishments 
in the area under their jurisdiction, and dividing the take in 
equal shares. 
' It noted that when-. supervisors were involved, 
they received a share and a half. The commission found evidence 
that payoffs were widespread in other divisions of the New York 
Police Department as well. In the 1970s, the Investigative 
2 
Task Force Report of the Seattle Police Department found similar 
patterns of police corruption, which can be observed in almost 
all the U. S. cities. The Task Force noted that illegal payoffs 
and bribery in various forms have existed in the Seattle Police 
Department for many years; 
3 that a large portion of the rank 
and file of the officers were involved. It revealed that 
officers were generally recruited into the system by older 
officers, after they had been carefully screened to determine 
their reliability and willingness to participate in the payoff 
system; that the structure of payoff system with the Patrol 
4 
Division was similar to that of the Vice Squad. The Task Force 
Report revealed that the criteria for admittance was a display 
of tolerance and approval toward other officers' transgressions 
5 
and a propensity for engaging in similar conduct. 
1. The Knapp Commission of 
Police Corruption, Office o 
uiry into the New York Cit 
he Governor, Albany, 1974. 
2. ibid. 
3. W. J. Chambliss, On the Take, op. cit.: 238. 
4. ibid.: 240. 




Generally speaking, as the symbiotic relationships of the 
police officials and organized criminals elsewhere have shown, 
the cooperation of the police is admittedly more crucial than 
that of the politicians for organized crime to exist and operate, 
for in the final analysis it is the police who have to decide 
when and how the laws against vice should be enforced. 
3. Union-Businesdg Component 
Historians of American labour usually identify two 
strains in trade unionism: the 'pure and simple' business 
unionism of Samuel Gompers, and the social unionism of Sidney 
Hillman or Walter Reuther. 
2 But beneath these avowed differ- 
ences, however, there is a fundamental consensus shared by 
both kinds of labour leaders - that a corporate society offers 
the best means of achieving industrial stability, order and 
social harmony. 
3 C. Wright Mills was perhaps the first 
social scientist to emphasize that labour leaders 
1. See, for instance, W. P. Morgan, The Triad Societies in 
Hong Kon , Hong Kong, 1982; J. L. Albini, o. ci.; F. Bresler, 0D. cit.: 38-52,112-124; W. J. bliss and 
M. Mankoff (e s. , Whose-Law,, What Order?: A Conflict Approach to Criminology, New York, 1976. 
2. See, S. Yellen, American Labour Struggles, New York, 1936; 
R. O. Boyer and H. M. Morais, A History of the American Labour 
Movement, New York, 1955. 
Ronald Rodosh, 'The Corporate Ideology of American Labour 
Leaders from Gompers to Hillman, in James Weinstein and D. W. 
Eakins (eds. ), For A New America: Essays in History and 
Politics from Studies on the Left, 1959-1967, New York, 1970: 
12 -. 
3. R. Radosh, op. cit. 
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in America framed unions as instruments for integration into 
the existing political economy, not levers for changing it. 
The result, in Mills' words, was a 'kind of procapitalist 
syndicalism from the top. '1 Mills may have been partly 
right in his assessment of the role of unions, but the issue 
goes deeper than mere integration. 
For our purposes, however, it can be argued that labour 
unions in America have also been an instrument for 
manipulation and exploitation of workers by corrupt union 
leaders in alliance with the big business. 
2 The struggle 
between social classes for control of the profits from 
production inevitably led to a situation in the early 1900s 
where business was faced with a serious challenge to its 
control of labour, and the most serious of these being the 
introduction of communist and socialist ideology into the 
labour movement. 
3 The dilemma thus created for business 
was whether to join into an unholy alliance with some union 
leaders or to risk the possibility of losing the entire game 
in the form of a labour force that would demand not just 
higher wages, but control of the means of production. The` 
dilemma was resolved in favour of supporting and joining 
those in the labour movement who employed illegal and violent 
means to circumvent the demands of workers. 
4 
1. C. Wright Mills, 'The Labour leaders and the Power Elite' 
in A. Komhauser, R. Dubin, A. Ross, (eds. ), Roots of 
Industrial Conflict' New York, 1954: 144-152; C. W. Mills, 
Power, Politics and People: Essas of C. W. Mills, Edited by 
Irving L. Horowitz, New York, 1963: 108-109. 
2. F. Pearce, op. cit. 
3. A. Block and W. J. Chambliss, op` cit.: 88. 
4. ibid. 
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The traditional perspective in the sociological 
literature often finds the roots of labour-union racketeering 
in the unions themselves and makes frequent allusion to, but 
little systematic analysis of, corruption in labour 
unions. 
' However, one notable exception in this regard 
appears to be Daniel Bell's classic study in New York City of 
2 the 'Racket-Ridden Longshoremen'. Although his analysis 
is unquestionably insightful and imaginative, it appears to 
be seriously flawed because of its uncritical acceptance of 
the functional paradigm as the lens through which 
racketeering in the Longshoremen's Union is viewed. 
3 
According to Bell: 
Industrial racketeering performs the function - at 
a high price - which other agencies cannot do, of 
stabilizing a chaotic market and est4blishing an 
order and structure in the industry. 
Rather than tracing the historical development of 
racketeering in the New York Longshoremen's Union, Bell seeks 
to 'explain' the phenomenon solely in terms of the 'function' 
served by the existence of racketeering and fails to ask the 
appropriate question: functional for whom? and in the process 
he is apparently misled into believing that 'what is good for 
shippers is also good for everyone. ' 
1. Lester Velie, 'The Mafia tightens its grip on the 
teamsters', Readers Digest, August 1974: 99; U. S. Chamber of 
Commerce, Desk book on Organized Crime, Washington, D. C., 
1972; A. Bequai, 0 Organized Crime, op. cit.: 51-68. 
2. D. Bell, The End of Ideology, (1967), op. cit.: 176-209. 
3. For a criticism of Bell's position, see F. Pearce, op. 
cit.: 131-146. 
4. D. Bell, op. cit. 
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Although the development of racket-ridden unions may be 
'functional' for businesses and labour racketeers, there is 
no doubt that it is 'dysfunctional' for the workers and for 
the development of organized labour. The creation of 
racket-ridden unions makes possible the manipulation of union 
leadership by owners at the expense of an independent labour 
union that would represent the interests of the workers. 
' 
In the 1930s it was difficult to find any key industries and 
trades in New York and, indeed, in America generally which were 
not subject in one form or another to racketeering, which was 
well defined then as organized extortion by powerful 
syndicates. 
2 This was arguably the result of the often 
violently antagonistic relations between labour and capital, 
workers and bosses in the modern era. 
3 A look at the 
history of trade unionism in America reveals the violent 
tactics which were adopted by employers to prevent, contain, 
and even destroy unions, including the use of hired thugs to 
engage in strikebreaking, and purchasing the services of 
strikebreakers from private detective agencies such as 
Pinkerton, Burns, and Farley, and from Molly Maguires. 
4 
1. A. Block and W. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 87; L. Huberman, 
The Labour Spy Racket, New York, 1937. 
2. An investigation conducted by Samuel Seabury for the 
District Attorney's office in Manhattan in 1931 pinpointed at 
least 32 key industries that were pervaded by racketeers, 
see, The New York Times, (September 1,1931): 14. 
3. S. Yellen, American Labour Struggles, op. cit. 
4. For detailed accounts of the labour struggle in America, 
see L. Huberman, The Labour Spy Racket, New York, 1937; S. 
Lens, The Labour Wars: From the Moll Maguires to the 
Sitdowns, Garden City, New York, 1913; P. S. Foner, Te 
Industrial Workers of the World, 1905-1917, New York1965. 
I. Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the American 
Worker, 1920-1 , Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966* 
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As a result of this situation, many gangsters turned to indust- 
rial racketeering as a fruitful source of income. 
' Whereas 
before gangsters had been used to stop any unionization, they 
were now used also to try to emasculate any locals that were 
set up by setting up 'paper locals' (local branhes only in 
name, with no control by their rank-and-file members) and 
negotiate 'sweet-heart' contracts. 
2 
As in the case of the politicians and police, the 
coalition and conspiracy between labour racketeers and owners 
of business and industries has always worked for the benefits 
of both sides. Such conspiracies often provide the groundwork 
for the more publicized kind of corruption - the domination of 
both locals and certain national unions by the likes of Jimmy 
Hoffa, Dave Beck, 3 Frank Fitzsimmons and Tony Boyle, who 
enriched themselves and their associates by looting union 
treasuries and stealing from the rank and file through institu- 
4 
tionalized loan sharking and other criminal activities. 
1. Landesco has detailed the activities of the racketeers in the 
1920s such as Al Capone, Arnold Rothstein, Louis Buchalter and 
many others who offered their services as insurance against 
upsets of any kind, from the unions, from competition or from 
bombings; see J. Landesco, op.! cit.: 107-147. 
2. F. Pearce, op. cit.: 135. 'Control of a union local often... 
contro of the host of rackets that are spawned on the dock. 
A victorious clique has a number of concessions it can parcel 
out which include bookmaking, loan sharking, kickbacks for 
jobs, etc. But the biggest prize of all was the loading racket'; 
see Bell, op. cit.: 183. 
3. Dave Beck's friendship with and support for the Democrats is 
believed to have caused the Eisenhower administration to 
investigate his misuse of the union funds which eventually sent 
him to jail in 1956. His replacement, Jimmy Hoffa, a Republican 
supporter, was sent to jail ten years later under a Democratic 
adiminstration, for stealing the Teamster's Union funds. 
4. W. J. Chambliss, Organized Crime, op. cit.: 87. 
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It is a classic situation in which organized labour is turned 
into organized crime. Labour racketeering in America is as 
old as the history of violent struggle between labour and 
management and its capital, and it has been the chief instru- 
ment by which the latter has always maintained the upper hand 
in the struggle. In 1978, a high official of the Justice 
Department told a Congressional hearing that efforts to get 
the Labour Department to take an aggressive posture toward 
labour racketeering, 'including the infiltration of labour 
unions' by organized crime, had not proven successful. 
' As 
well, the history of pension funds in the U. S. is replete with 
instances of frauds by the union officials, of multi-million 
dollar loans made, to firms owned by organized criminals, and 
of investments made in fraudulent and non-existent schemes. 
2 
It can be argued that the persistent pervasion of rack- 
eteering in most American industries is due partly to the 
operation of capitalist economy which provides the basic cond- 
itions3 and partly to the failure of socialist and communist 
ideology to take root in the country4, and the naive accept- 
ance by the majority of the workers that what is good for 
the industry is necessarily good for them. 
5 This view which 
has been consistently articulated by union leaders usually 
depicts the role of labour as one of making the system work, 
not to change it. 
1. 'Civiletti chides Labour Department on Strike Force 
Cooperation', Washington Post, March 3,1978: A29; A. Bequai, 
op. cit.: 65. 
2. A. Bequai, op. cit.: 63-64. 
3. W. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 182. 
4. For reason why socialism has not succeeded in America, see Bell's analysis from the point of view of a liberal democrat 
who is an exponent of capitalist system: 'The Failure of 
American Socialism: The Tension of Ethnic and Politics', Bell, op. cit.: 275-298. 
5. Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common 
Man Believes What He Does, New York, 1962. 
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As Dave Beck of the Teamster's Union once put it: 
Our aim has been to develop better understanding 
between industry and labour. This is our contribution 
toward good government. We have inculcated the concept 
of... a definite understanding between those employed 
and those who invest capital. We do our part to make 
the system work. 
' 
On the other hand, those who subscribe to the opposite per- 
spective realize that workers and capitalist owners have nothing 
in common. As Harry Bridges saw it, 'we take the stand that we 
as workers have nothing in common with the employers. We are 
in a class struggle, and we subscribe to the belief that if 
the employer is not in business, his products will still be 
necessary and we still will be providing them when there is 
no employing class. f2 This belief which was at the heart of 
the ideology of the Industrial Workers of the 
traditionally considered a dangerous doctrine 
its advocates have usually been the target of 
agencies, as they are perceived as a threat ti 
capitalist class. 
4 A strong socialist labour 
been able to eliminate the racketeers, and in 
1. M. Morgan, Skid Road, New York, 1951: 250. 
2. ibid.: 248. 
World3 is 
in America and 
law enforcement 
D the ruling 
union would have 
the country as a 
3. Organized in Chicago in June 1905, the I. W. W. hoped to 
create a labour-union equivalent of the Socialist party. Its 
chairman, William D. Haywood, at the founding convention told 
the delegates: 'The working class and the employing class have 
nothing in common... Our duty is to compile the category of 
crimes perpetrated by the capitalist class', see, William 
Preston Jr. Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of 
Radicals, 160-3-1933, New York, -1966: 35-44. 
4. F. Pearce, op. cit.: 127. 
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whole such a socialist influence seemed to be a possibility up 
until the late 1940s. 
1 Even in the thirties when the 
'Communists sought to gain a foothold among the Italian workers, 
it is admitted that such actions were dealt with summarily. 
2 It 
would appear that the activities of the Communists were evidently 
perceived as threats to the long-established patterns of political 
and economic accommodation between the racketeers and the 
industrial barons. 
It can be seen and argued that the real operators of 
organized crime in America at the present time are not the 'Mafia' 
members most of whom have since long branched out into legitimate 
business or simply retired from the field; however, as a result 
of the succession process and ethnic bias the mafia continues, 
unfortunately, to dominate organized crime debate in the 
country. As we have shown in this chapter, a debate on organized 
crime in America, as in Sicily, should focus not only on the 
racketeers but equally, if not more, on the corrupt politicians, 
law enforcement officials, union leaders, and businessmen who 
are in symbiotic relationship with the racketeers. Organized 
crime has persisted for many decades in America mainly became 
of this unholy alliance between the 'respectable' members of the 
society and the racketeers who supply the illegal goods and 
services demanded by the former. It is an alliance or coalition 
in which organized crime has traditionally played the role of a 
servant for the ruling class who uses it to maintain its politi- 
cal and economic domination. While organized crime serves the 
ends of the ruling class it also serves those of the marginal 
elements in the crime network by providing them with an altern- 
ative avenue through which they could enhance their social status. 
1. F. Pearce, op. cit.: 143. 
2. D. Bell, op. cit.: 197. 
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An Alternative Route to Wealth And Power 
If there is one conspicuous theme that the study of 
organized crime should be oriented around it is that of 
wealth and the power it brings to its possessor. The pursuit 
of wealth in f . one , guise , or , another 
has been the cement which 
holds the underworld and upperworld together. As Block and 
Chambliss have noted; 1 organized crime always reflects the 
structure and tension in civil society, the opportunities for 
profit and power, and the contradictions in political 
economy. 
2 Whereas a social structure may not in itself be 
the direct cause of organized crime, its operation may be, 
such as to provide conditions conducive to the development' 
and growth of the phenomenon. The logic of capitalism, it 
has been argued, is a logic from which crime networks often 
arises and become 'institutionalized'. 
3 Capitalism is based 
on the private ownership of property which can be acquired 
legally by selling one's labour, products or. providing 
services, all of which can be exchanged for money at a 
profit. Thus a society that is bent on accumulating capital 
often gives rise to criminal conduct also bent on acquiring 
property and wealth. 
4 Although capitalism provides the 
basic conditions, it is admittedly the organization of 
1. A. Block and W. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 131. 
2. For a schematic treatment of the general model of 
contradictions and their resultant conflicts and dilemmas in 
Capitalist societies, and their resolutions, see idem: 7-10. 
3. W. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 181. 
4. R. Quinney, Criminolo : An Analysis and Critique of 
Crime in America. Boston, 1975. 
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politics in America that joins the capitalist mode of 
production to make the ground fertile for the creation and 
sustenance of crime networks. 
' 
Because money has always been a crucial factor in 
getting elected to public office in America, crime networks 
with huge sums of money have naturally been a valuable source 
of funds to oil capitalism's political machinery. In the 
normal course of events some politicians will come to 
cooperate more fully than others with the crime networks 
which receive in return prmission and immunity to`operate 
their business. 2 In the process the crime networks become 
an institutionalized, fixed, and permanent link in the chain 
of the country's political economy, and thus persist year 
after year with only the faces and methods of operation 
changing. 
3 The struggle and tension in the operation of 
the American economy is reflected in the degree to which 
racketeers from successive ethnic groups have sought to 
exploit the economy to advance their social status through 
alliance with the established power structure. 
4 Given the 
importance attached to the acquisition of wealthy and the 
1. W. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 182-185. 
2. F. Tannenbaum, Crime and The Community, op. cit. 
3. D. Bell, The End of Ideolo , op. cit.: 143-144; K. Allsop, ýo c t.; W. J. Cam ss, op. c t.: 183; F. Pearce, 
op. cit.: 121-124. 
4. D. Bell, op. cit.: 129. 
5. R. K. Merton, op. cit.; Irvin G. Wyllie, The Self-made Man 
In America: The Myth of Rags to Riches, New Brunswick, New 
Jersey, 1954. 
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high concentration of economic power in a few hands and 
corporations in America, 
l 
organized crime has for decades 
provided an alternative avenue through which marginal 
elements have been able to achieve their 'American Dream' - 
the aquisition of wealth and power. 
It is believed that the Anglo elements to the new world, 
later joined by the Scottish and Irish, wert: the pioneers of 
organized crime in the country. 
2 By the turn of the 
century, however, the field had been broadened to include the 
Jews, Germans, Poles and others, and during the same period 
the Anglo elements had faded from the scene; to be replaced 
by the Irish. As each ethnic group acquired wealth and power 
and faded into respectability, its place was taken by the 
next immigrant arrival. Thus the Irish were succeeded by the 
Jews who in-turn were succeeded by the Italians who are said 
to be in 'control' of the field since the twenties. 
Although, in general, each ethnic group in its turn took to 
crime as part of the early adjustment to urban life, there 
were some ethnic groups - the Germans and Scandinavians, for 
example - who did not appear to have made significant 
_ contributions to the 
development of organized crime. 
3 
1. Estes Kefauver, In a Few Hands: Monopoly Power in America, 
New York, 1965. The monopoly of wealth by a few hands is 
almost a common phenomenon in most capitalist societies and 
is a concomitant of the ownership of the means of production; 
see R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, London, 
1980: 25; J. E. Mead, Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership 
of Property, London, . 
2. The activities of Roger Plant and Mike McDonald, both 
Englishmen, in establishing prostitution and gambling 
enterprises in Chicago are generally regarded as the models 
which their successors later emulated; J. L. Albini, op. cit.: 
177-183. 
3. D. Bell, op. cit., A. Bequai, op. cit. 
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Among those that did contribute, however, there appeared to 
be some degree of specialization. The Irish predominated in 
racketeering which derived from their importance as leaders 
of organized labour in general, 
1 
and in the operation of 
major gambling syndicates. The Irish politics - gambling 
complex remained intact until about World War One when 
developing black ghettos allowed black politicians and 
policy operators to build rival independent, gambling and 
political organizations linked to the Republicans in the 
1920s and the Democratic city machines in the 1930x. 
2 
Later Jewish wealth, among the East European immigrants, 
was apparently built in the garment trades, though with some 
involvement with the Jewish gangsters who were typically, 
industrial racketeers. 
3 Apart from their involvement in 
gambling and bootlegging, they made a special contribution to 
the organized underworld by providing professional or expert 
services, became a majority of the bailbondsmen in the 
cities, and constituted over half the fences who disposed of 
stolen goods. 
4 This was, of course, closely related to Jewish 
predominance as junk dealers and their importance in retail 
1. For discussions of labour racketeering, see John 
Hutchinson, The Imperfect Union: A History of Corruption in 
American Trade Unions, New York, 1970t especially chapters 4 
and 9; D. Bell. op. cit.: 'The Racket-Ridden Longshoremen: 
the Web of Economics and Politics', chapter 9: 175-209; 
with particular reference to Chicago, see Royal E. Montgomery, 
Industrial Relations in Chicago Building Trades, Chicago, 1970. 
2. Mark H. Haller, 'Organized Crime in Urban Society: Chicago 
in the Twentieth Century', Jounal of Social History, 5, 
1971-1972: 210-234; John Landesco, Organize Crime in Chicago, 
op. cit.: chapter 3. 
3. D. Bell, pp. cit.: 142. 
4. M. H. Haller, op. cit. 
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trade. ' They were also heavily over represented among 
defence lawyers and a small minority of thew rose through 
politics and occasionally touched the fringes of crime. 
2 
The Italians, on the other hand, specialized in prostitution, 
and political protection often had to be arranged through 
Irish political leaders. Just as the Irish blocked Italians 
in politics, so also they blocked Italians in gambling which 
was both more respectable and more profitable than 
prostitution. 
3 
Thus, as the latecomem to the field, the Italians 
initially 'found the more obvious big-city paths from rags to 
riches pre-empted'4 by the Irish and Jews. Although 
Prohibition was an added bonanza to all gangsters in general, 
its main importance to the Italians actually lay in the fact 
that it provided them with an opportunity to break into a 
major field of organized crime that was not already 
monopolized by the Irish. 
5 The success of organization 
1. It is unnecessary to emphasize that the entrepreneurial 
and professional services of the Jews reflected broader 
patterns of adaptation to American urban life; see, W. F. 
Ogburn and Clark Tibbitts, 'A memorandum on the Nativity of 
Certain Criminal Classes Engaged in Organized Crime' in 
Charles E. Merriam Papers, University of Chicago Library, 
Chicago, Illinois, July 30,1930: 43. 
2. D. Bell, op. cit. 
3. For the accounts of the rise of the Capone Organization, 
see, John Kobler, Capone: the Life and World of Al Ca one, 
London, 1971; F. D. Pas ley, Al Capone: The Biography oa 
Self-Made Man, New York, 197F. 
4. D. Bell, op. cit.: 142; Stuart L Hills, Crimes, Power and 
Moralit : the Criminal Law Process in the U. S., Scranton, 
Pa., 1971: 109. 
5. M. H. Haller, 'Organized Crime in Urban Society: Chicago in 
the twentieth century', Journal of Social History, 51 1971- 72: 219. Prohibition enabled Italian Americans to challenge 
the Irish dominance in politics, business, labour unions and 
other areas which had hitherto been the preserve of the Irish. 
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brought wealth and power to many ambitious Italians and 
provided them with lush money in the late 1920s and early 
1930s to move into gambling, racketeering, and, entertainment, 
as well as a broad range of legitimate enterprises. 
Bootlegging allowed them, through entrepreneurial skillsl 
and by assassinations of rivals, to gain a central position 
in the world of organized crime. With the massive capital 
which they accumulated during this period, the Italian 
racketeers were eventually able to break the Irish blockage 
in politics, and to influence the appointment of a number of 
Italian Americans to the judiciary. It is thought that most 
of the Italian judges in America in the 1940s and 1950s and 
beyond owe their positions to Frank Costello, a political 
power broker in New York. 
2 Italians' high visibility in 
the field of organized crime up to the present time is 
probably due to the fact that the Irish and Jews have faded 
into respectability as they attained wealth and power, and 
probably because no other new ethnic group has seriously 
challenged their ascendancy. 3 
With the abolition of Prohibition in 1933, however, 
gambling once more surfaced as the major enterprise of 
4 
organized crime, along with narcotics trafficking. It 
1. Al Capone remarked in this regard, 'Prohibition is a 
business. All I do is to supply a public demand. I do it in 
the best and least harmful way I can'; see Kenneth Allsop, 
The Bootleggers and Their Era, Garden City, New York, 1961: 
364. 
2. D.. Bell; op. cit.: 143-145. 
3. F. A. Lanni, Black Mafia, New York, 1974. 
4. M. H. Haller, op. cit. 
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cannot be seriously disputed that the Italians do not have a 
monopoly of these enterprises, and that perhaps the main 
beneficiaries of organized crime in America today are the 
'respectable' members of the society in the crime network, 
The symbiotic relationship between crime and politics which 
was fashioned in the last century has continued to remain the 
basis of organized crime in America. Despite the fact that 
most of the Italians who controlled the field in the fifties 
and sixties have since branched into legitimate businesses, 
the public continues to harp on the 'Mafia' as the sole 
purveyor of organized crime in the country. It is a view 
that often ignores the symbiotic relationship between crime 
and politics and their complex networks. 
This symbiotic relationship between criminal syndicates 
and the established authorities, and the operation of the 
economy have admittedly been responsible for sustaining the 
persistence of organized crime in America. The extent to 
which the politicians, police, union leaders and businessmen 
in other capitalist societies are corrupt may vary from place 
to place. The variations, however important they may be, 
1. As late as 1978, a group of journalists and investigators 
declared that 'U. S. Senator Barry Goldwater, once a 
Republican presidential candidate, and his brother and a 
close friend have dominated Phoenix and Arizona for nearly 
thirty years while condoning the presence of organized crime 
through friendships and business alliances with mob figures. ' 
At the same time, the governor of Maryland, Marvin Mandel, 
continuing the practice initiated by the former 
Vice-President, Spiro Agnew, was found guilty of fraud and 
racketeering while in office; W. J. Chambliss, On the Take, 
op. cit.: IX. 
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should not obscure the fact that the systematic organization 
of illegal activities organized for continuing profits, 
rather than individual illegal acts, ' is as characteristic 
of capitalism as bureaucracy is characteristic of the modern 
state. 
2 This situation contrasts dramatically with the 
nature of individual corruption and black markets which can 
take place in every society. Such activities usually last 
for a short period and are terminated as soon as they are 
brought to the attention of the authorities. Recently, cases" 
of such corruption and abuse of individual position were 
dealt with in the Soviet Union. 3 In one case, the offender 
who hoarded goods destined for the government warehouse was 
ordered to be shot. 
4 This kind of punishment clearly 
demonstrates the degree of abhorence with which such 
activities are regarded in socialist societies. 
5 There was 
apparently no suggestion that the offenders had any police or 
political protection in their activities. The crucial 
question here for our purposes is not whether a particular 
brand of crime can or cannot take place in a particular 
social system at any given time. Rather, the point is if it 
1. bid; 129. 
2. W. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 184. 
3. Mark Wood: Reuter News Agency, 'Gorbachev takes aim at 
cynicism, corruption', The Toronto Star, February 26,1986: 
A16. 
4. ibid. 
5. In most socialist societies this kind of activity falls 
under the crime against the national economy; L. Salas, Social Control and Deviance in Cuba, New York, 1979: 66" 
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does take place, whether there would be interested and 
powerful forces that would sustain its existence and keep it 
thriving for decades or even centuries for their own political 
and economic ends. This is the crucial point and the answer 
to the question would clearly account for the pervasiveness 
of organized crime in capitalist in contrast to socialist 
societies. As the profits from organized crime are shared 
by the American syndicates and their 'respectable' masters, 
these tend to cement their relationships. These forces which 
stem from the system of adversary politics, police corruption, 
and the violently antagonistic relations between labour and 
capital basically pursue the same objectives as organized crime - 
the acquisition of wealth and power. 
Meanwhile, speculations are rife as to which ethnic 
group in the country will be the next in line to succeed the 
Italians, whose role in organized crime is seen to be coming 
to an end. 
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The Future Successors 
At the risk of sounding too presumptions, one can argue 
that organized crime will continue to be one of the avenues 
of upward mobility for fringe groups and individuals who 
occupy minority or lower class status in America. In the 
past each ethnic group in turn had used this queer ladder to 
achieve wealth and power through the control of local 
politics and then moved on to the status of respectability. 
It was a process that began with the Anglo elements who were 
succeeded by the Irish, and and who in turn were succeeded by 
the Jews who dominated the field until the beginning of the 
1920s when the Italians forced them to 'abdicate'. Now that 
this last group has achieved wealth and power through their 
involvement in organized crime,, and the majority of them have 
entered the legitimate pathways to respectability, their role 
in organized crime has noticeably started to decline. The 
question now is whether organized crime will continue to 
afford upward social mobility to ethnic groups and, if so, 
which group or groups will take over from the Italians. 
Some observers of the American organized crime scene are 
of the view that the Blacks and Hispanics are the most likely 
on the drawing board. ' 
1. The indiscriminate use of the term 'mafia' among most 
American writers can be seen here where Sealey refers to the 
influence of the blacks in future syndicated crime as the 
coming of a 'Black mafia', see Pat Sealey, 'Negroes Get Rung 
on Mafia Ladder', The Miami Herald, March 12, . 1968: 1v 
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There are, however, some organizational, technical and 
political problems which these groups must overcome before 
they can hope to take over from the Italians. Currently, the 
two groups appear to lack strategic political connections 
which helped the previous ethnic groups in their quest for 
the American dream. Their hold on political power appears 
tenuous and has yet to be consolidated. At present their 
crime networks are excluded from the larger markets, and are 
mainly confined to the ghettos. A similar situation 
prevailed against the Italians when they were shut out by the 
Irish in the earlier part of the century until Prohibition 
provided a source for extra-ghetto profit and political power 
enabled the Italian gangsters to challenge the Irish 
domination. ' These crime networks apparently lack 
effective control over large sectors of criminal enterprises 
within as well as outside the ghetto. The two groups also 
appear to lack organizational mechanism that could bring 
their disparate networks together into large active, criminal 
organizations capable of exercising effective control. 2 , 
Just as the Irish and Italians were able to dominate 
. organized crime in America through their domination of muni- 
cipal politics, it is likely that the recent election of 
several Black mayors and other public Black and Hispanic 
officials across the nation3 will enable them to wield power 
in the political machine and place them in a position of 
1. Mark Haller, 'Organized Crime in Urban City', op. cit.: 219. 
2. Francis J. Lanni, Black Mafia: Ethnic Succession in 
Organized Crime, New York, 316-317. 
3. For analyses of the votimg power of blacks, see Rod Bush (eda, The New Black Vote: Politics and Power in four American 
cities, San Francisco, 1984-; Ernest Patterson, Black Cit 
Politics, New York, 1974; M. B. Preston, L. J. Henderson an P. Puryear (eds), The Search for Political Power, New York, 1982' 
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vote brokers . However, since machine politics is declining 
in the country, it is likely that Black and Hispanic crime 
networks will not be afforded the use of urban machines for 
upward mobility to the same degree as their forerunners. 
' 
However, it would appear that the political machines will 
continue to offer them limited representation as was true in 
the past. 
2 For years it has long been recognized by Black 
leaders that the urban poor are among the worst victims of 
organized crime, and the Blacks who constitute the greater 
portion of these victims have been urged to take control of 
the operations of vices in their community, and to turn them 
into economic enterprises, while eliminating those they 
consider to be most harmful to the psychological health of the 
community. 
3 However, some pundits believe that a black man 
'has a better chance of being elected mayor of Selma, 
Alabama, than moving into the big money with syndicates'. 
4 
Despite this gloomy prediction, one shculd rot forget 
that in America, ethnic groups often succeed to political 
power before they succeed in crime, and that the two forms of 
mobility invariably go together. With the decline in-machine 
1. See, for instance, Bruce M. Stave and Sondra A. Stave 
(eds. ), Urban Bosses Machines, and Progressive Reformers, 
Malabar, For a, 1984# 
2. Elmer E. Cormwell, Jr., Bosses, Machines and Ethnic 
Groups', The Annals of American Academy. 353 (May, 1964): 
27-39. 
3. Reaction of the Congress of Racial Equality to police 
corruption and victimization of the urban poor by organized 
crime, at its 1967 annual convention at Oakland, California, 
cited in D. R. Cressey, Theft of The Nation, op. cit.: 197. 
4. Nicholas Gage Column: The Wall Street Journal, October 26, 
1967. 
5. D. Bell, op. cit: 191-192. 
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politics, however, it is most likely that political 
protection for future syndicate operators will probably be 
more frequently obtained through direct payoffs to the 
police and politicians of the crime networks than reliance 
on machine politics. This symbiotic accommodation which 
largely sustained the existence of the mafia phenomenon in 
Sicily has also been reponsible for the sustenance and 
existence of syndicated crime in America. Given the fact 
that narcotics trafficking is becoming more lucrative than 
gambling (considering the legalization of gambling in most 
States), and given its international connections, it is 
equally possible that eventually no one ethnic group would 
be able to dominate organized crime in the country when the 
Italians finally vacate the field. 
Often overlooked when considering potential ethnic 
successors to organized crime in America are the ethnic 
Chinese. As Robertson notes, Americailaw enforcement 
agents have for so long overlooked self-effacing Chinese in 
their midst because the 'mafia' loomed so perilously 
large .1 Their activities in recent years in drug trafficking 
have attracted the attention of law enforcers, and it is 
believed they are a potent force to be reckoned with in this 
area, giv en their connections with their relatives in 
Hong Kong and Southeast Asian countries who control most of 
the heroin originating in the Golden Triangle. 
2 
1. F. Robertson, Triangle of death, pp. cit.: 77. 
2. A. W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia,.. 
New York, 1972: 185-69 223,237-41. 
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It is noted that they have clannishness and reticence 
which helped the Sicilian mafiosi and American syndicates to 
become successful. 
' If they can succeed to political power, 
their vastly superior international connections and contacts2 
would certainly place them in a serious position as 
competitors to the blacks and Hispanics, especially in the 
areas of drug trafficking and loansharking. But as the 
experience of the Irish and other previous ethnic groups would 
indicate, in America ethnic groups usually succeed to political 
power, which affords protective shield, before they can 
succeed in crime. Unlike black and Hispanic Americans who have 
been elected to important political positions since the 1970s, 
Chinese Americans have so far shown no eagerness for public 
office. With the decline in machine politics in the country, 
it would appear that their only way to achieve success in the 
field of organized crime would be through direct payoffs to 
the established legal authorities for the permission to 
operate. As the field and its operations become more sophis- 
ticated, rather than having one single ethnic group at a time 
dominate the field as in the past, it is conceivale that there 
would be several of them attempting to use organized crime to 
improve their social status. The field is becoming a kind of 
asphalt jungle where anybody can always find his way if he has 
the necessary political and police connections. Organized crime 
will probably continue to attract some minority groups as one 
of the queer ladders of social mobility, 
3 
as it is fed by the 
growing profits from drug trafficking, gambling, loansharking 
and other kinds of vice. 
1. F. Bresler, The Chinese Mafia, New York, 1981: 78,197-228. 
2. A. W. McCoy, op. cit.; F. Bresler, op. cit.: 30. 
3. D. Bell, The End of Ideology, op. cit.: 129. 
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Conclusion 
Organized crime in America derives its matrix from certain 
characteristics of the society and can be viewed as a form of 
competition and struggle, rather than conspiracy, waged by 
successive ethnic groups and immigrants in the illicit sector 
of the country's economy, through the control of urban 
politics which often results in the achievement of wealth and 
power which are defined as the 'American dream'. The 
preoccupation with the 'Mafia' as the sole purveyor of 
organized crime has created a dangerous distortion and 
obstacle in understanding the true nature of organized crime 
in the country. As argued in this chapter, it would appear 
that the 'mafia' currently plays very little role in the 
country's syndicated crime and that the real power behind 
organized crime in the country is the crooked politicians, 
law enforcement officials, union leaders, businessmen, 
prosecutors and judges in a coalition with the racketeers. 
These participants that make up the crime network have shared 
financial interests which help to maintain and ensure mutual 
cooperation among the members of the network and those who 
work for it. This symbiotic accommodation between the 
racketeers and 'respectable' members of the network is 
maintained through a system of payoffs and 'campaign 
contributions' and it works to the advantage of both parties. 
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More importantly, these 'respectable'-members use organized 
crime as servant to maintain financial, economic, and 
political domination of the society. 
It has been suggested that black and Hispanic Americans may 
be the next ethnic groups to use organized crime to attain 
social mobility when the Italians fade away from the scene. 
We have suggested that ethnic Chinese could also be a 
potential force in the battle to succeed Italians, given 
their international connections and contacts which place them 
on a more advantageous postition than Black and Hispanic 
Americans. There are, however certain political and 
organizational problems to be surmounted before these groups 
can hope to succeed the Italians. For some members of these 
ethnic groups, organized crime constitutes an alternative 
avenue to getting their share of American wealth. The 
operation of the American economy admittedly supplies the 
basis of accomodation between organized criminals and 
officials in the power structure. This situation may vary 
from one capitalist society to another. The variations, 
however important they may be, do not obscure the fact that 
the systematic organization of illegal activities and illicit 
goods and services for continuing profits, rather than 
individual illegal acts, is ascharacteristic of capitalism as 
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ORGANIZED CRIME IN CANADA 
Introduction 
Organized crime has existed in Canada for several 
decades but it was only in the last two and a half decades 
that concern about it began to be expressed in the form of 
public inquiries on its activities and the extent of its 
connections with the respectable members of the society and 
its establishments. Organized crime in Canada is to a large 
extent influenced by the existence of the same phenomenon in 
the United States where it has enjoyed more than a century of 
longevity, despite public inquiries and commissions to deal 
with it. The operations of the phenomenon in the two 
countries, however, appear to differ in many areas. Unlike 
the American which is as vast in scope as the country itself 
and is capable of penetrating every facet of American life, 
organized crime in Cananda appears to be concentrated mainly 
in the three big Canadian cities. 
The preponderance of individuals and groups with 
Italian-sounding names in the Canadian operation has led 
early investigators to the conclusion that organized crime in 
Canada is a branch of the American and that it is controlled, 
as it is claimed in the U. S., by the American 'Mafia', a view 
we consider to be possibly misleading. This study examines 
recent investigations whch indicate that the phenomenon in 
Canada cuts across all ethnic lines and which cast some doubt 
on the branch plant and 'Mafia' control theory. It examines 
how the operation of organized crime differs in the two 
countries in terms of its intensity and pervasiveness, and 
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the three clear areas where organized crime and its 
connections with Canadian society resemble what prevail in 
the United States. It argues that the branch plant theory 
would be inconsistent with the way independent, loose 
associations are known to operate of which organized crime is 
a prototype. 
The Branch Plant Theory 
For years, Canadian policy makers and planners, along 
with their U. S. counterparts, have been in a muddle in 
conceptualizing the phenomenon of organized crime and this 
was mainly caused by the tawdry romance these officials 
perenially enjoy in viewing organized crime in terms of the 
'Mafia' and alien conspiracy as a method for explaining 
issues perceived as social problems. Prior to the mid 1970s, 
organized crime in Canada was viewed as a spill-over from the 
United States and, according to the police, a branch plant 
operation controlled by members of the 'mafia' gangs south of 
the border. ' The reports of the commission of enquiries 
into organized crime conducted by law enforcement officials 
in the 1960s and early 1970s in the provinces of Ontario2 
and British Columbia3 consistently maintained that 
organized crime in the country was a branch plant operation 
of the U. S. phenomenon, and that the 'mafia' was the sole 
1. Report of the Ontario Police Commission on Organized 
Crime, Toronto, Ontario, January 31,1964. 
2. ibid. 
3. Coordinated Law Enforcement Unit (CLEU): Initial Report on Organized Crime in British Columbia, Department of Attorney General of B. C., October, " 
204. 
controller of the operation. The reports, however, were 
remarkable for what the commissioners failed to do: they 
failed to investigate the symbiotic relationship, if any, 
between the organized criminals or the syndicates and the 
'respectable' members and institutions of Canadian society; 
what role the former play in relation to the latter, and how 
these criminals gained their power and fortunes. 
Even though Al Capone-type crime is distinctly American, 
something like it does exist not only in Canada but also in 
other territories adjacent to the United States. 
' For 
years, major Canadian cities like Vancouver, Toronto, and 
especially Montreal have been choice staging points and 
operational bases for the international traffick in drugs. 
The closeness of the U. S. market and the affinities'of 
Canadian gangsters for drug smugglers in other countries are 
believed to have made major Canadian cities one of the most 
active and important links in this international commerce. 
2 
In the 1970s organized crime networks in Canada, especially 
in Montreal and Toronto, featured many Canadians of Italian 
origin whose links and interactions with their American 
counterparts obviously created an appearance of a vast 
international conspiracy of monopoly and control of organized 
crime activities by one ethnic group, with Canada serving as 
supposedly a branch plant. 
No one can say with certainty the exact nature of the 
relationship between the two groups on both sides of the 
1. J. A. Mack with H. Kerner, The Crime Industry, Westmead, 
1975: 5. 
2. Jean-Pierre Charbonneau, The Canadian Connection, trans. 
from the French by James Stewart, Montreal, 1976: X111. 
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border; but whether this liaison should be viewed in terms of 
interactions between employees at a branch plant and their 
officials at the headquarters, vassals and their overlords, 
or strictly interactions between individuals and groups 
engaged in the same business is still open to debate. The 
police authorities, however, take the view that American 
syndicates not only control the existing criminal organ- 
izations in Canada but have also expanded their activities 
there. 1 For some time after the Kefauver inquiry in the 
United States, the police Commission report states, several 
of the syndicates in the eastern U. S. moved their head- 
quarters into eastern Canada because it was impossible to 
place a bet east of Chicago that was not cleared through 
Canada. It maintains that it was a matter of strategic move 
which enabled the American gangsters to evade U. S. law 
enforcement efforts. 
2 However, the report concedes that 
none of these operations brought the power of the syndicates 
into Canada for the purpose of taking over control of 
organized crime in Canada. It nevertheless claims that this 
picture is changing and that the American syndicates are 
showing an increasing interest in Canada and are moving to 
take over direct control of some existing criminal organ- 
izations and to expand their criminal activities. They are 
already active in the field of gambling, narcotics, 
trafficking, counterfeiting and the protection racket, the 
Commission report claims. 
3 
1. Report of the Ontario Police Commission on Organized 




In conclusion, the report asserts that 'there are many 
indications, and there is some evidence, that the American 
syndicates have already started to treat Canada as an area 
for expansion of their activities'. 
l The claim by any one 
country that its organized crime problem is imported from 
abroad is basically a standard one and there is nothing new 
about it; 
2 it is often designed to assuage the moral 
sentiments of the people, especially where the crime networks 
contain a high proportion of one newly-arrived ethnic group. 
Such a claim also provides an easy rationalization on the 
part of the police and politicians for their inability to 
successfully deal with the problem. 
In the mid 1970s, however, two more inquiries in Canada 
into organized crime were conducted which, through the 
techniques and methods the inquirers employed, shed a better 
light into the activities and identities of organized 
criminals than the earlier investigations by the police 
commissions in Ontario and British Columbia. The first of 
these was the Quebec Commission of Inquiry on organized 
crime3 of 1975 during which time many victims of organized 
crime in the province appeared and testified under oath as to 
how they had been subjected to regular 'protection' payments 
by the urban gangsters; the cash payoffs made to some crooked 
1. ibid. 
2. While Canadian authorities would like to view organized 
crime in Canada as a spill-over from the U. S., some American 
authorities and writers have long maintained that theirs was 
imported from Sicily. The view does not of course appear to 
take into account the existence of organized crime in the 
U. S. prior to the 1920s when Italian Americans played a very little role in the scene; see A. Bequai, Organized Crime: the 
Fifth Estate, Lexington, Mass., 1979: 19; Ed Reid, Mafia: 
Cosa Nostra Syndicate, New york, 1964. 
3. Quebec Commission of Inquiry on Organized Crime, Attorney 
General's office, Quebec City, 1975. 
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police officials by vice operators, the resale by corrupt 
police officials to the public of narcotics seized from drug 
traffickers; and the alliance of some city politicians with 
organized crime network members. 
' The inquiry also revealed, 
contrary to the general belief that the members of the 'mafia' 
controlled and monopolized all organized crime in the country, 
that other ethnic groups are also involved in organized crime 
networks. 
2 The second and a nation-wide enquiry lasting 
three years and costing over one million dollars was undertaken 
by select staff of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation which 
released their findings in a two-90 minute documentary in June 
19773 
Utilizing the enormous resources of the Network, the 
investigators were able to dig further and travel more exten- 
sively than any independent researcher or organization with 
limited means would be able to accomplish. The investigators 
interviewed some defectors from crime networks who had their 
voices and faces altered so as to prevent any possible identi- 
fication, while others appeared hooded while answering 
questions from the investigators. Although the investigators 
accepted everything the defectors told them at face value, one 
must not forget that defectors are often given to exaggerations 
1. ibid. 
2. ibid. 
3. The salient parts of the findings in this investigation were 
released to the public by the CBC Networks and were called 'Connections: An Investigation into Organized Crime in Canada', 
on the 12th and 13th. June, 1977. By the kind permission of 
the CBC Management, the writer was able to view the entire documentary for the second time at their studio in Toronto. 
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in order to impress the officials-1 Using hidden night 
cameras and microfilms, the investigators interviewed and 
filmed some of the active members of the crime networks in 
the cities they visited; much of their filming, however, was 
done from camouflaged vehicles using a new lens that could 
shoot in the dark and magnify available light 80,000 times. 
Though the focus of the enquiry was on Canada, the 
investigators visited more than thirty cities in America, in 
addition to ten Canadian cities; and two of the investi- 
gators, William MacAdam and Martin Burke, traveled as far 
afield as Amsterdam, Hong Kong, Marseilles, London and Sicily 
to run down leads and examine how the various crime network 
'connections' interlock. Through their superior resources 
and the fact that they were not law-enforcement officials, 
the investigators were able to penetrate where law enforcers 
would never dare to tread. As a result, their investigation 
appeared to produce better results than those of the police 
commissions indicated earlier on. 
The investigators, however, could not resist the popular 
term 'mafia' in describing the members of the crime networks, 
ostensibly because most of them had Italian-sounding names 
and because the term has always had a magic appeal in North 
America. Their conclusions, nevertheless, revealed that the 
crime networks in the country also include members of other 
ethnic groups, 'respectable' office holders and institutions, 
1. Morris and Hawkins, for instance, who analysed Valachi's 
testimony before the Senate Crime Commitee in the U. S. found 
a great deal of inconsistencies in his testimony: M. Morris 
and G., Hawkins (eds)The Honest Politicians Guide to Crime 
Control, Chicago, 1976: 72-1-27-; -6. Hawkins, 'God and the Mafia' 
The Public Interest, volume 14,1969. 
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and that the members of the crime networks are in constant 
interactions and communications with their counterparts in 
America, Europe and elsewhere. Despite this, the invest- 
igators, however, leaned towards the 'branch plant operation' 
theory advanced earlier by the police commission even though 
their own findings would not support such a conclusion. 
' 
In many ways, however, their findings contrast with those of 
the police commissions which made the 'mafia' the central 
focus of their investigation and whose findings could be seen 
as a rationalization of preconceived opinion. The invest- 
igators also interviewed some victims of organized crime: 
individuals who were swindled of their money in non-existent 
stocks; those who had been forced to make regular payments by 
mobsters for 'protection'; 
2 
a gang leader who had lost most 
of his men in a war with a rival crime network, and victims 
of loansharking, etc. In one incident, we hear the actual 
recorded phone call from a loan shark , recorded by his 
victim in Montreal, warning him, 'If your kids get hit with 
bullets tonight, that is your fault'. The victim told the 
3 
investigators that he had paid $10,000 interest on a $300 
loan, and that as the interest continued to multiply weekly 
and as he had no money to pay, he was refusing further pay- 
ment. In other recorded phone calls we hear the syndicates 
making drug deals, tapes of mobsters posing as federal agents 
to bilk little old ladies of their savings, and so on. 
4 
1. Canadian organized 
is a motley of ethnic 
inquiries, among them 
Yugoslavs, the Irish, 
featuring prominently 
Star, June 14,1977; 
crime, like its American counterpart, 
groups as revealed by all the 
Italians, French-Canadians, Greeks, 
Chinese, and others, with the Italians 
in the three large cities; The Toronto 
A. Bequai, op. cit., 17. 
2. ' Connection: An Investigation into Organized Crime in 




These and many other instances uncovered during the CBC 
Network's investigations clearly cast serious doubts on the 
'branch plant' theory, for many of the men involved in these 
criminal activities are indigenous Canadians with no Italian- 
sounding names and certainly no connection with the so-called 
'mafia'. 1 Canada, like any other capitalist country, is cap- 
able of producing as many organized criminals as the illicit 
sector of the economy can generate, and does no longer have to 
look to the United States for its hoods and drug smugglers, 
loansharks and the rest. Organized crime in Canada as revealed 
by the various inquiries appears to follow the pattern which is 
observed in most capitalist countries where the phenomenon 
exists, and it consists of such rackets as drug trafficking, 
loansharking, bookmaking, illegal gambling, prostitution and 
pimping, smuggling, fencing, political graft and corruption, 
extortion and labour racketeering. 
2 Since the late 1970s 
when the playing of lotteries was legalized in all the 
provinces but one, with the winnings being tax-free, narcotics 
trafficking and smuggling appear to have replaced gambling as 
the most lucrative of the enterprises. These organized crim- 
inal activities operating in the illegal sectors can be viewed 
as a developmental adjunct to the general system of Canadian 
private profit economy3 and are similar to those operating in 
the United States. Despite the similarities, however, there 
are definite differences which mark the operation of illicit 
industries in Canada from those of the United States. 
1. Jack Ackroyd, Chief of Toronto Police, 'Organized crime in 
Canada is not the domain of any one ethnic group'. The Toronto 
Star, March 15,1984: A5. 
2. Report on Organized Crime in Ontario, op. cit.: 64- 
3. See, for instance, G. B. Vold, Theoretical Criminology, New 
York, 1958: 221-242. 
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A Difference of Degree 
Almost all the organized criminal activities for which the 
United States has been noted world-wide are also found in 
Canada. The significant differences, however, appear to 
concern more the degree of their pervasiveness and intensity 
of operation in the two countries. The alliance of politics 
and crime in America at local and national levels dating back 
to the 1920s and beyond has been a hallmark of American 
politics. ' It has been the vehicle through which the 
Republican and Democratic political machines have received at 
one time or another their political campaign funds from members 
of the crime networks in return for permission to operate. 
2 
Campaign 'donations' by gangsters to individuals running for 
political office from the alderman to the president has long 
been an American phenomenon. 
3 In Canada, however there have 
been no documented cases of a political party allying itself 
with, or receiving campaign contributions from, organized 
criminals; in a few cases recently where politics and crime got 
entangled, they involved only individual politicians and not a 
political machine. 
4 The pursuit of the 'American Dreami5 - 
1. See, among otherSaJ. Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago, 
Chicago, 1968, especially chapters 4, and E Reid, The 
Shame of New York, Scranton, Pa., 1953; W. J. Chambliss, On The 
Take: From Petty Crooks to Presidents, Indiana, 1982. 
2. A. Block and W. J. Chambliss, Organizing Crime, New York, 
1981: 105-114; F. Tannenbaum, Crime and the Community, Boston, 
1978. 
3. The American government at all levels is largely a matter 
of pressure-group politics; the power and influence wielded by 
the syndicates might reasonably be regarded as simply an 
extension of the non-criminal pressure-group system; J. A. Mack, 
op. cit.: 175. 
4. These cases are treated here under the heading of 'Political 
Connection'. 
5. For a full treatment of the American Dream, see I. Wyllie;, 
The Self-Made Man in America: The Myth of Rags to Riches, New 
Brunswick, N. J., 1954. 
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wealth and power - so much woven into the national ethos has 
often induced successive ethnic groups and individuals to 
resort to organized crime to nail down their dream. 1 Since 
the achievement of the dream is shared not only by urban 
dwellers but also by those living in towns and villages, 
organized crime in America is not simply a phenomenon of the 
big cities only as it is in Canada. 
The American syndicates have always had an uncanny success 
in penetrating not only the politicians but also the police 
officials and the judiciary. Cash payoffs to the police and 
politicians2 have been the principal mechanism by which the 
syndicates in America have retained the goodwill of these 
officials and which assure them of immunity from prosecution in 
the course of their operation. This practice which is wide- 
spread in the United States also exists to a lesser degree in 
Canada at municipal and provincial levels. It has been shown 
that some politicians have supported organized crime figures in 
deportation and parole hearings, and that those connected with 
organized crime are not shy about trying to influence polit- 
icians, sometimes by making 'friendly donations' to their 
campaign funds. 
3 The inquiries in Ontario and Quebec also 
revealed a pattern of cash payoffs by organized crime figures 
to the police. 
4 The alliance between the American syndicates 
and their lawyers usually ensures a quick 'fix', that is, an 
1. Bell has appropriately characterized organized crime in this 
regard as 'a queer ladder of social mobility'; D. Bell, 'Crime 
as an American Way of Life', The Antioch Review, 135June. 1953" 
2. W. J. Chambliss: On the Take, op. cit.; Block and Chambliss, 
op. cit.; F. Tannebaum, Crime an the ýhe Community, op. cit. 
3. Don Dutton and Cal Millar, 'Organized Crime', The Toronto 
Star, March 5,1984: Al, A5. 
4. ibid; Organized Crime in Ontario, op. cit; Quebec Commission 
of Inquiry on Organized Crime, op. cit. 
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arrangement by which the syndicate safeguards himself from 
arrest, or conviction, or imprisonment by the lavish use of 
first rate lawyers-1 Although the system of 'fix' is still a 
novelty in Canada, the Ontario Police Inquiry notes that some 
lawyers practising in the province have participated in the 
activities of their clients who were in association with the 
members of the crime networks. 
2 
The activities of the American syndicates have tradition- 
ally been distinguished by their incredible degree of violence 
and intimidation resulting from their extra-legal status. 
Their efforts to maintain internal and inter-syndicate order 
and territorial monopoly have usually driven them, in the 
absence of any recourse to the public law, to a systematic use 
of violence ranging from roughing-up to murder. While New York 
City and Chicago, among others, have exemplified these 
activities in the United States, in recent years Montreal and 
Toronto in Canada have been getting their small share of this 
. 
bogus distinction. 3 The police believe that the recent rash 
of murders of well-known syndicates in the two cities was as a 
1. 'The Big Fix' in G. Tyler (ed. ), Organized Crime in America: 
A. Book of Readings, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1962; J. A. Mack, 
op, cit.: 35. 
2. Organized Crime in Ontario op. cit.: 106- 
3. In the current case in Montreal before the court, six bodies 
of the members of the motorcycle gang were recovered by the 
police from the bottom of a river near Montreal. The victims, 
which were riddled with bullets and chained to heavy objects, 
are believed by the police to have been shot by the gang 
members for misuse of money from drug sales, according to the 
police informer who managed to escape the execution. More than 
ten members of the gang picked up in Montreal and Halifax are 
currently in custody for the murders: The Toronto Star, 
November 12,1985: A4: For the activities of the U. S. warring 
gangsters over the control of criminal operations and 
territories, see K. Allsop, The Bootleggers and their Era, 
Garden City, New York, 1961; A. Bequai, Organized Crime, op. 
cit.; B. Trukus and S. Feder, Murder, Inc.: The Story of the Syndicate, London, 1952; J. Landesco, op. cit., among others. Also see M. McIntosh, The Organization of Crime, London, 1975: 56. 
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result of power and territorial struggle for the control of the 
lucrative narcotics trade. 
' 
The diversification of resources into legitimate 
businesses by the syndicates is seen by the officials of the 
United States as an invasion and subversion of legitimate 
business which constitutes a major threat to the political and 
economic system of the country because the invasion is 
undertaken, in the officials' view, with criminal intent. 
2 
In Canada, on the other hand, some well known syndicates have 
also legitimate businesses, probably as a front, and there has 
been no outcry by the officials that their operations cons- 
titute an invasion and subversion of legitimate business. 
3 
The 'invasion and subversion' theory can be viewed as an 
extension of the 'conspiracy' theory in the United States which 
sees a sinister plot in any undertaking by a syndicate, no 
matter how legitimate3and often is couched in a moral tone 
designed to disguise a social hypocrisy. 
4 It has been noted 
1. Police records indicate that over forty seven gangsters have 
lost their lives in gangland slayings in Toronto in the last 
ten years, and more than that number have died in Montreal 
'without a pillow under their heads', The Toronto Star, 
March 3,1984: Al, A10; November 15,19 : A-1-5. 
2. D. R. Cressey, Theft of The Nation: The Structure and 
Operations of Organized Crime in America, New York, 9: 
95-lud, 
3. Domenic Racco, a well known Toronto mobster whose murder in 
Dec. 1983 was linked to the earlier slaying of a Toronto 
gangster Paul Volpe in November 1983, owned a thriving bakery 
industry, probably as a front, and so do the Dubois brothers of 
Montreal who operate tavern establishments; The Toronto Star, 
December 13,1983: A14; CBC Organized Crime: 'Connections' , Part 2, June 13,1977. 
4. D. Bell, The End of Ideology, New York, 1967: 148-149. 
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that in the United States most key industries have become at 
one time or another the province of power syndicates as a 
result of the often violently antagonistic relations between 
labour and capital, workers and bosses. ' This situation 
explains the traditional alliance betwen the management and 
racketeers in the labour unions who receive regular payments 
from the management in return for an undertaking to maintain 
labour peace in their ranks; through such an alliance under- 
the-table deals are made, sweet-heart contracts are reached and 
the workers are cheated of their fair wages. 2 In addition to 
the labour-management racketeering, most American industries 
are often subjected to 'protection' payment while union workers 
face the problem of professional strike-breakers hired by the 
enployers who usually support the politician; with the result 
that politicians persuade the police to side with employers. 
3 
All these labour-management racketeering activities also exist 
in Canada though to a lesser extent. In a most recent case 
involving the Consumers Distributing of Toronto, the company 
pleaded guilty in court to paying more than a quarter of a 
million dollars in illegal kickbacks to a Toronto official of 
the Teamster's Union for 'labour peace' over a period of many 
months. 
4 
1. Block and Chambliss, op. cit.: 65. 
2. For a more detailed account of industrial and labour 
racketeerng in the U. S., see F. Pearce, Crimes of the Powerful: 
Marxism, Crime and Deviance, London, 1976: 131-146,15 -5; D. Bell, op. cit.: 'The Racket-Ridden Longshoremen: The Web of Economics and Politics', 175-209. 
3. ibid. 
4. The Toronto Star; 'Company paid Teamster $255,000 for Labour 
Peace, ' June 85: Al. 
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It can be argued, as the records of the two countries have 
shown, that all the various kinds of organized crime which 
exist in the United States also exist in Canada; the difference 
is basically one of degree. In one area at least, drug 
smuggling and trafficking, Canada appears to have a clear edge 
over the United States as a result of its enormous size and 
sparse population which enable smuggling boats, ships and 
planes to land with comparitively little risk. 
1 On the other 
hand, organized crime in Canada does not appear to enjoy the 
deep-rooted support which it finds across a broad spectrum of 
all segments of American society. But like its counterpart in 
America, however, organized crime in Canada has its own 
networks and connections which lend it support and through 
which its activities are sustained. But unlike in the U. S. 
where the phenomenon exists not only in big but also in 
medium-sized cities and small towns, organized crime in Canada 
appears to be concentrated mainly in the three large cities of 
Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. 
2 
1. Canada is the second largest country in the world after the 
Soviet union, but has a population almost equal to one-tenth of 
that of the United States. 
2. Report of the Ontario Police Commission. op. cit. 
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The Toronto Network 
Metropolitan Toronto, the most populous and prosperous 
city in Ontario and Canada, is believed to have been for years 
an attractive field for those engaged in organized crime. ' 
Organized crime activities consisting mainly of narcotics 
2 trafficking, gambling, prostitution, sales of phony stocks 
and disposal of stolen goods and bonds have long been dominated 
by men with Italian-sounding names, leading many people to 
believe that organized crime in this city is a preserve of the 
'mafia' organization. The close association which has existed 
between the Toronto crime networks and the Buffalo networks in 
the U. S. has also led the police in Canada to theorize that the 
Toronto network is actually 'a branch of the Buffalo 
networks'. 
3 Against that view it should be stated that 
people in the same business usually have need for close 
association with one another. The strategic position of 
Metropolitan Toronto has made it possible for the activities of 
its crime networks often to be felt throughout southern 
Ontario, including such cities as Hamilton, Niagara Falls, 
Ottawa, Guelph, and London, Ontario. 4 
1. Organized Crime in Ontario, op. cit.: 70. 
2. It should be noted that there is no legal sanction in Canada 
against acts of prostituion as such, that is, the offering of 
one's body commonly for lewdness in return for payment. 
However, four related sections are sanctioned. Soliciting in a 
public place and transporting a person to a bawdy-house are 
subject to summary convictions, while keeping a common 
bawdy-house and 'procuring' a person for prostitution are 
considered indictable offences; Canadian Criminal Code Part 5, 
sections 179,270. 
3. Organized Crime in Ontario, op. cit.: 36-37. 
4. ibid. 
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In spite of the previous reassurances of the Ontario 
government, metropolitan Toronto is now a mob city, as shown by 
the recent revelations and inter-syndicate feuds. 
1 Its crime 
networks have become so powerful that they should no longer be 
considered a subsidiary of the Buffalo organization and it is 
one of the open cities in North America where more than one 
crime network can exist and operate. In the 1950s and early 
1960s when Italian Americans featured prominently in the U. S. 
rackets, organized crime in Toronto was said to be dominated by 
the crime networks of Alberto and Vito Agueci and Dan 
Gasbarini. 2 According to Hamilton Spectator, Gasbarini was 
one of eight Canadians named as smugglers and suppliers of 
narcotics in Canada by a Buffalo police officer testifying at 
the Senate Crime Investigating Subcommittee hearings in 
Washington in 1963.3 The networks, based in Toronto and 
Hamilton, were reported to be closely associated with the 
Stefano Magadino network of Buffalo. 
4 Gasbarini himself 
admitted to the Spectator that he ran a wide-open gambling 
enterprise in Hamilton and that it was only closed 'when the 
police stopped looking the other way', S apparently as a 
result of his failure to keep up with payoffs. In the view of 
the police, the Magadino gang is so powerful and ruthless that 
it has been able to exercise an almost indisputable control 
1. Organized Crime: 'Connections' op. cit.: Part I, June 12, 
1977. 
2. Organized Crime in Ontario, op. cit.: 36. 
3. Hamilton Spectator, October 18,1963- 
4. Organized Crime in Ontario, op. cit. 
5. Hamilton Spectator, op. cit. 
219. 
over southern Ontario networks from its base in Buffalo. ' 
They cite the disappearance of Peter Mitchell in October 1959 
in Toronto and the murder of Alberto Agueci in 1961, both well- 
known gamblers and narcotics smugglers, as resulting from the 
victims' refusal to cooperate with this powerful network. 2 
In recent years, however, it has been noted that John 
Papalia, whose network began in the 1960s, is now the head of a 
criminal organization that stretches across Canada from its 
base in Toronto and Hamilton and which operates gambling, 
narcotics trafficking, counterfeiting, stock racketeering, 
stills operation, extortion and protection rackets, 
prostitution and smuggling of all descriptions. 3 His 
incredible success is said to have been the result of his 
ablility to cooperate with the powerful Magadino network. His 
only rival is believed to be Max Bluestein whose network is 
known to control one of the most profitable operations in 
Toronto and who is said to have refused to accept the 
Magadino's gang as a partner in his illegal gambling oper- 
ations. The failure of Magadino's effort to gain total control 
over organized crime in Toronto is attributed by the police to 
the stiff opposition from Bluestein and his network. 
4 The 
inter-syndicate conflict betwen Papalia and Bluestein is 
believed to have resulted largely from the opposing stand the 
two men took with regards to the Magadino gang. 5 
1. Organized Crime in Ontario, op. cit. 
2. ibid: 45. 
3. ib id : 64. 
4. ibid: 70-71. 
5. ibid: 62" 
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Other crime networks in Toronto which have attracted 
public attention in recent years and whose blood feuds and 
intersyndicate rivalries have resulted in several gangland 
murders are those of the late Paul Volpe, Cosimo Elia Commisso, 
and Mike Racco, the last two being in alliance and closely 
associated with the Violi network of Montreal as well as 
being in opposition to the Volpe network. 
' Volpe, a 
millionaire who controlled a large portion of drug trade, 
gambling and other vices in metro Toronto, was found murdered, 
his body stuffed in the boot of his wife's Mercedes Benz car 
parked at the Pearson International Airport in November 
1983.2 The police speculated that the killing was part of an 
attempt by two gangland 'enforcers' to gain control of the 
drug trade and illegal gambling operations in the city for a 
local underworld 'family' linked to crime networks in 
Montreal. 3 Prior to this muder, Cosimo Commisso had pleaded 
guilty in August 1981, to conspiring to kill Volpe by hiring 
a hit man who turned police informer. 
4 
In what was seen as a revenge less than a month later, 
Domenic Racco, son of Mike Racco, was found murdered in 
December 1983 and his bullet-riddled body was dumped on a 
5 lonely railway siding, with bullets in his head and chest. 
1. CBC: 'Connections', Part 1, June 12,1977. 
2. '`Gangland slaying of Paul Volpe a year-old puzzle', 
The Toronto Star, November 15,1984: A15. 
3. ibid. 
4. ibid. 
5. 'Mobster's death linked to dope trade', The Toronto Star, 
December 13,1983: A14. 
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Through wiretaps the police were able to pick up three members 
of Volpe's network living in Hamilton who were later tried and 
convicted of conspiracy to murder young Racco, two of them 
receiving twelve years and the third five years. 
' As has 
been noted, at least forty-seven people have been murdered in 
the Toronto area in the past decade in what observers and 
police view as inter-syndicate struggle for control of Ont rid'"s 
two billion dollar underworld business. 
2 As in most gangland 
murders, twenty-nine of these remain unsolved, according to the 
police record. 
3 Organized crime in Toronto appears to be 
more sophisticated than is usually thought and recent 
information regarding the existence of sophisticated production 
and distribution networks based in Toronto would clearly 
indicate that Toronto is rapidly replacing California as the 
production capital of metamphetamine crystals and powder. 
4 
Finally, "Chinatown in Toronto, the second largest in 
Canada which once led a more lawful existence than most other 
ethnic groups, has, since the late 1960s, become the scene of 
increasing organized criminal activities and is no longer 
defined by its service business. 5 With the rewriting of the 
1. 'Three jailed for the 1983 plot to murder Metro mobster: We 
will take him for a ride - threat picked up on wiretap', The 
Toronto Star, February 19,1985: All. 
2. 'A 3-month probe by The Star reveals organized crime is a 
two billion dollars industry he Toronto Star, March 3, 
1984: 1. 
3. The Toronto Star, March 5,1984: 1, 'Deaths Unsolved'. 
4. CBC: 'Connections', Part 1, June 12,1977. 
5. F. Bresler, The Chinese Mafia, New York, 1981: 232. 
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immigration laws in Canada in 1967 the floodgates of immigration 
from the Far East were thrown open. The new flood of 
immigrants, unlike the old settlers, is said to contain a 
large proportion of organized criminals. who have ties with 
criminal organizations back home in Hong Kong, and they are 
believed to be largely responsible for a large portion of 
heroin appearing on the streets of Boston and New York, 
smuggled from Toronto. 
1 A new criminal type of Triad Society 
2 
called the Kung Lok, affiliated to the 14K' in Hong Kong, is 
said to have opened up its headquarters in Toronto and has 
been active in other areas of organized criminal activity, 
besides drug trafficking and smuggling. 
3 
1. ibid.: 233. 
2. The numerals indicate the rank or position of the official, 
and the letter of the society to which he belongs, W. P. Morgan, 
Triad Societies in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 1982. 
3. F. Bresler, op. cit. 
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The Montreal Networks 
In the history of organized crime in Canada, Montreal and 
Toronto occupy on a lower scale the positions which New York 
and Chicago occupy in the United States. For the past sixty 
years or so Montreal has been one of the North American 
continent's major ports for heroin imports and most other 
narcotics, ' a nerve centre of all kinds of organized criminal 
activities that spill over to most Canadian cities. Like 
Chicago and New York, Montreal has had its own inter-syndicate 
blood feuds and gangland wars for territorial control of 
criminal operations. 
21n the 1920s and 1930s, during the 
period of Prohibition in the U. S., Montreal, along with Toronto 
and Vancouver, was among the major Canadian cities that 
American syndicates used as staging points for transportation 
of illicit liquor into the U. S. 
3 Like Toronto to its west, 
the activities of organized criminals in Montreal have been 
closely associated with those of their counterparts in the 
northeast of the United States and until relatively recently 
these activities were viewed in most cases as those of the 
American syndicates expanding into Canada. 4 This inescapable 
1. J. P. Charbonneau, op. cit. 
2. 'Montreal gangland figure slain', Washington Post, January 
23,1978: A-4; A. Bequai, op. cit.: 17; For the account of the 
inter-syndicate feuds between the McSween gang and the Dubois 
gang, the Dubois gang and the Devil's Disciples, and between 
the Cotroni organization and other gangs, see J. P. Charbonneau, 
op. cit.: 40,88,501-504; The Montreal Star, 'Murdered 
McSweens were gang 'dummies', December 8,1975: 1. 
3. J. L. Albini. The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend, New York, 1979: 200; Jefferson Farjeon, The Compleat Smuggler, New 
York, 1938: 315-316. 
4. Organized Crime in Ontario, op. cit.: 80-81" 
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conclusion derives mostly from the fact that the cast of 
organized crime in Montreal, like Toronto, until recently, 
contained a large proportion of individuals with Italian- 
sounding names. 
A Commission of Inquiry into Gambling and Commercialized 
Vice in Montreal in May 1950 revealed that Montreal, like most 
big cities south of the border, had a large number of networks 
of organized criminals whose activities ranged from loan- 
sharking, prostitution, illegal gambling to drug trafficking, 
electoral fraud and 'corruption of officials'. 
' During the 
same month, however, the police discovered in the house of 
Frank Petrula, one of the prominent drug traffickers at the 
time, a list of policemen, journalists, and politicians who 
were being paid off by the crime syndicate during the municipal 
election which had just ended. 
2 Petrula's notes indicated 
that his network and those of his fellow operators had spent 
more than one hundred thousand dollars in an attempt to defeat 
the Civic Action League and its reform-minded candidate Jean 
Drapeau. Although the Civic Action League won the election, 
its victory was only short-lived. 
3 Before the League 
1. J. P. Charbonneau, op. cit.: 83; 'Chief Langlois Fired, Fined 
$500; Dufresne and Brodeur Fined $7000; 17 other police, 
Ex-Police Punished', The Montreal Star, October 8,1954- 
2. J. P. Charbonneau, op. cit. These payments were actually 
insignificant when compared to what the Capone and other crime 
organizations paid in the U. S. in the two or three decades 
earlier for the protection of their gambling and liquor 
operations, see H. Asbury, Sucker's Progress: An Informal 
History of Gambling in America from the Colonies to Canfield, 
Montclair., N. J., 1969; idem, The Underworld of Chicago, London, 
1941; J. Landesco, op. cit.; K. Allsop, op. cit. 
3. J. P. Charbonneau, op. cit.: 85" 
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regrouped and regained power a few years later after the 
initial setback (it has governed Montreal todate), municipal 
politics in Montreal was said to be dominated by organized 
crime figures who virtually decided who should be elected, 
through their enormous 'campaign contributions' and 
manpower, 
' 
as was the case in most big cities in America2 
and Sicily. 
3 
It is well beyond the scope of this study to catalogue all 
the various criminal networks that have flourished in 
Montreal; nevertheless in the history of organized crime in 
Canada the names and networks of the Cotroni brothers, Paolo 
Violi, and the Dubois brothers clearly rank in importance and 
notoriety as those of Al Capone, Lucky Luciano, Frank Costello, 
Gambino, Bonanno and others in the United States. These three 
networks in Montreal streamlined organized crime in Canada in 
the same way Capone and others did in America. Until his death 
in 1980 by natural causes, the name Vic Cotroni was synomymous 
locally with the Montreal 'Mafia', and it is generally believed 
that it was his organization, which included his three brothers 
and associates Frank Dastin and Lucien Rivard, that made 
Montreal one of the world's notorious underworld cities by 
establishing it as a key North American point of entry for 
heroin from Marseilles. 4 The police believe that Cotroni's 
1. J. P. Charbonneau, op. cit. 
2. Ed Reid, op. cit; J. Landesco, op. cit; W. J. Chambliss, op. 
cit. 
3. M. Pantaleone, The Mafia and Politics, London, 1962; G. 
Servadio, Mafia and Mafioso: A History of the Mafia from its 
origins to the present day, New York, 1916. 
4. CBC Organized Crime 'Connections', Part I, June 12,1977. 
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success in the field of organized crime was largely due to his 
close association with the Joe Bonanno's network of New York 
whose associate, Carmen Galente, worked in Montreal from 1953 
to 1955 to assist the Cotroni gang to take over the criminal 
life of the city through the imposition of ruthless orders. ' 
For Cotroni, according to the police, the arrival of Carmen 
Galente with the power of the New York Bonanno network behind 
him was a turning point in the dangerous feud with that city's 
Jewish gangs who were in alliance with the Magadino network of 
Buffalo. This situation set off the gangland slayings of the 
1950s and 1960s for the control of narcotic trafficking and 
other criminal operations. 
2 Galente, however, was expelled 
from Canada in 1955 after he was apparently believed to have 
achieved his objective in reorganizing the Cotroni network. 
The Cotroni 'family' is said to have established extensive 
gambling interests in Florida as well, and good ties with the 
Corsican underworld. 
3 Even after his retirement from active 
engagement, Cotroni was reported to have remained influential 
in the criminal life of the country and often served as an 
adviser to his successor, Paolo Violi. 4 
Violi who inherited the leadership of the Cotroni 
organization ran an ice cream parlour in the Italian area, east 
of Montreal, which the police believe was actually a front for 
1. ibid. 
2. ibid. 
3. Florida, 'Organized Crime Controls Council', 1976 Annual 
Report, Tallahassee, Florida, 1977: 2-11. 
4. CRC: 'Organized Crime, Connections', op. cit. 
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a variety of criminal activities which included loansharking, 
prostitution, drug trafficking, extortion by violence and 
murder. 
' The activities of the Violi gang were laid bare 
during the Quebec Organized Crime probe as a result of the 
electronic bugging device which the police planted behind the 
milk cooler in Violi's ice cream parlour which has been the 
meeting place of members of criminal gangs, not just from his 
Montreal organization but from across Canada, such as Joe 
Gentile, a leader of the Vancouver gang and a business partner 
of Violi, and John Papalia from Toronto. The device recorded 
incidents that resulted in a curious spectacle. For years, a 
number of ruthless killers and extortionists in his gang donned 
headsets to listen to themselves talking to Violi about various 
criminal exploits. 
2 The device recorded, among others, a 
conversation regarding the dynamiting of the home of a woman 
who owed money to a man with the network ties. 3 Violi, 
however, preferred to go to jail rather than testify during the 
Quebec probe into organized crime on the grounds that his 
answers would tend to incriminate him. He listed himself as a 
businessman with interests in several Montreal pizza shops, but 
the Montreal Police Commission in 1974 named him the head of 
that city's underworld. 




4. A. Bequai, Organized Crime, op. cit.: 17. 
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assailants in Montreal on January 22,1978,1 Violi and his 
gang were already facing problems from the growing powers of 
the French Canadian gangs. 
2 
The Dubois clan of nine brothers has been the most 
formidable force in the Montreal underworld in recent years 
and, like other gangs in the Montreal underworld, they had 
previously worked for leaders of the Cotroni organization from 
which they broke away. 
3 Although the police had been aware 
of their presence for at least twenty years previously, it was 
not until the Quebec Organized Crime Commission hearings of the 
1970s that the public learned of the awesome power of the 
gang. 
4 From a small beginning in petty theft in the poor 
district of St. Henri which was formerly believed to be 
controlled by Italian gangs, the Dubois have recently emerged 
supreme, probably as a result of leadership void created in the 
Italian gangs, and have put together, according to the latest 
estimate, an army of about two hundred gangsters trained in a 
variety of criminal activities: drug trafficking, loansharking, 
prostitution, protection rackets and contract killing, among 
others; 5 they have been able to implant themselves in force 
1. 'Montreal gangland figure slain', Washington Post, January 
23,1978: A. 
2. CBC: 'Connections', Part I, op. cit. 
3. J. P. Charbonneau, op. cit.: 501. 
4. 'Dubois terrors of ST. Henri', The Montreal Star, December 
9,1975: 1. 
5. The Toronto Star June 13,1977: B5: 'The Dubois Brothers 
find Pub icity -Pays 
s. 
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downtown and in Old Montreal. As revealed by the Quebec crime 
probe, their bitter rivals have been the Pierre McSween gang 
and the Devil's Disciples, a motorcycle gang. 
l. The Dubois 
were able to wrestle control of a large part of the east-end 
drug trade from the Disciples after a dozen gangland murders in 
the 1970s when there was a marked increase in drug use among 
young people. 
2 As a hooded man commented during the CBC 
documentary, 'it would appear that the Italian gangs are not 
only losing to the French Canadian gang, they are getting 
weaker'. 
3 
Whereas the Sicilian mafioso and American and other 
Canadian syndicates strenuously avoid publicity the Dubois 
brothers actively seek it as a means of cultivating a false 
Robin Hood image and instilling terror and fear in the 
population, especially in their actual and potential rivals. 
4 
In this latter respect they appear to resemble the mafia and 
the American syndicates. Their violence has enabled them to go 
virtually unchallenged in their control of many areas of 
Montreal criminal life. 
5 Despite the terror which 
1. J. P. Charbonneau, op. cit.: 504- 
2. ibid. 
3. CBC Organized Crime documentary, 'Connections', Part 2, June 
13,1977. 
4. J. P. Charbonneau, op. cit.; The Toronto Star, op. cit. 
5. The Toronto Star, op. cit. 
I 
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they perpetrate, the Quebec Crime Commission heard public 
testimony from several witnesses on the Dubois family 
activities. The bulk of the information on the ruthless 
brothers who stonewalled the crime inquiry for five days came 
from Pierre McSween, an ex-Dubois gang member, who volunteered 
eight hours of testimony to avenge the death of his younger 
brother Jacques whom he claimed was gunned down by the Dubois 
gang in a dispute over drug trafficking territory. ' He 
related in detail how the Dubois acquired control of much of 
Montreal's drug, loansharking, prostitution and protection 
rackets; he told the inquiry that he was then in hiding 
'because the Dubois have killed all my gang members'. 
2 An 
aging nightclub owner, Charles Houle, told the organized crime 
inquiry that in the previous ten years he had paid the family 
$50,000 for 'protection' at the rate of $100.00 a week, and he 
dazed the inquiry commissioners with the revelation that his 
last $100.00 payment had been made only two days prior to his 
testimony. 3 But charges were never laid against the brothers 
because of lack of evidence. In their concluding report, the 
inquiry commisioners observed, 'While some experts believe the 
Mafia to be a greater threat, others maintain that the ruthless 
methods of the Dubois, the large number of thugs surrounding 
each brother, and the frightening cruelty of their strong-arm 
men make them the most influential criminal group on the island 
of Montreal'. 
4 Admittedly the Dubois gang is extremely 
1. CBC: 'Connections', Part 2, op. cit. 
2. CBC: 'Connections', Part 2, op. cit.; The Toronto Star, June 
13,1977: B5. 
3. The Toronto Star, op. cit.; CBC: 'Connections', op. cit. 
4. The Toronto Star, op. cit. 
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proficient in the destruction of businesses that would not 
cooperate with them. 
1 Former employees of the Iroquois Hotel 
in Old Montreal, among others, detailed how the Dubois had 
gradually taken over the place, first by slipping in a few of 
their men as employees, and then by physically expelling all 
other staff members who would not cooperate with them in 
bringing drugs into the hotel. 2 One ex-employee testified 
that gang members had lured him into a room and then 
deliberately gouged out one of his eyes. 
3 
Largely through McSween's detailed testimony the Quebec 
Crime Commission came to believe that the Dubois brothers were 
not only the central figures in the Montreal gangland war, but 
also its main beneficiaries. As a result of these bloody 
conflicts, the brothers have increased their prestige and 
renown in the Montreal underworld, where their tight grip 
remains clear and present despite the Commission's explosive 
revelations. 
4 'Possibly, never before has someone admitted 
on television to being involved in murders for which he has not 
been charged'. 
5 In comparison to the Italian gangs in 
Montreal, the French Canadian gang exhibits more savagery and 
ruthlessness and their actions resemble those of Sicilian mafia 
and American syndicates in all respects. 
1. 'Bar Owner defied Protection racket in Dubois Territory', 
The Montreal Star, December 9,1975- 
2. J. P. Charbonneau, op. cit.: 502. 
3. ibid. 
4. ibid: 504" 
5. CBC 'Connections', op. cit. 
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The Vancouver Networks 
As in its sister cities of Toronto and Montreal, 
organized crime in Vancouver consists of a variety of 
racketeerings: loansharking, extortion, contract killing, 
fencing, labour racketeering, corruption, illegal gambling, 
prostitution and drug trafficking, among others. 
1 Whereas 
prior to the mid 1960s these criminal activities were the 
exclusive preserve of the native whites in cooperation with 
their confederates in the United States, in recent years, 
however, the Chinese triad syndicates, often known locally as 
Tongs, have emerged as serious rivals in the operation and 
control of these activities, especially extortion, gambling and 
drug trafficking. Vancouver is said to have become not only 
the organizing headquarters of a massive illegal immigration 
network for both Canada and the United States but has also 
attained an international reputation as the narcotic capital of 
Canada, which serves as major entry point and distribution 
centre for southeast Asian heroin for British Columbia itself 
and for onward transmission to the rest of Canada and the 
United States. 2 
For reasons of history, climate, law enforcement, 
availability, easy transportation and distribution patterns, 
British Columbia, and in particular Vancouver, has the largest 
1. Organized Crime in British Columbia: Co-ordinated Law 
Enforcement Unit (CLEU), Second Findings Report, November 1975, 
Department of Attorney-General of-B. C. 
2. F. Bresler, The Chinese Mafia, New York, 1981: 233. 
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population in Canada of heroin addicts whose activities, in 
support of their habits, often give rise to a variety of other 
crimes: burglary, mugging, break and enter, bank robbery, 
robbery, extortion and murder, among others. 
' With a 
population of about two million, it has been conservativly 
estimated that British Columbia has over twelve thousand heroin 
addicts, or more than two-thirds of the national figure, and 
the City of Vancouver alone is believed to have in excess of 
seven thousand addicts who require nearly a half million 
dollars each day to support their habits. 
2 Malcolm Matheson, 
chairman of the Federal Provincial Drug Strategies, told the 
local Rotary Club in Victoria, Capital of British Columbia, 
that the heroin rate in the Province is more than five times 
the national average. He stated that the illicit trade ranks 
as the Province's fifth-largest industry, with an annual take 
of about $255 million, and that the risks are minimal and the 
profits enormous. 
3 
1. 'Why British Columbia, and in particular Vancouver, has a 
large heroin addict population', CLEU: Initial Report on 
Organized Crime in B. C., 2 October, 1974: 9-10. 
2. ibid; Opium smoking was introduced in the Province of B. C. 
by Chinese settlers who took part in the railroad construction 
in the 1800s, and later some of them settled in the Province. 
The Opium Act in Canada of 1908 outlawed its import, 
manufacture, sale, or possession for sale, except for medical 
use. The Act, in effect, created the illicit market and, with 
the advent of the Opium and Drug Act in 1911, criminalized the 
user. Heroin appeared first in Canada in the early 1920s and 
after World War II, it quickly replaced opium as the drug of 
choice; CLEU, 1974: 9" 
3. F. Bresler, op. cit.: 236. 
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It was not until the late 1960s that organized criminals 
started to emerge from Vancouver's Chinatown, the largest in 
Canada, whose inhabitants were formerly known for their 
law-abiding behaviour. Chinese groups are reported to be 
engaged in the importation and trafficking of heroin, in the 
fencing of stolen property, in prostitution, loansharking, 
bookmaking, and gambling; all of which activities are often 
carried out behind the facade of legitimate business. 
' Their 
cultural ties with southeast Asia and Hong Kong in particular 
often place them in an advantageous position over their 
competitors in the procuring and marketing of heroin. It has 
been established that more than ninety per cent of heroin end- 
ing up on the streets of Canadian cities, especially Vancouver, 
originates in the Golden Triangle region - northeastern Burma, 
northern Thailand, and northern Laos. 
2 These remote areas 
are said to be controlled by tribesmen and members of the triad 
societies based in Hong Kong - the so-called Hong Kong 
Connection. Outside Asia, the key cities serving as smuggling 
centres for the Triad organization are Vancouver and Amsterdam, 
1. Prior to 1967, Canadian immigration policy was basically 
racist in orientation and the Chinese were among the ethnic 
groups not welcomed in Canada. In 1885 a head tax of $50.00 
was introduced, raised, then raised again to $500 for every 
Chinese coming into Canada by 1903. As the Chinese found ways 
of paying the tax, the government in 1923 passed the 
Immigration Act which cut off Chinese immigration altogether. 
The liberalized Immigration Act in 1967 is said to have enabled 
criminal elements from Hong Kong, holding British passports, to 
enter the country, and their activities have tended to pollute 
the once law-abiding Chinatown. Their crime networks now rival 
those of other ethnic groups; Bresler, op. cit.: 229-231; CBC: 
'Connections', Part 2, op. cit. 
2. A. W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin In Southeast Asia, New 
York, 1972: 9,64-65; The New York T mes, September 17,1968: 
45; idem, June 6,1971: 2; Bresler, op. cit.: 235. 
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the latter being called the heroin capital of Europe, ' just 
as the former is of Canada. Both cities have huge Chinatowns. 
Large quantities of heroin reaching Hong Kong from the Golden 
Triangle are smuggled into these cities for onward distribution 
to Europe and North America. In addition to narcotics, 
Vancouver in recent years has earned another dubious distinct- 
ion: the prostitution capital of Canada. The recent 'clean 
street law' passed by the Parliament of Canada in December 1985 
was due largely to the pressures from the councils and mayors 
of such cities as Vancouver, Toronto, Calgary and Halifax where 
street solicitations appear to have reached a 'crisis 
stage'. 
2 Street solicitation became a major problem in 
Canada in 1978, after a supreme Court of Canada ruling that 
prostitutes could not be convicted, as a lower court had done, 
of soliciting unless they were 'pressing and persistent' in 
their advances. 
3 As a result, prostitutes began lining the 
streets of many cities, and were able to discuss prices openly 
with customers on the street, and police were unable to 
interfere with their activities. The new tough law gives 
police broad powers and empowers them to arrest and charge 
prostitutes and their clients 'whenever they communicate with 
one another in public for the sale or purchase of sex'. 
4 
According to the new law, police no longer have to prove that 
the prostitutes were 'pressing and persistent'. Observers, 
1. CBC: 'Connections', Part 2, op. cit.: F. Robertson, Triangle 
of Death: The Inside Story of the Triads - The Chinese Mafia, 
London, 1977: F. Bresler, op. cit. 
2. "Prostitution at a 'crisis stage' in Toronto, Mayor Art 
Eggleton says", The Toronto Star, December 19,1983: Al, A2. 
3. ibid. 
4. Dale Brazao, 'Police give Prostitutes 30 days grace on new law', The Sunday Star, December 22,1985: Al, A. 
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however, believe that the new legislation is wrong-headed and 
that it does not address the real problem, which is high 
unemployment in the country, especially among teenage girls who 
are driven into prostitution. 
' Most of these girls have 
consistently maintained that they are in prostitution because 
they could not find any other jobs. 
2 Others say that they 
are in prostitution because it is the easiest way to make money 
which they cannot otherwise make in the conventional jobs. 
Their services are usually in high demand by a large minority 
of the population. This lack of employment and the consequent 
recourse to prostitution by women is a common phenomenon, we 
would argue, in most capitalist societies, and they are 
conditions that one does not normally find in socialist 
societies. 
The strength of organized crime in any country can be 
measured not only by the number of its networks and gangs but 
also by the nature of its links and connections with the 
'respectable' members of the society and its institutions. 
Where these connections are pervasive, as in the United States 
and Sicily, organized crime tends to be widespread. Where, 
however, these connections are relatively few, as in Canada, 
organized crime naturally tends to be limited in scope and 
easily contained. Knowingly or unknowingly, they help to 
facilitate the activities of organized crime. In Canada, three 
clear, distinct connections have been noted to be analogous to 
those in the U. S. 
1. ibid. 
2. Sarah Jane Growe, 'Prostitutes fighting to ply the trade legally', The Toronto Star, March 3,1984: Fl, F4. 
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Financial Connection 
While it may be easy to identify the crime whether it is 
illegal gambling, extortion or drug trafficking, it is always 
hard to pinpoint what happens to the vast profits made from 
these crimes. And ever since Al Capone was jailed in 1931 on 
the only charge in which he could be caught, income tax 
evasion, 
l criminals have been faced with the problem of 
reporting how they made their money, which means making dirty 
money clean or laundering it. One of the methods of overcoming 
this problem has been through complicated property deals, 
possibly in foreign countries, where the true ownership and 
financing of hotels and apartments is virtually impossible to 
trace. 2 Another method involves moving money across borders 
by means of secret bank accounts in foreign countries, such as 
Switzerland, from where the money is sent back to the mob, its 
origin disguised. 
3 Recent revelations in Toronto and 
Vancouver indicate that the five Hong Kong ex-sergeants-majors, 
1. Elmer L. Irey with W. J. Slocum, The Tax Dodgers: The Inside 
Story of the T-men's War with Ameri'ca's Political Underworld 
Hoodlums, London & New York, . 
2. It has been argued that Meyer Lansky, Charles Luciano's 
lieutenant, was the originator of money laundering techniques 
which he perfected to husband the profits form his world-wide 
drug deals in Cuba, the Caribbean, Marseille and Amsterdam, and 
to finance his nightclubs in Havana, Miami and other places; 
A. W. McCoy, o ý. cit.: 18-28; F. Pearce, Crimes of the Powerful: 
Marxism, Crime-and Deviance, London' 1976: -5. 
3. CBC: 'Connections', Part 2, op. cit. 
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who were heavily involved in narcotics deals in Hong Kong and 
who recently emigrated to Canada, have huge investments in a 
number of Canadian construction companies, among them the 
Barony Estates Inc., and Roy East, a hugely profitable 
subsidiary of a company in Amsterdam that is itself owned by 
the Royal Bank of Canada which apparently handled some of the 
transfer of funds of the Five Dragons, as the five ex-Hong Kong 
police officers are known. 
' 
In addition to owning a factory in Thailand, Nam Kong, one 
of the five, is also said to have an involvement in the 
Florence Nightingale Hospital just outside Vancouver. 2 In 
1974 it was estimated that 66 percent of all purchases of 
downtown Vancouver highrise buildings were made with money from 
ex-Hong Kong police racketeers. 
3 It has also been noted that 
the 1971 corporate papers of the Barony Estate indicated that 
Lui Lok, the most notorious of the Five Dragons, was among the 
directors of the company. 
4 Many less powerful but equally 
corrupt former Hong Kong policemen also moved to exclusive 
areas of Vancouver in the 1970s but some are said to have fled 
to Taiwan, fearing that they might be extradited back to Hong 
Kong if the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption 
then probing into shady financial deals by officials were to 
1. 'Royal Bank Linked with Crooked Cops from Hong Kong', The 
Toronto Star, June 16,1977: A3. 
2. CBC 'Connections', op. cit. 
3. ibid. 
4. The Toronto Star, op. cit. 
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reveal their activities in Hong Kong. 
' Their presence in 
Canada. has raised several questions, including the manner in 
which they gained entry to the country and their dealings with 
the Canadian chartered banks which apparently displayed no 
curiosity when the ex-policemen made their huge deposits. 
2 
Recently the United States Congress has passed a legislation 
making it mandatory on the part of financial institutions to 
report to the authorities any unusual deposits and movements of 
huge sums of money by individuals suspected of organized crime 
activities. No such mandatory reporting exists in Canada yet. 
Political Connection 
In the United States and Sicily, politics and crime have 
long been known as familiar bedfellows both at local and 
national levels. 
3 One of the areas in Canadian life where 
1. ibid. Apparently the 'Five Dragons' were aware of the CBC 
investigation into their activities as well as the Crime 
Commission hearings in Hong Kong at the time in 1977; F. 
Bresler, op. cit.: 234; CBC: 'Connections', Part 2, op. cit. 
2. 'Dragons' qualified for landed immigrant status, Cullen 
Tells MPs'. When the question was raised in Parliament of how 
the 'Five Dragons' gained entry into Canada, the then 
Immigration Minister, Bud Cullen, told the House that the five 
men met the immigration requirements; The Toronto Star, June 
16,1977: A3. 
3. Usually in the U. S. political influence of the cabal is more 
directly obtained through generous contributions to political 
candidates of its choice, often made possible by huge, tax-free 
profits from criminal operations. Often the cabal assists both 
candidates in an election, thus assuring itself of influence 
regardless who wins; see W. J. Chambliss and M. Mankoff (eds. ), 
Whose Law What Order? A Conflict Approach to Criminology, New 
York, 1976: 167, M. McIntosh, op. cit.: 56-58. The mafia in 
Sicily, on the other hand, is noted for its uncanny ability to 
procure votes for its 'candidates; B. King and T. Okey, ItalY 
Today, London, 1909: 121; G. Servadio: Mafioso: A Histor of 
the Mafia from its Origins to the Present Day, New York, 1976; 
H. Hess, Mafia and Mafioso: The Structure of Power, 
Farnborough, . 
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the proximity and influence of the United States do not seem to 
have made any significant impact appears to be that of 
politics, especially at the national level. This situation 
could be the result of the different political systems, 
cultural ethos, and the manner in which the law is held in the 
two countries. ' Unlike in the United States and Sicily where 
criminals and politicians have traditionally supported each 
other for mutual benefits, 
2 
politicians in Canada, especially 
at the federal level, have been relatively free of the 'entente 
cordiale'. However, two cases involving politicians and 
organized criminals have come to the attention of the Canadian 
public in the last fifteen years: the first involving a deputy 
premier of a province, and the second a federal member of 
parliament. 
In October 1970 the Quebec deputy premier and minister of 
Labour was kidnapped and later murdered by the 'Front de 
Liberation du Quebec' (FLQ) terrorists. One of the chilling 
discoveries made after his death was his several meetings with 
members of the Cotroni network of Montreal. His executive 
1. The manner in which the law is held in any country is often 
an indication of the degree of respect or lack of it accorded 
to it. While Americans have traditionally relied on the use of 
the law to deal with social problems they often show little 
regard for it. This contrasts with the way the law is used in 
Canada and the degree of respect it commands; see D. R. Taft and 
R. W. England, Jr., Criminology, 4th ed., New York, 1964: 23; 
G. Tyler, 'The Roots o Organized Crime', Crime and 
Delinquency, 8,1962: 325-338, J. T. Adams, Our Law ess 
Heritage', Atlantic Monthly, December 1928. 
2. D. Bell, The End of Ideology, op. cit. 128; Estes Kefauver, 
Crime in America, Garden City, New York, 1951; W. J. Chambliss, 
On the Take, op. cit.: 150-168; F. Pearce, op. cit.: 131-152. 
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assistant, Rene Gagnon, who was present during the meetings, 
confirmed that the minister had been meeting with Nicol Diori, 
Cotroni's lieutenant, and Frank Dastin, a network member who 
owned gambling and nightclub enterprises in Montreal. Gagnon 
also confirmed that the network members had "asked that they 
should be able to continue their operations in exchange for 
'information "'. 1 The second case involved the efforts of one 
of the Vancouver networks to pry information from a Vancouver 
member of Parliament who was a close friend of the Conservative 
Party leadership candidate, regarding the route of a proposed 
gas pipeline. The land would then be bought at a low price and 
resold to the gas pipeline firms at a huge profit. While 
confirming that the meetings took place, the M. P. insisted he 
was not aware that the other person was a member of organized 
crime. But the network member claimed that he made his 
identity clear to the M. P. from the outset. The M. P. who 
threatened to sue the CBC for exposing the meeting later backed 
down in his threat. 2 
1. CBC: 'Connections', Part 1, June 12,1977; The Toronto Star, 
June 13,1977: 'CBC scores direct hit on mob'. 
2. 'John Reynolds suing CBC for Crime Story', The Toronto Star, 
June 16,1977: A3; CBC: 'Connections', Part 2, June 13,1977. 
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Infiltrating the Unions 
All independent labour unions are naturally prime targets 
for organized crime wherever it can manage to establish a 
foothold and 'mutual understanding' with the union hierarchy. 
Often they represent the opportunity of providing jobs for 
newly arrived organized crime recruits, of getting kickbacks 
from employers in under-the-table deals, and of getting work 
done cheaply for 'respectable' employers and for organized 
crime companies. But above all, control of unions demonstrates 
to businessmen and criminals alike the most potent 
manifestations of raw power. 
' As a result of the integration 
of most key Canadian industries with their parent companies in 
the U. S. and the consequent amalgamation of the unions in these 
industries, organized crime has made more inroads in the 
labour-management field in Canada than it has in any other 
areas of Canadian life. 
2 Nowhere is this phenomenon more 
evident than in Ontario and Quebec, the provinces with the 
largest proportion of their work force unionized. Labour 
racketeering in Canada is such an involved topic that it cannot 
be treated fully within the scope of this study; however, two 
or three cases in Canada may be cited to illustrate the 
situation that is more pervasive in the U. S. 
1. The autonomy which the labour unions enjoy in capitalist 
countries, as contrasted with their counterparts in socialist 
countries where they are closely monitored by the government, 
often creates room for beneficial relationships between 
racketeers and crooked union leaders in which the union members 
are exploited in a variety of ways; W. J. Chambliss, On the 
Take, o e. cit.; A. Block and W. J. Chambliss, Organizing Crime, o. cit: 65-82; M. McIntosh, op. cit.: 51-52. 
2. Such unions as United Auto Workers (UAW), Teamster's Union, 
Allied Workers of Pulp and Paper have branches both in the 
United States and Canada. 
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One of the major areas of involvement of organized crime 
network is often the construction unions, for the greater part 
of the work force here is both unskilled and little educated. 
Thus, in Toronto it has been noted that the Cicero Romanelli 
company which owns several construction firms in the Toronto 
area has long been dominated by the Jack Luppino gang of 
Toronto which specializes in construction racketeering. 1 
Recently the company expanded its operation to Ottawa. In an 
effort to gain control of the Ottawa operaton, the network 
approached one Shongay Denis, the business agent of the 
Plasterers and Cement Masons Union who was responsible for 
dealing with the company on behalf of his union. According to 
Denis, he was asked to set up a different union separate from 
the one he was then working for. His refusal to cooperate 
resulted in a series of harassment and intimidation directed at 
him and his family, he told the CBC documentary. 2 The new 
union, if formed, would probably exist only on paper. 
In a world of large transportation firms, Maislin 
Transport is certainly a name to be reckoned with. With 
headquarters in Montreal, they are one of Canada's largest 
carriers, with much of their business being carried on with 
customers in the U. S., particularly in places like New York and 
Chicago. It was revealed in the late 1970s that the firm had 
had a long connection with the Cotroni network of Montreal in 
matters of personnel. It was also noted that one of the men 
1. CBC: 'Connections', Part 1, June 12,1977. 
2. ibid. 
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who initiated the connection was the president of the company 
itself, Sidney Maislin. A member of the network interviewed by 
the CBC suggested that the purpose of the connection was to 
maintain labour peace and to enable the company to get business 
by hiring organized criminals of Italian descent. 1 
In a more recent case, Consumers Distributing, a North 
American retail chain headquartered in Toronto, pleaded guilty 
to paying $255,000 in illegal kickbacks to Sean Floyd. of 
Teamster Local 419 'with a view to ensuring a beneficial 
relationship for the Company with the Teamsters' Union which 
represents the company's lorry drivers and warehouse 
workers'. 
2 While Floyd received a prison sentence the 
company was fined $125,000. The court noted that the payments 
were made at various locations suggested by Floyd such as 
doughnut shops, restaurant and hotel parking lots, and to his 
two married sisters purportedly for construction repairs and 
'security consulting', although the services were never 
provided. The Court noted that payments were concealed by 
'false deceptive entries in the company's books'. In passing 
sentence, Judge John Kerr observed: 'Even though Jimmy Hoffa is 
gone, problems with the Teamsters still linger on'. 3 
1. ibid. 




Organized crime in Canada, like its counterpart in the 
U. S., offers an easy means of achieving wealth and power, and 
its operation cuts across ethnic lines. In particular, it 
offers the minority and deprived groups and fringe elements in 
the society an easy means of advancing their social and 
economic status which otherwise would not be possible by 
conventional means. The phenomenon has existed in the country 
probably for more than fifty years but it was only in the 1960s 
and 1970s that public concern about it began to be heard. 
Admittedly organized crime in Canada does draw a lot of 
strength from, and may be heavily influenced by, the activites 
of its counterpart in the U. S., but it would be misleading to 
view the operators as employees of American syndicates. Their 
association is probably as a result of cooperation among men in 
the same business or men with common interests. 
There are, however, differences and similarities in the 
manner in which organized crime is carried out in the two 
countries mainly due to differences in political morality, 
cultural ethos and geographical size. Organized crime in 
Canada, as in the U. S., could be viewed as an extension of the 
Canadian private profit economy operating in the illicit 
sector. It will continue to attract some groups who feel that 
they are at strategic disadvantge or left out in the 
competition which often favours the stronger, and it will 
probably continue to thrive so long as its goods and services 
are in demand by the 'respectable' members of the society. 
Some of the conditions which favour the growth of organized 
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crime in the U. S. are also present in Canada. Organized crime 
in Canada is admittedly an indigenous growth in the soil of an 
urban industrial economy moving into affluence, but retaining 
extensive pockets of poverty. While there are some close 
associations and cooperation between the operators on both 
sides of the border, it would be misleading to jump into the 
conclusion that the operation in Canada is a branch of the 
American phenomenon. As we pointed out in the preceding 
chapter, organized crime consists of a coalition of people and 
networks; who dominates the coalition or which network 
dominates the other varies from place to place and from time to 
time. Being a loose association, there is usually no one man 
in the network whose word is law. 
1 The view of a branch 
plant operation obviously harkens to the theory of a 
nation-wide organization or international organization which 
has never been proven. It is inconsistent with the way 
organized crime is known to operate. 
2 People in the same 
business usually have need for close association with one 
another and organized criminals are no exception. As in the 
case of the U. S. and Sicily, it is the operation of the 
Canadian private profit economy that tends to bring the 
racketeers and 'respectable' members of the power structure 
into mutual, reciprocal relationships in which each side is 
able to pursue the goal of profit and the power it brings, 
which is the essence of capitalism. 
1. Estes Kefauver, Crime in America, op. cit.: 13; W. J. 
Chambliss, On the Take, op. cit. 
2. W. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 9,73. 
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Although we have argued that one area in Canada where the 
proximity of the U. S. and its organized crime do not appear to 
have made any significant impact is that of politics at the 
national level, it is easy to attribute this difference in 
political morality to the wrong causes. Most observers, of 
Canadian scene know the extent of the impact of its Socialist 
Party on Canadian politics and economy. Since its formation 
in 1932 as the Cooperative Commonwelth Federation, later 
renamed .. the New Democratic Party 
in 1961, this party's avowed 
objective has been the establishment of 'a social order that is 
based on the common good, not private profit'. 
' Even though 
it has so far not been able to form the government on the 
national level, it has persistently kept successive Canadian 
governments from moving dangerously to the right. 
It is an acknowledged fact in Canada that all the social 
safety nets which make Canada different from the U. S. - universal 
medicare, universal old age pension, baby bonus, unemployment 
insurance, hundreds of government corporations, etc - were 
originated by this party, though implemented by the successive 
Liberal government which adopted the proposed programs upon 
being elected. The alliance between the labour unions and the 
New Democratic Party has not only kept labour racketeering to 
a minimum but has also kept politics and organized crime from 
becoming strange bedfellows to the extent they are known to 
be in the United States. Before its birth, the operation of 
the Canadian government was in no way different from that of 
the United States in terms of social policies that are based 
on the common good, not private profit. 
1. Paul Martin, A Very Public Life, Ottawa, Ontario, 1983. 
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Introduction 
This chapter explores the activities of the Triad 
Societies in Hong Kong. In recent years the activities of the 
Triad societies have been noted in many parts of the world and 
in particular in Southeast Asia with regards to the narcotics 
trade and other forms of organized crime. The chapter, however, 
first explores the old China background with its myriads of 
secret societies of which the Triad was one. Next, the 
chapter traces the origin of the Society, the reason for its 
formation, its role as an unofficial opposition to the Chinese 
Imperial government, its evolution from political to underworld 
activities, its place in China after the establihment of the 
Republic, its role during the Japanese invasion of the country, 
and the reasons why the Society members were compelled to leave 
mainland China for Hong Kong after the Socialist Revolution. 
The chapter then explores the activities of the society 
in Hong Kong, their symbiotic relationship with the police and 
the activities of some corrupt police officials who borrow a 
leaf from the book of the Society to set up their own 
criminal networks, and others who collaborated with the Triad 
syndicates in the pursuit of wealth. The internal organization 
and structure of the Society are examined and its initiation 
rite is as well noted. It argues that their persistent exist- 
ence in Hong Kong is due largely to the operation of the 
capitalist economy in whose illegal sector they operate; to 
the protective shield afforded them by the Hong Kong police 
in return for a share of the graft, and that this 'alliance' 
stems from shared interest - the pursuit of profit, wealth 
and power. 
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THE TRIAD PHENOMENON: 
The Old China Background 
The evolution of the Triad Societies in Hong Kong, and 
its consequent proliferation in other countries of Asia, 
Europe, and North America, is bound up with the historical 
evolution in China of secret societies which had flourished 
there more than in any other country in the world. In order 
to understand the Triad evolution it is necessary to take a 
brief look at the Chinese secret societies of the past 
centuries of which the Triads are a component, and which had 
prior to 1912 played an important role in Chinese affairs. 
It should be noted at the outset that societies may be 
'secret' in two different ways: they may be clandestine 
organizations working underground with the identities of 
their leaders and members carefully concealed; or they may be 
'open' societies whose officials are known or knowable, but 
which have a secret ritual (usually of initiation) and an 
oath of secrecy binding the members not to reveal the affairs 
of the society to non-members or, above all, to the 
authorities. 
' It is possible, however, for a society to be 
'secret' in both these ways, and the Chinese secret societies 
which were numbered in hundreds by the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries fell into either of these 
1. Wilfred Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in 




A propensity to form groups for mutual support and the 
attainment of common objectives has long been a character- 
istic of the Chinese social pattern. 
2 China's ritualistic 
societies existed for centuries born of needs based on a 
combination of self-protection and spiritual satisfaction, as 
well as ethical, political and social needs. However, once 
established, such societies frequently tend to deteriorate 
through the easy profits of power into tyrannical groups of 
bullies and extortionist gangs battening, as in the case of 
the Sicilian Mafia and the Triad Societies, upon the weakness 
of the public, providing a shelter under which entrepreneurs 
and traders at every level who were prepared to pay and obey 
could operate in comparative safety, and yet retaining an 
aura of chivalry as the poor man's protector and champion. 
3 
The secret sects and societies were, in fact, as much a part 
of the constitutional machinery of China as are the political 
party and the ballot box in the West. They were often the 
ultimate instruments for the. relief of oppression, the only 
effective opposition to the Chinese authoritarian emperors, 
and they opened the way for changing a government with which 
1. Regarding the Elder Brothers Society, for example, Barnett 
notes, 'There is nothing secret about it in Hsiehmahsiang, 
however. Everybody who is anybody belongs to it and it 
operates quite openly... '; A. Doak Barnett, China on the Eve 
of Communist Takeover, London, 1963: 127. 
2. W. Blythe, op. cit.: 14- 
3. ibid: 1- 
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the people were dissatisfied. 
' The Chinese secret 
societies whose members consisted largely of poor peasants 
and destitute elements were closely linked, unlike the 
mafia, to the peasantry without themselves being engaged in 
agriculture; however, they were freer in their movements than 
peasants tied to the land, and they usually served as liaison 
agents and transmitters of rumours. 
2 
Their activities in China included the stirring up of 
anti-foreign feelings, the extortion of money from hawkers, 
shopkeepers, hotel-keepers, prostitutes, labourers, transport 
undertakings, opium and gambling dens; 'protection' rackets; 
kidnapping for ransom; the operation of criminal rings and of 
course the organization of opposition to the Imperial 
government. 
3 There is, however, a good reason to believe 
that many of them were originally founded as benevolent 
associations for laudable and unobjectionable purposes, 
something akin to the Mafia and Freemasonary in the West. 
Throughout the centuries there were repeated outbreaks of 
revolts against the ruling emperors sponsored by the secret 
societies whose main role was that of fifth columnists. 
4 
1. ibid: 18- 
2. Jean Chesneaux (ed. ), Po ular Movements and Secret 
Societies in China 1840-1950, Stanford, California , 1972: 8. 
3. Jean Chesneaux, Secret Societies in China in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Ann Arbor, Mic igan, 
vi. 
4. The political activities of secret societies have been a 
basic factor in the establishment of dynasties and in the 
political fortunes of the republic. They were the principal 
instrument in Imperial China for the expression of political 
grievances; ibid. 
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With the establishment of the Republic in 1912 secret 
societies were no longer considered unlawful and they came 
out into the open as power groups, still maintaining the 
secret rituals of sworn blood brotherhood, and claiming 
freedom from legal restraint. Before long, however, every 
official and military leader who hoped to advance in his 
career found it essential to belong to the local society. 
' 
Time and time again they were to be found among the national 
resistance forces and they drew their strength from the 
sociological and ideological bases of the old society: 
economic stagnation, the local and narrow character of social 
relations, the weight of tradition and the respect for 
authority (even that of an outlaw), routine, and 
superstition. 
2 
From the end of the nineteenth century onwards when a 
capitalist economy was developed by large-scale foreign 
financial interests3 and a modern sector made its 
appearance in the Chinese national economy - banking, 
wholesale trade, and light industry - the quadripartite 
1. K. S. Latourette, The Chinese: Their History and Culture, 
New York, 1964: 681. 
2. J. Chesneaux, Secret Societies, op. cit.: 10-11" 
3. Foreign investments in China more than doubled between 
1928 and 1930, from Y100 million to Y202 million annually, 
and remittances from overseas Chinese increased from Y215.6 
million to Y316.3 million, Yang Sueh-Chang, 'China's 
Depression and Subsequent Recovery, 1931-36: An Inquiry into 
the Applicability of the Modern Income Determination Theory: 
Ph. D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1950: 118, cited in 
Lloyd E. Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China under 
Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937, Cambridge, Mass., 3. 
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traditional hierarchy of scholars, peasants, artisans, 
and tradesmen which still characterized Chinese society in 
1840 was completely broken up. 
' It was thought at first 
that with this transformation of the economy and the conse- 
quent changes in Chinese life in modern times sooner or later 
the secret societies would disappear. But this apparently 
did not happen; rather these changes considerably widened the 
social basis of these archaic groups, particularly among the 
urban masses. Thus the wretched peasants who flooded into 
Shanghai and the other big cities completely without means of 
support naturally clung to the secret societies. 
2 Even up 
to the beginning of the present century, far from withering 
away in the cities, the societies were known to have main- 
tained a great deal of influence in the country. Many of the 
powerful figures in the Communist Government of China in the 
1950s-1970s were thought to have graduated from the school of 
the secret societies3 (especially the 'Elder Brothers') 
1. J. Chesneaux, Secret Societies, op. cit. 
2. ibid. 
3. The Chinese Novel, Shui Hu Chuan (The Story of the River 
Bank) relates how large numbers of outlaws resisted 
conscription for public works during the Sui dynasty (A. D. 
618). This story which achieved widespread popularity 
throughout China by the year 1660 relates how a group of 108 
men, gathered together and swore oaths of mutual fidelity, 
secrecy and obedience, taking Heaven, Earth, Stars, and the 
Moon as Father, Mother, Brothers, and Sisters respectively, 
and drinking a mixture of blood and wine. The book naturally 
was banned during the Imperial regime but in the early 1930s 
the Communist Party reprinted it and saw it 'as suitable to 
this day as the the day it was written'. Chairman Mao 
admitted that this story was one of the powerful influences 
that shaped his early thoughts. The Story has two 
translations in English: All Men are Brothers, by Pearl 
Buck, London, (1933), and Water Mar in, by J. H. Jackson, 
Shanghai, 1937; J. Chesneaux; see als, W. Blythe, o cit..: 21; E. Snow, Red Star over China, New York, 1977: 129-132, 
138. 
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where they learned the technique of harnessing the 
traditional rebellious urge of the masses to the chariot of 
political ambition. 
' 
Lyman has noted with respect to the Chinese secret 
societies what Bell has noted with respect to organized crime 
in America as a tool for achieving social mobility. He 
observed in his Chinese Americans that secret societies have 
attracted adventurers to their ranks, that those who felt 
that the legitimate avenues to wealth or power were blocked 
against them or too slow to suit their ambitions found that 
extortion and the control of vice offered advantages. He 
notes that much of the gambling, robbery and prostitution 
enterprises in China and in overseas Chinese communities were 
under either the direct ownership or the tributary control of 
secret societies. He maintains that a career was possible in 
a secret society - either a brief, exciting life of adventure 
and thrills or, if fortune smiled, the chance to overthrow 
the empire itself and participate in the establishment of a 
new dynasty. 
2 
A full list of Chinese secret societies is rather 
bewildering and is outside the scope of this study. The 
names used by Chinese secret societies are confusing to the 
extreme, perhaps purposely so in order to confound the 
1. Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China, New York, 1943: 113; 
Edgar Snow, op. cit.: 65-b8, -1$; 212-214. 
2. S. M. Lyman, Chinese Americans, cited in F. Bresler, The 
Chinese Mafia, New York, 1981. 
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authorities. A list of their more important and exotic names 
in Chinese history would have to include the White Lotus, the 
Red Eyebrow, the Yellow and Red Turbans, the Elder Brothers, 
the Heaven and Earth, the Three Dots, the Triad, the Eight 
Trigrams, the Small and Big Swords, the Righteous Harmony, 
the Red Beards, the Black Flags, the Mutual Progress, the 
Boxers, the Green and Red Gangs, the White Dragon, the White 
Gang, Achieve Justice, and the Two Dragons and a Tiger, etc. 
1' 
Chinese Secret societies were not onlya formidable force and 
opposition against China's ancien regime and the West, they 
were also said to have played a positive role in the country's 
War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945). 
3 
It should be noted that of the four useful functions - 
spiritual, political, economic and social - which the secret 
societies performed in China, perhaps it was in their military 
and insurrectionist performance that they were best noted. 
Secret society members thought themselves immunce against 
bullets*, 4 and some secret societies were intimately involved 
with local peasant 'self-defence' movements in central China 
and the interior. 
5 Both sides in the civil war between the 
Kuomintang, the Party of the bourgeoisie (KMT), and the 
1. J. Chesneaux, Secret Societies in China, op. cit.: vii. 
2. The secret. societies actually constituted two main systems: 
The White Lotus in the north and central China, and the Triad 
in the south. J. Chesneaux, op. cit.; W. Blythe, pp. cit.: 20.. 
3. Frank Robertson, Triangle of Death:, The Inside Story of the Triads - The Chinese Ma fiat London, or the 
full text of Mao Tse-Tung's appeal to the Elder Brothers' 
society to close rank against the Japanese invading forces; 
see J. Chesneaux, Secret Societies, op. cit.: 182-184. 
4. North China Herald, April 26,1924. 
5. Lucien Bianco, 'Secret Societies and Peasant Self-Defence, 1921-1933', in J. Chesneaux (ed. ), Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China, op. cit.: 213-2-2-4. 
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Communists actively sought the help of the secret societies 
by appealing to their sense of patriotism which had been 
manifested in the past wars. 
' 
Although they were an opposition force within the 
established order, they were not detached from the Chinese 
ancien regime: they were an integral part of it, stamped with 
the same defects and prisoners of the same limitations rather 
than a fundamental alternative to the regime. 
2 Other secret 
societies, notably-the Green Gang, turned to crime in the 
style of the Sicilian mafia and the American syndicates. This 
kind of activity, which had always been a component of secret 
society behaviour, was especially prevalent in great port 
cities like Shanghai and Hong Kong, whose vast floating 
population constituted an inexhaustible source of recruits 
and whose concentration of wealth made them particulary 
attractive to organized crime. 
3 Their leaders were known to 
have engaged in innumerable forms of vice and crime: smuggling 
(particularly opium), gambling, extortion, prostitution and 
'protection' rackets. From 1927 onwards Tu Yueh-sheng, the 
head of the Ch'ing Pang (Green Gang) society, was reputed to 
be the overlord of Shanghai in politics, business, and the 
4 
underworld. 
1. J. Chesneaux, Popular Movements, op. cit.: 13-14; W. 
Blythe, op. cit.: 12. 
2. J. Chesneaux, Secret Societies, op. cit.: 189-190. 
3. J. Chesneaux, Popular Movements, op. cit.: 12. 
4. Tu Yueh-sheng, Hwang Ching-yung, and Chang-Siao-Ling were 
frequently referred to in the Chinese press as the 'Big Three'. 
They dealt in a variety of organized crime - opium trafficking, kidnapping, blackmailing, gambling, prostitution, 'protection' 
rackets and plain murder in Shanghai. They were the supreme 
rulers of the French Concession, and the French authorities derived tremendous wealth from the activities of the gangs 
and in return the administration was turned over to them; J. Chesneaux, Secret Societies, o. cit.: 164-165. 
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For over thirty years, Tu Yueh-sheng's cartel was 
reported to have managed Shanghai's narcotics traffick with 
admirable efficiency; it not only imposed order on the city's 
rival gangs, but also demonstrated a keen awareness of 
international and domestic potentials. 
1 In the early 1920s, 
the Shanghai syndicate began promoting the sale of millions 
of-red-coloured heroin pills advertised as 'antiopium pills' 
and 'the best medicine in the world'. As thousands of Chinese 
opium smokers switched to that Western wonder drug, heroin, 
the cartel had to import by 1923 an estimated ten million 
tons of heroin annually from Europe and Japan to keep up with 
consumer demand. The promotion quickly turned thousands of 
residents of Shanghai and China into heroin addicts. 
2 
It is precisely these aspects of the secret societies - 
their ancient characters and criminal activities - that would 
bring them and their leaders into conflict with the new 
regime in China at the end of the civil war which saw the 
collapse of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the coming of the 
People's Republic of China. In the process an exodus would 
be triggered of the secret societies and their leaders into 
Hong Kong and other Asian countries, Europe, and North 
America. 3 
1. A. W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, 
New York, 1972: 225. 
2. ibid. 
3. These later emigrants in the 1950s would be joining the 
earlier Chinese emigrants who had fled to the west coast 
of America (California and British Columbia) in the 1850s 
when the Imperial troops were 'cleaning up' after the 
Taiping and Triad rebellions: see W. Blythe, op. cit.: 26. 
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THE TRIAD SOCIETIES 
Orin 
It is generally believed that the Triad Society was 
founded, according to its own claim, in 1674 - twenty six 
years after the establishment of the Manchu dynasty of Ch'ing 
- by a group of five Buddhist monks in southern China. 
' 
Like the Sicilian Mafia which was established to check the 
oppression and excesses of foreigp rulers, the avowed aim of 
the Triad Society was to overthrow the Manchus, an authorit- 
arian, repressive foreign regime from Mongolia that had 
usurped china's Dragon Throne, and to restore the Imperial 
House of Chu (Ming dynasty) whose founder and first emperor 
came from the Chinese peasant class and which enjoyed tremen- 
dous popularity among the Chinese people. 
2 The sacred 
emblem of the Society was a triangle, the three sides of 
which represented the three basic powers of Heaven, Earth, 
and Man. The word 'Triad' is actually the English desig- 
nation of that emblem. The society is also known by many 
other names3 such as the Heaven and Earth Society, the 
Three Dots society, Hung Wu, the reign title of Chu whom the 
Triad Society regarded as its first Ancestor and thus adopted 
1. W. P. Morgan, Triad Societies in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 
1982: 3; W. Blythe, op. c it: 21. 
2. J. Chesneaux, Popular Movements, op. cit.: 62. 
3. Other names of the Society include: San Ho Hui - Society of the Three Elements in One; Hung Pang-Hung Party or Red Party, 
J. Chesneaux, Secret Societies, op. cit.: 15" 
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the character 'Hung' as the family name of its members. 
' 
Prior to the advent of the Triad Society, it is 
generally accepted that the most notorious of China's 
rebellious society was the White Lotus Society, a wholly 
Buddhist organization formed in the tenth century (1129 A. D. ) 
in northern China. 
2 From the outset, it should be noted, 
the Triad Society was regarded by the Chinese Imperial 
authorities as a seditious brotherhood, and its tentacles, 
like the mafia's, spread throughout the southern provinces of 
Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Fukien where innumerable local 
societies sprang up. Its disturbing influence was reflected 
in the Imperial promulgation of special laws proscribing such 
brotherhoods, and, in 1792, mentioning the Heaven and Earth 
Society by name. 
3 This was six years after a serious revolt 
1. Blythe, op. cit.: 20" 
2. Chinese history is replete with seditious sects whose 
persistence and pervasiveness often boggles the imagination. 
Throughout the centuries there were repeated outbreaks of 
revolts sponsored by sects claiming the name and ritual of 
the White Lotus. There had been a concerted drive by the 
Manchu dynasty of Ch'ing (1644-1911) to close down - 
monasteries and crush the Buddhist movement which was viewed 
as political. Numerous Imperial edicts proscribing heterodox 
sects mentioned the White Lotus by name, but the society 
survived to reappear among the groups which coalesced to form 
the Boxer movement leading to the uprising of 1900; J. M. 
De Groot, Sectarianism and Religious Persectution in China, 
London, 1903-1904: ; J. S. Ward and W. G. Stirling, The Hung 
Society or The Society of Heaven and Earth, London, 1925: i, 
W. Blythe, op. c t. 
4. W. Blythe, op. cit.: 22. The Triad's ability to penetrate 
almost every segment of the southern provinces of China was 
basically reminiscent of the Mafia's penetration of Sicilian 
society at every level; M. Pantaleone, The Mafia and 
Politics, London, 1966. 
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organized by a local Triad society had taken place in Formosa 
in which a magistrate was killed. Thereafter, the activities 
of the Brotherhood came increasingly to official 
attention, 
' and from 1817 onwards uprisings fostered by 
Triad societies became endemic throughout the three southern 
provinces despite the public beheading of thousands of their 
members. With the outlawing of the Society by the Manchus, 
it became basically clandestine in operation. 
2 Thus the 
change from active rebellion and freedom of movement to 
comparatively secret resistance created an additional need 
for shared traditions, aims, and even rituals, including the 
adoption of identifying signs and passwords, as is believed 
to be the case with the Sicilian mafia and American 
syndicates, to help. ensure safety and some unity of purpose 
and action. 
3 For the same reason, initiation and promotion 
ceremonies also became elaborate affairs in which the 
aspirants are made to swear a succession of 36 oaths of 
allegiance and integrity (a kind of Ten Commandments), one of 
the the more famous being the thirteenth oath which reads: 
If I should change my mind and deny my 
membership of the Hung family, I will be 
killed by myriads of swords. 
4 
1. According to Favre, the Triad Society was 'officially 
noticed' in connection with seditious movements in 1749, 
1789,1814,11817, and 1832, B. Favre, Les societes secretes 
en Chine, Paris, 1933. 
2. W. P. Morgan, op. cit.: 16. 
3. ibid- 
4. ibid: 158. 
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" Initially, the Triad Society, like the Sicilian mafia, was 
essentially a political organization directed against the 
Ch'ing dynasty1 and its evolution into a wholly criminal 
organization is said to have come after the overthrow of 
that dynasty in 1911. In a way, there is a similarity 
between the evolution of the Triad Society and the Mafia. While 
the former was supposedly founded with the avowed objective 
of overthrowing a 'foreign' dynasty, the latter was said to be 
founded to check injustice and the excesses of colonial rule. 
2 
But as it happens with such secret societies, as we have 
already noted, they easily become a reservoir for recriutment 
of organized criminals. With the overthrow of the Manchus, 
the Triad Society members were left with no more political 
objectives to hang on; as a result, it is noted that as its 
members were driven by greed and love of wealth, they began 
to devote themselves to full-time criminal careers. 
3 
This led to the break-up of the Society into many hundreds 
of small factions which operated independently of each other. 
Thus as the single unified Society disappeared, each of the 
separate societies claimed membership of the Triad family. 4 
1. J. Chesneaux, Secret Societies, op. cit.: 15. 
2. Giovanni Schiavo, The Truth about the Mafia and Or anized 
Crime in America, New York, 1962: 32-38; A Bequai, 0r anized 
Crime: The Fifth Estate, Lexington, Mass., 1979: 12-16. 
3. W. P. Morgan, op. cit.: 27. 
4. ibid.: xiii. 
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From Political to Underworld Activities 
During the early nineteenth century the declared 
political objective of the Triads was the overthrow of the 
Imperial House of Manchu and this they pursued through 
insurrections and propaganda aimed at the masses. Armed 
insurrections formented by the Triads burst out in various 
places in the provinces of Kwangtung (1802,1817,1832, 
1837), Kiangsi (1809,1814), Kwangsi (1810,1820-21,1832), 
and Hunan (1832), among others. 
'. The insurrections 
continued, too, in those regions where the Triads had 
previously been active: in Taiwan in 1802 and 1832, and in 
Fukien in 1837. By this time, however, the headquarters of 
the Triads had already been transferred to the Kwangtung- 
Kwangsi area, and by the 1840s they had apparently become the 
largest and most influential secret anti-Manchu organization 
in China. 2 
One of the guiding principles of Triad propaganda 
against the Ch'ing was to put forward everywhere the idea 
that old Chinese customs were being trampled underfoot, and 
the propaganda hinged upon the slogan fan-Ch'ing fu-Ming 
('Overthrow the Ch'ing and restore the Ming'), and it ran 
1. J. Chesneaux, Popular Movements, op. cit.: 49. 
2. ibid. 
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like a red thread through all the documents of the 
society. 
1 It was celebrated in songs, and rhymed verses 
and it appeared in the legend of the origin of the Heaven and 
Earth Society, on its banners, on the members' identification 
cards, and on other objects that were reproduced in the 
publication of the society's material. 
2 For example, 
during the ceremony of sacrifice to the Five legendary 
Founders of the society, the members used to sing the 
following quatrains: 
We will give the Manchus no rest 
In the Hung-hua Pavilion 
We swore in Heavens's name 
To overthrow the Ch'ing and restore the Ming. 
3 
Dozens of similar verses like the above (which initiates are 
required to recite when burning various kinds of incense) 
could be cited, for almost every page of the ritual text 
collected by the authorities contains this appeal to 
overthrow the Ch'ing and restore the Ming. 
4 That this was 
the fundamental purpose of the organization, viewed as 
honourable by the temper of the period, was well illustrated 
by the question put to the initiates at the moment of 
admission into the Society, 'Why are you here? ', and they 
1. ibid: 52. 
2. Historical Materials on Modern Secret Societies, Peking, 
1935, chapter 1: 3b, 7b, a-1 a, 26a, 29a; 31b. 
3. Documents of the Heaven and Earth Society, Shanghai, 1947: 
47. 
4. W. Blythe, op. cit.: xiii" 
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were required to answer, 'To overthrow the Ch'ing and restore 
the Ming'. 1 
It was in fact in the south that the real, and final 
show-down between the proscribed Triad Society and the 
Manchus was said to have come to a head. The members of the 
Republican Party, which was led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen2 and 
which dominated the Provincial Assemblies in the south, had 
attempted as early as 1859 an unsuccessful revolt. Dr. Sun, 
himself a Triad member and a 426 Fighter official, then fled 
the country and set out to canvas support among the Overseas 
Chinese in Japan and the U. S. for the Republican cause, and 
the Triad branches in Honolulu, Chicago and other places were 
fully utilized for the dissemination of the Republican 
propaganda and for the collection of funds for the Party from 
Chinese residents in foreign countries. 
3 When in 1909 the 
Provincial Assemblies sought for the immediate setting up of 
a National Parliament and the Prince Regent demurred, issues 
1. Historical Materials, op. cit. Chapter 4: 3a, 15b. 
2. W. P. Morgan, Triad Societies, op. cit.: 24-25. Dr. Sun 
who joined the Triad Brotherhood about 188b and devoted 
himself to the revolutionary cause soon discovered that his 
enthusiasm for the proclamation of a Republic was received 
with great reserve. Triad tradition postulated an Emperor of 
Chinese ethnic stock, not a foreign-style president of a 
Republic; Sun Yat-sen, Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary, 
London, 1918: 190-198. 
3. In 1894 Sun founded his own society, the Hsing Chung Hui 
(Revive China Society), which in its organization followed 
the traditional secret society pattern with the swearing of a 
blood-oath of brotherhood and the use of secret signs and 
language: B. Martin, Strange Vigour: A Biography of Sun 
Yat-sen, London, 1944: 101; W. P Morgan, op. c it. 
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were finally joined. The Republicans who had considered the 
Prince Regent's promised reform a mere window dressing, 
resolved to fight on until the Manchus were driven out and 
a Republic proclaimed. 
1 In the ensuing revolt by the 
Republican Party which was behind the Assembles' demand, the 
Manchus were driven out from China in 1911 and in January 
1912 the country was declared a Republic with Dr. Sun Yat-sen 
as its President. 
2 Dr. Sun himself visited the Ming tombs 
and there expressed satisfaction that-the Manchus had 
finally been overthrown. The Triads had finally achieved their 
political objective but China's troubles, however, were by no 
means over and the Ming dynasty had not been restored, but 
at least the Chinese were once again in control of China. 
3 
The assistance given by the Triad Society to the 
Republican Party resulted in its virtual official recognition 
by the new government and, freed from restrictions, it 
expanded to an even greater extent than before. Its power as 
a lobbying force became such that ambitious civic and 
military officials were usually bound to join the Society in 
order to further their ends, and merchants and traders found 
that membership and subscription to the Society greatly eased 
their commercial ventures. However, as power often 
1. W. P. Morgan, op. cit.: 26-27. 
2. ibid. 
3. With the establishment of the Republic, the Society was 
said to have disintegrated and self-styled triad gangs 
blossomed in Hong Kong in common with the rest of China, and 
the activities of these gangs became mostly criminal. Rather 
like New York, for example, having its 'Went 46th Street 
Gang' and its 'North 22nd Street Gang', Hong Kong came to have its 'Fuk Yee Hing Triad', and its 'Wo Shing Wo Triad', 
amongst others; W. P. Morgan, op. cit.: 26,63-66. 
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corrupts, so the Society became increasingly corrupted and 
was said to have disintegrated into gangs whose activities 
became largely criminal. 
' Opinions as to the exact time 
when the Triad Society changed from being a political 
organization to a criminal organization, as in the case of 
the Sicilian Mafia, are not, however, clear cut. One 
perspective maintains that from the nineteenth century 
onwards, the criminal and political aspects of its activities 
were inextricably linked, and that they represented two 
facets of the same sociological reality, provoked by the 
sheer severity of imperial order. But in modern times, it 
argues, and especially since the Republican revolution, the 
political function has been assumed by other organizations: 
political parties, trade unions, and various professional and 
cultural bodies, 
2 just as we saw in the factors that led to 
the decline of the mafia power in Sicily. The Triad was 
therefore, according to this perspective, forced to fall back 
on its criminal activities, and thus from then on it became 
much more than before an instrument in the hands of 
politicians and intriguers. 
3 There was to come, however, 
1. ibid: 26. It is too simple to explain this degeneration, 
as Morgan does now, by saying that with the establishment of 
the Republic in 1911, the society saw itself in a political 
vacuum. The fact is that from the nineteenth century 
onwards, the political and criminal aspects of its activities 
were inextricably linked; see J. Chesneaux, Secret Societies, 
op. cit. 34 
2. J. Chesneaux, Secret Societies, op. cit.: 34. 
3. ibid. 
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a further turn in the wheel of the Society's history. That 
would be the impact of the policies and ideology of the 
Chinese Peoples' Government on Triad traditions, on Triad 
membership, on Triad-inspired organizations, and on Triad 
business activities, all of which the new government of the 
1950s would find incompatible, if not intolerable, with its 
own. 
It should be noted that during the occupation of China 
and the island of Hong Kong, between 1941 and 1945, a 
proportion of these gangs collaborated with the occupying 
Japanese and thus became a modest Fifth Column. The Japanese 
were well aware of the importance of the Chinese secret 
societies, especially the Triads, in the political field. 
1 
Collaboration with the Japanese was encouraged by the puppet 
'Reformed Government' established by the Japanese to 
integrate all societies on behalf of their masters. The 
gangs' main reasons for collaboration were believed to be 
entirely pecuniary because the Japanese allowed them to 
continue their organization of prostitution, narcotics 
trafficking and gambling which were the main sources of Triad 
revenue. After the Japanese surender in 1945, the Triads 
quickly obtained control of a whole range of organized 
1.. W. Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies, op. 
cit.: 31; R. Storry, The Double Patriots: Study o Japanese 
Patriotism, London, 1957; W. P. Morgan, op. cit.: 71-73; F. 
Robertson, Triangle of Death: op. cit. 
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criminal activities in the island of Hong Kong, 
' but the 
end of their hold in mainland China was only a few years 
away. In the power struggle betwen the Nationalist 
Government led by Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists led by 
Mao Tse-tung, after the two parties had uneasily closed ranks 
to fight the Japanese, each side appealed to the Triads for 
assistance for the control of the country. 
2 
When, however, the Communist forces finally emerged 
triumphant in 1950, they found the presence of the Triad 
societies, whose activities by now had become entirely 
criminal, a thorn in the flesh of the new Communist 
Government and the stage was set for their expulsion and that 
of other secret societies from China. 
3 The Government 
decree of 2 January 1951 declared that all secret societies 
(Triads) were dissolved as being 'contrary to the best 
interests of the people'. Regulations issued on 23 February 
authorized death penalty or life imprisonment for members of 
1. The Japanese were quite willing to use Triad societies to 
assist them in their task of maintaining order, and organized 
them into a group known as the Hing Ah Kee Kwan (Asian 
Flourishing Organization); W. P. Morgan, op. cit.: 72-73; F. 
Robertson, op. cit.: 176. 
2. During the Civil War? Chairman Mao described the members 
of secret societies as heroes and brave fellows' who had 
demonstrated their valour in the past, just to win their 
support; but as soon as he won the war he no longer regarded 
them as such; W. Blythe, op. cit. 35; 'F. Robertson, op. cit.: 
113,157,168. 
3, J. Chesneaux, Popular Movements and Secret Societies, op. 
cit.: 16 
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secret societies, and article 8 of the regulations mentioned 
in particular 'those who utilize feudalistic secret societies 
to engage in counter-revolutionary activities'. 
' The immediate 
result of the promulgation of these penalties was a series of 
mass executions throughout the country of which the majority 
of the victims were secret society members. This measure, in 
addition to the Government's land reform program, wholesale 
nationalization of means of production, and other socialist 
measures, led to the final exodus of the Triads and other 
secret societies from China into the European colonies of 
Southeast Asia - South Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Singapore, and countries of Western Europe and North America. 
2 
As stated previously, prior to the final exodus from 
the mainland, Triad societies were already flourishing in 
Hong Kong where they were involved in a variety of organized 
crime activities. 
3 Because of its proximity to the mainland 
Hong Kong was frequently used by Republican and Triad leaders 
as a meeting place to discuss their plans of action. The 
island was also a sanctuary for the society members during 
the great Taiping and Triad rebellions which raged on 
mainland almost continuously from the 1850s until the 
establishment of the Republic in 1912.4 And with each victory 
by the Imperial troops a fresh wave of Triad members escaped 
to Hong Kong. The first Triad arrest were reported to have 
been made in 1844, two years after it was ceded to the British. 5 
1. W. Blythe, op. cit.: 34,35. 
2. J. Chesneaux, Secret Societies, op. cit.: 15; F. Bresler, 
The Chinese Mafia, New York, 1581; W. Blythe, OP* cit.: 34. 
3. F. Robertson, op, cit.: 15. 
4. W. P. Morgan, op, cit.: 62. 
5. ibid.: 79; F. Robertson, op. cit.; W. Blythe, op. cit. 
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Hong Kong: Home of the Triads. 
Triad Activities in Hong Kong, 
In many ways the British crown colony of Hong Kong 
resembles Marseille: both have a long standing tradition of 
random violence and organized crime. While Marseille was and 
still is the heroin laboratory for Turkish opium, Hong Kong 
has in recent years played a similar major role for Southeast 
Asia with regards to the heroin from the Golden Triangle 
region. 
' It should be noted, however, that prior to the 
Communist revolution, Shanghai was the centre of commerce and 
industry in China as well as the centre of organized criminal 
activities of which narcotics trafficking was the most 
lucrative. By the time the British took over the island of 
Hong Kong in 1842, Triad and other secret society members 
were among the inhabitants of the island. 2 The former's 
activities so alarmed the British administration that in 1845 
and again in 1857 two anti-Triad Ordinances were proclaimed 
aimed at controlling their criminal activities. 3 The first 
Triad arrests in Hong Kong were reported to have been made in 
1844, just two years after it was ceded to the British. 4 
1. A. W. McCoy, the Politics of Heroin in South-East Asia, New 
York, 1972: 223. 
2. F. Robertson, op. cit.: 172-173. 
3. ibid. 
4. W. P. Morgan, op. cit.: 79; F. Robertson, op. cit. 
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But despite the anti-Triad ordinances, the Triad societies 
have managed to survive to date. 
The Triad is today by far the best known of the Chinese 
secret societies with its 'headquarters' in Hong Kong and the 
best known criminal organization with its roots in Asia and 
branches in many parts of the world. 
' In 1960 it was 
estimated then that of the three million inhabitants of Hong 
Kong, 300,000 of these were Triad society members, 
2 
and 
that the majority of these are of Chiu Chao dialect group. 
The chui chao syndicates, who had battled with the Green Gang 
syndicates for the control of underworld business in Shangai 
and had participated with the Green Gangs in the massacre in 
the city of the Communists and revolutionary workers in 1927, 
migrated en masse to Hong Kong from 1947 to 1950 as the 
Nationalist forces began to crumble before those of the 
Communists. This massive influx of China's toughest 
criminals (chui chaos) coming to join their ethnic group 
which already comprised eight per cent of the colony's 
population, caused organized crime to flourish on an 
unprecedented scale in the colony. 
3 
1. J. Chesneaux, Secret Societies, op. cit.: 14-5. 
2. It is believed, however, that not all of these are active 
members; W. P. Morgan, op. cit.: ix. However, for reasos 
which are not quite clear, the Hong Kong police in 1977 
revised this figure down to 80,000 which many responsible and 
knowledgeable citizens, including several police officers, 
believe to be far too low; F. Robertson, op. cit.: 115. 
3. A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 227-228. 
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By 1939, however, the Triad societies in Hong Kong had 
evolved into the type of criminal organizations they are 
known to be today. Although they had engaged in organized 
criminal activities prior to that time, their allegedly 
patriotic motivation had hitherto given them some measure of 
popular support. When the Republic was established in 1912, 
this prop of patriotism was immediately removed and the 
various societies could no longer pretend they were a 
coordinated movement dedicated to a common goal, and hence- 
forth they had to stand in their true light as independent 
secret associations actuated by self-aggrandisement .1 
Thus, in order to prevent their own destruction by inter- 
necine warfare a general agreement on spheres of influence 
had to be worked out. 
2 The Triad influence over the 
island's population during this time was exercised apparently 
by seven main groups each. of which consisted of a head- 
quarters branch and a number of sub-branches operating in 
their respective areas. It is believed they were far better 
organized and disciplined than the societies of today as the 
various group leaders were able to exercise control over 
their subordinates. 
3 
1. W. P. Morgan, op. cit.: 65. 
2. ibid. 
3. The seven main groups of the Triad which controlled the 
various regions of the colony include the Wo in western 
district and Yau Ma Tei, the Tung and Tung in eastern, the 
Chuen in Mong Kok, the 'Shing' amongst the Hakka of Sham Shiu 
Po, the Fuk Yee Hing amongst the Hoklo, and the Yee On among 
the Chiu Chao residents; W. P. Morgan, op. cit.; F. Robertson, 
op. cit.: . 
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Thus stripped of their patriotic aura, some societies by 
the late 1920s sought to give themselves some facade of 
respectability by operating under phony business names. For 
example, the Fuk Yee Hing Triad society became a registered 
society with the name Fuk Yee Industrial and Commercial 
General Association with twelve branch offices to administer 
its members in Hong Kong Island, Kowloon and the New 
Territories. Similarly, the Yee On operated under the 
registered name of Yee On Commercial and Industrial Guild. 
' 
However, their incursions into the employment field had 
resulted in the establishment of Triad-type associations by 
labour groups as self-protection measures against Triad 
interference; and these associations are said to owe no 
allegiance to any of the seven Triad groups exercising power 
in Hong Kong. Such an association is believed to be the 
parent of the present day Luen criminal group which sprang up 
amongst the metal workers and which soon controlled most of 
the blacksmiths, foundry workers, tinsmith and dockyard 
workers. 
2 The creation of these new groups has tended to 
weaken the older societies. The inability of the old secret 
society officials to crush the new groups encouraged the 
lesser officials and minor members who were dissatisfied with 
their share of society's proceeds to attempt to remedy the 
situation by splitting away from the main branch societies 
1. W. P. Morgan, op. cit.: 65-67. 
2. ibid. 
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and setting themselves up as leaders of semi-independent 
units. 
' This situation led to a multiplicity of Triad 
societies whose unit leaders, anxious to increase their 
financial rewards by ruthless exploitation of the people, 
were prepared to defend their sources of revenue against all 
comers by any means. In this way, according to the Hong Kong 
police view, any form of central control at group or branch 
level was largely destroyed and the older leaders became, in 
effect, mere figureheads with no real authority over the rank 
and file. 2 
Thus in 1977 it was estimated that there were about 
thirty five acti 
known as the Red 
threat to public 
criminal gangs. 
3 
Six groupings is 
ve Triad groupings in Hong Kong, collectively 
Sect, of which six are known to pose serious 
security, controlling between 300 and 500 
The most notorious and feared of the Big 
said to be the 14K group which was formed 
1. It was probably clear to the old Triad officials that any 
efforts to crush the new groups would have necessitated the 
use of open violence which could have drawn the attention of 
the authorities, thereby exposing them to the risk of 
banishment from Hong Kong; W. P. Morgan, op. cit.: 70- 
2. The Hong Kong police have consistently used the lack of 'central control' amongst the Triad groups to play down the 
seriousness of the Triad activities and the police 
connections with the societies; see, for example, F. Bresler, 
op. cit.: 54; W. P. Morgan, op. cit.: 71. The action of Triad 
members in defending the sources of their revenue by any 
means resembles in many respects the action of the Sicilian 
mafia in defending their former mainstay the latifundia; see 
M. Pantaleone, The Mafia and Politics, op. c it. 
3. The Hong Kong police maintain that their revised official 
figure of 80,000 members includes 8,000 vicious, full-time 
criminals; F. Robertson, op. cit.: 115-116. 
276. 
in 1945 by a high-ranking Nationalist general Kot Siu-Wong. 
The number '14' indicates the place where the group was 
formed: 14 Po Wah Road, Canton, while the letter 'K' 
symbolizes 'Karat' gold which is harder and stronger than the 
soft local type of gold. 
' The Chinese, like the Frenchmen 
and Italians, tend to group themselves in business and 
voluntary groups by linguistic dialect and regional origins. 
As one police officer in Hong Kong put it, almost all of the 
gangsters who dominate the Hong Kong heroin trade are members 
of the chui chao dialect group who migrated from the Swatow 
region of southern China where they originally controlled 
drug trade and other criminal activities prior to the late 
1950s. 2 As McCoy also notes in this regard, 'chiu chao 
syndicates have controlled much of Asia's illicit drug 
traffick since the mid 1800s and have played a role in 
China's organized crime in a manner similar to the Sicilian 
Mafia and the Corsican and American syndicates'. 
3 In Hong 
Kong the chiu chao elements constitute a powerful Fifth 
Column strategically placed to take over narcotics activity 
1. ibid: 117; F. Bresler, op. cit.: 31. Having set up his 
headquarters at No. 14 Po Wah Road, Canton, General Kot 
hastily set about recruiting thousands of members who had no 
idea of the traditions or even the name of the society they 
had joined. It became common to refer to 'men of No. 14' or 
the '14 Association'. 
2. F. Bresler, op. cit. 
3. A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 185-186 
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in the colony; they are notorious throughout the area for 
their activities in vice and smuggling rings. Because of 
their clannishness they are sometimes called the Mafia of 
Southeast Asia. ' 
The indiscipline and greed for wealth and power amongst 
the later triad society members can be gleaned from the 
activities of the 14K group members. It is noted that the 
'Association' was reorganized when it moved into Hong Kong as 
part of General Kot's overall design for an eventual 
reconquest of mainland China, but this dream died with his 
death in 1953.2 But as Morgan notes, 'Freed from the 
restrictions imposed by Kot Siu-Wong, the more determined 
branch leaders embarked on a campaign of extortion and 
intimidation the ruthlessness of which shocked not only the 
local societies, but also some of the older 14K officials and 
branch leaders. '3 The same behaviour was observed amongst 
other Triad group society members where it was reported to 
have resulted in clashes between various groups or even units 
belonging to different parent societies for the control of 
the narcotics trade which remains their most lucrative, 
1. F. Bresler, op. cit.: A. W. McCoy, op. cit. 
2. F. Bresler, op. cit.; F. Robertson, op. cit.: 178. 
3. W. P. Morgan, 
_o . Kong in 1950, going 
whence he continued 
in Hong Kong. He ri 
to rebuild eighteen 
before his death in 
cit.: 81-82. Kot was deported from Hong 
first to Hainan, and then to Formosa from 
to issue instructions to his lieutenants 
eturned to Hong Kong in 1951 and managed 
of the former thirty six sub-branches 
1953; F. Bresler, op. cit.: 31" 
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criminal enterprise. 
' The chiu chao victory over the Green 
Gang in Hong Kong was only their first step in gaining a 
complete monopoly over the importation of Thai morphine and 
opium and a virtual monopoly over the manufacture and 
wholesale distribution phases of the colony's drug trade. 2 
In recent years Thailand, one of the three countries making 
up the Golden Triangle, has emerged as the world's largest 
exporter! of illicit drugs, with Hong Kong by far one of the 
biggest customers of the products. 
3 
Besides narcotics trafficking, Hong Kong Triad societies 
are also involved, as in the case of the American syndicates 
and the Sicilian Mafia, in a wide variety of rackets and 
other underworld activities. There are over 20,000 hawkers 
in Hong Kong, many licensed, more unlicensed. To prevent the 
Triad 'bully boys' from usurping their pitch or destroying 
their goods, the hawkers must either join a Triad society and 
subscribe to the expenses of the society 'protectors' or pay 
a flat daily fee to the society collectors. 
4 They are 
1. ibid. 
2. Since the end of World War II, Marseille and Hong Kong 
have established themselves as the major centres for heroin 
laboratories. However, their dominance is now being 
challenged by a new cluster of heroin laboratories located in 
the wilds of Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle; A. W. McCoy, 
op. cit.: 12. 
3. With and estimated 100,000 narcotics addicts out of a total population of 4 million (1970), Hong Kong has the 
highest percentage of drug users anywhere in the world; Hong 
Kong Standard, October 17,1970. 
4. W. P. Morgan, op. cit. 
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said to abduct young girls into prostitution and take a 
percentage of both the girls' earnings and those of the 
brothel-keepers. 1 Cinema and dance-hall managers, loan- 
sharks, stevedores, shopkeepers, restaurant operators, shoe- 
shine boys, prostitutes, and operators of unscheduled public 
transport are believed to be among their victims. 
2 All 
these people have to make regular 'protection' payments in 
order to be guaranteed a place in which to ply their 
büsiness3 and they could expect Triad help if an outsider 
attempted to move into their area. The Triad society members 
are believed to be in collusive and symbiotic relationships 
with some corrupt Hong Kong police officers who provide them 
with a. protective shield in return for a cut of the graft, 
4 
just as in the case of the U. S. syndicates and Sicilian 
mafia. Triad members are also reported to be involved in 
contract murders, in the organization and distributing of 
narcotics to the inmates of Hong Kong's Stanley prison and 
various other jails through the 'profitable cooperation of 
prison authorities. i5 Although the 'political' riots of 
1. F. Robertson, op. cit.: 114-115. 
2. ibid: 120' 
3. For a similar 'protection tax' imposed by the U. S. 
syndicates, see A. Block and W. J. Chambliss, Organizing 
Crime, New York, 1981: 65-76; W. J. Chambliss, On the Take: 
From Petty Crooks to Presidents, Bloomington, Indiana, :, 
-, 55- . 
4. F. Bresler, op. cit.: 38-52; F. Robertson, op. cit.: 
116-125. 
5. F. Robertson, op. cit.: 119. 
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October 10,1956.1, were not inspired by the Triad 
societies, 
l they were reported to have helped to develop 
the riots and profited from them as they whipped up emotions 
to cover up their looting activities. The Government's 
report on the riots notes that some Triad members were issued 
with bundles of cheap paper flags of one of the political 
factions involved in the basic riot, and these they sold at 
exorbitant prices to pedestrians and motorists as safe- 
conduct passes, beating up anyone who refused to buy and 
smashing the vehicles of those motorists who attempted to 
crash the barricades. 
2 Again, as in the case of the 
American syndicates and the Sicilian Mafia, official 
corruption has to a large extent helped to perpetuate the 
existence of the Triad societies in Hong Kong despite the 
belatedly organized anti-Triad Society Bureau within the 
Criminal Investigation Branch of the Hong Kong Police 
Department in 1956 in the wake of the Riots. 
1. The riots are said to have begun when the supporters of 
the Taiwan government were told by the authorities that they 
could not paste paper flags of the Nationalist Government on 
the outside walls, and this they regarded as an insult to the 
Taiwan government; F. Robertson, op. cit.; Report on Hong 
Kong Triad Riots, Hong Kong, 1956, passim. 
2. F. Robertson, op. cit. 
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The Police-Triad Connections 
The Triad-Police connections in Hong Kong bear a classic 
resemblance to the connections of the officials with 
organized criminals in the United States and Sicily which we 
have examined in the previous chapters. It once again would 
illustrate the point that in order for organized criminals to 
find a permanent foothold in any society they would require, 
to borrow Chairman Mao's phrase from a political context, 'a 
supportive sea of partisans around them in order to 
survive'. 
' The official view of the Hong Kong police on 
the activities of the Triads has consistently differed with 
those of the colony's press and other writers and one often 
gets the impression that the two sides are not looking at the 
same phenomenon. Apparently as a result of the connection of 
a large section of its officers in the middle and low echelon 
of the force with the Triad society operatives and the 
embarrassing publicity this has caused, the Royal Hong Kong 
pol Iice official line on the Triad societies has invariably 
tended to minimize the seriousness of the Triad involvement 
in organized criminal activities in the colony. 
2 While 
this official line is prepared to admit that Triad society 
1. Cited in F. A. Lanni, A Family Business: Kinship and Social 
Control in Organized Crime, New York, 1972: 40. 
2. F. Bresler, op. cit.: 56; F. Robertson, o cit.: 121. 
Similar police line in the U. S. and Sicily has tended to 
minimize the impact of the activities of the American 
syndicates and the Sicilian mafia; W. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 
96; M. Pantaleone, op. cit. 
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members have been involved in serious organized criminal 
activities abroad in such places as the United States, 
Europe, Canada, Australia and other countries, it at the 
same time would like the public to believe that at home in 
Hong Kong and other areas of Southeast Asia they exist 
largely in name only. 
1 It maintains that the societies 
today have degenerated from strictly controlled, politically 
motivated organizations into loose-knit gangs of criminals 
which usurp the names of the Triad Societies of years 
past. 
2 In the face of the available evidence this official 
view seems hardly credible. It should be noted, however, 
that not all Hong Kong police officers subscribe to the 
official view, especially those who recognize, the 
seriousness of the situation and who are not on the take. 
The relationship which exists between the Triad society 
members and corrupt Hong Kong police officers has all the 
earmarks of similar relationships between the American 
syndicates, the Sicilian mafia and the corrupt police 
officers in those societies in terms of payoffs and 
protection. 
3 
1. F. Bresler, op. cit. 
2. ibid. 
3. W. J. Chambliss, On The Take: op, cit.: 50-52,88-100, 
237-248; A. Block and W. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 97-114; G. 
Servadio, Mafioso: A History of the Ma is from- its origins to 
the Present day, New York, 253-254. 
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The current strength of the Hong Kong police force is 
over 20,000 of which ten percent are officers and of whom the 
overwhelming majority are white and mainly British, and none 
of these hold any rank lower than that of inspector. The 
lower ranks which constitute the remaining ninety percent are 
made up largely of ethnic Chinese who are undereducated, and 
apparently poorly paid. Only about ten percent of them speak 
good enough English to qualify to wear a red tab on their 
sleeve indicating that they are English speaking. It is 
within the lower ranks, 'though by no means limited to them, 
that corruption is reported to be most rampant and the 
Police-Triad connections most evident, 
' 
especially in the 
areas of drug trafficking and other money-making rackets. 
Some of these officers usually are not content with just 
taking handouts, like their American counterparts, from the 
Triad syndicates, but instead they often set up their own 
criminal networks. As a result it is not unusual for a Hong 
Kong police officer to leave the force ase, millionaire. 2 
The first revelation of any large-scale graft and 
corruption in the force was reported in the late 1960s. As 
one newspaper noted, 'while the police offensive (which began 
in the mid 1960s) in no way inhibited the growth of the 
narcotics traffick, it made many Chinese police sergeants 
millionaires. The corruption was so pervasive that in 
1. F. Bresler, op. cit.: 39-40. 
2. CBC Documentar : Connections: Organized Crime in Canada, 
Part Two, 'The Hong Kong connections' June 13,1977. 
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August 1969 the mere hint of an anti-corruption campaign 
produced a wave of resignations by senior Chinese detectives 
and sergeants. '1 One such resignation occurred that year 
in the case of a staff sergeant named Lai Ma Yau, and two 
years later, 1971, it was authoritatively estimated that his 
assets were worth nearly US$6 million. Ironically, he was 
not arrested until 1977 when he was charged with having 
'unexplained assets disproportionate to his official income'; 
and when he was convicted in 1978 he was jailed for only two 
years and ordered to compensate the Crown to the tune of 
US$3.1 million. However, inflation and shrewd investment as 
a 'merchant' over the years enabled him to pay over 
immediately US$2.3 million and to meet the balance shortly by 
arranging mortgages on his property. 
2 
The case of Superintendents Peter Godber and Ernest Hunt 
in July and August respectively 1973 points to the fact that 
the Triad-police connections are not limited to the ethnic 
Chinese police officers only. Godber who was charged and 
eventually convicted, after his extradition from Britain, of 
corruptly accepting HK$25,000, although it was widely known 
that the real amount he stashed away was more than four 
million English pounds, was the 'first high-ranking British 
police officer to take a leaf out of the Chinese sergeants' 
book and set up his own corruption network instead of 
1. South China Morning Post, August 28,1969; A. W. McCoy, op. 
cit.: 231. 
2. F. Bresler, op. cit.: 40. 
285. 
Although he was receiving payoffs from the Chinese. 
11 
jailed for only four years, it was believed that Godber had 
acquired some three hundred thousand pounds in various bank 
accounts. Similarly, Hunt was jailed for only one year for 
failing to give a satisfactory explanation of how he was able 
to spend over sixteen thousand pounds when his official 
income for that period was just about twelve thousand 
pounds. 
2 
Walter Easey, a former Hong Kong police officer 
(1962-1968) who eventually left the Force to return to 
England, has stated that right from the time he left training 
school he was never in any job in which he was not being paid 
up, small or large amount; that it was the police in Hong 
Kong who ran most of the night life and the crime that 
surrounds it; 
3 that they controlled the bars and operated 
prostitution, gambling and drug rings. 
4 Mr. Easey also 
1. ibid: 41- 
2. ibid. 
3. ibid. In the case of Seattle, Washington, it was found 
that the Police Vice Squad exerted control over gambling such 
as licensed cardrooms, stag actvities and the private and 
often covert gambling games that moved about certain sections 
of the city. The Squad also set the ground rules and 
established the price for illegal operation, and collected 
the payoffs usually on a monthly basis; W. J. Chambliss, On 
The Take, o cit.: 239-243. See also F. Robertson, op. 
cit.: 119-123- 
4. CBC Documentary - Connections: An Investigation Into 
Organize Crime in Canada, Second Part, June 13,1977; 
F. Robertson, op. cit. 
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believes that 'the apparent sudden surfacing of Triad 
violence in Western capitals around 1974 occurred as the 
worldwide coordinating centre for Triads -a group of about 
forty senior Chinese detectives in the Hong Kong Police - 
fled to Taiwan and other countries in the wake of the 
corruption purge that followed the scandal of Godber's escape 
and subsequent extradition. Safe in hospitable Taiwan from 
extradition, they could no longer arbitrate inter-Triad 
disputes - most of them in the heroin trade - and matters 
once settled peacefully by courier or telex from Hong Kong 
are dealt with locally by the boot and the gun', he said. 
' 
The degree to which some corrupt Hong Kong police 
officers have become not only recipients from but major 
operatives themselves in organized crime can further be 
illustrated by-an incident that took place in the colony in 
the late 1970s. Both the Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (ICAC) and the Triad Society Bureau (TSB) were 
each asked to submit a report on all the established gambling 
places on the island. It turned out that the ICAC's list was 
far bigger than TSB's list; so they picked one of the ICAC's 
address not contained in TSB's, to conduct a police raid on - 
and whom did they arrest? Twenty police officers, including 
a station sergeant from special Branch, Detective Constables 
from various divisions, and a sergeant from TSB itself. 2 
1. F. Bresler, op. cit.: 42; F. Robertson, op. cit.: 124. 
2. CBC Documentar : Connections, Part Two, o cit.: An 
Interview with Walter Easey; F. Bresler, op. c. t.: 50. 
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Besides setting up their own organized crime rings, corrupt 
Hong Kong police officers have on occasions used their 
positions and connections with major syndicate drug dealers 
to enable the latter to evade justice by escaping to either 
Thailand or Taiwan which has become notorious as a safe haven 
for criminals fleeing justice in Hong Kong. 
This was the case with Ma Sik Yu and three of the top 
members of his syndicate who were charged in the late 1960s 
with, among other things, 'conspiring with a man named Lui 
Lok to deal in dangerous drugs'. ' After he heard, 
apparently through his police connections, of police 
inquiries homing in on his syndicate, Ma shipped out of Hong 
Kong and sought shelter on 'The Isle of the Fugitives' as 
Taiwan was described, 
2 to be followed later in 1978 by 
three of his top members. Ma was said to have built himself 
into a multi-millionaire by organizing massive shipments of 
heroin from Thailand into Hong Kong where he was known as 
'White Powder Man' by thousands of junkies and small-time 
dealers. 3 Lui Lok was a Chinese station sergeant at the 
time of the indictment; he and four other millionaire ex- 
sergeants, collectively known as 'the five Dragons', fled 
from Hong Kong into Canada in 1974. However, Canadian 
1. F. Bresler, op. cit.: 43. 
2 Hong Kong Standard, October 19,20,1978; F. Bresler, op. 
cit. 
3. F. Bresler, op. cit. 
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police activity eventually drove them out of Canada to seek 
ultimate refuge in Taiwan in 1977.1 Seldom, if ever, does 
any major fugitive from justice in Hong Kong receive anything 
but token difficulties at the hands of the Taiwan 
authorities. 
2 
Despite these explosive revelations of police-Triad deep 
involvement in organized criminal activities, the police 
official reports always tend to play-down the seriousness of 
the situation, to represent the Triad societies as a little 
more than an irritant that has been smashed, and to claim 
that major syndicate corruption has been eradicated. 
3 In 
December 1974 the police let it be known that acting on 
orders to 'break the Triads once and for all', the entire 
20,000-strong Hong Kong force participated in a long-range 
operation against them code-named 'Halam'. 
4 The head of 
the Triad Society Bureau then, Superintendent Norman Temple 
who hailed the operation as a grand success, was quoted as 
saying 'One development we do not want is top Triad bosses 
getting together under any kind of monolithic leadership. 
1. CBC Documentary, op. cit. 
2. F. Bresler, op. cit. 
3. Similarly hollow-sounding claims of the break-up of the 
syndicates were made by the police in Seattle at the height 
of police-syndicate collusion in that city; see W. J. 
Chambliss, On the Take, op. cit. 
4. F. Bresler, op. cit.: 53. 
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We have them broken up now and we intend to keep them that 
way'. 
' How far the triad organizations have been broken up 
and with them the . police connections was 
demonstrated two 
months later when the same Superintendent Temple pleaded 
guilty in court to 'having control of assets disproportionate 
2 
to his then present or past emoluments'. Because he 
volunteered to return to the Crown assets totalling up to 
eighty-thousand pounds held in bank accounts outside Hong 
Kong, he received a comparatively lenient sentence of one 
year's imprisonment. 
3 
Shared interests, 4 we would argue, are one of the 
factors that are at the root of the official police line on 
the impact of the Triads in the colony's organized crime, and 
the established symbiotic accommodation between the two has 
enabled corrupt police officials to utilize Triad syndicates 
as servants to pursue their own financial goal. 
5 It is the 
same master-servant relationships which prevail within the 
Sicilian mafia and American syndicate organizations, and it 




4. On this issue, see W. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 81-114. 
5. For the role of organized criminal as servant, see F. 
Pearce, Crimes of the Powerful: Marxism, Crime and Deviance, 
London, 124-130. 
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system. Not all police officers, however, share the official 
view on the Triad activities in the colony. As one young 
British detective inspector sees the situation, 'the. spirit 
of Peter Godber is alive and well. Corruption is still going 
on. It always will be. You can't put an end to it... They 
are wildly overstating things when they claim that they have 
smashed the last of the big syndicates... i1 The official 
police view becomes even'more ironic when it is realized that 
in June 1979, some two years after the Ma Sik Yu syndicate 
had supposedly been smashed, a top member of the syndicate 
was caught in Bangkok smuggling HK$1.5 million worth of 
heroin to Hong Kong. 2 
Although the Royal Hong Kong Police Force is 
particularly sensitive to the publicity given to crimes 
committed by Triad members abroad, yet there is a baffling 
ambivalence in the official line which insists that the Triad 
Societies wield little influence in Hong Kong itself; that 
only ten percent of the Societies' membership is engaged in 
criminal activities; and that this minority is a disorganized 
rabble, hoodlums and nothing else. 3 If this view were 
correct, one would wonder why the Triad Society Bureau would 
increase its manpower from 189 in 1977 to nearly 270 officers 
now. The Hong Kong official police line would claim, among 
1. Bresler, op. cit.: 47. 
2. ib id : 45. 
3. F. Robertson, op. cit.: 58. 
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other things, that the traditional rituals which enforce the 
secrecy and power of Triad societies have in effect 
disappeared, ' despite their own recent infiltration of-such 
ceremonies. The police also claim that the two highest 
ranks, 489 and 438, in the Triad promotion ladder, have 
fallen into disuse. Here again their view conflicts with 
available evidence, for it was reported that it was 438, the 
Incense Master, who carried out the initiation ceremony which 
the police recently infiltrated. 
2 It should be noted that 
during the 1950s, W. P. Morgan, then a junior police officer 
in the Royal Hong Kong Police Force, meticulously gathered 
over a period of three years valuable information on the 
Triad societies for the book he prepared for the Royal Hong 
Kong Police Force. He was greatly helped in his research 
when several honourable elders of the society, appalled by 
the violence of Triad members in the 1956 Hong Kong riots, 
disgustedly gave the young officer and his team much valuable 
information, under conditions of great secrecy. Much of the 
information here, especially on the Triad's internal organiz- 
ation, structure, and initiation-ceremonies, is derived from 
him. Unlike the Sicilian Mafia and American syndicates where 
the nature of the internal structure and initiation ceremony 
has been a matter of speculation, the Triad societies are 
reputed to have a well-defined internal organization and a 
system of initiation ceremony for the new recruits and for 
officers to be promoted. 
1. F. Bresler, op. cit.: 58- 
2. ibid. 
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Internal Organization and Structure of Triad Societies in 
Hong Kong 
It is believed that in Triad's early stages some sort of 
central control of the Society was exercised from the head- 
quarters of the five main Lodges but this system apparently 
broke down when the Lodges ceased to exist as effective 
bodies. ' 
The organization of a traditional Triad society today 
(in this case in Hong Kong) usually consists of a head- 
quarters branch led, at least nominally, by a respected, 
venerable member of the society called the Shan chu ('Leader' 
of the society), and who may or may not have a deputy known 
as the Fu Shan Chu to assist him. The headquarters is a 
purely administrative body and is not a branch society of the 
group; its personnel, who are usually old and respected 
members or businessmen whose community standing might command 
some measure of respect when they are engaged in the duties 
of arbitration, are usually drawn from the various branch 
societies it controls. 
2 The leader who is the most 
important person at the headquarters and his deputy are 
frequently referred to as the Tai Lo ('Elder Brother'), and 
Yee Lo ('Second Elder Brother') respectively, but these are 
slang and not official expressions. Next in importance in 
1. W. P. Morgan, op. cit: 95. 
2. bid; F. Robertson, op. cit. 
293. 
the hierarchy are the Heung Chu (an Incense Master), and Sin 
Fung (a Vanguard) who control the Rites Department of the 
society and they are said to be responsible for the 
organization and performance of all initiation and promotion 
ceremonies. They may also have deputies-' The rest of the 
headquarters personnel are said to be senior officials 
charged with the five main departments through which the 
society as a whole is controlled. The Shan Chu, Heung Chu, 
Sin Fung, and heads of the five departments are said to form 
the Grand Council of the society. 
2 These departments are 
believed to consist of General Affairs, 
3 Recruiting, 4 
Organization, 5 Liaison, 6 and Education and Welfare 
Sections. 
1. W. P. Morgan, op. cit.: 96-98. 
2. ibid; There appears to be a similarity here to the 
'Comm ssion' which Professor Cressey and others claim that 
controls the American syndicates; D. R. Cressey, Theft of the 
Nation: The Structure and 0 erations of Organized Cr me in 
America, New York, 1969 141-161; R. Salerno and J. S. 
Tompkins, The Crime Confederation, Garden City, New York, 
1969. As or the alleged Mafia Grand Council , see A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 53- 
3. This section is charged with administrative matters, 
finance, etc. 
4. This section is said to be responsible for propaganda, 
recruitment, registration, investigation of members, etc. 
5. Controls the activities of the branch societies, 
organization of major criminal operations, internal 
discipline, etc. 
6. Said to be responsible for internal communications within 
the society between headquarters and branches, etc. 
7. Believed to be in charge of maintenance of 'schools' for 
the education of members' children, general welfare work, 
funeral arrangements, etc.; W. P. Morgan, op. cit.: 97-98k 
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Members are normally known by numbers which are shrouded 
in Chinese mythology and which are mostly, with few 
exceptions, divisible by the magical figure three; they also 
have symbolic names such as Red Rod, White Paper Fan, Grass 
Sandal, ' etc. The numbers assigned to the members are 489, 
438,426,415, and 432 or 49, which indicate the various 
ranks or positions of the various officials and office 
bearers. 2 It should be noted that all the code numbers 
begin with 4 and it is believed to symbolise the world since 
the ancient Chinese believed that the whole earth was 
surrounded by four seas and therefore the use of this numeral 
indicates the universal nature of the brotherhood. The 
leader, Shan Chu, is usually 489, while his deputy, Fu Shan 
Chu, along with a few other functionaries, is 438. Thus, 
while the original significance of these numbers remains 
obscure, it is strongly suspected that they have a much 
closer connection with the ancient Chinese Science of numer- 
ology than with the society as such. 
3 Triad officials are 
customarily referred to by the sum of their code numbers. 
1. F. Robertson, op. cit.: 143. 
2. The four basic ranks within the Triad Society are: 
(1) Hung Kwan - 'Red Pole' (fighter official). 
(2) Pak Tsz Sin - 'White Paer Fan' (adviser official). 
(3) Cho Hai - 'Grass Sandal' (messenger official). 
(4) Sze Kau - '49' (ordinary member); 
W. P. Morgan op. cit.: 99. Once again there is a striking 
similarity with respect to the ranks within the American 
syndicate structure, as put forward by Cressey and Salerno 
cited above. 
3. W. P. Morgan, op. cit.: 102; F. Bresler, op. cit.: 36. 
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Thus a 489 official is also known as a '21': the sum of the 
three digits and the multiple of 3 (representing Creation) 
and 7 (Death) and signifies the idea of Re-birth which is the 
primary significance of the society's initiation ceremony. 
Similarly, a 438 official, the second rank, is known as a 
'15', a multiple of 3 (Creation) and 5 (Longevity or 
Preservation). ' 
The figure '15' has a particular fascination for 
superstitious Chinese and is rooted in a myth. It is 
believed that around the year 2,000 B. C. a tortoise, a 
creature noted for its long life, was found with this set of 




so that no matter in which direction each line is added it 
will always total 15.2 The 426 official is known as a '12' 
which is the multiple of 3 (Creation) and 4 (Earth) conveying 
the idea of heaven and earth, the two forces that produced 
man. These three: Heaven, Earth, and Man are believed to 
form the three sides of the triangle which is the sacred 
emblem of the society. 
3 The 415 official is also known as 
1. F. Robertson, op. cit.: 143; W. P. Morgan, op. cit.: 1031 
2. F. Robertson, op. cit.; W. P. Morgan, op. cit. 
3. W. P. Morgan, op. cit.: 103-104. 
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a '10' which number, in itself, can convey the idea of 
earthly perfection, and it stems from the Chinese philosophy 
of dualism in nature, the principle of Yin and Yang, the 
opposing forces such as darkness and light, heat and cold, 
good and evil, life and death, which, when properly balanced, 
produced harmony and from this harmonious balance of all 
things was created the third basic force, man. 
' Under this 
principle, the basic numbers from one to ten were divided so 
that odd numbers were ascribed to Yang which also governs all 
heavenly manifestations, while even numbers were ascribed to 
Yin which governs all earthly matters. The number '9' which 
is the alternative code for 432 official is said to represent 
perfection in a heavenly sense. In the code numbers 
426, 
415, and 432, the number 4 is used not only to denote the 
sense of a worldwide fraternity but also as a multiplier for 
the other two numerals in each code and is added to the sum 
of such multiplication to arrive at the final figure which 
illustrates the true meaning of'the code. 
2 
Thus 426 should be resolved as 4x 26 +4 which is equal 
to 108, and this is said to be the strength of a legendary 
band of patriots who fought against government oppression in 
the early Sung dynasty. As well, 415 becomes 4 x"15 +4 
which gives 64 and is said to be the square of the famous Pat 
Kwa or Eight Diagrams believed to be invented by Fuh Teh, 
1. W. P. Morgan, op. cit. 
2. ibid: 102; F. Robertson, op. cit.; F. Bresler, op. cit. 
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one of the mystical Emperors of Chinese mythology. It is 
also believed that it was from his original 8 diagrams that 
Fuh Teh, by subsequent combination, expanded them to 64 and 
it was from these 64 diagrams that the Chinese script is said 
to have been evolved. 
' The lowest ranking member of a Triad 
group is a '49', the only number which has a straight-forward 
meaning and one of the two numbers not divisible by three; 
however, when multiplied (4 x 9) they equal 36, the number 
of oaths a new member swears to obey when he joins the 
society. The myth surrounding the internal organization of 
the Triad society is also reflected in its initiation ceremony. 
Although the numbers game is truly complex, it does 
indicate not only the rank to which a member belongs but 
also the degree of fear and power which the rank carries. 
For instance, the'426'is known to be the most feared and 
powerful member of any society member, for he is known to be 
in charge of the musclemen, with the title in Hong Kong, at 
least of Red Rod. He is reputed to be the executioner, when 
the death sentence is called for within his own group, the 
planner and leader of violent attacks against the Hong Kong 
security forces, rival gangs, or clients who do not pay 
their protection fees. 
2 
1. F. Bresler, op. Cit.; W. P. Morgan, op. cit. 
2. F. Robertson, op. cit.: 143. 
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Triad Initiation Ceremony 
As far back as the mid-nineteenth century, first-hand 
accounts and descriptions of the ritual of the Triad's 
initiation ceremonies were available. About 1885 an English 
civil servant, "W. A. Pickering, managed to attend this 
initiation ceremony in China. 
' In the post-war period the 
British Secretary for Chinese Affairs in the Federation of 
Malaya, Wilfred Blythe, was one of the recipients of many 
documents, paraphernalia, and manuscript notebooks of ritual 
verses seized by the police in raids during initiation 
ceremonies and on secret premises. 
2 In Hong Kong in 1976 
much of the regalia used in the initiation ceremony was found 
in the house of an arrested Triad society member, and in 
January 1977 similar paraphernalia was seized in Singapore, 
apparently all in readiness for an initiation. 3 As late as 
May 1978, the Hong Kong police, using two Chinese police 
officers as under-cover agents, were able to infiltrate a 
Triad society initiation ceremony which took place on an 
off-shore lighter, after a suitable background had been built 
up for the two officers in a poor class area. 
4 A U. S. Drug 
1. J. Chesneaux, Secret Societies, op. cit.: 15. 
2. W. Blythe, op. cit.: xiii" 
3. F. Robertson, op. cit.: 145- 
4. F. Bresler, op. cit.: 58. 
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Enforcement Administration (DEA) special agent who partici- 
pated in a Triad initiation ceremony in the basement in 
London's Chinatown told his colleagues in 1978 that he was 
scared and felt very frightened by it. 
' Something that all 
the mainland Triad societies (prior to their exodus into Hong 
Kong) had in common, together with the colony's own 
indigenous societies at the time of Chiang Kai Shek's defeat 
was a highly ritualized system of initiation ceremonies, 
blood oaths, passwords, secret hand signals and poems and a 
rigorously maintained military-style hierarchy of officers 
and other ranks. 
Although the lengthy initiation ritual lasting as long 
as three days has been abridged drastically because of fear 
of police raids, it is believed that the full ceremony is 
still observed by a number of overseas branches of the 
society, where the ritual is regarded as a nostalgic link 
with the homeland that their ancestors may have left more 
than 150 years ago. Since the full account of the 
initiation rituals would run into several pages, 
3 
we treat 
here only the salient aspects of it which, in many respects, 
resemble the alleged initiation ceremony in the Sicilian 
1. ibid: 31. 
2. F. Robertson, op. cit.: 142. 
3. For a full account of the initiation ceremonies, see J. 
Chesneaux, Secret Societies op. cit.: 16-29; W. P. Morgan, 
op. cit.: 105-160; F. Robertson, op. cit.: 142-156; F. 
Bresler, op. cit.: 31-36; 59-62. 
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Mafia, the Neapolitan Camorra, and the American syndicate 
brotherhoods. ' Essentially, the ceremony in Hong Kong is 
said to be held usually in a rectangular room, at the four 
cardinal points of the compass in keeping with the 
traditional lay-out of Chinese walled cities and towns, 
with their four gates; however, to the Triads it represents 
the City of Willows, the fictional founding place of the 
Society. 2. The room is decorated with the banners and 
flags of mythical bygone heroes. Among the objects to be 
found in the room, the principal ones are said to be a folded 
table, an abacus, the Chinese forerunner of today's 
calculating machine (on which the debts owed by the Manchus, 
the foreign dynasty which ruled China and which the Triad 
Society helped overthrow, were said to be counted); a Red 
Club, symbolizing punishment for traitors, a blood-stained 
white robe and a rosary, in memory of the monks of Shao Lin 
monastery, the Sword of Loyalty and Righteousness, and 
various other tablets. 
3 
1. On this, see, for example, E. J. Hobsbaum, Primitive 
Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movements in the 
19th and 20th Centuries, Manchester, 34-35; Cesare 
Mori, The Last Struggle with the Mafia, London, 1933: 39-40; 
Ed Rei ; The Grim Rea ers: The Anatomy of Organized Crime in 
America, Chicago, 1969: 7-23; G. Montalbano, 'La Mafia e 
Banditismo', in Rinascita, No. 10, October 1953; H. Hess, 
Mafia and mafiosi: The Structure of Power, Westmead, 1973; 
Renato Candida, Questa Mafia, Caltanissetta-Rome, 1960: 102. 
2. F. Robertson, op. cit.: 145. 
3. W. P. Morgan, o2. cit. passim; F. Robertson, op. cit.: 
142145. It should be that all the paraphernalias 
mentioned here have symbolic meanings which are rooted in 
Chinese mythology. 
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The recruits are usually introduced by the Vanguard 
after their names, addresses and ages have been recorded, 
fees paid, and all responses to questions have been 
mastered. 
' The ceremony which is officiated by the Incense 
Master commences when he lights five joss sticks in memory of 
the First Five Ancestors of the Society. A live chicken is 
beheaded, and its headless body is wrapped in joss paper, to 
symbolize the rightful fate of Ma Ning Yee, the Buddhist monk 
who, according to legend, betrayed his brethren in the 
monastery near Foochow. 
2 Its blood is then drained into a 
bowl of wine with the words: 'After joining the Hung family 
remain loyal and faithful. The wicked and treacherous will 
die like this chicken'. 
3 Blood is then drawn from the left 
middle-finger of each new recruit, mingled with the wine and 
dead chicken's blood and then drunk by all present to signify 
blood brotherhood. The 36 oaths of loyalty are then read and 
sworn to the Triad movement. 
4 The new recruits finally 
enter into a society from which, theoretically, only death 
can release them, just as it is believed to be the case in 
1. J. Chesneaux, op. cit.: 17-21; F. Robertson, op. cit.: 
146-148. 
2. F. Bresler, op. cit.: 59-61. 
3. ibid: 32. 
4. ibid; J. Chesneaux, op. cit.: 23-27; F. Robertson, op. 
cit49-153. 
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the Sicilian Mafia, ' the American syndicates, 2 and the 
Neapolitan Camorra. 3 Membership entails absolute 
conformity to the society's code of conduct. 
Whereas in the U. S. and Sicily the criminal syndicates 
and the mafia have been able to carry on their activities for 
many decades by virtue of the protective shield which the 
politicians and police have accorded them in return for a cut 
in the graft and votes during elections, in Hong Kong, 
similarly, police protection has been instrumental in 
sustaining the activities of Triad societies in return for 
cash payoffs. What we have uncovered in the preceding and 
present chapters would clearly argue that organized crime is 
a protected crime, and that it cannot thrive without the 
protection of the established authorities. Furthermore, it 
is largely the nature of the market economy which provides 
the basic conditions in which Triad syndicates and police 
officers are able to pursue their respective ends of wealth 
and power, and in which shared interests make it easy for the 
two sides to come to symbiotic relationships in the 
systematic exploitation of illegal activities for profits 
which the free enterprise economy makes possible. When, as 
in the U. S. and Sicily, this symbiosis is joined by party 
politics in which politicians and parties seek the help of 
the racketeers and their money on a quid pro quo basis, 
organized crime becomes an institutionalized and permanent 
feature in the chain of a society's political economy. 
1. C. Mori, op. cit.: 40- 
2. F. A. Lanni, op. cit.: 144 
3. H. Hess, op. cit.: 94 
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The manner in which Hong Kong police officials control 
the operation of vices in the country are in no way different 
from similar controls which police officials in the U. S. exert 
over vices in that country. Because the crime operatives and 
police officials seek the same ends-profits from the operations 
of these vices and the wealth and power accruing thereof - and 
because a large minority of the population are willing to 
patronize their operations, this situation accounts not only 
for the longevity of the phenomenon in these societies but also 
for the ineffectiveness of measures to control it. 
That the existence of criminal organizations such as the 
Triad societies, the Sicilian mafia, and the North American 
syndicates is largely connected with the nature of-the 
economic system is an argument that can best be demonstrated 
by way of contrast with non-capitalist countries. In the 
next chapter we shall examine two societies that were once a 
citadel and safe haven for organized crime when their system 
was capitalist, but which today are free of the phenomenon as 




The Triad Society was one of the many secret societies 
that flourished in China prior to the turn of the last 
century and its activities were concentrated mainly in the 
south of the country. It is believed that it was one of the 
secret societies founded in China, like the Sicilian mafia, 
whose avowed objective was to overthrow the Ch'ing dynasty 
and to restore the Ming dynasty. Its political activities 
were considered so seditious that the organization was 
outlawed by Imperial order in 1792; henceforth it became 
clandestine in operation. It is believed that the Society's 
assistance to the Republican Party in its fight to overthrow 
the Manchu dynasty was instrumental and resulted in the 
virtual recognition of the Society by the new regime when the 
Manchus were finally overthrown in 1911. At the same time, 
like the Sicilian Mafia whose decline was brought about by 
the rise of the peasant leagues and the Socialist and 
Communist parties, the overthrow relegated the Society to a 
political oblivion, as its place was now taken over by 
political parties. Henceforth its members devoted themselves 
to full-time criminal careers, leading to the break up of the 
Society into small factions each of which claimed membership 
of the Triad family. Each side during the civil war. courted 
the assistance of the societies, but when the Communist won 
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the war members of the organization were forced out of 
mainland China into Hong Kong, and other places, as their 
activities were judged by the new regime to be counter- 
revolutionary and incompatable with its goals and philosophy. 
The societies today are known to be heavily involved in a 
variety of organized crime of which trafficking in narcotics 
is the most prominent. Their long existence in the island is 
due mostly to the protection extended to them by some corrupt 
Hong Kong police officials in return for payoffs. The 
symbiotic accommodation between the Triad society members and 
some corrupt Hong Kong police officers which shields the 
former from the hands of the law in their criminal operations 
bears striking similarities to that which exists in the U. S. 
and Sicily between the syndicates, the mafia, and corrupt 
officials in those countries. It is largely the operation of 
the free enterprise economy which creates the opportunity 
that brings Triad society members and police officials into a 
system of symbiotic relationship in which each side is able 
to pursue their goal of profit and the wealth and power it 
brings, which is the essence of the capitalist system of 
enterprise. 
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CHINA AND CUBA AS TEST CASES 
Introduction 
The argument that organized crime is intimately 
connected with the operation of the capitalist system of 
economy would be largely academic and essentially problematic 
if there were no grounds for comparision and contrast with 
respect to at least two countries where organized crime once 
flourished abundantly when their system of economy was 
capitalism, and in which organized crime is later found to be 
non-existent when they switched from capitalism to socialism. 
The transformation from the former to the latter mode of 
economic system by mainland China in 1950 and by Cuba in 1960 
is worth examining, for what happened in those two societies 
clearly demonstrates this close connection. Prior to the 
above dates (which mark the beginning of their post- 
revolutionary history), organized crime in mainland China, 
especially in the city of Shanghai, exemplified the current 
situation in Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Burma, Sing- 
apore, and Taiwan with respect to narcotics trafficking, 
prostitution, protection rackets, gambling, etc., which were 
controlled mainly by the Triad syndicates; while Cuba was a 
miniature present-day New York and Chicago and served as a 
safe haven for American syndicates and their Cuban confeder- 
ates. In order to present a clear case of contrast, it is 
necessary. to examine the phenomenon of organized crime in 
each society before and after the transformation of their 
economic system from capitalism to socialism. 
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Organized Crime in China prior to 1950 
With the development of a capitalist type economy in the 
late nineteenth century in China, organized crime became 
prevalent in many parts of the country and its source was 
mainly the secret societies that flourished in the 
country. 
' Although these secret societies portrayed 
themselves as patriotic organizations formed to liberate 
China from the yoke of a foreign dynasty and check foreign 
penetration of the country, the criminal and political 
aspects of their activities were inextricably linked from the 
nineteenth century onwards. 
2 They represented two facets 
of the same sociological reality, provoked by the sheer 
severity of imperial order. With the successful Republican 
revolution, however, the political function was assumed by 
other organizations: political parties, trade unions, and 
various professional and cultural bodies. The Triad (as well 
as other secret societies) was therefore forced to fall back 
on its criminal activities and from then on it became much 
more than before an instrument in the hands of politicians 
and intriguers. 
3 The conversion from patriotic into 
criminal organizations by the secret societies not only 
1. Jean Chesneaux, Secret Societies in China, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, 1971: 164. 
2. ibid: 34- 
3. ibi ibid: 163' 
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accelerated the spread of organized criminal activities in 
the major Chinese cities such as Shanghai, but also 
necessitated a new alliance with the bourgeoisie and 
officials of the power structure, and a corresponding war 
against the trade unions and Left-wing organizations. 
' 
The Red Band (Hung-Pang), like its numerous offshoots, 
controlled the opium-smoking dens, gambling houses and 
brothels. It practised kidnapping and racketeering at the 
expense of rich tradesmen and exploited the working class. 
It more or less monopolized the market system for the 
recruitment of dockers and sailors (many of whom were 
employed by the Eastern companies), and in the process it 
appropriated a generous percentage of their wages. 
2 
Although such was the situation in Shanghai in the Kuomintang 
period, it is still found today in Singapore and Hong Kong, 
since the gangster chiefs withdrew to these cities after the 
Communist victory in 1949.3 During the early twentieth 
century the hands of Ch'ing Pang, which had been the ruling 
power in its own zone in China, were found in innumerable 
forms of vice and crime - in smuggling (particularly opium), 
gambling, extortion, prostitution, and protection rackets. 
4 
1. ibid 166; A. W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast 
Asia, New York, 1972: 226. 
2. ibid: 34-35" 
3. ibid: 35. 
4. Wilfred Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in 
Malaya: A Historical Study, London, 1" 
310. 
Even during the Japanese invasion of China (1937-45) a part of 
the Triad society, which was supposedly formed for patriotic 
reasons, could not resist their criminal instinct and fully 
collaborated with the Japanese ostensibly because the Japanese 
favoured and encouraged open organization of criminal 
activities - prostitution, narcotics, gambling, etc. 
' 
Tools of the Bourgeoisie 
Like the Sicilian mafia and the American syndicates in 
2 
their role as servant to their legal masters, organized 
crime in China served a similar role and its members con- 
sequently became cannon-fodder in the battles between the 
different leaders and instruments for the making of their 
profits. 
3 The gangsters' alliance with reactionary forces 
can be demonstrated by the help which they rendered to Chiang 
Kai-shek and the right-wing of the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1927 
when they decided to get rid of workers' organizations and 
Communist cadres in Shanghai, which was then a great 
industrial centre, principal home of the conservative 
1. W. P. Morgan, The Triad Societies in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 
1982: 73. 
2. For a similar role which the Yakuza play to their masters 
in the officialdom, see Florence Rome, The Tatooed Men: An 
American Woman Reports on the Japanese Criminal Underwor 
New York, 1975: 70. 
3. Deng Zhong-xia, Zhong-guo zhi-gong yun-dongjian-shi 
(Short History of the Chinese Workers, Movement), Peking, 
1953: 3-4. 
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bourgeoisie, and international vice capital. 
1 It was the 
very support the party and its leaders needed to keep control 
of the working classes, and the support continued until the 
party and its leaders were driven out of China. Chief among 
the instruments the Kuomintang used to keep the reaction 
firmly in the saddle were the notorious gangs of Shanghai 
which had affiliations in other big cities of China. To 
understand the character of the Shanghai gangs, it is 
necessary to combine the characteristics of th'e Society of 
December Tenth as utilized by Louis Bonaparte, the Russian 
Black Hundred, and the modern Chicago variety of racketeers 
and criminal gunmen. The gangs were known to have dealt in 
human slaves, opium traffick, kidnappings for ransom, 
blackmailing, gambling, gun-running, smuggling, protection 
rackets, and plain, everyday murder. 
2 
As in the case of the United States and Sicily crime 
networks, the rank and file of the Shanghai gangs included 
people from a variety of social strata: riff-raff of the slum 
proletariat, most of the detectives and policemen of the 
French Concession, International Settlement, and Chinese 
1. Until it was ceded to Western powers after China's 
humiliating defeat in the first Opium War (1839-1842), 
Shanghai was little more than a fishing village. As Western 
merchants and commercial goods flooded into China in the 
latter half of the 19th. century, Shanghai became China's 
largest and most modern city. But, in reality, it was not a 
Chinese city, for the imperial government divided it among the 
British, French, Americans, and other foreign powers, which 
ran their concessions as they saw fit; A. W. McCoy, The 
Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, New York, 1972: 224. 
2. H. R. Isaacs, 'Gang Rule in Shanghai', China Forum, May, 
1932: 1-7, Extract from Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction, 
Shanghai, 1932. 
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municipality, military officers in the local garrison 
commander's headquarters, officers of the Bureau of Public 
Safety, minor politicians and jobholders, most factory foremen 
and labour contractors, Kuomintang 'labour leaders' (trade 
union officials), 
' as well as many petty merchants. 
2 The 
remunerative activities of the gangs mentioned above were 
generally carried out by the lower strata of the gangs, 
however. Because these gangs were also politically utilized 
on behalf of the reaction by its leaders they also drew into 
their membership bankers, rich businessmen, highly placed 
politicians and KMT officials. 
3 As we indicated in the 
preceding chapter, the 'Big Three', as they were frequently 
called in the Chinese press, were at the head of these 
criminal organizations as well as being the overlords of the 
French Concession. 
4 
1. The trade unions had passed under the control of the 
Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek since the latter's break with 
the Communists in 1927; Kuomintanq(KMT): the Chinese name for 
the Nationalist party founded shortly after World War I and 
headed then by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek before he and his 
supporters were driven to the island of Taiwan. 
2. J. Chesneaux, op. cit.: 164. For similar membership in the 
crime networks in the U. S., see W. J. Chambliss, On The Take: 
From Petty Crooks to Presidents, Bloomington, 1978: 61-8U; 
W. J. Chambliss and M. Mankoff (eds. ) Whose Law, What Order? 
New York, 1976: 169. 
3. J. Chesneaux, op. cit. 
4. They were Tu Yueh-shang, Hwang Ching-yung, and Chang 
Siao-ling; J. Chesneaux, op. cit.: 165; Y. C. Wang, 'Tu 
Yueh-sheng (1888-1951): 'A Tentative Political Biography', The 
Journal of Asian Studies, volume 26, No. 3, (May 1967): 13 5. 
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The basic defect of the Nationalist government, so far as 
the urban economy was concerned, was that the regime's leader- 
ship which placed its highest priority upon the military and 
political unification of the nation valued the urban economy 
but as a source of revenue, and thus devoted little attention 
to the problems of economic development. The fundamental 
attitude of the regime toward the financial and business 
groups was revealed with clarity during the first years after 
Chiang's Northern Expedition. In early 1927 these groups had 
been among the most ardent supporters of Chiang and the 
anti-communist wing of the Kuomintang. 
' They had felt 
desperation and panic during the Northern Expedition when the 
striking workers, presumably under the leadership of the 
communists, struck for higher wages and even assumed control 
of the factories. 
2 As Coble notes, when the moneyed classes 
of Shanghai in early April 1927 contributed a reported ten 
million yens to Chiang Kai-shek in return for repression of 
revolutionary workers and communist elements in the city, it 
appeared that an alliance between China's capitalist class and 
Chiang Kai-shek had been consummated. 3 
1. Lloyd E. Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China under 
Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937, Cambridge, Mass., 228. 
2. H. R. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, 2nd 
rev. ed., Stanford, Ca., 196-1: 111-131. 
3. Parks M. Coble, 'The Shanghai Commercial, Financial, and 
Industrial Elite and the Kuomintang, 1927-1929', Seminar 
paper, University of Illinois, 1971: 11. 
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In what has been known as the 'White Terror' massacre, 
l 
following Chiang kai-shek's visit to Nanking in 1927 and his 
rapprochement with the bankers there, the bourgeoisie utilized 
the gangs to slaughter revolutionary workers who had risen 
against economic conditions. 
2 In Shanghai, working in close 
cooperation with the foreign police forces the gangs hunted 
down and butchered thousands of revolutionary workers and 
intellectuals in all sections of the city in which about 4,000 
young men and women were known to have lost their lives. 
3 
Tu Yueh-sheng, who was the head of the Green Gang, was report- 
ed to have led the attack on the revolutionary workers and 
Communist labour unions3 for which he was rewarded with the 
rank of major general in the KMT army, and soon became one of 
Shanghai's most respected citizens. As one Chinese historian 
1. The gangsters portrayed this purge of the workers as 
meritorious, in that the country was saved from the scourge of 
Communism. A more objective appraisal tends to show, however, 
that the gangsters acted in the interests of the side from 
which the most lucrative rewards could be expected; W. Blythe, 
op. cit.: 29. 
2. Harold R. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, 
op. cit.: 142-145. For a similar massacre o workers an 
members of Left-wing organizations in Sicily by gangsters 
sponsored by the bourgeoisie, see Norman Lewis, The Honoured 
Society, London, 1964: 150-153,161-163; M. Pantaleone, The 
Mafia and Politics, London, 1966: 110-111. 
3. J. Chesneaux, op. cit.: 166; H. R. Issaacs, The Tragedy, op. 
cit.: 135. 
4. H. R. Isaacs, The Tragedy, op. cit.: 174-180. 
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later commented, 'Perhaps for the first time in Chinese 
history, the underworld gained formal recognition in national 
politics'. 
1 Thus from 1927 onwards, the criminal gangs in 
China became increasingly an important arm of the Kuomintang 
and an instrument of the bourgeoisie used chiefly to keep the 
lid down on the workers' mass movement, to smash strike action 
through intimidation and control of all the so-called labour 
organizations. 
2 With the smashing of the revolutionary 
labour unions and the establishment of 'respectable' trade 
unions which became a tool of the KMT, the gangs assumed full 
leadership and functioned in that capacity until the Communist 
victory in 1949.3 
It should be noted, however, that in China, prior to the 
Communist Revolution, academic degrees gave access to public 
office, and degrees were conferred by examination without any 
apparent regard for family or wealth, and only barbers and 
certain classes of boatmen, together with their children, were 
barred from competing for the various grades of the madarin- 
ate. 
4 But although the moneyed class in China was less 
1. Y. C. Wang, 'Tu Yueh-sheng (1888-1951): A Tentative 
Political Biographgy', The Journal of Asian Studies, 26, No.. 
3, (May 1967): 438-439. 
2. In the 1920s the gangsters in the United States employed 
similar tactics against the workers and on behalf of their 
masters, the employers. For instance, Al Capone, Arnold 
Rothstein and many others were introduced into labour 
relations as strike-breakers; F. Pearce, Crimes of the 
Powerful, New York, 1976: 131; J. Landesco, Organized Crime in 
Chicago, Chicago, 1968: 107-147. 
3. J. Chesneaux, op. cit.: 166. 
4. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, New York, 1939, cited in W. J. Chambliss (ed. ), Sociological Readings in the Conflict 
Perspective, Reading, Mass., 1973: 239. 
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numerous, less wealthy, less powerful than the moneyed class 
in the United States is at present, it was none the less able 
to modify the scrupulous application of this system to a very 
considerable extent. Not only was the indulgence of examiners 
often bought with money, the government itself sometimes sold 
the various academic degrees and allowed ignorant persons, 
often from the lowest social strata, to hold public office. 
Gangsters were also used by the KMT and the bourgeoisie 
as spies among the workers; militant workers were thus 
detected and subsequently butchered. In addition, they served 
as the direct instrument of native and foreign capitalist 
exploiters who used them as foremen and labour contractors to 
swindle the workers of their wages. As Isaacs notes, 'Every 
labour union, every factory, every working-class district is 
shot through with agents of the gangs who have proved an able 
supplement to the legalized organs of repression which have 
helped shatter the working-class movement in the last five 
years'. 
1 Thus under these conditions truly militant leaders 
of strike movements were arrested, sentenced to long jail 
terms, or killed and the strike smashed. As Isaacs reports, 
there was, for example, in September, 1931 the case of Zih 
Ah-mei, leader of the workers of the French Concession 
Tramways who were on strike. He was of course arrested, 
1. H. R. Isaacs (ed. ), Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction, 'Gang 
Rule in Shanghai', re-edited from the special issue of China 
Forum, Shanghai, May 1932: 1-7 
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charged with being a Communist, and although there was no 
proof against him, as the case was a planted one, yet he was 
sentenced to ten years' hard labour and deprived of all civil 
rights for twelve years upon completion of the sentence. 
' 
An anonymous worker correspondent made the following 
observation in a Chinese paper about the gangsters and their 
masters in 1932: 
'If they (the gangsters) only stand right opposite to the 
workers, harshly oppressing the workers, that would not 
increase our difficulties so much. We would know then that 
they will always be confederates of the capitalists. If we 
want to fight capitalism we must have a hand-to-hand fight 
with its servants. What is our most difficult task is that 
the influence of the gangs has penetrated right to the midst 
of the workers to demoralise them. In our factory ALL the 
powerful workers are members of the gangs. The reason is that 
if they join the gangs, they are sure of their jobs. The 
gangsters are not afraid of any unemployment. Their 
organization centres around one man. A strong-willed man with 
thirty to fifty disciples can work within his territory. They 
are afraid of nobody but the ruling class, the capitalists. 
It seems to me that if the vanguard of the working class could 
cause their penetration to within the worker masses to be as 




' As it turned ou, such a victory became a 
reality seventeen years later when the working class and the 
socialist triumphed over the forces of the KMT and their 
capitalist confederates. 
Furthermore, the Kuomintang-controlled trade unions were 
placed entirely in the hands of the gangsters, much as it is 
the case in many labour unions in the U. S., 
2 
who, as offic- 
ials, could act in labour disputes independent of the rank and 
fill. These 'labour leaders' frequently were said to live in 
comfortable houses whose monthly rental amounted to more than 
a worker could earn in a year. 
3 The alliance of the gang- 
sters and Kuomintang-controlled unions was also evident in 
industrial racketeering which they operated. They got a rake- 
off from workers' wages, from every job given to a worker, 
from the squeeze manipulated by foremen and contractors, from 
direct subsidies provided by grateful factory-owners, from 
selling opium to workers, and from buying their children as 
slaves. 
4 As Isaacs notes, 'It is not uncommon to hear a 
1. An anonymous Letter to China Forum, January 20,1932, cited 
in H. R. Isaacs (ed. ) Five Years of Kuomintang, op. cit. (our 
emphasis). 
2. J. Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago, Chicago, 1968: 
144-145,149. As Bell notes for the U. S., 'control of a union 
local means control of the host of rackets that are spawned on 
the docks. A victorious clique has a number of concessions it 
can parcel out... including kickback for jobs, etc... But the 
biggest prize of all was the loading racket'. D. Bell, The 
End of Ideology, New York, 1967: 183. 
3. J. Chesneaux, op. cit.: 168. 
4. ibid. 
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pudgy-faced, fat-fingered capitalist remark at Chinese 
banquets: "Yes, much that is bad can be said about the 
gangsters, but they have served one good purpose - keeping 
down the workers... "" It was further noted that in 
Shanghai and China generally, where oppressed, exploited 
workers were forbidden to organize or to hold a single 
demonstration without meeting machine-gun bullets, gangsters 
on the other hand were organized in a great secret society for 
vice and crime and were utilized by the Shanghai bourgeoisie 
and the Kuomintang against the revolutionary working class. 
2 
As Isaacs concludes, 'As in the big cities of the United 
States, so in Shanghai, social and political decandence has 
brought gangsters to the top and they are used to keep the 
productive proletariat in a state of slavery. '3 
Such was the state of organized crime in capitalist China 
up to 1949; the same situation was equally true of Sicily and 
the United States during the same period. If today, however, 
organized crime is eradicated in China while it continues to 
thrive in the other societies, it would not be because the 
Chinese have recently become more law-abiding people, or 
1. H. R. Isaacs, op. cit. In the 1920s and 1930s gangsters in 
the United States also offered their services as insurance 
against upsets of any kind, from the unions, from competition 
or from bombing. The cost of protection was usually passed on 
to customers in'higher prices by businesses which negotiated 
contracts with mobster-controlled unions; F. Pearce, op_ 
cit.; John Kobler, Capone: The Life and World of Al Capone, 
London, 1971: 231-233. 
2. H. R. Isaacs, op. cit. 
3. ibid, 
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acquired a higher standard of morality, or that the Chinese 
police have discovered a better method of policing than their 
counterparts in the U. S. and Sicily. What has made the 
crucial difference in our view is the economic path China 
chose after 1949 which the other countries do not follow. 
China and Opium Trade. 
It should be borne in mind that the narcotics trade which 
has become an acute problem in recent years to the countries 
of Southeast Asia, Europe, North and South America was first 
introduced into China on a large scale in the 1820s by the 
British merchants despite the ban placed on the product by the 
emperor. ' It was the British refusal to desist from this 
deadly merchandise (imported from India into China) which led 
to the first Opium War and resulted in China being forced to 
open treaty ports to European merchants and thereby to opium 
imports. 2 By 1870, in the aftermath of yet another Opium 
War (1856-1858) with the British, which forced the Chinese 
imperial government to legalize, the importation of opium, 
British merchants were said to be supplying the opium habits, 
which they diligently fostered and fed, of an estimated 15 
1. A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 60-61. 
2. J. M. Scott, The White Poppy: A History of Opium, New York, 
1969: 84-85. 
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million Chinese opium addicts. 
' 
Following the Opium War, however, China began to grow her 
own opium on a massive scale in the 1860s and in 1880 China 
was known to have imported more than 6,500 tons, most of which 
was produced in India. 
2 Karl Marx commented at the time 
that 'the Chinese government will try a method recommended by 
political and financial considerations - viz: legalize the 
cultivation of poppy in China. '3 As a result, Chinese 
provincial officials started encouraging local production 
which transformed China into a nation of addicts, a de facto 
legalization of domestic cultivation and importation having 
been sanctioned in the country in 1858. Although only the 
British government possessed the monopoly of opium trade in 
the early 19th century in Asia, 
4 by the later part of the 
century every nation and colony in Southeast Asia had a state- 
regulated opium monopoly5 for the pursuit of capital. 
1. David E. Owen, British Opium Policy in China and India, New 
Haven, Conn., 1934: 14-18, passim; Jonathan Spence, PýO um 
Smoking in Ch'ing China, (Honolulu: conference on Local 
Control and Protest During the Ching Period, 1971: ]. 6. ); F. 
Bresler, The Chinese Mafia, New York, 1.981: 69. 
2. A. J. McCoy, op. cit.: 369. 
3. Shlomo Avineri, Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization, 
Garden City, New York, 1969: 361. 
4. David Owen, op. cit. 
5. A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 63; G. Kolko, The Politics of War: 
The World and U. S. Foreign Polic 1943-1941, New York, 1 8: 
80-81. The Philippines became an exception soon after the 
Spanish were replaced by the American colonial government in 
1898, the U. S. having banned opium and its derivatives in 
1886; H. Taylor, American Diplomacy and the Narcotics Traffic, 
1900-1939, Durham, N. C., 19b9: 31-32,43. 
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For China there were several important reasons to grow its 
own opium. First, its policy of outlawing opium had never 
worked because opium business was a lucrative one. 
Prior to the Opium War with the British there had been 
a spectacular amount of opium entering China, and after the 
war China was still diplomatically and militarily unable to 
stop the drug flow into the country, as Britain continued to 
peddle increasing amount of Indian opium. From 1811 to 1821 
there were over 340 tons of both Bengal and Malwa opium 
imported annually into China by foreign drug magnates. 
' In 
the late 1820s and 1830s, because of the ease with which opium 
could be smuggled and the profits involved, the flow of opium 
became a flood, and during the next two decades imports from 
India were reported to be in thousands of tons. 
2 While the 
government of India profited from the opium revenue, China's 
government was becoming more hard-pressed for funds. It 
needed money to pay indemnity to the British for having lost 
the Opium War, and money to pay the cost of suppressing the 
massive Taiping Rebellion which broke out in 1850. More 
importantly, China needed to counterbalance the British 
import of opium into the country. 
3 Gradually, most of the 
governments of Southeast Asian countries came to produce 
their own opium, 
4 
and until very recently they came to 
depend very heavily on its cultivation and importation as 
a source of revenues. 
5 
1. H. B. Morse, The Trade and A ministration of China, London, 
1913: 335. 
2. A. W. McCoy, o. cit. 
3. ibid.: 369-37u. 
4. F. Bresler, The Chinese Mafia New York, 1981: 70; 
F. Pearce, op. cit.: 151; A. W. McCoy, op. cit. 
5. Opium not only became a bulwark of the tax base of colonial India, during much of the nineteeth century it served as the 
economic pivot around which the whole China trade revolved; A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 367; F. Pearce, op. cit.: 151; see 
especially F. Bresler, The Chinese Mafia, op. cit. 
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The KMT and Narcotics Trade 
Chiang Kai-shek's opium programs further illustrate the 
gap between the MIT's original political idealism and the 
sordid reality of conditions under his dictatorship. Like the 
warlords, Chiang who needed money to finance his mU. litary 
campaigns, legalized the opium trade in August 1927, setting 
up a monopoly to tax opium sales. However, before public 
pressure forced the scheme's abolition in July 1929, the 
government was believed to have made an estimated 40 million 
Chinese dollars. ' Although Chiang and the Nationalists 
began a well-publicized campaign against opium in 1934, its 
real objective was probably to gain control of the financial 
base of Chiang's warlord opponents. 
2 Having appointed 
himself commissioner for opium suppression in 1935, the 
Nationalist leader was able to reroute opium moving toward the 
coast from Yunnan and Kweichow so that it was sent north 
through Hankow on the Yangtze River and then to Shanghai, thus 
depriving Kwangsi Province of the opium revenue. 3 According 
1. Garfied Huang, 'Three Aspects of China's Opium Problem', 
Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal, 16, July 3930: 
2. The KMT was known to have been deeply involved in the 
management of the Golden Triangle opium trade. Its army sent 
to reconquer southern China, although it failed militarily, 
succeeded in monopolizing and expanding the Shan State's opium 
trade. With the assistance of the CIA, anxious to halt the 
liberation movement, the KMT freely traded in narcotics; A. W. 
McCoy, op. cit.: 126-145; The New York Times, March 9,1952: 
8; ibid, September 17,196 5. 
3. Loss of opium revenue was said to be one of the motives behind Kwangsi's 1936 agitation against the Nationalist 
regime; F. T. Merrill, Japan and the Opium Menance, New York, 
1942: 33. 
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to one source, during the period 1934-1937 the government made 
an estimated 500 million Chinese dollars from its suppression 
program. 
' 
Even during the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 which 
halted the flow of heroin from China to the United States, the 
drug traffick within China continued unabated and the KMT and 
Japan, which played an official role in the narcotics business 
in occupied China, continued to freely trade opium across 
mostly stagnant battle lines. Nanking, under Japanese 
occupation, was believed to have an estimated fifty thousand 
heroin addicts, while in Shanghai about one-sixth of the 1.5 
million dollars spent every month was used to buy heroin. 
2 
With the defeat of the Japanese in 1945, Chiang Kai-shek's 
forces made a speedy return to Shanghai, acting with the 
support of the American government and the cooperation of the 
defeated Japanese in order to reaffirm Nationalist control and 
forestall the Communist takeover. Once again corruption and 
vice, including narcotics, flourished with the active 
participation of the Nationalist officials. 
3 In fact, China 
remained the opium centre of Asia until the Communist forces 
won the civil war in 1949. One would have expected that the 
post-war elimination of China as a major drug centre and the 
end of the colonial era and its monopolies in Southeast Asia 
would have improved prospects for solving the narcotics 
problem in Asia, but exactly the opposite appears to have 
happened. Instead, Southeast Asia, particularly the Golden 
Triangle, has more than filled the gap left by China 
1. ibid: 32. 
2. League of Nations AdvisQr Committee, g_Ror_ _R the 
Council on the Work ok the 24t}yi. Session, 1i ý1 ý 
3. Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder 
Out of China, 
New York, 1946: 311. 
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especially in terms of supplying heroin for the European and 
North American markets. 
' 
Thus, as the evil that men do often lives after them, the 
opium business in Asia which was carefully, albeit corruptly, 
organized and controlled in a plain profit motive by an unholy 
alliance of colonial officials, local governments, a new breed 
of entrepreneurs2 and gangsters has continued to pose 
serious national and international problems long after the 
colonies and their masters are gone; it has, moreover, 
continued to play an important part in capitalism's political 
economy as a mechanism for reducing conflicts and dilemmas 
stemming from its basic contradictions. 
3 Even though almost 
all countries today have legislations controlling or banning 
the production and sale of opium, this has not stopped the 
1. A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 383. 
2. T. B. Koh, 'Drug Use in SingaporeInternational Journal of 
Criminology and Penology, 2, February 1,1974: 51-52; HUG. 
Alexander, Narcotics in India and South Asia, London, 1930; A. 
Block and W. J. Chambliss, Organizing Cr me, New York, 19Rt: 
25. 
3. Opium was said to have offered a resolution of some 
important dilemmas for the expanding trade of European 
capitalist countries. The creation of capital through trade 
was an important and valued source of income for capitalists 
and nations alike. For a full account of the use of opium as 
a mechanism for reducing conflicts and dilemmas resulting from 
capitalism's basic contradictions, see Alan A. Block and W. J. 
Chambliss, Organizing Crime, op. cit.: 7-10,20-21,29. Also 
see D. Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, New 
York, 197ä. 
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trade because the profit motive has always been an over- 
powering factor in capitalist enterprise. 
The U. S. Bureau of Narcotics reported in 1970 that by 
the end of the 1950s, Burma, Laos, and Thailand together 
had become a massive producer of opium, and the source of more 
than half the world's present illicit supply of the substance. 
' 
Ironically, the U. S. foreign policy before 1970 had indirectly 
encouraged the growth of heroin traffick as it sought to 
strike alliances with gangsters, despots and dictators willing 
and able to check communist insurgency. 
2 The Guerinis of 
Marseille gained power and status. from their role in smashing 
Communist strikes; the CIA operatives supplied them with arms 
and money to assault Communist pickets. Their political 
influence and control of the docks created the perfect' 
environment for the growth of Marseille's heroin laboratories 
at a time when 'mafia' boss Lucky Luciano was seeking an 
alternate source of heroin supply. 
3 This policy allowed 
most southeast Asian generals and politicians before 1970s 
to deal in heroin in return for their anti-communist stance. 
4 
While capitalist countries in Asia continue to wrestle with 
the heroin problem, China has resolved its share of the 
problem from 1950 onward when the country embarked upon a 
transformation of its political economy from a capitalist 
to a socialist one. 
5 
1. 'The World Opium Situation' U. S. Burean of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs, Washington, D. C., 1970: 29. 
2. See F. Bresler, op. cit.; A. W. McCoy, op. Cit.: 37-49. 
3. A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 44-45. 
4. ibid. 
5. See the next section on how these changes in the economy 
were achieved, especially with regards to the production of 
opium. 
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Situation of Organized Crime in China after 1950. 
Organized criminals, it has been noted, have 
traditionally gone to 'where the power is'1 in the society, 
and in the case of conflict, it has traditionally supported 
the winning side. 
2 Such support, however, has tended to be 
given on the basis of a quid pro quo. As we indicated 
earlier, the secret societies in China assumed the role of 
gangsters after 1912 when the Republic was established and 
they could no longer pretend to be movements dedicated to the 
liberation of China from the Manchus. Under the Nationalist 
party which ruled China from 1912 until the Communist victory 
in 1949, the gangsters found a comfortable accommodation with 
the bourgeois party and were able to carry out their criminal 
activities for the benefit of both sides. 
3 in the ensuing 
war between the Nationalist party led by Chiang Kai-shek and 
the Communist forces led by Chairman Mao, the gangsters saw 
the hand-writing on the wall and right from the start allied 
themselves with the party of the bourgeoisie. 
4 
1. G. Servadio, Mafioso: A History of the Mafia from its 
Origins to the Present Day, New York, 1976: 143s- , 213-217. 
2. W. J. Chambliss, On the Take, op. cit.: 154-155; A. Block 
and J. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 36-39. 
3. J. Chesneaux, op. cit.: 164; H. R. Isaacs, Five Years 
of Kuomitang Reaction, op. cit.; ibid: The Tragedy of Chinese 
Revolution, op. cit.: 14Z-145; A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 226-227. 
4. J. Chesneaux, op. cit.: 33-34. 
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As indicated in the preceding chapter, the new Communist 
government in Peking upon assuming power in 1950 found the 
presence of the gngsters and their secret societies incompat- 
tible with the nature of the new society it wished to build. 
In a series of decrees of which those of 2nd January and 23d 
February, 1951, were the most significant, the secret societ- 
ies, and with them their criminal activities, were out- 
lawed. ' The measures authorized death penalty or long 
imprisonment for membership in the secret societies. That the 
gangsters were a thorn in the flesh of the new government was 
clearly revealed by the governments's announcement which 
stated that anti-Communist elements were becoming increasing- 
ly active in various parts of the country, that there was a 
stiff opposition to the governments's land reform, and that 
armed defiance was spreading. 
2 In Kwangsi Province alone 
3,000 officials sent to enforce the Communist administrative 
measure had been killed, the announcement said. 
3 That 
organized crime cannot exist without the cooperation and coll- 
usion of those in authority can be demonstrated in the case of 
China. With the promulgation of the decrees against the 
gangsters and their secret societies and the consequent execu- 
tion and/or life imprisonment meted out to those found in 
violation, 
4 the gangsters who had found China a safe haven 





for their operation under the Kuomintang regime, now found 
China a very hostile place in which to carry out criminal 
activities. The result was a mass exodus of the gangsters 
from mainland China into the colonies of Southeast Asia and 
countries of Europe and North America. 
' While these 
countries today continue to be plagued by incidents of 
organized crime, 
2 it can be argued that Communist China 
effectively denied organized criminals any foothold in the 
country right from its foundation. 
The new Chinese government was equally determined to 
eradicate the opium trade and 
country since its introduction 
eighteenth century, and it had 
organization to do so. As one 
war, 'in five months of travel 
production which had plagued the 
by the British in the late 
both the will and the 
visitor noted during the civil 
in the communist areas I found 
not the slightest trace of opium in any form'. 
3 As well as 
a change in social attitude, the new Chinese government also 
recognized that successful opium suppression would require a 
drastic change at all levels of the economy. By extending its 
1. As McCoy summed up the situation, 'as the Chinese 
Revolution, after World War II, gathered momentum in the late 
1940s, Shanghai's gangsters realized it was only a matter of 
time until the Communist forces would occupy the city. Most 
of the city's gangsters had participated in the Green Gang's 
1927 massacre of Communist supporters, and so almost the 
entire underworld migrated en masse to Hong Kong from 1947 to 
1950'; A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 227-228; J. Chesneaux, op. cit.: 
15. 
2. F. Bresler, op. cit.: 74-82; F. Robertson, Triangle of 
Death: The Inside Story of the Triads - The Chinese Maa, 
London, 1977, passim. 
3. Harrison Forman, Report from Red China, London, 1946: 10. 
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campaign against cultivation to the most remote areas of 
China, the new government was able to persuade poppy growers 
to grow other crops. 
l At the same time harsh penalties 
against drug overlords and merchants were ruthlessly enforced 
by a government that had no economic or political obligations 
to those engaged in the trade.? Not only was Shanghai 
cleaned up and its Western business interests forced out, but 
its corruption was also eradicated. According to one high 
ranking Hong Kong customs official, since 1949 there have been 
no seizures of opium coming from mainland China. 3 Despite 
such testimony, the defeat of the KMT and America's natural 
hostility toward revolutionary regimes led the two to portray 
China during the period of cold war as the centre of the 
international narcotics traffick which earned Peking the much- 
needed foreign exchange. 
4 
1. For a detailed account of how the campaign worked in one 
area of China, see Alan Winnington, The Slaves of the Cool 
Mountains: The Ancient Social Conditions and Changes now in 
Progress on the Remote Southwestern Borders o China, London, 
1959. 
2. This is the crucial difference. In some capitalist 
countries the enforcement of the drug law often becomes a mere 
exercise in public relations because some law enforcers and 
their political masters (as in the U. S. and Sicily are often 
recipients of payoffs from drug dealers, or are themselves 
active participants (as in Southeast Asian countries) in the 
drug traffick; see W. J. Chambliss, On the Take, op. cit.: 
52-55,163-167; A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 5 -75; M. Pants eone, 
The Mafia and Politics, op. cit.: 184-185; F. Bresler, op. 
cit.: 70; F. Robertson., op. cit.: 119-120,123. 
3. Interview given by Mr. Graham Crookdake, Hong Kong, July 5, 
1971, cited in A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 383. 
4. A. J. McCoy, op. cit.: 145. 
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Cold War Opium Propaganda Against China 
The leading American advocate of this propaganda was the 
former director of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), 
Harry Anslinger, who joined with Taiwanese officials in 
vigorously denouncing the People's Republic as late as 1961. 
He claimed that one primary outlet for the Red Chinese 
traffick has been Hong Kong through which heroin made in China 
was smuggled to Malaya, Macao, the Philippines, the Hawaiian 
Islands, the United States, or to the other direction: India, 
Egypt, Africa, and Europe. 
' He further asserted that the 
'target area' in the U. S. was California which he claimed 
received more than forty percent of smuggled China's heroin 
and morphine plants. According to Anslinger, 'the syndicate 
crowd does not object to dealing with the Reds, as long as the 
profits are big in terms of dollars' .2 This may be probably 
true but it is equally doubtful whether the reverse could also 
be true. 
Despite the difficulty of visiting the Burma-China 
borderlands to observe the situation first hand, investigators 
have interviewed some leading opium operatives in the Shan 
States who asserted that there were absolutely no opium 
caravans crossing into the Shan States from China. 
3 
1. Harry J. Anslinger, The Murderers, New York, 1961: 230. 
2. ibid. 
3. A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 146-147. 
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A British film producer who travelled through the Shan States 
for five months during 1964-1965 reported in his television 
documentary that-the rebel leaders 'are certain that no 
Chinese convoys of opium come through their region. '1 
On the contrary, it was known that General Phao 
Sriyanonda, then the Director General of Thailand's para- 
military police, was heavily involved in the narcotics trade 
with the assistance of the U. S. CIA. 2 It was believed in 
many quarters that 'The CIA had promoted the Phao-KMT 
partnership in opium trade in order to provide a secure rear 
area for the KMT, but this alliance soon became a critical 
factor in the growth of Southeast Asia's narcotics 
traffick'. 3 The KMT soldiers sent to Burma, with the 
support of the CIA, to conduct border raids into China were 
known to have been heavily involved in narcotics trade in the 
1960s before a large number of them - over 4000 troops - were 
airlifted to Taiwan with the assistance of the U. S. State 
Department. As General Tuan Shih Wen who commanded the 
'Chinese Irregular Forces' (CIF) in the Burmese-Thai border 
admitted before a British journalist, the late Peter Duval, in 
an interview in 1966, 'Necessity knows no law. That is why 
1. Adrian Cowell, The Opium Trail (ATV, London, filmed 1964- 
1965) reel No. 1; Interview given by Cowell, London, March 9, 
1971. 
2. F. Bresler, op. cit.: 69, 
3. F. Bresler, op. cit. 
we deal with opium. We have to continue to fight the evil3of 
Communism, and to fight you must have an army, and any army 
must have guns, and to buy guns you must have money. In these 
mountains, the only money is opium'. 
1 
Many of these irregular forces in the Shan States were 
said to be employed by the CIA to patrol the Burma-China 
border or to cross into China on long-range intelligence 
patrols. 2 A CIA agent, William Young, who directed these 
operations from 1962 to 1967 from a secret base in North- 
western Laos has stated that he never discovered any evidence 
that opium was coming out of China. However, his intelligence 
teams learnt that the Chinese had transformed the patterns of 
hill tribe agriculture, and opium was no longer a major crop 
in Yunnan. 3 Most significantly, when Anslinger retired, the 
Bureau began to change its point of view and in an article in 
1970 it concluded that there had been two major postwar 
upheavals in the international opium trade, one of which was 
'the rapid suppression of China's illicit production' in the 
mid 1950s. 
4 Even such admission falls short of the truth. 
In the 1970s, however, many FBN agents were known to be openly 
bitter toward Anslinger for what they considered to have been 
the abuse of the Bureau's name for purposes of blatant, 
1. ibid: 70; A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 142-145. 
2. A. W. McCoy, op. cit. 
3. Interview given by William Young, Chiangmai, Thailand, 
September 8,1971, cited in McCoy, op. cit.: 147. 
4. The U. S. Bureau of Narcotics, op. cit. 
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inaccurate propaganda. 
' An FBN agent serving in Southeast 
Asia recalled in a mid 1971 interview: "Everytime Anslinger 
spoke anywhere he always said the same thing - 'The Chicoms 
are flooding the world with dope to corrupt the youth of 
America'... It was kind of like the 'Mlarijauna rots your 
brains' stuff the old FBN put out. It really destroyed our 
credibility and now nobody believes us. There was no evidence 
for Anslinger's accusations, but that never stopped him 
anyway. "2 What Anslinger and the Bureau were doing at the 
time was of course part of the U. S. foreign policy toward 
China - part of the cold war rhetorics. 
With the retirement of Anslinger, the propaganda was 
continued by Taiwan officials. In 1971, for instance, one of 
Taiwan's papers made the following allegation: 
Red China exported some US$800 million worth of 
narcotics last year. Plantings of poppies are 
said to be on the increase in Yunnan, whence raw 
opium moves into the free world via Laos, Burma, 
and Thailand... Formerly the mainland exported only 
opium. Recently soge 30 processing plants have 
been established... 
These allegations would usually name Burma or Hong Kong as the 
transit point for narcotics from the People's Republic, but 
1. A. W. McCoy, op. cit. 
2. ibid. 
3. Free China Weekly, February 14,1971. 
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British customs and police officals consulted in Hong Kong by 
investigators regarded the charges as ridiculous and 
completely unfounded. ' In the temper of the time Taiwan's 
persistent damning accusations against the People's Republic 
obviously went far beyond mere propaganda, and they were 
calculated to damage the Republic in the eyes of the 
international community. Mr. John Warner, chief of the FBN's 
Strategic Intelligence office in 1971 offered the following 
explanation: 
Recently we have been getting a number of Congressional 
inquiries about Chinese Communist involvement in the 
opium trade. The Taiwanese floated a series of non- 
attributable articles in the right wing press, quoting 
statements from British police officers in Hong Kong 
saying 'we have seized five tons of opiates in Hong Kong 
this year'. And the article would then state that this 
came from Red China. Actually it comes from Bangkok. 
The real object of this sudden mushrooming Rf this kind 
of propaganda is to bar China from the U. N. 
Most surprisingly, since Red China was admitted to the U. N. 
and Taiwan kicked out, and the U. S. eventually recognized 
China, Taiwan has learned to moderate its propaganda against 
the Republic. It cannot be seriously disputed that the drug 
traffick in China as well as other varieties of organized 
crime prior to 1949 would have continued today on the same 
pattern we find it in many of the Southeast Asian countries if 
there had been no socialist revolution in the country. The 
same argument can be made with equal force in the case of 
Cuba. 
1. See interview with Graham Crookdake previously cited. 
2. Interview given by John Warner, Washington, D. C., October 
14,1971, cited in A. W. McCoy, op. cit. 
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In view of the recent developments in China which 
capitalists societies hail as a progressive innovation, it is 
necessary to drop a caveat here as to what impact these develo- 
pments may have on organized crime in the future. Recently, 
the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping and his associates have begun 
to encourage what appears to be capitalist-type operations in 
the country: small individual business are being allowed to 
operate for profits and family businesses are being revived. 
Virtually every small restaurant, food stall, noodle shop, 
cake shop, barber shop or other personal service business has 
been privatized. 
1 It is argued that the aim of Deng's`revol- 
ution' is to 'build prperity and support modernization'. 
2 
In the pursuit of this goal, state enterprises are being 
reconstituted into companies and told they must make profits 
and pay taxes; foreign capital is being welcomed, and it is 
said that 'profit' is no longer considered a bad word. 
3 It is 
said that the government's new policy encourages the establis- 
hment of an open market for food produced by farmers working 
land on a household contract responsibity system to replace the 
old system of collectivization. Whereas in the past there was 
one price for goods set by the government, it is now said that 
there are three- the state price, the price set by enterprises, 
and that set by market forces. 
4 It is too early to assess the 
impact of these new developments in China. If the lure for 
profit elsewhere is any guide, it can be argued that sooner or 
later these developments would open up the Pandora's box of 
organized crime in China once again, as individuals and groups 
begin to compete with one another for profits. 
1: Gerald Utting, 'Family business revive a nation', The 
Toronto Star, January 19,1986: Al, A8. 
2. The Toronto Star, January 18,1986: A10. 
3. ibid. 
4. G. Utting, op. cit. 
337. 
Organized Crime in Cuba before the Revolution 
Before Castro came to power, Cuba was in all but name a 
'colony' of the United States. When all of Spain's American 
possessions, except Cuba and Puerto Rico, passed out of her 
control by 1821, the United States became practically 
sovereign on that continent and Cuba and, indeed, the whole 
Caribbean came to be claimed as an exclusive American 'sphere 
of interest'. 1 American domination of Cuba both politically 
and economically2 was even better illustrated by the Platt 
Amendment (drafted by Senator Orville H. Platt 1901) which was 
attached to the new Constitution of Cuba in June 1901 against 
Cuban objections. 3 It was only after it was adopted by Cuba 
that the American army of occupation was withdrawn and Cuba 
became formally 'independent'. The Amendment required Cuba to 
sell or lease lands to the U. S. for naval stations, limited 
Cuban's treaty-making powers and its capacity to contract 
debts, and gave the U. S. the right to intervene to preserve 
independence and to maintain law and order. 
4 
1. John Plank (ed. ), Cuba and the United States: Long Range 
Perspectives, Washington, D. C., 1967: 6-7. 
2. See generally, Leland H. Jenks, Our Cuban Colon :A Study 
in Sugar (Studies-in American imperialism), New Yor ; 
Robert Scheer and Maurice Zeitlin, Cuba: An American Tragedy, 
Harmondsworth, 1964; R. E. Bonachea and N. P. Valdes (eds. ), 
Cuba in Revolution, Garden City, New York, 1972. 
3. The Platt Amendment was really in the spirit of 'the Monroe 
Doctrine' enunciated by President James Monroe in 1823. It 
states that the U. S. would regard as an unfriendly act any 
attempt by a European nation to interfere in the affairs of 
the American countries or increase its possessions on the 
American continent. 
4. J. Plank, op. cit.: 12. 
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As a client nation, organized crime flourished in Cuba on 
the same scale as in New York or Chicago and it became not 
only a safe haven for Cuban and American gangsters but an 
ideal holiday spot for any 'respectable' American wishing to 
indulge in vices. - Under the corrupt regime of President 
Fulgencio Batista, American and Cuban 'mafia' operated a huge 
gambling empire in Havana which became the Las Vegas of the 
Caribbean. 2 Havana also became the prostitution, drug 
distribution, loansharking and bookmaking capital of the 
Caribbean. Organized crime was not only welcomedbut carefully 
cultivated in prerevolutionary Cuba, and Havana was probably 
the most important transit point for Charles Luciano's 
European heroin shipment to the U. S. 
3 The leaders of 
Luciano's heroin syndicate were believed to be at home in the 
Cuban capital, and regarded it as a 'safe' city to do 
business. 
On the other hand, Meyer Lansky who managed Luciano's 
financial empire in Havana after the latter was jailed in 
1936, was said to have played a key role in organizing 
Luciano's heroin syndicate: he supervised smuggling 
operations, negotiated with Corsican heroin manufacturers, and 
managed the collection and concealment of the enormous 
1. A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 55-56. 
2. Hank Messick, The Mobs and the Mafia: The Illustrated 
History of Organized Crime, London, N. Y., 1972: 5-, 71-7,77. 
3. A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 26. 
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profits. 
1 His control over the Caribbean, particularly 
Havana, and his relationship with the Florida-based 
Trafficante family were said to be of particular importance, 
since most of the heroin shipments passed through Cuba or 
Florida on their way to America's urban markets. 2 For 
almost twenty years the Luciano-Lansky-Trafficante troika was 
known to have remained a major feature of the international 
heroin3 traffick with Havana as one of the major conduits. 
Lansky was also reported to have owned most of Havana's 
casinos, 
4 and the Trafficante family to have served as 
Lansky's resident managers in the Cuban capital. Luciano's 
1947 visit to Cuba, following his release from prison in 1936 
and deportation to Italy, 
5 was believed to have laid the 
groundwork for Havana's subsequent role in international 
narcotics-smuggling traffick. As reported by Anslinger, 
'Luciano had developed a full-fledged plan which envisioned 
the Caribbean as his centre of operations... and Cuba was to 
be made the centre of all international narcotics 
operations'. However, presssure from the U. S. government 
6 
1. A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 25. 
2. ibid. 
3. ibid. 
4. F. Pearce, Crimes of the Powerful: Marxism, Crime and 
Deviance, London, 1976: 150. 
5. M. Pantaleone, o. cit.: 180; G. Servadio, Mafioso: A 
History of the Mafia from its origins to the Present Day, New 
York, 1976: 186. 
6. Harry J. Anslinger, The Murderers, op. cit.: 106. 
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finally resulted in the revocation of his residence visa and 
his return to Italy, but not, according to Messick, before he 
had received commitments from organized crime leaders in the 
U. S. to distribute the regular heroin shipments he promised 
them from Europe. ' 
The Caribbean on the whole, with Havana as the centre 
piece, was a happy place for American racketeers, as most 
governments were friendly to them and did not interfere with 
the 'business ventures' that brought some badly needed capital 
into their generally poor countries. 2 It should be noted, 
however, that organized crime had been well established in 
Havana long before Luciano's historic voyage. During the 
period of the U. S. Prohibition, underworld figures realized 
the potential of the island as a protectorate for their 
operations. Casinos were built in several parts of Havana 
with most of the establishments being in operation by 1956. 
The Havana Post described Cuba as bidding for the title of Las 
Vegas of Latin America. 3 Numerous government officials were 
said to be involved in the casino trade, providing protection 
in return for a share of the profits. 
4 
1. Hank Messick, Lansky, New York, 1971: 137. 
2. A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 26. 
3. Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom, New York, 1971: 
873. 
4. L. Salas, Social Control and Deviance in Cuba, New York, 
1979: 64. 
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Gambling in Cuba has a long and varied history, and an 
interesting feature of most of these forms of gambling is that 
they were institutionalized by the government in power. 
Cockfighting was one of the earliest forms of gambling 
introduced around 1740 by the Spanish Crown which established 
a monopoly over the game, with entrance fees being charged in 
accordance with the expertise of the animals being used. 1 
The lottery which was introduced in Cuba in 1912, with the 
Spanish Crown maintaining a monopoly over its operation, was 
said to be 'the only institution of government, popular in the 
entire island, sanctioned and accepted by all inhabitants'. 2 
It became a sort of 'national plague' which cut across all 
social barriers with some of the major bettors being 
corporations that purchased large blocks of tickets 
immediately after they were issued. 
3 As. the lottery grew it 
became one of the principal sources of revenue for the Spanish 
Crown; it also became a major source of corruption. 4 
Sellers' licences were awarded to political fuctionaries who 
collected their percentage of the bets without having to 
perform any services. The lottery, which provided money for 
public officials without their performing a service and 
depended on public officials for supervision, is said to be 
perhaps the single best example of the institutionalization of 
public power for private profits. 5 President Batista is 
1. ibid: 62- 
2. ibid: 63- 
3. ibid. 
4. ibid. 
5. Jorge I. Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1978: 37. 
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reported to have created schemes whereby govenment supporters 
and potential opponents would be paid from lottery 
proceeds. 
1 The manipulation of lottery revenue thus became 
a tool for the maintenance not only of office holders and the 
system itself, but a mechanism for social control. The 
lottery in effect created an alternative channel for the 
acquisition of status and wealth. 
2 
During the 1930s Meyer Lansky had already 'discovered' 
the Caribbean for northeastern syndicate bosses and invested 
their illegal profits in an assortment of lucrative gambling 
ventures. In 1933 he was reported to have moved into the 
Miami Beach area and taken over most of the illegal off-track 
betting and a variety of hotels and casinos. 
3 As a result 
of his financial success in Miami, Lansky then moved into 
Cuba where profits were even more impressive and where he also 
purchased the goodwill, friendship, and protection of Batista. 
Because Cuba was conducive for business and profits from 
gambling, drugs, and usury incredibly high, Lansky was said to 
have invested heavily in the casinos and in the heroin 
traffick from Turkey and France. 
4 By the beginning of 
1. ibid. 
2. L. Salas,. op. cit.: 64. 
3. Hank Messick, op. cit.: 87-88. 
4. W. J. Chambliss, On the Take, op. cit.: 154. 
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World War 11 he was reported to have owned the Hotel 
Nacional's casino as well as leasing the municipal racetrack 
from a reputable New York bank as a form of diversification. 
1 
By the early 1950s Santo Trafficante Sr., Lansky's lieutenant 
to whom Lansky had delegated much of the responsibility for 
the daily management of his Havana enterprises, had himself 
become such an important figure that he in turn delegated his 
Havana concession to Santo Trafficante. Jr., the most talented 
of his six sons. 
2 As his fathers financial representative, 
and ultimately Meyer Lansky's, Santo Jr. was reported to have 
controlled much of Havana's tourist industry and to have become 
quite close to the Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista. 
3 
His involvement in narcotics traffick in Havana was said 
to be only at the level of financing and crisis management, 
and his organization was reported to be so airtight, and he 
was so discreet, that federal narcotics agent considered him 
virtually untouchable. 
4 In 1957 when Albert Anastasia wanted 
to open a competing casino in Havana,. Trafficante invited him 
to a friendly meeting in New York. An hour after Trafficante 
checked out of his hotel, three gunmen murdered Anastasia in 
the hotel barbershop. 5 Organized crime in pre-Castro Cuba 
was indeed in no way different from what prevailed and still 
prevails in the U. S. today. 
1. A. W. McCoy, op. cit. 
2. Hank Messick, op. cit.: 89. 
3. Ed. Reid, The Grim Reapers, Chicago, 1969: 90-92. 
4. Senate Committee on Government Operations. Organized Crime 
and Illicit Traffick in Narcotics, 88th Congress, First and 
Second Sessions, 1964, Part 4: 928. 
5. ibid.: Part 2: 524-525; A. W. McCoy, op cit.: 55. 
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The Situation of Organized Crime in Cuba after 1960. 
Cuba, which was a lucrative paradise for American and 
Cuban organized criminals, underwent a thorough cleansing when 
Castro and his men came to power in January 1959 through a 
successful revolution. Once again history stood to repeat 
itself as in the case of China, with regards to the activities 
of organized criminals in the country. The tone of the new 
government left no doubt with the crime syndictes that there 
would be no place for them under the new Cuba. As one report 
noted: 
Rumours regarding the abolition of gambling circulated 
throughout the island during the first days of the new 
government. Substance was given to these reports as 
notorious U. S. Racketeers - those who had not yet 
escaped - were rounded up by rebel troops for 
questioning. 
The revolution which sent corrupt Batista and his friend 
Lansky packing into the United States also triggered a mass 
exodus of American and Cuban crime cabals into Miami. 
2 
Trafficante was reported to have written off his valuable 
Havana casino operations as a total loss, but this was 
partially compensated for by his expansion and control over 
the bolita lottery in Florida, a Cuban numbers game which 
became enormously lucrative when the refugees started pouring 
1. Hispanic American Report, volume 12, No. I, January 1959. 
2. Hank Messick, op. cit.: 5. 
0 
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into Florida in 1960.1 The new socialist government began 
by ridding the country of all forms of prostitution, loan- 
sharking, racketeering and above all, narcotics trafficking. 
It should be noted, however, that although the triumph of the 
revolution caused the immediate flight of the majority of the 
underworld figures from the island and barred most forms of 
gambling, cockfighting and casinos were allowed to continue in 
the first few months of the revolution. Observers believe 
that the reluctance to move against cockfighting during this 
period was due to the fact that this sport had a tradition 
that was ingrained in the history of the people, while in the 
case of the casinos, they not only served as a source of 
revenue to the new socialist government in the interim, they 
also served to keep some possible counterrevolutionaries from 
other temptations. 
2 In many ways, the delay bought time for 
the revolution to develop by rechanneling potential discontent 
into harmless actions. 
As late as 1960, over six million pesos were reported 
gambled in the four or five casinos that were still open. In 
October 1961, the nature of the new government had been 
defined, and Castro called for the abolition of casinos: 
But why are we going to collect the parasite's 
money on green felt if the Revolution, through 
its revenue system, can collect all of these 
1. A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 55-56. 
2. H. Thomas, Thomas, op. cit.: 344. 
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funds plus the parasites themselves. Then don't 
you think that the existence of these casinos is 
no longer c9mpatible with the Socialist 
Revolution. 
In 1968, Cuba's own Cultural Revolution took place in the form 
of the 'economic offensive' which saw the bars closed and all 
remaining small businesses nationalized. In this atmosphere 
of socialist puritanism, the existence of a state-run lottery 
became contradictory and it was formally abolished. It is 
believed that the abolition of gambling was one of the reasons 
for the offensive. 
2 
It should also be noted that since 1960 Cuba is no longer 
a factor in the international drug trade. Although Washington 
has always accused Havana of exporting revolution in Latin 
America, it has never been able to make such accusations in 
the case of narcotics. 
3 It is difficult to imagine this 
state of affairs coming about without a socialist revolution. 
Today, while the rest of the countries in the Caribbean and 
America (North and South) continue to battle with narcotics 
problems and other forms of organized crime, Cuba remains the 
only shining star in a continental sea of darkness, and it 
further testifies to our contention that organized crime is a 
phenomenon that is intimately linked to capitalist operation. 
1. Fidel Castro, Obra Revolucionaria 37, October 9,1961: 18, 
cited in L. Salas, op. cit. 
2. Waldo Medina, 'La loteria y ostros juegos de azar', Bohemia 
60, May 3,1968: 69, cited in L. Salas, op. cit. 
3. See, for example, Lester D. Langley (ed. ), The U. S., Cuba 
and The Cold War: American Failure or Communist Conspiracy., 
Lexington, Mass., 1970. 
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The heroin industry is a mainstay of the political 
economy of much of the capitalist world and it shall not be 
eliminated any more readily than the construction industries, 
banking, or the automobile. 
1 The accumulation of capital 
and profit has always been the driving force in the operation 
of capitalism. In an effort to make both capital and profit, 
capitalist entrepreneurs in the course of human history have 
engaged in morally reprehensible but enormously lucrative 
enterprises that eventually prove to be 'a bloody instruction 
that being taught, only returns to plague the inventor'. This 
was the case with slave trade2 and opium trade8 which were 
motivated by capital accumulation and profit motive. Although 
Turkish traders were the first people to introduce opium to 
the rest of the world in their search for exchangeable 
commodities with China and Southeast Asia, trade in opium, 
however, remained small and relatively inconsequential. A 
full-fledged market in opium was not introduced into South 
Asia until the emergence of capitalism and its attendant 
search for labour, profits, and market. 
4 It is believed 
that the profits. from opium trading were invested in the 
textile mills in Massachusetts and other New England states, 
following the introduction of the power loom in 1814, and 
1. A. Block and W. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 38. 
2. Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, Chapel Hill, N. 
Carolina, 1945, passim. 
3. D. E. Owen, op. cit. 
4. A. Block and W. J. Chambliss, op. cit.: 20' 
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that opium helped create a labour force for capitalist 
expansion in Asia and America, and that the profits from the 
opium provided the capital for the development of the factory 
1 
system in New England. 
It should be borne in mind that the opium business in 
Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the twentieth century simply 
fellows the pattern laid down by the West European capitalist 
nations and the United States in the last century in Asia. 
2 
These capitalist Asian countries realize, as we have pointed 
out before, that opium business is a lucrative source of 
revenue. Their anti-communist rhetorics and the American CIA's 
covert support for them to check communist insurgents enabled 
them for years to carry on this deadly trade with little 
international furor. It was not until 1960s and 1970s when 
American cities began to show an alarming number of heroin 
addicts and a large number of American soldiers in Vietnam 
were found to be heroin addicts did the U. S. government begin 
to take concrete steps to halt the opium production in 
Southeast Asia and elsewhere. 
3 Despite these belated efforts 
by the U. S., opium business will continue to play a significant 
role in the illicit sector of the economies of capitalist 
societies, especially in Southeast Asia. 
1. ibid.: 26. 
2. A. W. McCoy, op. cit.: 264-293,315-322. 
3. In the 1970s, American policy in Thailand changed dramati- 
cally from the cynical, CIA-mounted support for the drug - 
running ex- KMT Nationalist armies during the late 1960s. In 
June 1971, President Nixon told the Congress, 'Heroin, this 
deadly poison in the American lifestream, is a foreign export. 
No serious attack.... can ignore the international implications 
.... nor can domestic efforts succeed without attacking the 
problem on an international plane'; F. Bresler, op. cit.: 87-88. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined the pre- and 
post-revolutionary phases of China and Cuba with regards to 
the existence of organized crime in those countries. Before 
their socialist revolutions, the two countries were a safe 
haven for organized criminals; in the aftermath of the 
revolution, however, the basis of their operation was 
eliminated. In China the Triad syndicates were outlawed thus 
forcing their exodus from the country into Hong Kong and other 
southeast Asian countries; opium dens were closed down and 
officials in the countryside moved effectively to eliminate 
its cultivation and penalties against drug merchants were 
ruthlessly enforced. At the same time poppy growers were 
persuaded to produce other crops. In Cuba, as well, the new 
Castro regime closed down the casinos and took effective steps 
to rid the country of other forms of organized crime: 
prostitution, loan sharking, racketeering and, above-all, 
narcotics trafficking for which Cuba was the staging point 
into the U. S. The contrast represented by China and Cuba in 
their post-revolutionary historyl clearly indicatesan 
abundant and overwhelming evidence that organized crime is a 
phenomenon that is closely connected with the capitalist 
1. It can be argued that our findings in the case of China and 
Cuba could be extrapolated with equal justice to include other 
socialist countries with regards to the state of organized 
crime (when they were capitalist and in their current phase of 
socialism). 
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system of economy where it operates in the illicit sector, and 
where the profits from the illicit enterprise are shared by 
organized criminals and their 'respectable' protectors in the 
power structure, and which in turn help to cement the symbiotic 
relationship between the two and thus keep the phenomenon 
thriving on a permanent basis as servant of the power structure. 
Furthermore, the case of China and Cuba clearly under- 
lines two other important factors crucial for the existence and 
operations of organized crime: the willingness of a society to 
patronize its illicit goods and services, and the protection 
which it receives from those in authority which enables it to 
operate. While the absence of these factors in China and Cuba 
after their socialist revolution effectively spelled the demise 
of organized crime in those countries, their ever presence in 
the United States, Sicily, Canada, Hong Kong ias served to 
keep the phenomenon flourishing in those societies. Moreover, 
as our' examination of the crime networks would indicate, the 
people who run and control organizations that supply the vices 
in these societies are members of the business, political and 
law enforcement communities - not simply members of a criminal 
society. As the case of Seattle and 'Wincanton' in the U. S. 
makes clear, the gambling, prostitution, drug distribution, 
and loansharking that flourish in the lower class centres of 
those cities do so with the compliance, encouragement, and 
cooperation of the major political and law enforcement 
officials in the cities. It is known that there exists a 
symbiotic relationship between the law enforcement political 
organizations of the cities and a group of local, as distinct 
from national, men who control the distribution of vices. 
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Final Summary 
Generally speaking, this study also views organized crime, 
based on our findings, as essentially a form of struggle, and 
competition in the political economy for wealth and power which 
is the essence of private enterprise in capitalist societies 
where the conditions that promote this struggle constitute 
part of the social system, and where the profits from organized 
crime help raise the social status of the participants. As the 
examination of the capitalist and socialist societies would 
indicate, its flourishing in the former and its demise in the 
latter would clearly suggest that organized crime, like a 
particular kind of seed, can thrive only in societies where 
there are forces that can nurture and sustain its growth. 
Political and economic competition, intense horizontal 
conflicts between individuals and groups, a decentralized, 
free market economy, and alliance of racketeers and crooked 
businessmen which are closely tied to the operation of the 
capitalist system usually provide the right climate for the 
development and growth of organized crime in this system. 
1 
Whereas functionalists would argue that the activities of 
organized crime are functional, this view is only true to 
the extent that such activities invariably tend to benefit 
its masters in the power structure but detrimental to the 
workers who are exploited in the process. Like the system itself 
in which it thrives, organized crime represents a perfectly 
1. A. R. Lindesmith, 'Organized Crime', Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 217,1941: 119-127; 
P. Arlacchi, 'The Mafioso, Fromman of Honour to Entrepreneur' 
New Left Review, 118,1979. 
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rational kind of economic acti_vity, 
l as well as a consensual 
crime which supplies the illicit goods and services desired by 
a large minority of the consuming public. 
2 The philosophy 
and values, as Lindesmith has observed, which inform the 
growth of organized crime are also those that underpin the 
capitalist system. 
3 
Organized crime usually mirrors the tension, insecurity, 
and inequality in capitalist societies. The tension between 
the landlords and peasants over the ownership of land in which 
the Mafia was used to suppress the latter and keep them in 
their place, the use of organized crime by successive ethnic 
groups in America to get their share of the country's wealth, 
the activities of the syndicates in Canada and the Triads in 
Hong Kong, all illustrate the nature of this tension and 
struggle. As a result of some countervailing factors in some 
advanced capitalist societies, not all of them appear to 
generate organized crime to the same degree. This would 
account for the difference between the U. S. and West European 
societies, Italy being an exception, with regards to the 
existence of organized crime. These countries appear to have 
more fully developed welfare policies, such as medical care, 
1. W. J. Chambliss and M. Mankoff (eds. ) Whose Law What Order? 
op. cit.: 201; N.. Morris and G. Hawkins, The Honest 
Politician's Guide to Crime Control, Chicago, 1969, 
2. Ramsey Clark, Crime in America, New York, 1970: 68; D. R 
Cressey, Theft o The Na" New York, 1969. 
3. A. R. Lindesmith, op. cit.: 120. 
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better unemployment benefits which often prevent people from 
reaching the level of dehumanization possible in the United 
States. 1 These welfare policies contrast with the situation 
in the U. S. where laissez-faire ideology, puritan individua- 
lism, and ethnic and racial pluralism have inhibited the 
growth of community responsibility for the disadvantaged. 
2 
In addition, these European societies have more radical 
working-class traditions, a much higher degree of class 
consciousness, stronger labour movements, often with 
Socialist or Communist leadership, than the U. S. 3 As the 
decline in: the mafia power was largely due to the rise of 
Left-wing organizations in Sicily, 
4 
a similar decline in the 
power of the American syndicates would have been a distinct 
possibility long ago if there had been similar, strong 
Left-wing organizations in that country. The U. S. is 
virtually the only advanced capitalist society in the world 
which does not have a powerful Labour, Socialist, or 
Communist party representing the working class, 
5 
and which 
could bring about a better redistribution of wealth and 
social amenities. 
1. W. J. Chambliss and M. Mankoff, op. cit.: 191. 
2. D. Wedderbum 'Facts and Theories of the Welfare State', in 
M. Mankoff (ed. 5, The Poverty of Progress: The Political 
Economy of American Socia Probems, New York, 1972: 19 0-206. 
3. W. J. Chambliss and M. Mankoff, op. cit.: 192; fQz- the 
American worker's lack of class consciousness, see C. M. Regmus 
and D. B. McLaughlin (eds), Labour and American Politics, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, 1967: 4. 
4. E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms 
of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Manchester, 
1959: 44-4 . 
5. W. J. Chambliss and M. Mankoff, op. cit. 
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Furthermore, the easy collusion and symbiotic 
accommodation between the syndicates on the one hand and 
politicians, police and union leaders on the other which are a 
permanent feature of organized crime in the United States are 
not so readily evident in the west European capitalist 
societies, with the exception of Italy. In the absence of 
this working relationship in which organized crime plays the 
role of a servant, neither the mafia nor the Triad and 
American syndicates can exist let alone exercise any influence 
in their respective societies on a permanent basis. Thus it 
can be argued that organized crime cannot exist without the 
collaboration and collusion of the established power 
structure. The nature of organized crime in the societies we 
have investigated should be distinguished from the general 
corruption by individuals which takes place in every society, 
whether socialist or capitalist. Such an act usually has 
neither police nor political protection and is quickly brought 
to an end as soon as the culprit is discovered and punished. 
The type of the phenomenon we have investigated has both 
management and coordination; has almost an institutional 
character extending over decades or even centuries; is 
protected from the law through collusion and accommodation 
with the established authorities, and it constitutes part of 
the operation of the political economy. The protective shield 
which organized crime has enjoyed at the hands of the 
established power structure in capitalist societies has 
enabled it to survive a series of committee and commissions of 
enquiry investigating its activities. It is in this regard 
355. 
that some writers speak of the phenomenon in terms of its 
permanency of form, its invisibility', its 'eternal life', 
and 'institutional longevity extending far beyond the natural 
life span of its more mortal leadership'. 
As a human activity which is underpinned by man's 
competition and greed for wealth and power, it can be argued 
that organized crime does not possess any of these attributes 
which some writers ascribe to it. Rather the appearance of 
these characteristies of organized crime should be attributed 
to the long and unbroken chain of support, collusion and 
alliance which successive generations of politicians, law 
enforcers, labour leaders and businessmen in capitalist 
societies have maintained with organized crime operatives 
with whom they share the profits of their enterprises in 
return for protection. As the case of China and Cuba would 
indicate, whenever and wherever this alliance is broken or 
removed organized crime would cease to exist. More 
importantly, the operation of the capitalist system itself 
which encourages human greed, unbridled competition, and 
conspicuous consumptions usually plays into the hands of 
this alliance. 
In the nature of the phenomenon, any public policy 
designed to eliminate/control organized crime which does 
not address itself first to this symbiotic relationship 
is not likely to succeed. This has been demonstrated by the 
failure of the recommendations of the anti-mafia commissions 
in Italy and similar those recommendation of the crime 
committees in the U. S. and Hong Kong. In the final analysis, 
the complete elimination of organized crime will of necessity 
require a radical rearrangement and transformation, as it has 
been done in China and Cuba, of the political and economic 
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